

# **One Reason Countries Pay their Debts: Renegotiation and International Trade**

Andrew K. Rose\*

Draft: December 3, 2003

## **Abstract**

This paper estimates the effect of sovereign debt renegotiation on international trade. Sovereigns may fear negative trade consequences from default for a number of reasons; creditors may want to deter default by debtors, or trade finance may dry up after default. To estimate the effect of default on trade, I use an empirical gravity model of bilateral trade and a large panel data set covering fifty years and over 200 trading partners. The model controls for a host of factors that influence bilateral trade flows, including income and the incidence of IMF programs. Using the dates of sovereign debt renegotiations conducted through the Paris Club as a proxy measure for sovereign default, I find that renegotiation is associated with an economically and statistically significant decline in bilateral trade between a debtor and its creditors. The decline in bilateral trade is approximately eight percent a year and persists for around fifteen years.

**Keywords :** empirical, sovereign, default, bilateral, panel, gravity, Paris, club, rescheduling.

**JEL Classification Number:** F10, F34

**Contact:** Andrew K. Rose, Haas School of Business,  
University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720-1900  
Tel: (510) 642-6609  
Fax: (510) 642-4700  
E-mail: [arose@haas.berkeley.edu](mailto:arose@haas.berkeley.edu)  
URL: <http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/arose>

\* B.T. Rocca Jr. Professor of International Business, Economic Analysis and Policy Group, Haas School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, NBER Research Associate, and CEPR Research Fellow. I thank: Mark Aguiar, Joshua Aizenman, Yin-Wong Cheung, Alan Drazen, Mike Dooley, Julian di Giovanni, Jonathan Eaton, Barry Eichengreen, Rob Feenstra, Jeff Frankel, Stefan Gerlach, Ann Harrison, Michael Hutchison, Ken Kletzer, Maury Obstfeld, Peter Pedroni, Ken Rogoff, Mark Spiegel, Phil Suttle, seminar participants at Berkeley, the City University of Hong Kong, the European University Institute, FRBNY, FRBSF, NBER Summer Institute, UCSC, and the University of Colorado at Boulder, and two anonymous referees for comments, and the EUI, the FRBNY, the HKIMR, the IMF, and the Tel Aviv economics department for hospitality while I worked on this paper. I owe special thanks to Eddie Dekel and Ben Hermalin, who helped write much of the game-theoretic sub-section. For assistance with the data, I thank Eduardo Borensztein, Malvina Pollock, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer. The data set (the part used for the benchmark estimates), Paris Club renegotiation details, key output and a current version of the paper are available at my website. A shorter version of this paper is freely available at my website.

## **I: Introduction**

Why do countries pay their international debts? Three reasons are typically proposed. First, countries that renege on their debts may have their overseas assets seized by foreign creditors. Second, countries with poor repayment reputations may be cut off from capital flows in the future. Third, delinquent countries may suffer reduced benefits of international trade. While all three penalties are of interest, this paper is concerned with the last explanation. The first sanction is of limited potency for net debtors with little foreign collateral. A number of economists (most visibly Bulow and Rogoff) have disputed the importance of future exclusion from capital markets. The third explanation is widely accepted, but has never been quantified. The objective of this paper is to estimate empirically the effect of sovereign debt renegotiations on international trade.

There are a number of reasons why international default may reduce trade in principle. First and most plausibly, trade credit may naturally shrink after default. Alternatively, creditors may wish to punish default with reduced trade benefits, in order to discourage future default, or default by third parties. While these theories are of interest, the focus in this paper is wholly empirical in nature. It turns out that, for whatever reason, it is logical for sovereigns to fear default since in practice, default is strongly associated with reduced trade. I demonstrate this by using a large panel data set covering over 200 trading partners over fifty years of data to estimate a “gravity” model of trade. I show that debt renegotiation is associated with a decline in bilateral trade that is both economically and statistically significant, adding up to a year’s worth of trade, although the effect is spread over fifteen years.

The next section presents an intuitive and institutional framework to understand the relationship between sovereign default and international trade, focusing on debt renegotiations at

the Paris Club. Next, the empirical methodology and data set are discussed. The actual empirical results are presented in the fifth section, which includes sensitivity analysis. The paper finishes with some suggestions for future work and a brief conclusion.

## **II: Why Might Sovereign Default Affect Trade?**

There is a large literature on the issue of sovereign default; Eaton and Fernandez (1995) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, chapter 6) provide recent surveys.<sup>1</sup> However, little of it has been explicitly concerned with the interaction between default and trade. In this section, I provide a mostly institutional description of debt rescheduling through the Paris Club. A theoretical framework for the empirical analysis that follows is relegated to an appendix.

From a theoretical perspective, there are many reasons why sovereign default could affect trade. A theoretically interesting reason is that a creditor may want to discourage further default (either by the debtor in the future or by other debtors), with a punishing decline in trade. A more banal (but probably more realistic) reason is that default may naturally result in a drying up of short-term trade credit, the vehicle used to finance most international trade. In practice, it is difficult and, for my purposes, unimportant, to differentiate between these explanations (and others), so long as sovereigns fear the trade effects of debt renegotiation. These ideas are explored in more detail in an appendix.

### **Sovereign Debt Renegotiation in Practice**

In practice, it is rare for a country simply to default on (let alone repudiate) its international financial obligations. Instead, it typically renegotiates its debts, usually through the “Paris Club.” In this section, I provide a brief overview of the debt renegotiation process. More

information on the Paris Club is provided by Sevigny (1990), Eichengreen and Portes (1995), and the website of the Paris Club.<sup>2</sup>

The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors that meets approximately ten times a year to discuss issues associated with external debts of developing countries, and renegotiate these debts.<sup>3</sup> The Paris Club began with the 1956 renegotiation of Argentina's external debt, and has since reached over 335 agreements with over 75 debtor countries; these collectively total over \$375 billion. The French Treasury provides a small secretariat for the club.

The Paris Club is informal and has no legal basis or status; instead it adheres to a set of principles. Three of the key principles are particularly germane. First, all decisions by creditors are taken by consensus, ensuring "creditor solidarity." Second, the Paris Club preserves "comparability of treatment" between all creditors. In particular, it is expected that Paris Club members, non-members, and private creditors (notably banks) be treated comparably by the debtor country, to ensure equitable burden sharing. The only exceptions are the international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank that are treated as preferred, though they are often expected to provide new money. Third, the Paris Club prefers that deals be negotiated only for countries that are engaged in an IMF-approved program, complete with appropriate conditionality.

The relationship with the IMF is important. An IMF program is a litmus test for "imminent default," and thus ensures that renegotiation is warranted. More importantly, an IMF program is a means to implementing the reforms required to resolve the underlying payments difficulties. Thus an IMF program usually precedes a Paris Club deal. But the dance is complicated, since the IMF typically agrees to a program only with the implicit assurance from

the Paris Club that temporary debt relief from the creditors will be forthcoming, in order to ensure IMF repayment.<sup>4</sup>

Paris Club agreements apply to public sector debt as well as private debt guaranteed by the public sector.<sup>5</sup> The debts considered are only those granted before a “cutoff date” which is not changed in subsequent negotiations; this division of debts is intended to help restoration of the flow of credit. It is important to note that only medium and long-term debts (which constitute over 80% of all developing country debt) are rescheduled.<sup>6</sup> To quote the Paris Club: “Short term debt (debt with a maturity of one year or less) is excluded from the treatments, as their restructuring can create a significant disruption of the capacity of the debtor country to participate in international trade.”<sup>7</sup> The overt attempt by the Paris Club to protect trade from default is an additional reason why determining the relationship between trade and default is essentially an empirical matter.

Paris Club membership is open to all creditor governments that accept its practices. However, while developing countries occasionally participate in the negotiations, the core members are large OECD countries.<sup>8</sup> In order to reduce the costs of renegotiation, only creditor countries with debts exceeding a small “de minimis” level negotiate (creditors sometimes participate as observers if their levels are lower than the de minimis level). Thus, participation varies with both the debtor and time. The Paris Club operates quickly in practice; negotiations begin soon after an IMF program begins and are typically concluded within six to eight months.<sup>9</sup>

The Paris Club provides four different types of renegotiation. “Classic terms” include: five years of grace; semi-annual principal repayment terms in years six to ten; and a moratorium interest rate which is designed to keep the net present value of the debt intact. Three sets of additional terms have been made available more recently; all involve a grant element that

reduces the net present value of the debt. “Toronto terms” were created in 1988 to facilitate debt reduction for very low-income countries. These were superseded in 1991 by “London terms” which were in turn replaced in 1994 by “Naples terms.” “Houston terms” were created in 1990 for low-middle income countries. In 1996 the HIPC initiative (for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) became available under “Lyon Terms” which were subsequently modified to “Cologne terms”. In this paper I use only “classic” Paris Club agreements, which account for the majority of all Paris Club deals. Since they do not involve any (intended) grant element, they are most appropriate in isolating any effects of debt renegotiations on trade. (It would be interesting to investigate Paris Club deals with a grant element, although the small sample size makes this a difficult endeavor at present).

Paris Club agreements seem to be the most appropriate dates for measuring sovereign default. Potential alternative dating schemes use either the onset of arrears of international payments (of interest, principal, or both), or the onset of sovereign defaults to private creditors measured by Standard and Poor’s. Both seem to be inferior measures. For instance, there were 283 Paris Club deals through 1997 (some of which were not “classic”), 163 spells of arrears, and only 82 spells of S&P defaults. The overlap is often low. While some of the arrears spells were clearly defaults, some defaults or arrears were officially or quietly encouraged (Dooley, 2000). Further, arrears were rarely absolute; partial debt service was routinely continued during periods of arrears and was usually comparable to (or higher than) the size of arrears. This makes it difficult to measure the nature and scope of default simply though using the presence of arrears. Further, arrears and defaults are multilateral concepts, whereas Paris Club information is available on a bilateral basis. For all these reasons, I use the dates of Paris Club deals to date

sovereign debt renegotiation, though I do use arrears and sovereign defaults as sensitivity checks.<sup>10</sup>

### III: Empirical Methodology and Data

#### Estimation Strategy

I use a conventional gravity model to model bilateral trade flows, augmented with a number of extra controls:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(X_{ijt}) = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(Y_i Y_j)_t + \beta_2 \ln(Y_i Y_j / \text{Pop}_i \text{Pop}_j)_t + \beta_3 \ln D_{ij} + \beta_4 \text{Lang}_{ij} + \beta_5 \text{Cont}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_6 \text{FTA}_{ijt} + \beta_7 \text{Landl}_{ij} + \beta_8 \text{Island}_{ij} + \beta_9 \ln(\text{Area}_i \text{Area}_j) + \beta_{10} \text{ComCol}_{ij} \\ & + \beta_{11} \text{CurCol}_{ijt} + \beta_{12} \text{Colony}_{ij} + \beta_{13} \text{ComNat}_{ij} + \beta_{14} \text{CU}_{ijt} \\ & + \beta_{15,0} \text{IMF}_{ijt} + \sum_K \beta_{15,k} \text{IMF}_{ijt-k} + \phi \text{RENEG}_{ijt} + \sum_M \phi_m \text{RENEG}_{ijt-m} + \varepsilon_{ijt} \end{aligned}$$

where  $i$  and  $j$  denotes countries,  $t$  denotes time, and the variables are defined as:

- $X_{ijt}$  denotes the average value of real bilateral trade between  $i$  and  $j$  at time  $t$ ,
- $Y$  is real GDP,
- $\text{Pop}$  is population,
- $D_{ij}$  is the distance between  $i$  and  $j$ ,
- $\text{Lang}$  is a binary variable which is unity if  $i$  and  $j$  have a common language,
- $\text{Cont}$  is a binary variable which is unity if  $i$  and  $j$  share a land border,
- $\text{FTA}$  is a binary variable which is unity if  $i$  and  $j$  belong to the same regional trade agreement,
- $\text{Landl}$  is the number of landlocked countries in the country-pair dyad (0, 1, or 2).

- Island is the number of island nations in the pair (0, 1, or 2),
- Area is the land mass of the country,
- ComCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j were ever colonies after 1945 with the same colonizer,
- CurCol is a binary variable which is unity if i and j are colonies at time t,
- Colony is a binary variable which is unity if i ever colonized j or *vice versa*,
- ComNat is a binary variable which is unity if i and j remained part of the same nation during the sample (e.g., France and Guadeloupe, or the UK and Bermuda),
- CU is a binary variable which is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t,
- IMF is one/two if one/both of i or/and j began an IMF program at t and zero otherwise,
- RENEG is a binary variable which is unity if i and j renegotiated international debt at time t and zero otherwise,
- K and M are unknown lag lengths,
- $\beta$  are a set of nuisance coefficients, and
- $\varepsilon$  represents the myriad other influences on bilateral trade, assumed to be well behaved.

The coefficients of interest to me are  $\{\phi\}$ , the effect of current and lagged debt renegotiations on trade.

I estimate the model with both fixed and random effects panel data estimators. The fixed-effects (“within”) estimator is equivalent to adding a comprehensive set of (11,178) country pair-specific intercepts to the estimating equation. Thus any time-invariant factor that is common to the pair of countries is automatically taken into account (e.g., distance). This ensures consistent estimation of  $\phi$  under a wide range of circumstances, but may not be efficient.<sup>11</sup> GLS/random-



effects (“variance components”) can be more efficient, but is well known to be consistent only in a more restricted set of circumstances.<sup>12</sup>

## **The Data Set**

The trade data used in this paper are taken from the “Direction of Trade” data set developed in CD-ROM form by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the same data set is used by Glick and Rose (2002). The data set covers bilateral trade between all 217 entities measured by the IMF between 1948 and 1997 (though many observations are missing). Not all of the trading partners are “countries” in the conventional sense of the word; colonies (e.g., Bermuda), territories (e.g., Guam), overseas departments (e.g., Guadeloupe), countries that gained their independence (e.g., Guinea-Bissau), and so forth are all included. I use the term “country” simply for convenience. The countries are listed in Appendix 1. Bilateral trade on FOB exports and CIF imports is recorded in American dollars; I deflate trade by the American CPI.<sup>13</sup> I create an average value of bilateral trade between a pair of countries by averaging all four trade flows available.<sup>14</sup>

To this data set, I add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the gravity model. Population and real GDP data (in constant dollars) are taken from three sources. Wherever possible, I use “World Development Indicators” (taken from the World Bank’s WDI 2000 CD-ROM) data. When the data are unavailable from the World Bank, I fill in missing observations with comparables from the Penn World Table Mark 5.6, and (when all else fails), from the IMF’s “International Financial Statistics”.<sup>15</sup> The series have been checked and corrected for errors.

I exploit the CIA's "World Factbook" for a number of country-specific variables. These include: latitude and longitude, land area (in square kilometers), landlocked and island status, physically contiguous neighbors, language, colonizers, and dates of independence.<sup>16</sup> I use these to create great-circle distance (in miles) and other controls. I obtain data from the World Trade Organization to create an indicator of regional trade agreements, and include: EEC/EC/EU; US-Israel FTA; NAFTA; CARICOM; PATCRA; ANZCERTA; and Mercosur.<sup>17</sup> Currency union pairs are taken from Glick and Rose (2002).

The Paris Club's website provides data on all agreements including: the date; the cutoff date; the type of treatment (Classic/Naples, etc.); the list of participating creditor and observer countries; the amount of debt treated; the current status of the agreement; and so forth. I use these data in order to construct my dummy variable for debt renegotiations, RENEQ, which is unity in the year when a pair of countries was involved with each other in a Paris Club deal, and zero otherwise. (Details on these renegotiations are available at my website).<sup>18</sup>

"Classic" Paris Club agreements are almost always conditioned on IMF programs; in my sample, over eighty percent of Paris Club agreements coincide with an IMF program signed in the same year.<sup>19</sup> However, not all IMF programs are associated with Paris Club agreements. Indeed, while there were 283 Paris Club deals through 1997 (of which 163 were "classic"), there were 898 IMF programs initiated during the same time. (Of these, over 80% (739) were "Stand-bys Arrangements," designed to address short-term payments imbalances.<sup>20</sup>) Since the implementation of an IMF program is often associated with economic trauma and/or reform, it is important to condition on the existence of an IMF program in determining the additional marginal effect of any debt renegotiations.<sup>21</sup> My variable,  $IMF_{ijt}$  is a dummy variable that is

unity if either country  $i$  or  $j$  *initiated* an IMF program (of any type) during year  $t$ . It takes on a value of two if both  $i$  and  $j$  begin an IMF program in the year, and zero otherwise.

Descriptive statistics for the variables are provided in Appendix 2, along with OLS coefficients from a simple regression of the log of trade on the contemporaneous regressors (and an unrecorded intercept); Appendix 3 tabulates simple bivariate correlations. It is interesting to note that the OLS coefficient for renegotiation is positive. Negative estimates (which are presented below) manifestly depend on a more sophisticated estimator that takes into account the panel nature of the data set. It is also worth noting that the simple correlation between Paris Club negotiations and trade is positive; any negative effect relies on conditioning and/or a more sophisticated estimator. Further, the incidence of bilateral Paris Club negotiations has only low correlations with the other (nuisance) variables. While the correlations are statistically significant given the sample size, none exceeds .1 in magnitude.<sup>22</sup>

#### **IV: Empirical Results**

##### **Benchmark Results**

Benchmark results are reported in Table 1. In the middle of the table, I tabulate fixed- and random-effects estimates for an empirical model with contemporaneous and fifteen lags of the dummy variable for debt renegotiation, five lags of IMF program inception (i.e.,  $K=5$ ,  $M=15$ ). The gaps in the fixed-effect columns reflect the fact that any time-invariant characteristic of the country-pair is wiped out by the pair-specific intercepts.

The model works well in a number of senses. The standard “gravity” effects are present; countries that are further apart geographically trade less, while larger and richer pairs of countries trade more. Countries that share a common currency, a common language, a common

border, or membership in a regional free trade agreement trade more. Landlocked countries and islands trade less, and most of the colonial effects are large and positive. Almost all these effects are economically and statistically significant. The model also explains a reasonable percentage of the data variation. The inception of IMF programs is associated with a drop in bilateral trade of about ten percent, holding other things equal. This effect is economically and statistically large, but transient. After around three years this effect dies away, and turns slightly positive after five years.

Above and beyond all these (mostly) conventional effects on bilateral trade, debt renegotiations seem to have a substantial negative effect on international trade. The effect is somewhat sensitive to the exact method of estimation; the fixed effects estimator indicates a decline of trade of about seven percent annually, while the GLS estimator shows a larger effect of nine percent. Both effects are highly persistent, lasting around fifteen years at more or less constant levels. While the individual  $\phi$  coefficients are often statistically insignificant because of multicollinearity, the hypothesis that debt renegotiations have no effect on trade can be rejected at any reasonable significance level. Further, the cumulative effect of renegotiations on trade is also large negative and significant. The effect averages about eight percent annually and persists for about fifteen years. The two middle columns of Table 1 show that these effects are not especially sensitive to the exact specification of the lag length; eliminating the lags of IMF program inception and dropping the last five renegotiation lags does not destroy the negative effect of debt renegotiation on trade. The two columns at the right demonstrate that the effect is smaller but still present without any lags at all.

### **Lag Length**

The appropriate number of lags of debt renegotiation ( $M$ ) is unknown. Does uncertainty about  $M$  affect any economic conclusions? No. Table 2 explores the effects of different lag lengths for the debt renegotiation variable. To simplify the analysis, I impose equality on the coefficients of lagged debt renegotiations. Thus in the left-hand columns of the top panel of Table 2, I tabulate the fixed- and random-effects estimates of  $\phi_k$  for  $k=1, \dots, 5$  where a single coefficient is estimated for lags of RENEQ between one and five. (Coefficients for the contemporaneous and 5 values of IMF program inception and the other nuisance coefficients are not reported.) In the next columns to the right, I add a tenth-order term to the fifth-order term.<sup>23</sup> At the extreme right of the table, I have four separate coefficients, representing lags up to twenty, up to fifteen, up to ten, and up to five years after debt renegotiations. The top panel includes five lags of IMF program inception as well as the contemporaneous impact, while the middle panel reports the analogous statistics when IMF program inception is modeled as only having a contemporaneous effect.

The results indicate that debt renegotiations have a persistent effect, one that seems to last about fifteen years. This result does not depend very strongly on which estimation method is used, or whether lags of the IMF variable are included. The bottom panel of Table 2 confirms this. It reports probability values for the hypothesis  $\phi_m=0$  for values of  $m>M$ , where  $M=5, 10, 15$ . As  $M$  rises to 15, the hypothesis that an additional five lags are not required becomes reasonable with the within estimator (though it is more marginal with GLS). Including fifteen lags of debt renegotiation and five of the IMF variable seems both intuitively and statistically reasonable. Still, it is inappropriate to place much confidence in the exact lag length, given that: a) many debt renegotiations have only taken place in the last fifteen years, and b) the lags seem quite long.

In passing, I note that adding one or two *leads* of Paris Club renegotiation has no effect on the economic or statistical significance of debt renegotiation; the leads themselves are insignificant. This provides further evidence that the Paris Club dates are appropriate dates for debt renegotiation.

### **Censoring, Simultaneity and Sensitivity Analysis**

Trade is bounded below by zero, so a technique that takes this constraint into account may be preferable to my default estimators, which are both linear. Thus Table 3 presents a random-effects panel Tobit estimator.<sup>24</sup> Reassuringly, the results are quite similar to those of Table 1 (though they are considerably more computationally demanding).<sup>25</sup>

Debt renegotiation may be caused by shocks that also cause trade flows to shrink; that is, the estimation strategy may be biased because trade and debt renegotiation are simultaneously determined by some other factor that has been omitted from the statistical analysis. While theoretically plausible, there is no direct evidence indicating that this issue is important in practice. A long unsuccessful research program attempted to find variables systematically associated with sovereign default in order to create leading and contemporaneous indicators of default. Babel (1996) provides an annotated bibliography of the literature, while Eaton, Gersovitz and Stiglitz (1986) provide an earlier survey. Finally, it is worth repeating that my findings indicate that renegotiation causes trade to shrink relative to income; shocks that cause both income and trade to fall proportionately would not explain my results.

Still, there is no reason in principle not to analyze regressors that are potentially associated with sovereign default. I proceed by using potential causes of default as instrumental variables in the trade equation. Table 3 uses three instrumental variables: 1) the government

budget surplus/deficit (expressed as a percentage of GDP); 2) the CPI inflation rate; and 3) the current account surplus/deficit (percentage of GDP). In each case I use values (for both  $i$  and  $j$ ) of these instrumental variables for contemporaneous debt renegotiation and the onset of IMF programs.<sup>26</sup> All the regressors were taken from the World Bank's *WDI* 2000 CD-ROM.

Reassuringly, both fixed- and random-effects indicate that simultaneity bias is not responsible for the negative effect of renegotiation on trade; both the joint and the cumulatively negative effects remain significant. Nevertheless, the IV estimates are obtained only with a dramatic reduction in observations since the macroeconomic instrumental variables are missing for many of the original observations.<sup>27</sup> Further, the instrumental variables are poor in the sense that they deliver imprecise estimates; while  $\beta_m \phi_m$  and  $\Sigma_m \phi_m$  remain negative and significant, the standard errors are much larger.

More sensitivity analysis is presented in Table 4. The top panel (Table 4a) performs a variety of sensitivity experiments with respect to the sample. It reports probability-values for a key hypothesis, namely  $\beta_m \phi_m = 0 \forall m$ , as well as the point estimate of  $\Sigma_m \phi_m$ , along with an appropriate standard error. The statistics are reported for both fixed- and random-effects estimators for four different samples: 1) the default entire sample; 2) the sample without the 1990s; 3) the sample without African observations; and 4) the sample without Latin-American observations. All the evidence indicates that debt renegotiation has a statistically significant effect on trade, and that the cumulative effect is negative. For one of the perturbations (when the fixed effects estimator is used without the 1990s), the cumulative effect is negative but with a  $t$ -statistic of unity.<sup>28</sup>

The second panel of Table 4 replaces the dates of Paris Club deals (and their lags) with two other measures of default. The first measure is simply the presence of arrears. The question

is whether (either interest or principal) arrears in either country has a negative effect of trade, holding other factors constant. I use arrears data from the *Global Development Finance 2001* CD-ROM, which provide series for 137 developing countries from 1970 through 1997. The sample is thus considerably smaller than that of my benchmark results, since there are no early observations, nor are there observations for rich or small countries. Still, the results at the left of Table 4b show that the presence of arrears seems to dampen trade considerably. The fixed effects estimate is eight percent, while the effect is over twenty percent with GLS.

The second measure I use in Table 4b is the log of the product of *Institutional Investor* country ratings. These are available for 118 countries from 1979 through 1997 (though some variables are missing), so that the sample is again much smaller. The country ratings are derived from surveys of leading banks who are asked to rank each country's creditworthiness on a scale from 0 to 100 (best); Haque, Mathieson, and Mark (1997) provide more detail. Since it is unclear exactly what is being measured, or how the banks are measuring it, it is important not to over-interpret these data. Still, it seems interesting to ask if higher creditworthiness is associated increased trade. The results at the right of Table 4b show that higher country ratings are indeed associated with much higher trade, and thus reduced creditworthiness is associated with less trade.

Finally, in Table 4c I use sovereign defaults as measured by Standard and Poor's. In particular, I examine the onset of defaults of foreign currency debt in the form of bonds and bank loans.<sup>29</sup> I examine both rated sovereigns and unrated issuers, and test the hypothesis that any default affects trade between the defaulter and all permanent members of the Paris Club. Table 4c uses the same specification and techniques of Table 1, but substituting the onset of S&P default dates for Paris Club dates. The results are quite similar in economic and statistical



significance to those of Table 1; after default, trade falls by a large magnitude for an extended period of time.

To summarize: the finding that debt renegotiation seems to affect trade adversely seems robust to uncertainty with respect to lag lengths, censoring, simultaneity, the exact sample, and using arrears, *Institutional Investor* country ratings, or S&P defaults instead of Paris Club dates.

### **Trade Diversion**

There seems to be evidence that countries that default engage in less bilateral trade with their creditors for a number of years after renegotiation. The costs of this reduced trade to the debtor may be alleviated if trade is merely diverted from creditor countries to others. Thus it is important to test for trade diversion after debt renegotiation.

I test for trade diversion by adding to the default equation, contemporaneous and lagged values of a dummy variable that is unity if (at least) one of the countries rescheduled its debt but the pair of countries was not directly involved in a renegotiation. For instance, Albania rescheduled debt with Austria in 1993, but not with Australia (since Australia is a permanent member of the Paris Club, this implies that its Albanian assets did not exceed the de minimis level). My variable “RENEG” is one for Albania-Austria in 1993, but zero for Albania-Australia; my variable “DIVERT” is exactly the opposite. A positive coefficient for DIVERT indicates that (e.g., Albanian) trade is diverted away from creditors (e.g., Austria) towards non-creditors (e.g., Australia).

Table 5 adds contemporaneous and lagged values of DIVERT. Independent of how many lags of DIVERT are included, its contemporaneous value has a significantly negative coefficient. Thus the trade of a debtor not only falls with its creditors at the time of

renegotiation, it falls with other countries (and thus the world) as well.<sup>30</sup> But it is interesting to note that this negative effect is much less persistent than that of RENEG. It turns positive within a couple of years using the fixed-effects estimator, and within five years using the random-effects estimator. The exact results are sensitive to both the estimator and the number of lags used, so that it is not possible to conclude with any confidence whether or not there has been any trade diversion.<sup>31</sup> But it is clear that trade between debtors and non-creditors is not as dramatically affected by renegotiation as trade between debtors and creditors.<sup>32</sup> This pushes one towards the hypothesis that creditor countries are seeking to punish default, since trade credit might be expected to dry up uniformly.

### **Differential Effects on Exports and Imports**

Thus far the analysis has focused on total bilateral trade between a pair of countries, rather than on exports and imports separately. But there is no reason why default need have the same effect on a defaulting country's exports and imports. I explore this possibility further in Table 6.

Table 6 is based on estimation of bilateral export flows, rather than total bilateral trade flows. Instead of using a single dummy variable to indicate a Paris Club deal that involved the pair of countries (and fifteen of its lags), I include two variables (and their lags); one for default by the exporting country, and another for default by the importer. The other nuisance variables are included, and results are, as usual, reported for both fixed- and random-effects estimators.

The results indicate that Paris Club renegotiation has similar effects on both exporting and importing countries. As is clear from the first two rows, the joint effect of the contemporaneous and (fifteen) lagged coefficients of renegotiation on exports is highly

statistically significant for both estimators, while the cumulative effect is economically and statistically large. The middle rows indicate that much the same effects characterize imports, though the cumulative effects are smaller. At the bottom, I test two hypotheses. The second line from the bottom is a test of the hypothesis that the joint effect on exports is equal to the joint effect of imports; that hypothesis cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. Still, the cumulative effect on exports is somewhat larger than the effect on imports, as is clear from the last line.

To summarize, the effects of default on exports seem somewhat higher than those on imports. Still, the most striking result is really that default has a substantive effect on trade.

### **Other Effects**

I have searched for other signs that debt renegotiation dampens international trade by examining other aspects of Paris Club deals. However, there seems to be only weak evidence that the dollar size of the Paris Club deal, the length of time since the last renegotiation, or the number of renegotiations has an impact on trade, once other factors have been taken into account.<sup>33,34</sup> I have also deflated trade by three different price deflators instead of the CPI, and added the dates of debt *reduction* packages to the “classic” Paris Club debt *renegotiation* dates, all without substantively altering my key results.<sup>35</sup>

### **V: Conclusion**

On June 15 1979, Togo renegotiated \$280 million in sovereign debt through the Paris Club, a package that was subsequently repaid in full. Yet Togo’s trade with the UK (one of Togo’s creditor’s in the Paris Club) fell from \$30.7 million in 1979 to \$5.5 million in 1994 (after

adjusting for inflation). Togo's trade with other key creditors such as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland also fell at rates exceeding ten percent during the same period. Similarly, other countries renegotiating their debts through the Paris Club (such as Peru in 1968 and Senegal in 1982) suffered large and persistent trade declines (with e.g., Finland and Denmark respectively). The question asked in this paper is: Has trade *typically* fallen after sovereign debt renegotiation, after other factors (such as income) are taken into account?

The answer is that trade typically *has* fallen after sovereign debt renegotiations. Paris Club deals are, on average associated with a decline in bilateral trade between debtors and creditors, holding other factors (such as income) constant. The reduction in trade is economically and statistically significant. While the results are somewhat sensitive to the exact specification, trade falls by about eight percent a year for around fifteen years, after taking other factors into account. That is, international default has significant negative consequences for trade. This result is robust to a number of econometric perturbations concerning lag length, treatment of simultaneity, censoring, sample size, and the exact measures of default and trade. There is weak evidence of trade diversion, and the exports of defaulters are hit somewhat harder than imports. Without denying the potential relevance of other reasons, it seems clear that one reason why sovereigns are reluctant to default on their external debts is that they fear the negative effects that debt renegotiation has for trade.

It would be interesting to extend this analysis to cover "London Club" negotiations between debtors and private sector banks. The primary obstacle to this lies in determining the default dates. London Club activity proceeds with a much longer lag than does the Paris Club, since the bank advisory committees require near or total unanimity from a more heterogeneous group than the Paris Club; Eichengreen and Portes (1995) provide more discussion.

I have not identified whether the effect of default on international trade appear because of a natural shrinking of trade finance, because creditors seek to punish and deter default, or some other reason. Providing direct evidence on the mechanism that links default and trade is a natural project for future research.

**Table 1: Debt Renegotiation and Trade**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Random</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Random</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Random</b>
<b>RENEG</b>	-06 (.04)	-08 (.04)	-05 (.04)	-06 (.04)	-07 (.03)	-09 (.03)
<b>RENEG: lag 1</b>	-07 (.04)	-09 (.04)	-07 (.04)	-09 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 2</b>	-06 (.04)	-08 (.04)	-07 (.04)	-08 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 3</b>	-06 (.04)	-07 (.04)	-06 (.04)	-08 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 4</b>	-03 (.04)	-04 (.04)	-03 (.04)	-04 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 5</b>	-04 (.04)	-05 (.04)	-02 (.04)	-04 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 6</b>	.00 (.04)	-02 (.04)	.00 (.04)	-02 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 7</b>	-04 (.04)	-07 (.04)	-04 (.04)	-07 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 8</b>	-06 (.04)	-09 (.04)	-07 (.04)	-11 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 9</b>	-06 (.04)	-09 (.04)	-09 (.04)	-13 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 10</b>	-07 (.04)	-10 (.05)	-11 (.04)	-16 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 11</b>	-12 (.05)	-16 (.05)				
<b>RENEG: lag 12</b>	-06 (.05)	-09 (.05)				
<b>RENEG: lag 13</b>	-10 (.06)	-13 (.06)				
<b>RENEG: lag 14</b>	-09 (.06)	-13 (.06)				
<b>RENEG: lag 15</b>	-09 (.07)	-12 (.07)				
<b>IMF</b>	-09 (.01)	-10 (.01)	-10 (.01)	-11 (.01)	-10 (.01)	-11 (.01)
<b>IMF: lag 1</b>	-02 (.01)	-03 (.01)				
<b>IMF: lag 2</b>	-01 (.01)	-02 (.01)				
<b>IMF: lag 3</b>	-01 (.01)	-02 (.01)				
<b>IMF: lag 4</b>	-00 (.01)	-01 (.01)				
<b>IMF: lag 5</b>	.03 (.01)	.01 (.01)				
<b>Log Distance</b>		-1.4 (.03)		-1.4 (.03)		-1.3 (.03)
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	.07 (.01)	.30 (.01)	.06 (.01)	.28 (.01)	.05 (.01)	.28 (.01)
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	.77 (.01)	.49 (.01)	.78 (.01)	.51 (.16)	.78 (.01)	.51 (.01)
<b>Language</b>		.19 (.06)		.18 (.06)		.18 (.06)
<b>Border</b>		.52 (.16)		.53 (.16)		.53 (.16)
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.68 (.04)	.65 (.04)	.68 (.04)	.65 (.04)	.69 (.04)	.66 (.04)
<b>Landlocked</b>		-.86 (.04)		-.86 (.04)		-.86 (.04)
<b>Island</b>		-.05 (.05)		-.06 (.05)		-.06 (.05)
<b>Log Area</b>		.24 (.01)		.25 (.01)		.25 (.01)
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>		-.26 (.08)		-.27 (.08)		-.27 (.08)
<b>Cur. Colony</b>	.37 (.09)	.44 (.09)	.37 (.09)	.43 (.09)	.37 (.09)	.44 (.09)
<b>Ex-Colonizer-Colony</b>		3.2 (.20)		3.2 (.20)		3.2 (.20)
<b>Same Country</b>		1.2 (.20)		1.3 (1.58)		1.3 (1.58)
<b>Currency Union</b>	.64 (.05)	.68 (.05)	.64 (.01)	.69 (.05)	.64 (.05)	.69 (.05)
<b>P(All RENEG=0)</b>	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000	.04	.01
<b>S RENEG</b>	-.99 (.13)	-1.4 (.13)	-.60 (.09)	-.88 (.09)		
<b>R<sup>2</sup> within</b>	.12	.12	.12	.12	.12	.12
<b>R<sup>2</sup> between</b>	.25	.53	.24	.53	.24	.52
<b>R<sup>2</sup> overall</b>	.25	.47	.24	.47	.23	.47

Intercepts not recorded. Standard errors in parentheses. 219,573 observations in 11,178 dyads.

**Table 2: Varying the Lag Structure of Renegotiation**

**Including 5 lags of IMF program**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>
MA(5) of RENEQ	-.11 (.02)	-.15 (.02)	.09 (.04)	.13 (.04)	.09 (.04)	.14 (.04)	.09 (.04)	.14 (.04)
MA(10) of RENEQ			-.23 (.03)	-.32 (.03)	-.01 (.05)	-.00 (.06)	-.01 (.05)	-.00 (.06)
MA(15) of RENEQ					-.24 (.05)	-.35 (.05)	-.22 (.11)	-.25 (.10)
MA(20) of RENEQ							-.02 (.09)	-.10 (.09)

**Without IMF lags**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>
MA(5) of RENEQ	-.12 (.02)	-.17 (.02)	.08 (.04)	.11 (.04)	.08 (.04)	.12 (.04)	.08 (.04)	.12 (.04)
MA(10) of RENEQ			-.23 (.04)	-.32 (.03)	-.01 (.05)	-.00 (.06)	-.22 (.10)	-.00 (.06)
MA(15) of RENEQ					-.24 (.05)	-.34 (.05)	-.02 (.09)	-.25 (.10)
MA(20) of RENEQ							-.02 (.09)	-.09 (.09)

**Are 5 Extra Lags Required?**

	<b>With 5 IMF lags</b>	<b>With 5 IMF lags</b>	<b>Without IMF lags</b>	<b>Without IMF lags</b>
	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>
Conditional on 5 lags	.0001	.0000	.0002	.0000
Conditional on 10 lags	.0002	.0000	.0002	.0000
Conditional on 15 lags	.1542	.0177	.1783	.0329

Probability value for hypothesis  $\phi_k=0$ .

Regressors not recorded include: Contemporaneous values of RENEQ and IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept.

Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads.

**Table 3: Estimator Sensitivity: Panel Tobit and Instrumental Variables Estimates**

	Random Effect Tobit	Fixed Effects, IV	Random Effects, IV
<b>RENEG</b>	-.08 (.04)	-2.26 (1.52)	-9.35 (2.29)
<b>RENEG: lag 1</b>	-.09 (.04)	-.24 (.06)	-.29 (.07)
<b>RENEG: lag 2</b>	-.08 (.04)	.14 (.21)	1.33 (.34)
<b>RENEG: lag 3</b>	-.08 (.04)	-.16 (.06)	-.28 (.07)
<b>RENEG: lag 4</b>	-.05 (.04)	-.07 (.05)	.15 (.08)
<b>RENEG: lag 5</b>	-.05 (.04)	-.11 (.06)	-.15 (.07)
<b>RENEG: lag 6</b>	-.03 (.04)	-.11 (.06)	-.27 (.08)
<b>RENEG: lag 7</b>	-.07 (.04)	-.27 (.16)	-1.02 (.23)
<b>RENEG: lag 8</b>	-.10 (.04)	-.33 (.19)	-1.24 (.27)
<b>RENEG: lag 9</b>	-.09 (.04)	-.15 (.07)	-.25 (.09)
<b>RENEG: lag 10</b>	-.11 (.05)	-.19 (.12)	-.60 (.16)
<b>RENEG: lag 11</b>	-.18 (.05)	-.29 (.19)	-1.24 (.27)
<b>RENEG: lag 12</b>	-.09 (.05)	-.25 (.17)	-.97 (.23)
<b>RENEG: lag 13</b>	-.13 (.06)	-.12 (.11)	-.50 (.14)
<b>RENEG: lag 14</b>	-.15 (.06)	-.14 (.11)	-.51 (.15)
<b>RENEG: lag 15</b>	-.14 (.07)	-.07 (.09)	-.13 (.12)
<b>IMF</b>	-.11 (.01)	.14 (.17)	-.39 (.25)
<b>IMF: lag 1</b>	-.03 (.01)	.03 (.03)	-.01 (.03)
<b>IMF: lag 2</b>	-.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.04 (.02)
<b>IMF: lag 3</b>	-.02 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.05 (.02)
<b>IMF: lag 4</b>	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	-.01 (.016)
<b>IMF: lag 5</b>	.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.01 (.02)
<b>Log Distance</b>	-1.47 (.02)		-1.46 (.04)
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	.39 (.005)	.27 (.04)	.80 (.02)
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	.43 (.01)	.75 (.06)	.42 (.04)
<b>Language</b>	.10 (.03)		.42 (.08)
<b>Border</b>	-1.57 (.05)		.09 (.24)
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.48 (.04)	.21 (.07)	.07 (.09)
<b>Landlocked</b>	-.76 (.02)		-.50 (.07)
<b>Island</b>	.24 (.02)		.06 (.07)
<b>Log Area</b>	.24 (.01)		.04 (.02)
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>	-.18 (.07)		.01 (.12)
<b>Cur. Colony</b>	.53 (.08)	-1.39 (.47)	-.86 (.63)
<b>Ex-Colonizer-Colony</b>	2.33 (.04)		2.40 (.25)
<b>Same Country</b>	2.72 (.19)		
<b>Currency Union</b>	.68 (.06)	.00 (.30)	.83 (.28)
<b>P(All RENEG=0)</b>	.0000	.0000	.0000
<b>S RENEG</b>	-1.54 (.12)	-4.61 (2.49)	-15.3 (3.5)
<b>R<sup>2</sup> within</b>		.02	.01
<b>R<sup>2</sup> between</b>		.52	.64
<b>R<sup>2</sup> overall</b>		.52	.56
<b>Observations</b>	219,573	59,481	59,481

Standard errors in parentheses. Instrumental variables: domestic and foreign CPI inflation rates, current accounts and budget surplus/deficit (latter expressed as percentage of GDP).



**Table 4a: Sample Sensitivity Analysis**

	<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>Random Effects/GLS</b>	<b>Random Effects/GLS</b>
	All RENEG=0	S RENEG	All RENEG=0	S RENEG
Default	.00	-.99 (.13)	.00	-1.43 (.13)
Without 1990s	.01	-.23 (.23)	.00	-.57 (.23)
Without Africa	.00	-.59 (.16)	.00	-.80 (.16)
Without Latins	.00	-1.00 (.14)	.00	-1.54 (.14)

Probability values for “All RENEG=0;” coefficient values and standard error for SRENEG.

Benchmark regression: Contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept.

Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads.

**Table 4b: Arrears and Institutional Investor Ratings**

	<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>Random Effects</b>	<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>Random Effects</b>
<b>Arrears</b>	-.08 (.02)	-.25 (.02)		
<b>Log Product II Ratings</b>			.86 (.03)	1.25 (.03)
<b>IMF</b>	-.09 (.01)	-.08 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)
<b>Log Distance</b>		-1.52 (.05)		-1.22 (.04)
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	.23 (.02)	.55 (.02)	.41 (.02)	.77 (.01)
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	.71 (.03)	.41 (.03)	.48 (.03)	.25 (.02)
<b>Language</b>		.23 (.10)		.53 (.07)
<b>Border</b>		.92 (.21)		.66 (.18)
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.43 (.19)	.75 (.17)	.27 (.07)	.23 (.07)
<b>Landlocked</b>		-.50 (.06)		-.56 (.05)
<b>Island</b>		.09 (.09)		-.10 (.06)
<b>Log Area</b>		.18 (.02)		-.01 (.01)
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>		.39 (.11)		.05 (.10)
<b>Ex-Colonizer-Colony</b>		.12 (.85)		1.45 (.21)
<b>Cur. Colony</b>			-1.77 (.79)	-1.23 (.73)
<b>Currency Union</b>	.31 (.13)	.33 (.12)	-.14 (.37)	.39 (.26)
<b>R<sup>2</sup> within</b>	.04	.04	.07	.06
<b>R<sup>2</sup> between</b>	.22	.49	.63	.74
<b>R<sup>2</sup> overall</b>	.19	.44	.59	.70
<b>Observations</b>	71,925	71,925	72,654	72,654

Intercepts not recorded. Standard errors in parentheses.

**Table 4c: Standard and Poor's Dates for onset of Foreign Bank/Bond Defaults**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Random</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>Random</b>
<b>RENEG</b>	-.07 (.03)	-.11 (.03)	-.05 (.03)	-.08 (.03)
<b>RENEG: lag 1</b>	-.13 (.03)	-.16 (.03)	-.11 (.03)	-.15 (.03)
<b>RENEG: lag 2</b>	-.16 (.03)	-.21 (.04)	-.16 (.03)	-.20 (.03)
<b>RENEG: lag 3</b>	-.14 (.04)	-.18 (.04)	-.14 (.03)	-.18 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 4</b>	-.16 (.04)	-.20 (.04)	-.17 (.04)	-.21 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 5</b>	-.14 (.04)	-.19 (.04)	-.14 (.04)	-.19 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 6</b>	-.13 (.04)	-.18 (.04)	-.13 (.04)	-.18 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 7</b>	-.12 (.04)	-.17 (.04)	-.13 (.04)	-.19 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 8</b>	-.15 (.04)	-.21 (.04)	-.18 (.04)	-.25 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 9</b>	-.13 (.04)	-.19 (.04)	-.15 (.04)	-.22 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 10</b>	-.14 (.04)	-.21 (.04)	-.15 (.04)	-.22 (.04)
<b>RENEG: lag 11</b>	-.17 (.04)	-.24 (.04)		
<b>RENEG: lag 12</b>	-.14 (.05)	-.21 (.05)		
<b>RENEG: lag 13</b>	-.14 (.05)	-.23 (.05)		
<b>RENEG: lag 14</b>	-.12 (.05)	-.21 (.05)		
<b>RENEG: lag 15</b>	-.07 (.06)	-.16 (.06)		
<b>IMF</b>	-.09 (.01)	-.10 (.01)	-.10 (.01)	-.11 (.01)
<b>IMF: lag 1</b>	-.03 (.01)	-.03 (.01)		
<b>IMF: lag 2</b>	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)		
<b>IMF: lag 3</b>	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.01)		
<b>IMF: lag 4</b>	-.00 (.01)	-.01 (.01)		
<b>IMF: lag 5</b>	.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)		
<b>Log Distance</b>		-1.35 (.03)		-1.35 (.03)
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	.08 (.01)	.32 (.01)	.07 (.01)	.30 (.01)
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	.76 (.01)	.49 (.01)	.77 (.01)	.51 (.01)
<b>Language</b>		.19 (.06)		.18 (.06)
<b>Border</b>		.52 (.16)		.52 (.16)
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.67 (.04)	.63 (.04)	.67 (.04)	.64 (.04)
<b>Landlocked</b>		-.85 (.04)		-.85 (.04)
<b>Island</b>		-.05 (.05)		-.05 (.05)
<b>Log Area</b>		.24 (.01)		.24 (.01)
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>		-.26 (.08)		-.27 (.08)
<b>Cur. Colony</b>	.36 (.09)	.43 (.09)	.36 (.09)	.43 (.09)
<b>Ex-Colonizer-Colony</b>		3.16 (.20)		3.18 (.20)
<b>Same Country</b>		1.21 (1.54)		1.23 (1.58)
<b>Currency Union</b>	.64 (.05)	.68 (.05)	.64 (.05)	.68 (.05)
<b>P(All RENEG=0)</b>	.0000	.0000	.0000	.0000
<b>S RENEG</b>	-2.13 (.16)	-3.07 (.16)	-1.51 (.12)	-2.06 (.12)
<b>R<sup>2</sup> within</b>	.12	.12	.12	.12
<b>R<sup>2</sup> between</b>	.26	.53	.25	.53
<b>R<sup>2</sup> overall</b>	.25	.48	.25	.47

Intercepts not recorded. Standard errors in parentheses. 219,573 observations in 11,178 dyads.

**Table 5: Estimating Trade Diversion**

**“DIVERT” is trade between non-rescheduler and rescheduler**

	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>	<b>Fixed</b>	<b>GLS</b>
<b>DIVERT</b>	-.16 (.01)	-.25 (.01)	-.16 (.01)	-.24 (.01)	-.16 (.01)	-.24 (.01)
<b>DIVERT: lag 1</b>			-.06 (.01)	-.13 (.01)	-.06 (.01)	-.14 (.01)
<b>DIVERT: lag 2</b>			.01 (.01)	-.05 (.01)	.00 (.01)	-.06 (.01)
<b>DIVERT: lag 3</b>			.03 (.01)	-.03 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.03 (.01)
<b>DIVERT: lag 4</b>			.05 (.02)	-.01 (.02)	.02 (.02)	-.02 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 5</b>			.08 (.02)	.02 (.02)	.05 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 6</b>					.09 (.02)	.05 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 7</b>					.08 (.02)	.03 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 8</b>					.04 (.02)	-.01 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 9</b>					.06 (.02)	.02 (.02)
<b>DIVERT: lag 10</b>					.07 (.02)	.01 (.02)
<b>DIVERT Lags=0</b>			.00	.00	.00	.00
<b>S DIVERT</b>			-.05 (.03)	-.43 (.03)	.21 (.04)	-.37 (.04)

Standard errors in parentheses.

Regressors not reported: contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept.

Number of observations = 219,573 in 11,178 dyads.

**Table 6: Exports and Imports**

<b>Hypothesis Tested</b>	<b>Fixed Effects</b>	<b>Random Effects/GLS</b>
P(Exporters RENEG=0)	.0000	.0000
S (Exporters RENEG), se	-1.29 (.14)	-1.76 (.14)
P(Importers RENEG=0)	.0000	.0000
S (Importers RENEG), se	-.83 (.13)	-1.30 (.13)
P(Exporters RENEG=Importers RENEG)	.63	.65
S(Exporters RENEG)- S(Importers RENEG), se	-.46 (.19)	-.46 (.19)

Bilateral real exports. Regressors not reported: contemporaneous and 15 lags of RENEG for both exporting and importing countries; contemporaneous and 5 lags of IMF; currency union; log distance; real GDP; real GDP per capita; common language; border; regional FTA; landlocked; island; log area; common colonizer; current colony; ex-colony; common country; and intercept.

Number of observations = 375,364 in 20,643 dyads.

## Appendix 1: Countries in Sample

Afghanistan	France	Netherlands	Vanuatu
Albania	French Guiana	Netherlands Antilles	Venezuela
Algeria	French Polynesia	New Caledonia	Vietnam
American Samoa	Gabon	New Zealand	Wake Islands
Angola	Gambia	Nicaragua	Wallis & Futuna
Anguilla	Georgia	Niger	West Bank/Gaza Strip
Antigua and Barbuda	Germany	Nigeria	Yemen Arab Rep.
Argentina	Ghana	Norway	Yemen, P.D.R.
Armenia	Gibraltar	Oman	Yemen, Republic of
Aruba	Greece	Pakistan	Yugoslavia, Fr (Serbia)
Australia	Greenland	Panama	Yugoslavia, Soc. Fed. Rep.
Austria	Grenada	Papua N.Guinea	Zambia
Azerbaijan	Guadeloupe	Paraguay	Zimbabwe
Bahamas	Guam	Peru	
Bahrain	Guatemala	Philippines	
Bangladesh	Guinea	Poland	
Barbados	Guinea-Bissau	Portugal	
Belarus	Guyana	Qatar	
Belgium	Haiti	Reunion	
Belize	Honduras	Romania	
Benin	Hong Kong	Russia	
Bermuda	Hungary	Rwanda	
Bhutan	Iceland	Samoa	
Bolivia	India	Sao Tome & Principe	
Bosnia & Herzegovina	Indonesia	Saudi Arabia	
Botswana	Iran	Senegal	
Brazil	Iraq	Seychelles	
Brunei Darussalam	Ireland	Sierra Leone	
Bulgaria	Israel	Singapore	
Burkina Faso	Italy	Slovak Republic	
Burma (Myanmar)	Jamaica	Slovenia	
Burundi	Japan	Solomon Islands	
Cambodia	Jordan	Somalia	
Cameroon	Kazakhstan	Somaliland, British	
Canada	Kenya	South Africa	
Cape Verde	Kiribati	Spain	
Cayman Islands	Korea, North	Spanish Sahara	
Central African Rep.	Korea, South (R)	Sri Lanka	
Chad	Kuwait	St. Helena	
Chile	Kyrgyz Republic	St. Kitts & Nevis	
China	Lao People's Dem. Rep.	St. Pierre & Miquelon	
Colombia	Latvia	St. Lucia	
Comoros	Lebanon	St. Vincent & Gren.	
Congo, Dem. Rep. (Zaire)	Lesotho	Sudan	
Congo, Rep. of	Liberia	Suriname	
Costa Rica	Libya	Swaziland	
Cote D'Ivoire	Lithuania	Sweden	
Croatia	Luxembourg	Switzerland	
Cuba	Macao	Syria	
Cyprus	Macedonia	Tajikistan	
Czech Republic	Madagascar	Tanzania	
Czechoslovakia	Malawi	Thailand	
Denmark	Malaysia	Timor	
Djibouti	Maldives	Togo	
Dominica	Mali	Tonga	
Dominican Rep.	Malta	Trinidad & Tobago	
Eastern Germany	Martinique	Tunisia	
Ecuador	Mauritania	Turkey	
Egypt	Mauritius	Turkmenistan	
El Salvador	Mexico	Tuvalu	
Equatorial Guinea	Moldova	U.S.S.R.	
Eritrea	Mongolia	Uganda	
Estonia	Montserrat	Ukraine	
Ethiopia	Morocco	United Arab Emirates	
Faeroe Islands	Mozambique	United Kingdom	
Falkland Islands	Namibia	United States	
Fiji	Nauru	Uruguay	
Finland	Nepal	Uzbekistan	

## Appendix 2: Descriptive Statistics

	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>OLS (se)</b>
<b>Log Trade</b>	14.6	3.35	-11.5	25.3	
<b>RENEG</b>	.01	.09	0	1	.56 (.05)
<b>IMF</b>	.29	.50	0	2	-.28 (.01)
<b>Log Distance</b>	8.17	.81	3.8	9.4	-1.14 (.01)
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	47.9	2.67	35.4	58.0	.86 (.003)
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	16.0	1.45	10.1	20.9	.39 (.004)
<b>Language</b>	.23	.42	0	1	.37 (.01)
<b>Border</b>	.03	.17	0	1	.42 (.03)
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.01	.11	0	1	.70 (.04)
<b>Landlocked</b>	.24	.46	0	2	-.39 (.01)
<b>Island</b>	.34	.54	0	2	.05 (.01)
<b>Log Area</b>	24.2	3.29	9.6	32.2	-.04 (.002)
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>	.10	.30	0	1	.20 (.02)
<b>Cur. Colony</b>	.00	.05	0	1	1.68 (.12)
<b>Ex-Colonizer-Colony</b>	.02	.14	0	1	1.48 (.04)
<b>Same Country</b>	.00	.02	0	1	-.79 (.29)
<b>Currency Union</b>	.01	.12	0	1	1.34 (.04)

219,573 observations.

### Appendix 3: Simple Correlations

	Trade	RENEG	IMF	CU	Dist.	GDP	GDP p/c	Lang.	Border	FTA	Land	Isl.	Area	Com. Col.	Cur. Col.	Ex-Col.
<b>RENEG</b>	.08															
<b>IMF</b>	-.09	.09														
<b>Currency Union</b>	.00	-.01	.00													
<b>Log Distance</b>	-.17	.01	-.00	-.18												
<b>Log Real GDP</b>	.67	.09	-.03	-.14	.18											
<b>Log GDP p/c</b>	.41	.05	-.19	-.13	.11	.38										
<b>Language</b>	-.01	-.01	.01	.19	-.13	-.18	-.05									
<b>Border</b>	.11	-.01	.02	.12	-.42	-.02	-.12	.12								
<b>Regional FTA</b>	.08	-.01	-.02	.08	-.25	-.06	.08	.10	.08							
<b>Landlocked</b>	-.15	-.01	-.01	.04	-.09	-.12	-.21	-.01	.08	-.05						
<b>Island</b>	-.17	-.03	-.08	.01	.15	-.30	.20	.10	-.11	.08	-.19					
<b>Log Area</b>	.27	.05	.07	-.01	.10	.57	-.22	-.11	.10	-.13	.04	-.51				
<b>Com. Colonizer</b>	-.16	-.03	-.00	.26	-.15	-.32	-.18	-.37	.06	.12	.02	.19	-.26			
<b>Cur. Colony</b>	.05	-.0	-.00	.15	.01	-.01	.01	.07	-.01	-.01	-.02	.01	-.03	-.02		
<b>Ex-Colony</b>	.15	.03	-.00	.08	-.02	.08	.06	.19	.03	.00	-.03	-.03	.01	-.05	.31	
<b>Same Country</b>	.02	-.00	-.01	.05	.00	-.00	.02	.03	-.00	-.00	-.01	.02	-.03	-.01	.39	.12

219,573 observations => standard error  $\approx$  .002.

## **Appendix 4: Restriction of Trade as an Inducement for Debt Repayment**

While the literature provides strong hints that restricted international trade can be used to encourage debt repayment, formal modeling is relatively rare.<sup>36</sup> It is not my intention to provide a full-fledged model of the interaction between sovereign default and trade. Rather, I provide two intuitive examples of how sovereign default might be punished by a reduction in international trade. The first example involves multiple debtors; the creditor restricts trade to punish the defaulter and thereby deter default by other countries. The second example involves only a single debtor; trade restrictions are used to deter future default.

### **Trade Restrictions to Deter Default by Other Debtors<sup>37</sup>**

Suppose there are  $N + 1$  countries, of which one is the creditor country and the other are borrowing countries. Trade between the creditor and debtor  $n$  generates surplus of  $2T(X_{nt})$  in period  $t$  if trade is unconstrained, where  $X_{nt}$  is the economic state of  $n$  at time  $t$ . For convenience, assume the surplus is evenly divided between the creditor and the debtor. Each period, the borrower must repay  $d$  to the creditor (i.e., service its debt). If  $d$  is not repaid, then the creditor can restrict trade, reducing the surplus per country to  $k_n T(X_{nt})$ , where  $0 < k_n < 1$ . The timing within a period is that debtors simultaneously decide to repay or not, then the creditor decides whether to take actions against delinquent debtors.

Assume that  $X_{nt}$  is randomly and, for convenience, independently determined each period from an interval that we normalize to be  $[0,1]$ . Let  $S(X)$  be the survival function (one minus the distribution function). Assume  $T$  is an increasing function and that  $T(0) = 0$ . Let  $\delta$  be the common discount factor. For convenience, assume all debtors are identical.

Consider the following strategies for the countries:



- Creditor: Provided it has maintained its reputation to punish, then, in the interactions with each debtor, set  $k_n = 1$  if repaid that period, otherwise set it to  $k_n = k^* < 1$  (i.e., punish). If it has failed to maintain its reputation, then set  $k_n = 1$  regardless of repayment.
- Debtor: If the creditor has always punished non-repayers or there has yet to be an instance of non-repayment, then repay if  $T - d > k^*T$  and default otherwise. If the creditor has ever failed to punish non-repayers, then default regardless of  $T$ .

If the creditor fails to punish, then the rest of the game is clearly subgame perfect: the creditor anticipates that it can not affect debtors' behavior, so there is no point to punishment, given that punishing also punishes the creditor. Without punishment, there is no motive to repay (and hence, no debt).

It is only required to verify that the strategies can be equilibrium strategies. If the debtor believes that the creditor will punish, then the strategy for the debtor is clearly rational. For the creditor, the question is whether to suffer the short-run cost of punishing to maintain its reputation. Let  $\pi$  denote that probability of repayment on the equilibrium path if the penalty is  $k^*$ ; that is,

$$\mathbf{p} = S \left[ T^{-1} \left( \frac{d}{1 - k^*} \right) \right].$$

Define  $E^* = d/1 - k^*$ . Then the expected net present value of maintaining a reputation is

$$V \equiv \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \mathbf{d}^t N \left( \mathbf{p} \left[ d - \int_{E^*}^1 T(E) dS(E | E \geq E^*) \right] - (1 - \mathbf{p}) \int_0^{E^*} k^* T(E) dS(E | E < E^*) \right)$$

(Recall that the density over  $E$  is  $-dS$ .) The expected net present value after losing a reputation is

$$V_0 \equiv -\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} d^t N \int_0^1 T(E) dS(E).$$

So the question is whether  $T(E) + V_0 < k^*T(E) + V$ , for all  $E < E^*$ . This is equivalent to asking whether  $T(E^*) + V_0 < k^*T(E^*) + V$ , since  $T$  is an increasing function. It can be shown that if there exists a  $k^*$  such that  $\pi > 1/2$ , then there is an  $N$  such that this inequality holds; that is, such that punishing is a credible threat.

Thus, the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, and thereby deter default by other debtors.

### **Trade Restrictions to Deter Future Default by the Same Debtor<sup>38</sup>**

An alternative reason why creditors may restrict trade is to deter future default by the same debtor. It is easy to analyze this phenomenon in a repeated game of loan repayment. Suppose there are two players, a creditor and a debtor. Before the game in period 0, the creditor decides whether to make a loan to the debtor. Naturally a loan is not made if in the subsequent repayment game there is no equilibrium with repayment. In each period of the repayment game, the debtor chooses whether to service his debt (“Pay”) or renegotiate the debt (“Default”). The creditor simultaneously chooses whether to engage in free international trade (“Trade”) or to restrict trade (“Restrict”).

The creditor prefers to be paid, the debtor prefers to default, and *both* prefer to trade freely. This can be depicted by the game, with payoffs for (Debtor, Creditor):

	<b>Trade</b>	<b>Restrict</b>
<b>Pay</b>	1,2	-1,x
<b>Default</b>	2,0	0,-2

$$-2 < x < 2$$

While the unique Nash equilibrium of the one-shot game is (Default,Trade), standard folk theorems (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) imply that any feasible payoff pair that is individually rational (i.e., gives each player at least the minmax that they could guarantee themselves) is an equilibrium payoff of the infinitely repeated game with sufficiently players (i.e., discount rate  $d$  close enough to 1). In this game the minmax is (0,0) and, in particular, (1,2) can be sustained by the carrot-stick equilibrium in which (Pay, Trade) is played along the equilibrium path and deviations are punished by playing (Default, Restrict) for an appropriate number of periods.<sup>39</sup>

The drawback of such a model is that in equilibrium, no punishments should be observed. In the spirit of Green and Porter (1984) one can therefore allow for imperfect observability (although of a different form). In particular consider a model with two states, Good and Bad, where it is very costly for the debtor to service debt in the bad state. The payoffs are as above, except that the debtor's payoffs when paying are reduced by some large  $M$ . The creditor cannot verify the state, although naturally the debtor observes the state. The state is independently drawn each period, where Good has a probability  $p$  in  $(p^*,1)$ .<sup>40</sup>

The equilibrium above can be simply modified to be a perfect public equilibrium (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin, 1994) in which punishments are observed along the equilibrium path. In particular, for appropriate values of  $d < 1$ ,  $p^* < 1$  and  $M$ , then the above will not be an equilibrium, since the debtor will default. Nevertheless, it will be equilibrium for the debtor to pay except in bad states, and to default in bad states. Default results in a single period of (Pay, Trade) followed by a punishment phase, which is a certain number of periods of (Default,

Restrict).<sup>41</sup> Thus, the equilibrium path will involve intervals of (Pay, Trade), broken by a period of (Default, Trade) which is then punished by an interval of (Default, Restrict) and then either a return to (Pay, Trade) (with probability  $p$ ) or, with probability  $(1-p)$  to another (Default, Trade), instigating another (Default, Restrict).<sup>42</sup>

Thus, in this example the creditor uses trade restrictions to punish the defaulting country, and thereby deter future default by the debtor.

### **Default and Trade Credit**

The two examples show that it is possible that trade restrictions can be used to punish and deter default. But a fall in trade after sovereign default need not be a deliberate overt act of retaliation. Indeed, as a result of sovereign default or risk creditor countries have never, to my knowledge, used formal legal sanctions.<sup>43</sup> Instead, any negative effect may be simply the result of the drying-up of short-term trade credit.<sup>44</sup>

Kaletsky (1985, pp 36-38) argues: “The interruption of trade finance might turn out to be the heaviest penalty for a defaulter. Trade finance is a critical issue because most trade is conducted on a credit basis of one kind or another ... trade finance could be the Achilles’ heel of a default strategy.”<sup>45</sup> Consistent with this, Cohen (1991, p1) states: “A defaulting country first loses access to its trade credit... Trade, in general, becomes difficult, exporting is tricky, and so is paying for its imports.” Rogoff (1999, p 31) writes “The strongest weapon of disgruntled creditors, perhaps, is the ability to interfere with short-term credits that are the lifeblood of international trade.” Alternatively, insurance rates for international trade (especially those offered by official agencies) may rise as a result of default.<sup>46</sup> Another possibility is that *all* credit-sensitive economic activity is disrupted by debt renegotiation. Thus, there are reasons to

expect a negative impact of debt renegotiation on international trade above and beyond those of deliberate government policy.<sup>47</sup>

## **Discussion**


It is not necessary to argue that reduced international trade is the *only* deterrent to sovereign default; the “pure reputation” effects disputed by Bulow and Rogoff (1989a,b) and Kletzer and Wright (2000) may also be present. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that alternative mechanisms are very important. For instance, Lindert and Morton (1989, p 231) examine historical rate of returns and find “A clear result from the history of rates of return on sovereign debt relates to the ex post treatment of those who fell into arrears: The only ones punished were few countries defaulting in isolation before 1918. The majority of non repayers ‘escaped’ punishment...” They later argue (p 234): “Countries that had defaulted in the past were significantly more likely to become problem debtors again. Yet defaulting governments have seldom been punished, either with direct sanctions or with discriminatory denial of later credit.”<sup>48</sup>

It seems clear that there are reasons to believe that sovereign default may lead to a decline in international trade, either as a punishment for and deterrent to further default, or simply because of more costly trade finance and/or insurance. For my purposes, all that is important is that there is *some* reason for debtors to fear the consequences of default for their international trade. Whether there is any significant linkage in practice is ultimately an empirical question.

**Appendix 5: Graphical Evidence (Event Studies)**


In this appendix, I provide event studies concerning the effects of Paris Club debt renegotiations on international trade. These are based on the gravity model presented in the text and estimated in e.g., the first two columns of table 1.

Figure 1 depicts an event study of the log of bilateral trade with respect to the Classic Paris Club dates discussed in the text. It becomes clear that trade does not actually shrink in absolute terms after sovereign default (except for a temporary spike around a decade out). This is likely the consequence of the fact that output is rising, so that trade (in the absence of default) might be expected to rise; that is, Figure 1 provides an unconditional graph of trade.




**Figure 1: Log Bilateral Trade and Paris Club Events**

In Figure 2, I provide four alternative ways to condition for standard influences on trade; each of the ways provides an alternative fitted value for trade. In particular, I estimate the gravity model with both fixed and random effects (“FE” and “RE” respectively) and both with and without five lags of IMF programs. In all cases, the other regressors (contemporary IMF programs, output, output per capita, common language, etc.) are included but neither contemporaneous nor lagged Paris Club dates are included. The graphs all clearly show a decline in trade that coincides with Paris Club dates, and sluggish subsequent growth with a large negative effect around a decade after default. Nevertheless, the major slowdown in trade is an opportunity cost rather than an actual decline.



**Figure 2: Fitted Trade and Paris Club Events**

Figure 3 provides the analogues for the residuals from the gravity model (rather than the fitted values of the regressand provided in Figure 2), computed without the estimated fixed/random effects.



**Figure 3: Gravity Residuals and Paris Club Events**

A little more insight might be gained by focusing on a particular case. For intrinsic interest, it is tough to beat the onset of the debt crisis that began in 1982/1983. In Figure 4, I present event studies for the residuals from the gravity model of trade (using the model with five years of IMF lags; analogues without IMF lags look similar). There are four different event studies, since there are two different estimation techniques (fixed and random effects), and two different samples of observations. The first sample corresponds to the countries that struck Paris Club deals in 1982 (“defaulters”) while the second sample corresponds to countries that did not



default then. It becomes clear that trade for all countries fell after the 1982 crisis broke out, but it only stayed persistently low for the defaulters. The analogue for 1983 defaults is portrayed in Figure 5.




Figure 4: Gravity Residuals and 1982 Paris Club Events




Figure 5: Gravity Residuals and 1983 Paris Club Events

## References

- Babbel, David F. (1996) "Insuring Sovereign Debt against Default, with an annotated bibliography on external debt capacity by Stefano Bertozzi" *World Bank Discussion Papers*.
- Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989a) "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt" *Journal of Political Economy* 97-1, 155-178.
- Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff (1989b) "Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?" *American Economic Review* 79-1, 44-50.
- Cohen, Daniel (1991) *Private Lending to Sovereign States* (Cambridge: MIT Press).
- Cole, Harold L. and Patrick J. Kehoe (1997) "Reviving Reputation Models of International Debt" *Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review* 21-1, 21-30.
- Dooley, Michael P. (2000) "Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?" NBER WP 7531.
- Eaton, Jonathan and Raquel Fernandez (1995) "Sovereign Debt" in *The Handbook of International Economics* vol. III (edited by G. Grossman and K. Rogoff), 1995, Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Eaton, Jonathan, Mark Gersovitz and Joseph Stiglitz (1986) "The Pure Theory of Country Risk" *European Economic Review* 30, 481-513.
- Eichengreen, Barry and Richard Portes (1995) *Crisis? What Crisis*, London: CEPR.
- Fudenberg, Drew, David Levine and Eric Maskin (1994) "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information" *Econometrica* 62, 997-1040.
- Fudenberg, Drew, and Eric Maskin (1986) "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information" *Econometrica* 54, 533-554.
- Glick, Reuven and Andrew K. Rose (2002) "Does a Currency Union affect Trade? The Time-Series Evidence" forthcoming *European Economic Review*.
- Global Development Finance* 2001.
- Green, Edward, and Robert Porter (1984) "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information" *Econometrica* 52, 87-100.
- Haque, Nadeem Ul, Donald Mathieson, and Nelson Mark (1997) "Rating the Raters of Country Creditworthiness" *Finance and Development* 3, 10-13.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde (1998) "Sanctions-Happy USA" *International Economics Policy Briefs* 98-4.

Kaletsky, Anatole (1985) *The Costs of Default* (New York: Priority Press).

Kaminsky, Graciela and Carmen Reinhart (1999) "The Twin Crises: The Causes of Banking and Balance of Payments Crises" *American Economic Review* 89-3, 473-500.

Kletzer, Kenneth M. and Brian D. Wright (2000) "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter" *American Economic Review* 90-3, 621-639.

Lindert, Peter H. and Peter J. Morton (1989) "How Sovereign Debt has Worked" in (Sachs, ed.) *Developing Country Debt and the World Economy* (Chicago: University Press).

Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (1996) *Foundations of International Macroeconomics* (Cambridge: MIT Press).

Rogoff (1999) "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability" *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 13(4), 21-42.

Schott, Jeffrey J. (1998) "US Economic Sanctions: Good Intentions, Bad Execution"  
<http://www.iie.com/papers/schott0698.htm>

Sevigny, David (1990) *The Paris Club: An Inside View*, Ottawa: North-South Institute.

Tomsz, Michael (2003) "Sovereign Debt and International Cooperation" unpublished.

Wright, Mark (2001) "Reputations and International Debt" unpublished.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> See also Tomsz (2003) and Wright (2001) for recent work on the reputation argument.
- <sup>2</sup> I exploit information from the [www.clubdeparis.org](http://www.clubdeparis.org) heavily in what follows.
- <sup>3</sup> Technically speaking, “rescheduling” amends the terms of a loan so as to stretch out payments due over time, while “refinancing” achieves the same effect by providing a new loan equal to the debt service due; Sevigny (1990). For simplicity, I use the term “renegotiation.”
- <sup>4</sup> Most IMF programs associated with Paris Club renegotiations are stand-by or extended arrangements, though standard and enhanced structural adjustment programs have also been used.
- <sup>5</sup> The “London Club” handles the renegotiation of international banks’ exposure to sovereign borrowers.
- <sup>6</sup> The Paris Club website indicates that on Dec 31, 1999, developing countries owed \$2,550 billion of which \$2,071 was long-term debt; \$1,580 (76%) of the latter was public- and publicly-guaranteed. See <http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B03WP01>
- <sup>7</sup> [www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP04#B1](http://www.clubdeparis.org/en/presentation/presentation.php?BATCH=B01WP04#B1)
- <sup>8</sup> The permanent Paris Club members include: Austria; Australia; Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan; the Netherlands; Norway; the Russian Federation; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; the UK; and the USA. Other creditor countries who have participated in Paris Club agreements include: Argentina; Brazil; Korea; Israel; Kuwait; Mexico; Morocco; New Zealand; Portugal; Trinidad and Tobago; South Africa; Turkey; and the United Arab Emirates.
- <sup>9</sup> E.g., Eichengreen and Portes (1995, p. 25).
- <sup>10</sup> I note in passing that Paris Club deals do not closely coincide with currency crises. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) list the dates of balance of payments crises for twenty countries from 1970 through 1997. Of the 79 currency crises, only six (8%) coincide with Paris Club dates, and only 21 (27%) coincide within two years.
- <sup>11</sup> Fixed-effects estimation also precludes estimation coefficients for time-invariant variables, such as the effect of distance. This is a small concern, given that the  $\beta$  coefficients are nuisances in this exercise.
- <sup>12</sup> In practice, the two sets of estimates typically lie close together.
- <sup>13</sup> There are a few instances where only FOB imports are available; I then use them instead of CIF imports. The CPI for all urban consumers was extracted from [freelunch.com](http://freelunch.com); 1982-84=1.
- <sup>14</sup> Since both exports and imports are measured by both countries, there are potentially four measured bilateral trade flows: exports from a to b, exports from b to a, imports into a from b, and imports into b from a.
- <sup>15</sup> The IFS-based series are calculated by converting national currency GDP figures into dollars at the current dollar exchange rate, and then dividing by the US GDP deflator.
- <sup>16</sup> The website is: <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook>.
- <sup>17</sup> All FTAs are treated as being equal for simplicity.
- <sup>18</sup> A few multilateral official debt renegotiations have been conducted outside the Paris Club forum, e.g., by the OECD, creditor groups, or special task forces. Information on these has been included from records of the Paris Club and *Global Development Finance*.
- <sup>19</sup> Over 93% of all Paris Club agreements are preceded by an IMF program within five years.
- <sup>20</sup> There were also 56 uses of the *Extended Fund Facility* (intended to address more protracted issues), 33 of the *Structural Adjustment Facility* and 70 of its successor *Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facilities*, the latter both intended for low-income countries. Both the *Supplemental Reserve Facility* and the *Contingent Credit Line* began in 1997, while the concessional *Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility* began only in 1999; these are ignored in this paper.
- <sup>21</sup> Data on IMF programs are available from the IMF’s *Annual Report*; I thank Eduardo Borensztein and Jeromin Zettlemeyer for assistance in obtaining data on IMF programs.
- <sup>22</sup> I note in passing that the log of bilateral real trade volume (the regressand) is not very highly correlated with the current accounts of either country (expressed as a percentage of GDP). In particular, a regression of the volume of trade between i and j on the current accounts of countries i and j delivers coefficients of less than .1 and a poor fit.
- <sup>23</sup> Thus, the fixed-effect estimation of renegotiations between one and five years ago is derived by adding .09 and -.23, while the effect of renegotiation between six and ten years ago is simply -.23.
- <sup>24</sup> For the Tobit estimation, small values of trade (less than \$1,000) are set to zero.
- <sup>25</sup> While the linear panel fixed- or random-effects estimates of Table 1 can be computed in a few seconds on a Pentium III, the results of Table 3 require over 40 hours to converge.
- <sup>26</sup> A number of other researchers have found such variables to be relevant, e.g., Haque, Mathieson, and Mark (1997).

<sup>27</sup> I have also used different sets of IVs with similar, though usually weaker results.

<sup>28</sup> Adding quadratic GDP terms only increases the size of the debt effects on trade.

<sup>29</sup> More analysis and discussion of sovereign default as measured by S&P, as well as the raw data set is available from tables 4 and 5 of *Sovereign Defaults: Heading Lower into 2004* available at: [http://www2.standardandpoors.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=sp/Page/PressSpecialCoveragePg&c=sp\\_speccoverage&cid=1025056354607&r=1&l=EN&b=5](http://www2.standardandpoors.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=sp/Page/PressSpecialCoveragePg&c=sp_speccoverage&cid=1025056354607&r=1&l=EN&b=5).

<sup>30</sup> Total trade thus falls for countries negotiating with the Paris Club. The real value of trade typically rises (unconditionally) by 6.2% annually; in the year of rescheduling, countries at the Paris Club experience a decline of trade of 2.2%.

<sup>31</sup> Aggregating across all trade partners, the total trade of a country renegotiating its debt falls and remains depressed for a number of years.

<sup>32</sup> Indeed, there may even be a net positive effect, though the data speak quietly on this issue.

<sup>33</sup> The results are always sensible (bigger renegotiations tend to dampen trade more, while countries that were recently rescheduled or have frequently had their debts rescheduled tend to trade less), and sometimes significant, especially with the GLS estimator.

<sup>34</sup> Also, adding the onset of arrears (and its lags) to the default equation does not affect my key conclusions.

<sup>35</sup> In particular, I used the implicit, export and import price deflators (from 1959 on), and separately added the dates of Houston and Naples Paris Club treatments to classic treatments.

<sup>36</sup> For instance, Bulow and Rogoff (1989b, p 44) write "...under fairly general conditions, lending to small countries must be supported by the direct sanctions available to creditors..." Bulow and Rogoff (1989b) mention a supergame supported by a trigger strategy where default leads to a costly trade war. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, pp. 349-350) write that "direct" mechanisms to reduce sovereign risk are "based on rights of creditors within their own borders, rights which allow them to impede or harass the international trade and commerce of any borrower than unilaterally defaults ... Creditors ... can often prevent [a defaulting country] from fully enjoying its gain from trade."

<sup>37</sup> My sincere thanks to Ben Hermalin, who deserves most of the credit for this sub-section.

<sup>38</sup> My sincere thanks to Eddie Dekel, who deserves most of the credit for this sub-section.

<sup>39</sup> This includes deviations from the punishment phase.

<sup>40</sup> A similar analysis can be carried out for additional stochastic processes.

<sup>41</sup> Punishment actually follows any period in which anything other than (Pay, Trade) or (Default, Restrict) is played.

<sup>42</sup> One can also allow the punishment phase to be (Pay, Restrict), with suitable modifications.

<sup>43</sup> Less than 1% of all trade sanctions coincide with Paris Club agreements. Sanctions are typically deployed for other reasons, especially to inhibit military intervention, arms proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, human rights abuses and so forth; see Herbie (1998) and Schott (1998).

<sup>44</sup> This is also plausible because of the stance of the Paris Club towards short-term debt, which is discussed further below.

<sup>45</sup> He also presents a number of mitigating factors and believes that "permanent damage to trade could be controlled and minimized by a conciliatory defaulter."

<sup>46</sup> For instance, the Export-Import Bank of the United States limits transactions by country, sector (public/private) and term, and updated its "Country Limitations Schedule" in April, June and August of 2001. Similarly, the UK's Export Credit Guarantees Department charges different premia and limits its exposure by countries for different risks, which include "Restrictions on Remittances." More information is available at the URL's [www.exim.gov](http://www.exim.gov) and [www.ecgd.gov.uk](http://www.ecgd.gov.uk).

<sup>47</sup> Dooley (2000) provides a model in which domestic financial intermediation breaks down following a currency crisis. The associated losses provide the incentive for external debt to be serviced. A modified version of Dooley's model might predict reduced international trade following debt renegotiation, given the sensitivity of trade to short-term credit. Still, Dooley's provocative model is not widely accepted; there is little direct evidence of his mechanism, and some currency crises seem to be expansionary. Further, the gravity model used below conditions on output, the key channel in Dooley's model.

<sup>48</sup> Still, this evidence is disputed by e.g., Ozler (1991). Further Cole and Kehoe (1997) argue that a tarnished reputation may have consequences above and beyond those in the debt arena.