Power Posing: P-Curving the Evidence

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In a well-known article, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2010) documented the benefits of “power posing.” In their study, participants (N=42) who were randomly assigned to briefly adopt expansive, powerful postures sought more risk, had higher testosterone levels, and had lower cortisol levels than those assigned to adopt contractive, powerless postures. This result has led some to recommend power posing as a way to improve performance and life outcomes (e.g., Blodget, 2013; Cuddy, 2012).

Despite the attention this study has received, there had until recently been no known attempts to closely replicate its methods. Ranehill et al. (2015), using similar but not identical procedures, found that although adopting powerful postures led to self-reported increases in feelings of power (thus verifying the effectiveness of their manipulation), it did not affect participants’ (N=200) behavior or hormonal levels.¹

In their response to the failed replication, Carney, Cuddy, and Yap (2015) reviewed 33 successful studies investigating the effects of expansive vs. contractive posing, focusing on differences between these studies and the failed replication, to identify possible moderators that future studies could explore. But before spending valuable resources on that, it is useful to establish whether the literature that Carney et al. (2015) cited actually suggests that power posing is effective.

It may seem that the existence of 33 supportive published studies is enough to conclude that there is an effect of expansive/contractive posture on psychological outcomes. However, we need to account for selective reporting. If results only get published when they show an effect, the fact that all the published evidence shows an effect is not diagnostic (see, e.g., Pashler & Harris, 2012).

In this paper we rely on p-curve analysis to answer the following question: Does the literature reviewed by Carney et al. (2015) suggest the existence of an effect once we account for selective reporting? We conclude not. The distribution of p-values from those 33 studies is indistinguishable from

¹ The original authors consider self-reported feelings of power to be a manipulation check rather than an outcome, writing in a recent article, “as a manipulation check, participants reported how dominant, in control, in charge, powerful, and like a leader they felt on a 5-point scale” (Cuddy, Wilmuth, Yap, & Carney, 2015). Moreover, the effects of postural manipulations on self-reported feelings of power are susceptible to demand effects. For example, if an experimenter asks a participant to slouch for two minutes and then to rate how powerful she feels, the participant may assume that the experimenter expects her to feel relatively powerless or may instead answer the question “How powerful is the pose you just assumed?”
what is expected if (1) the average effect size were zero, and (2) selective reporting (of studies and/or analyses) were solely responsible for the significant effects that are published.

Our results do not imply, nor could they imply, that the effect size examined in these studies is exactly zero. It is possible that it is undetectably small in the predicted direction, say $r = .03$, or in the unpredicted direction, say $r = -.03$. But $p$-curve’s estimates are precise enough to reject effects detectable in the studies cited by Carney et al. (2015) as evidence for power posing. Thus, what the results do imply is that direct replications of these studies are not expected to succeed.

The next three sections give an overview of selective reporting and $p$-curve analyses. Readers familiar with these topics may safely skip ahead to the “Results” section.

Selective Reporting

Results that obtain statistical significance are more likely to be published (Greenwald, 1975; Rosenthal, 1979; Sterling, 1959; Sterling, Rosenbaum, & Weinkam, 1995). Selective reporting comes in at least two forms. One form, “file-drawer” (Rosenthal, 1979), involves the selective reporting of individual studies that are statistically significant. For example, a researcher may run five studies investigating the same effect, but then only report the one study that achieved statistical significance, keeping the remaining four in the file-drawer. (Or equivalently, five researchers may each run one study, but only the researcher obtaining $p<.05$ publishes it).

The other form of selective reporting is known as “$p$-hacking” (Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 2014a), which consists of conducting alternative analyses on the same dataset, and then selectively reporting those that statistically significantly support a publishable claim. For example, a researcher may attempt to control for different variables, to exclude participants they had previously included, to log-transform the dependent variable, to analyze a few more (or fewer) participants than planned, etc., until reaching $p<.05$ (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011).
Both forms of selective reporting threaten the validity of the published literature by hiding from view unsupportive (nonsignificant) results, leading one to mistakenly conclude that an effect is larger than it actually is, or even that an effect is real when it actually is not.

A variety of statistical techniques exist to determine if selective reporting is present in a literature (Egger, Smith, Schneider, & Minder, 1997; Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2007; Rothstein, Sutton, & Borenstein, 2005). These tools can answer the question, “Are there some studies or results we are not observing in this literature?” (Francis, 2014; Ioannidis, 2011; Schimmack, 2012). However, they do not answer what is, in our view, the more important question: “Once we account for selective reporting, do the results we observe suggest the effect is real?” Answering this question requires correcting for selective reporting, rather than just diagnosing its existence.

The most common approach to correcting for selective reporting is the ‘Trim-and-Fill’ procedure (Duval & Tweedie, 2000). Unfortunately, it performs very poorly, often leaving estimates nearly as biased as the uncorrected estimates were. For example, Simonsohn, Nelson, and Simmons (2014b)’s Figure 2 shows that when a nonexistent effect (Cohen’s $d = 0$) is studied with predetermined samples between N=10 and N=70 (and there is no p-hacking), the average statistically significant estimate is $d = .72$. Trim-and-fill lowers that estimate only to $d = .70$. A less well known method is PET-PEESE (Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014). It too performs poorly. For example, Gervais (2015) simulated a literature in which half the studies investigated a true effect of $d=.4$ and half investigated a true effect of $d=.8$. PET-PEESE estimated the true effect to be zero.\(^2\) In our view, the use of these methods should be discontinued.

**P-curve Analysis**

In Simonsohn et al. (2014a), we introduced p-curve analysis, a statistical tool that tests whether a set of findings contains “evidential value.” A set of findings contains evidential value if we can statistically

\(^2\) Our own simulations show that PET-PEESE estimates are virtually non-diagnostic of true effect size.
rule out that selective reporting was solely responsible for the set of statistically significant results that have been observed. \( P \)-curve can also be used to obtain a selective-reporting-corrected estimate of the average statistical power of a set of studies (Simonsohn et al., 2014b).

\( P \)-curve is the observed distribution of statistically significant \( p \)-values testing the hypothesis of interest from a set of studies (i.e., \( p \leq .05 \)). Its shape is diagnostic of evidential value.

In the absence of \( p \)-hacking, we expect studies investigating a nonexistent (i.e., zero) effect to result in a flat (uniform) \( p \)-curve. To understand why, consider that when the null is true, there is a 5\% chance of \( p < .05 \), a 4\% chance of \( p < .04 \), a 3\% chance of observing \( p < .03 \), and so on. This means there is a 1\% chance of observing \( p < .01 \), a 1\% chance of observing \( .01 < p < .02 \), a 1\% chance of observing \( .02 < p < .03 \), and so on.

This is what is expected if the effect is zero in all studies and if \( p \)-hacking is absent from all studies. When \( p \)-curve includes some effects that exist (i.e., some non-zero effects), it is expected to be right-skewed, with more low significant \( p \)-values (e.g., .01s) than high significant \( p \)-values (e.g., .04s). Thus, if at least some of the studies in a literature are actually studying a true effect, then more of the critical \( p \)-values will be very significant (.01s) rather than barely significant (.04s). For example, if half the statistically significant results in a literature examine a real effect (studied with 80\% power), and the other half examine nonexistent effects, the resulting \( p \)-curve is expected to have about four times as many \( p < .01 \) as \( .04 < p < .05 \) (also see Cumming, 2008; Hung, O’Neill, Bauer, & Kohne, 1997; Wallis, 1942).³

Some kinds of \( p \)-hacking, the selective reporting of analyses conducted on the same dataset, are analogous to file-drawering, to selectively reporting studies (e.g., reporting results only for men or only for women). Thus, when a studied effect does not exist, these kinds are equally likely to result in low significant \( p \)-values (.01s) vs. high significant \( p \)-values (.04s). In contrast, other kinds of \( p \)-hacking are

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³ When studies are powered to 80\%, about 72\% of significant results are expected to be \( p < .01 \) and only 4\% \( p > .04 \) (see Figure 1 in Simonsohn et al., 2014a). Averaging each of these with 20\%, which is what is expected under the null, we see that 47\% of \( p < .05 \) are expected to be \( p < .01 \) and 12\% are expected to be \( .04 < p < .05 \).
disproportionately more likely to result in high significant $p$-values (.04s) than in low significant $p$-values (.01). Thus, $p$-hacking generally makes $p$-curve flatter (i.e., less right-skewed) and possibly left-skewed.\footnote{\textit{P}-hacking’s effect on $p$-curve’s shape hinges on whether the $p$-hacked analyses are correlated with each other. When the analyses are uncorrelated with each other, then $p$-hacking will do the same thing to $p$-curve as file-drawing does (i.e., it will make $p$-curve flat under the null). When the analyses are correlated with each other, then $p$-hacking is more likely to result in significant $p$-values that are closer to .05 than to .01 (Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). Simonsohn et al.’s (2014a) Supplement 3, “Modeling $p$-hacking,” provides a formal analysis of this distinction.}

When it comes to concluding a literature lacks evidential value, $p$-curve analysis is conservative; it occasionally results in right-skewed $p$-curves even in the absence of an effect. As discussed in Simonsohn, Simmons, and Nelson (2015), this can occur if the findings are misreported, fraudulent, or if researchers choose the smallest possible $p$-value from a large set of analyses (Ulrich & Miller, 2015). Simonsohn et al. (2015) recently revised $p$-curve to be more robust to these circumstances.

\textbf{Inferences from Observed $P$-curves}

$P$-curve analysis involves two tests, one examining whether $p$-curve’s shape is significantly right-skewed and one examining whether $p$-curve is significantly flat. The second test requires some explanation. In the same way that statistical inference cannot establish that two population means are exactly the same, one cannot establish that a distribution is exactly flat (i.e., that the ‘population’ frequency of $p$=.01s is exactly the same as the frequency of $p$=.04s). To circumvent this problem, we rely on the fact that how right-skewed a $p$-curve is expected to be depends on the statistical power of the underlying studies. Studies with greater power yield steeper right-skewed $p$-curves (see Simonsohn et al., 2014a, 2014b). To test whether $p$-curve is flat, $p$-curve analysis tests whether $p$-curve is significantly less right-skewed than we would expect if the studies were so underpowered as to be able to detect a true effect only 1/3 of the time.\footnote{Like all cutoffs, the 33%-power cutoff is necessarily arbitrary. Simonsohn et al. (2014a) chose it because it is a very low level of power, as a study with 33% power would be twice as likely to fail as to succeed. Because cutoffs are arbitrary, they should be used as reference points rather than as meaningful categorical divides. In the case of $p$-curve, the more strongly we reject the null of 33% power, the more inconsistent the evidence is with the existence of the hypothesized effect.} Thus, although we cannot establish whether $p$-curve is flat, we can establish whether it is significantly flatter than expected if studies had 33% power.
This test provides protection against underpowered $p$-curves. When too few studies are used for $p$-curve analysis, the results will be inconclusive, neither significantly right-skewed nor significantly flat.

**Results**

Using the online $p$-curve app (http://www.p-curve.com/app4), we analyzed the 33 studies that Carney et al. (2015) cited as evidence for the effectiveness of power posing (visit https://osf.io/ujpyn for our $P$-curve Disclosure Table and archived copy of R Code used by the app). We had to exclude two studies because they only investigated feelings of power (the manipulation check) rather than downstream effects of the postural manipulations, and two studies because the critical test statistics were unreported. In addition, $p$-curve necessarily (and automatically) excluded seven $p$-values because they were non-significant. Studies hypothesizing 2 x 2 reversing interactions require $p$-curvers to enter $p$-values from each simple effect, and thus to include two $p$-values rather than one. For two studies in this sample, $p$-curve automatically excluded one simple effect (because it was nonsignificant) but retained the other. Thus, we ultimately excluded 11 $p$-values from 9 studies from the analysis, giving us a final sample size of $33 - 9 = 24$ $p$-values from 24 studies. The results are shown in Figure 1.

We first evaluated if evidential value was present. As explained in Simonsohn et al. (2015), we conclude that a literature contains evidential value if either the half $p$-curve (which only analyzes critical $p$-values below .025) is significantly right-skewed at the 5% level, or if both the half and full $p$-curve are significantly right skewed at the 10% level. Neither condition is met here ($p_{\text{half}}=.11$ and $p_{\text{full}}=.63$, respectively).

We then compared the observed $p$-curve to what is expected when studies have an average power of only 33%. One can conclude there is absence of evidential value if the full $p$-curve is significantly flatter than the 33% power $p$-curve at $p<.05$. This condition is met, $p_{\text{full}}=.0016$, allowing us to conclusively reject the null that the sample of existing studies examines a detectable effect.

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6 This test is also significant if both the binomial and the full $p$-curve are flatter at $p<.10$. 
Finally, we can use \( p \)-curve to estimate the average power of these studies. It is only 5%, which is the “power” we expect when the true effect size is zero and the significance threshold is .05 (since 5% of null effects will be significant at a significance threshold of .05). The confidence interval around this estimate is narrow, excluding levels of average power greater than 14%. If the same studies were run again, it is unlikely that more than 14% of them will replicate, and our best guess is that 5% of them will be significant (in any direction).

**Additional Analyses**

In Simonsohn et al. (2014a) we provide detailed guidelines for selecting test results from studies. We followed those guidelines here, leaving minimal ambiguity as to which test to select from each study. Moreover, we conducted a “robustness” \( p \)-curve that included 12 valid alternative \( p \)-value selections. The results from this analysis were very similar to the results reported in the text: The test for evidential value was non-significant (\( p_{\text{full}} = .60, p_{\text{half}} = .53 \)) and \( p \)-curve was significantly flatter than if the studies were powered at 33% on average (\( p_{\text{full}} = .0031 \); the estimate of average power was still 5%, with a confidence interval excluding values greater than 17% (rather than 14%). Because Ranehill et al.’s replication obtained a significant effect of power posing on the manipulation check, self-reported power, we constructed a separate \( p \)-curve including only the 7 manipulation check results. The resulting \( p \)-curve was directionally right-skewed (\( p_{\text{full}} = .075, p_{\text{half}} = .19 \)). Our \( p \)-curve disclosure table (http://osf.io/3jkfr) includes all \( p \)-value selections (and justifications), as well as everything the reader needs to easily evaluate and reproduce our analyses.
Figure 1

$P$-curve of power poses literature.

Note. This figure was generated by $p$-curve app 4.05.

Power of $p$-curve

The conclusion that this literature lacks evidential value cannot be explained (away) by $p$-curve analysis lacking power. With 24 $p$-values, $p$-curve has vastly more power than the underlying studies do. For example, if the 24 studies investigating expansive vs. contractive posing were powered at 33% on average, then the resulting $p$-curve would have an 89% chance to detect evidential value. If the 24 studies
had 50% power on average, then the resulting $p$-curve would have 99% power to detect evidential value. If 14 studies examined null effects, and 10 examined real effects, a $p$-curve based on all 24 has more power than 10 studies do on average (R Code for these calibrations: https://osf.io/sdgkq/). Moreover, Figure 2 shows the results do not at all hinge on a few extreme observations.

**Set of studies**

$P$-curve analyses, like all statistical analyses, tell us only about the sampled populations. The sample of studies we analyzed consists of what Carney et al. (2015) described as “all published tests (to our knowledge) of expansive (vs. contractive) posture on psychological outcomes” (p. 657, emphasis added). Thus, our conclusions apply only to all studies known to Carney et al. in 2015 on the effects of expansive vs. contractive posing. One reviewer criticized our focus on this set of studies, believing it to be arbitrary and subjective. Thus, it seems worthwhile to explain it.

Carney et al. (2015)’s response to the failed replication of their work was to say that 33 other studies provided evidence for their effects. Our goal in this commentary was to examine whether that sample of studies contains evidential value.

Given this objective, our set of studies was chosen *for us, not by us*. Moreover, given that this sample was not selected by Carney et al. (2015) for the purpose of conducting a $p$-curve analysis, it seems implausible that the selection of studies was guided, either implicitly or explicitly, by how large or small the critical $p$-values were. Thus, this sample is both valid – it is by definition the population of interest to us – and unbiased – it was not selected by researchers interested in using $p$-curve to draw a particular conclusion. It is difficult to imagine a less arbitrary or subjective way to choose a sample of studies to analyze.\(^7\)

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\(^7\) The reviewer identified seven additional studies that Carney et al. (2015) did not include in their review. The editor suggested we update our analysis by including studies that were published since Carney et al.’s review. Only 2 of the 7 studies mentioned by the reviewer potentially met this criterion, and neither one of them actually investigated the effects of expansive vs. contractive postures. Leitan, Williams, and Murray (2015) manipulated whether people tilted their heads up and down (a manipulation Carney et al. explicitly chose to exclude, see the note in their Table 1). Michalak and Troje (2015) manipulated whether people walked on a treadmill with a happy vs depressed walking pattern. This is a good opportunity to emphasize a
Conclusion

Taken together, the results from the Ranehill et al.’s (2015) replication and from our $p$-curve analysis suggest the behavioral and physiological effects of expansive vs. contractive postures ought to be treated as hypotheses currently lacking in empirical support. Although more highly powered future research may find replicable evidence for those benefits (or unexpected detriments), the existing evidence is too weak to justify a search for moderators or to advocate for people to engage in power posing to better their lives.

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critical point about the use of $p$-curve: the rule guiding the selection of studies must be set in advance and be disclosed to protect against the cherry-picking of studies. The reviewer not only suggested studies that do not belong in the analysis, but s/he also did not disclose an a priori study selection rule.
Figure 2

Robustness of power poses p-curve to excluding extreme p-values.

Note. The y-axis of each chart reports the overall p-value from each test (i.e., the right-skewed test and the 33%-power test) as we exclude more extreme results. The filled marker is the result reported in Figure 1, without any exclusions. For example, the top right chart shows that without any exclusions the overall right-skew test obtains $p=.63$. As we exclude the highest p-values, the right-skew test remains nonsignificant. Our overall conclusions, therefore, do not hinge on a few extreme results. This figure was generated by p-curve app 4.05.
References


Author Note

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