Breakthroughs, Deadlines, and the Nature of Progress: Contracting for Multistage Projects

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Consider an entrepreneur (Anne) with an idea for a new product.

- Profiting from the idea requires completing two stages, e.g.,
  1. Develop a prototype
  2. Devise a cost-effective manufacturing process

- Each stage takes time, but the amount of time (and funding) needed is uncertain. Anne has no wealth.

A VC firm wants to fund the project, but faces several agency considerations:

- Anne can divert funds for private benefit, delaying progress
- Anne can (potentially) falsify or hide the prototype

**Question:** How should the VC structure the contract?

- How does it depend on Anne’s ability to falsify/hide progress?
More generally

- Many projects require successful completion of multiple stages before their benefits can be realized
  - Venture capital
  - Product development
  - Basic research

- Incentives of entrepreneur/employee/scientist need not be aligned with funder/firm/institution
  - Moral hazard: Agent can shirk/divert resources
  - Private information: About progress made

This Paper: explore incentive provision for multistage projects.
- How does the nature of progress affect the optimal mechanism?
What is progress?

Limited value in isolation; but a necessary step or “piece of the puzzle”

- **Tangible**: easily observable, difficult to manipulate
  - License, permit or patent
  - FDA approval
  - Number of users

- **Intangible**: privately observed by the agent, easy to manipulate
  - An idea or approach
  - An algorithm or subroutine of a larger program
  - Independently conducted experimental results
Research questions

1. How to design incentives for multistage projects?

2. How does the “nature of the progress” affect the terms of financing?
   - If progress is tangible how is it used?
   - If intangible, is there a role for communication? Is it possible to elicit progress reports and use them in a meaningful way?

3. What are the implications for how to design projects?
Findings

1. How to design optimal incentives for multistage projects?
   - With multiple deadlines and a reward that decreases over time

2. How does the “nature of the progress” affect the optimal contract? If progress is tangible, how is it used?
   - When you make progress, it extends your clock, i.e., you get another round of funding.
   - If intangible, is it possible to elicit progress reports and use them in a meaningful way?
     ▶ Yes, doing so optimally involves using a “soft deadline”

3. In designing projects and reporting requirements
   - There are benefits to
     ▶ Imposing a “small” reporting cost (e.g., time, effort, paperwork)
     ▶ Making the first stage somewhat “harder”
     ▶ Eliciting information rather than obscuring it
Related theoretical literature

Dynamic agency
  - Green (1987); Spear and Srivastava (1987); Phelan and Townsend (1991); Quadrini (2004); Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006); DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006); DeMarzo and Fishman (2007); Sannikov (2008)...

With (observable) Poisson arrivals
  - Hopenhayn and Nicoli (1997); Biais et al. (2010); Hoffmann and Pfeil (2010); Piskorski and Tchistyi (2011); Mason and Välimäki (2011); DeMarzo et al. (2014)

Persistent private information
  - Fernandes and Phelan (2000); Battaglini (2005); Zhang (2009); Williams (2011); Edmans et al. (2012); Hu (2014); Guo and Hörner (2015)

(Simultaneous) Multi-tasking
  - Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991); Laux (2001); Varas (2014)
Empirical “support”

Tangible progress ⇒ VC Contracts

- Staged financing contingent on observable milestones
- Entrepreneur’s stake grows conditional on reaching milestones
- Right for VC to stop funding, control future financing, and terminate entrepreneur

These features arise as part of the optimal contract for a multistage project with tangible progress.
Anectdotal evidence

Intangible progress $\Rightarrow$ Grant funding for scientific research

- Extensive reporting requirements
- Indefinite penalties for lack of reported progress

- According to the NSF Grant Policy Manual:

  *NSF reserves the right*...to withhold future funding after a specified date if the recipient fails to comply with the conditions of an NSF grant, including the reporting requirements.

- Similarly, the NIH website states that:

  If your [progress] report is extremely late, you risk losing funding...

Consistent with (costly) reporting playing a crucial role and vagaries have “similar flavor” to soft deadline.
What this paper is not about

We do **not** study learning or experimentation, e.g.,

In our model, information about progress made (or lack thereof) has **no value** to a social planner
- Focus on using progress/reports to control agency costs
A principal ($P$) contracts with an agent ($A$) to complete a project.

- Project requires: funding from $P$, expertise from $A$
  - $P$ incurs flow cost to fund project prior to termination

- Completion of two stages or “breakthroughs” required to realize project benefits

- Arrival rate of breakthroughs depends on the $A$’s hidden action
  - $A$ can “shirk” (or divert investment) for private benefit

- A contract is a termination rule $T$ and reward schedule $R$
  - Simple: single deadline and reward as function of success date
  - Complex: deadline contingent on history of progress or reports
Model details

- Both players risk neutral, $A$ has limited liability (trivial otherwise)
- Continuous time, no discounting (for simplicity)
- $P$ has full commitment power

Notation

- Benefit to $P$ if project succeeds in ultimate stage: $\Pi$
- Flow cost of operation: $c$
- Agent action: $a_t \in \{0, 1\}$
  - Arrival rate of breakthrough: $\lambda a_t$
  - Private flow benefit from diverting resources: $\phi$
- Arrival time of breakthroughs: $\tau_1, \tau_2$
First best

Assumption

*The project has positive expected value*

\[ \Pi - \frac{2c}{\lambda} > 0, \]

*and shirking (or diversion) is inefficient*

\[ \phi \leq c. \]

Therefore, the first-best policy involves no shirking and no termination

- There is **no learning** about project quality in the model
The contract

\( P \) offers \( A \) a contract \( C = \{ W, T \} \)

- \( dW_t \geq 0 \): payment to agent at time \( t \)
  - Optimal backload all payments to agent (Ray, 2002)

- \( T \): termination policy (or stopping rule)
  - Upon termination, players get their outside options (set to zero)

\( C \) must be measurable w.r.t. \( P \)'s information set, which includes a randomization device.

**Example**

A **simple contract** consists of a single deadline, \( T \in \mathbb{R}_+ \), and a reward that depends only on the time of success.
Payoffs

- To the principal:

\[
P_0(C) = \mathbb{E}^a \left[ \Pi \cdot 1_{\{\tau_2 \leq T\}} - \int_0^{T \land \tau_2} (cdt + dW_t) \right]
\]

- To the agent:

\[
U_0(C) = \mathbb{E}^a \left[ \int_0^{T \land \tau_2} (\phi 1_{\{a_t = 0\}} dt + dW_t) \right]
\]

(P-)Optimal contract: maximizes \(P_0(C)\) subject to relevant constraints
The nature of progress

We focus on the following two extreme cases:

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**Definition**

- **Progress is tangible** if $τ_1$ is publicly observable and verifiable

- **Progress is intangible** if $τ_1$ is privately observed by $A$ and is not verifiable

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Throughout, the ultimate success of the project (i.e., $τ_2$) is tangible.

- Observability not crucial, verifiability is.
Suppose that only one breakthrough is needed to realize $\Pi$

- Denote the reward for success at $t$ by $R_t$
- $U_t$ is the agent’s continuation value at $t$

### Preliminaries

1. It is optimal for the agent not to shirk/divert iff

   $$\lambda(R_t - U_t) \geq \phi$$  \hspace{1cm} (IC)

2. It is WLOG to focus on $C$ with no shirking
One-stage problem

Via standard recursive methods (Spear and Srivastava, 1987)

- State variable is $A$’s continuation value: $u$

The principal’s value function solves the HJB equation

$$
\lambda V(u) = \max_R \lambda (\Pi - R) - c + V'(u) \frac{du}{dt}
$$

subject to $V(0) = 0$ and

$$
\lambda(R - u) \geq \phi \quad \text{(IC)}
$$

$$
\frac{du}{dt} = -\lambda(R - u) \quad \text{(PK)}
$$
Result

In a one-stage project, (IC) always binds. Therefore,
\[
\frac{du}{dt} = -\phi \quad \text{and} \quad R(u) = u + \frac{\phi}{\lambda}
\]

and the principal’s value function is given by
\[
V_{\text{one stage}}(u) = \left( \Pi - \frac{c}{\lambda} \right) \left( 1 - e^{-\lambda u/\phi} \right) - u
\]
One-stage implementation

Result

The $P$-optimal contract for a one-stage project can be implemented with a simple contract, where the deadline is

$$T^* = \frac{1}{\lambda} \ln \left( \frac{\lambda \Pi - c}{\phi} \right)$$

and the reward schedule decreases linearly over time

$$R_t = \frac{\phi}{\lambda} + \phi (T^* - t).$$

The optimal deadline is decreasing in the severity of agency conflict

$$\lim_{\phi \to 0} T^* = \infty.$$
Agent continuation value decreases over time as deadline approaches.
Tangible progress

Solve by backward induction on the project stage

- State variable is a pair \((s, u) \in \{1, 2\} \times \mathbb{R}_+\)
- \(V_s(u)\) is \(P\)'s value function in stage \(s\)
- Characterize optimum through dynamics of \(A\)'s continuation value

Result

The optimal contract involves no shirking. The incentive compatibility constraint in stage \(s\) requires that

\[
\lambda (R_s(u) - u) \geq \phi, \quad \text{(IC)}
\]

where \(R_s(u)\) is the promised utility to the agent for a success in stage \(s\) given \(u\). Moreover, (IC) is binding for all \(u\) in the second stage.
Second-stage payoffs = One-stage benchmark

Given $u$, we already solved the second-stage problem!

Agent continuation value decreases over time as deadline approaches.
Solution to the first stage problem

Two cases:

1. IC always binds in the first stage
   - Occurs when ultimate success is sufficiently valuable
   \[
   \Pi \geq \frac{2c}{\lambda} \left( \frac{e - 1}{e - 2} \right) \tag{C1}
   \]

2. IC is slack for some \( u \) in the first stage
   - Occurs when (C1) does not hold
   - Optimal to set \( R_1(u) = w \) for all \( u \in [0, u] \)
   - \( P \) optimally shifts resources from first to second stage
When (C1) holds

Continuation value jumps up by $\phi/\lambda$ following a breakthrough regardless of when it occurs.
When (C1) does not hold

Continuation value increases by more than $\frac{\phi}{\lambda}$ if $u < \bar{u}$
**Optimal termination policy**

When (C1) holds, principal uses two “hard” deadlines, $T_1 < T_2$.

- If no breakthrough before $T_1$
  - Project terminated
- If first breakthrough before $T_1$, $A$ gets until $T_2$ to make second breakthrough
  - Agent rewarded only if $\tau_2 \leq T_2$

Equivalent to one deadline with fixed “extension” for success

When (C1) does not hold, the second deadline depends on $\tau_1$

- If no breakthrough by $t_s$, the second clock is “paused” and restarted only after a breakthrough

Equivalent to one deadline with “extension” that depends on $\tau_1$
Intangible progress

- The agent privately observes the first breakthrough
- The second breakthrough is still observable/contractible

A few observations:

1. Agent acquires (persistent) private information over time
   - Call the agent types $A_1$ (low) and $A_2$ (high)

2. The optimal contract with tangible progress would not induce truth telling
   - $A_1$ would falsely report breakthrough just before $T_1$
   - $A_2$ would hide a breakthrough and shirk for $t \in (t_s, T_1]$

3. A simple contract (independent of reports) would trivially induce truth telling..
   - But can the principal do better?
Without communication

Lemma
For any contract with fixed deadline $T$ and bounded reward scheme, there exists a $\bar{t}$ such that $A_1$ will shirk for all $t \in (\bar{t}, T]$.

Why?
- Probability of two breakthroughs proportional to $(\lambda dt)^2$
- Shirking yields payoff proportional to $dt$

But shirking is an inefficient form of compensation ($\phi \leq c$)
- Might as well just pay $A_1$ and terminate the project.

However, a severance payment is also not optimal...
By the revelation principle, can restrict attention to direct mechanisms in which the agent reports progress truthfully and immediately.

1. **No False Progress (NFP):** Agent does not want to falsely report a breakthrough.

2. **No Hidden Progress (NHP):** Agent does not want to “hide” a breakthrough.
   - Why hide progress? Think grant proposal...
To formulate principal’s problem recursively, need three state variables

- $s$: Project stage (as reported by the agent)
- $u_1$: Promised utility to $A_1$
- $u_2$: Promised utility to $A_2$

With the extra state variable, we can take a similar approach to the case of tangible progress

- Solve the principal’s problem by backward induction on $s$ for any $(u_1, u_2)$.
Implementable utility pairs

\( A_2 \) can always do at least as well as \( A_1 \)

- Note that \( u_2 \) is the “reward” to \( A_1 \) for a breakthrough
- Hence, \( A_1 \) will shirk if state evolves in \( \mathcal{U}_L \)
After the first (reported) breakthrough

- Need to deliver promised utility $u_2$ to $A_2$ (PK)
- $A_1$ can get no more than $u_1$ (NFP)

**Lemma**

*For any $u \in \mathcal{U}$, the principal’s value function in the second stage is*

$$F_2(u_1, u_2) = \left( 1 - e^{-\lambda \frac{u_1}{\phi}} \right) \left( b - \frac{c}{\lambda} \right) - u_2$$

$$\mathbb{P}(\tau_2 \leq \frac{u_1}{\phi})$$

- Principal sets deadline of length $\frac{u_1}{\phi}$
  - Unlike with tangible progress, deadline is independent of $u_2$!
- $R$ satisfies (IC) and (PK) for $A_2$
Optimal dynamics prior to breakthrough

Continuation utilities drift down toward $\kappa^*$, communication prior to $\kappa^*$ is not necessary.
What happens at $\kappa^*$?

Upon reaching $\kappa^*$, $P$ asks: “Have you made a breakthrough yet?”

- If agent answers “yes”
  - Principal gives agent a relatively short deadline to make the final breakthrough.

- If agent answer “no”
  - Principal begins randomly terminating the project
  - Conditional on not terminating, state remains at $\kappa^*$

**Interpretation:** A “soft” deadline

- $P$ guarantees funding until $\kappa^*$, but reserves the right to terminate thereafter if progress has not been reported
- Immediate communication is critical after the soft deadline
Intuition

*Why is a soft deadline part of the optimal contract?*

1. Why is it incentive compatible at $\kappa^*$?
   - $A_2$ likely to have ultimate success soon, does not want to risk termination  
     $\implies$ strictly prefers truth telling over the lottery (NHP slack).
   - $A_1$ is unlikely to succeed in near future, could “lie and steal” but weakly prefers the lottery by construction (NFP binds).

2. Why does the principal want to use it?
   - Needs to give $A_1$ utility of $u_s$ (PK) **without increasing** CV after a breakthrough (NFP).
   - But $P$ would like to give more time conditional on a breakthrough
   - Optimal to kill project today (with some prob) to preserve time following a breakthrough
Tangible vs Intangible

- Tangible: Principal does better, total surplus is higher
- Intangible: Agent earns more rents under P-optimal contract
Asymmetric stages

In many relevant applications, one stage may be

- Expected to take more time (smaller $\lambda$)
- Require more working capital (higher $c$)
- More susceptible to diversion/shirking (higher $\phi$)

To fix ideas, keep $c$ and $\phi$ constant across stages and parameterize the asymmetry by $\alpha \in [-1, 1]$, where

$$\frac{1}{\lambda_1} = \frac{1 + \alpha}{\lambda} \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{1}{\lambda_2} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\lambda}$$

- Maintains project value at $\Pi - 2c/\lambda$ as $\alpha$ varies
Asymmetric stages

Result
With either tangible or intangible progress, the principal’s ex-ante payoff under the $P$-optimal contract is

- Increasing in $\alpha$ for $\alpha$ near 0
- Decreasing in $\alpha$ for $\alpha$ near 1
- Converges to one-stage project value as $\alpha \to 1$

Intuition

- On the margin, it is cheaper to compensate agent with promised utility in stage 2 rather than cash for ultimate breakthrough
- But as $\alpha \to 1$, monitoring technology becomes inferior

Implication: Optimal to make the first stage more difficult than the second stage (but not too much more difficult).
Costly reporting

Formal channels of communication often require the agent incur costs to documenting progress.

**Question:** Can the principal benefit by imposing reporting costs?

- **Benefit:** relaxes (NFP), can give more time after a positive report
- **Cost:** requires extra compensation to $A_2$

**Result**

Let $\rho$ denote the cost incurred by the agent to report progress.

- A direct mechanism with $\rho > 0$ is inferior to one with $\rho = 0$.
- For $\rho$ small, there exists an (indirect) mechanism in which $P$’s payoff is higher than the optimal mechanism with $\rho = 0$.

**Intuition:** Only require reports after $\kappa^*$
Information suppression?

With intangible progress, $P$ must give $A$ rents to induce truth telling

- But $P$ also uses this information to optimize termination policy

**Question:** Do these benefits outweigh the costs?

- If $P$ cannot observe progress, restrict $A$’s ability to do so?

**Result**

When $\tau_1$ is unobservable to both $P$ and $A$:

- The $P$-optimal contract can be implemented with a simple contract
- The principal is worse off than with intangible progress

**Implication:** Better to elicit information than try to suppress it
Conclusion

Studied provision of incentives in multistage projects

- Nature of progress is important
  - **Tangible**: Sequence of hard deadlines resembling staged financing
  - **Intangible**: Communication is valuable, optimal to use “soft” deadlines

- Implications for project design
  - Better to make first stage slightly harder
  - Costly reporting can be valuable
  - Better to elicit rather than suppress

More progress yet to be made...

- Commitment, replacement, competition, continuous progress...
- Assuming NHP not violated :)

Assuming NHP not violated :)


