Impediments to Financial Trade: Theory and Applications*

Nicolae Gârleanu
UC Berkeley-Haas and NBER

Stavros Panageas
UCLA Anderson School of Management and NBER

Jianfeng Yu
Tsinghua University, PBC School of Finance

April 2019

Abstract

We propose a tractable model of an informationally inefficient market featuring non-revealing prices, no noise traders, and general preferences and payoff distributions. We show the equivalence between our model and a substantially simpler one in which investors face distortionary investment taxes depending both on their identity and the asset class. This equivalence allows us to account for such phenomena as under-diversification. We further employ the model to assess approaches to performance evaluation, and find that it provides a theoretical basis for some intuitive practices adopted by finance professionals, such as style analysis.

Keywords: Financial frictions, asset pricing, under-diversification, inefficient markets, performance evaluation, portfolio biases

JEL Classification: G11, G12, G14

*We are grateful for comments and suggestions from the editor, two anonymous referees, Hengjie Ai, Daniel Andrei, Jonathan Berk, Eugene Fama, John Heaton, Ralph Koijen, Motohiro Yogo and seminar participants at the Adam Smith conference on Asset Pricing, AFA meetings, Berkeley-Haas, Chicago Booth, Minnesota Macro-Finance Conference, NBER Asset Pricing, Northwestern University-Kellogg, NYU-Stern, SFS-Cavalcade, Tsinghua University-PBCSF, University of Bocconi, University of British Columbia-Sauder, University of Maryland-Smith, University of Rochester, USC-Marshall, University of Virginia-McIntire, University of Wisconsin at Madison. Panageas acknowledges research support from the Fama-Miller Center for Research in Finance.
1. Introduction

We present a simple, tractable framework featuring informational asymmetries in a multi-asset economy. By incorporating strategic behavior for a subset of investors, our framework can dispense with the common assumption of “noise” traders (or random endowments), and does not rely on constant-absolute-risk-aversion (CARA) preferences or normality of payoffs.\footnote{We do make such assumptions in Sections 3.1. and 3.2. for the purpose of comparing our results to the standard CAPM.} Moreover, the model is particularly tractable: It is isomorphic to a symmetric-information one featuring investor- and asset-class specific distortionary and redistributive taxes, reflecting investors’ abilities to distinguish between good- and bad-quality assets in the original model. Conceptualizing the impact of asymmetric information in terms of this tax equivalence makes it simpler to see how informational asymmetry can cause phenomena such as non-participation by some investors in some markets and associated risk-sharing imperfections.

We use this tractable theoretical framework to assess popular approaches to performance evaluation. A distinctive feature of the model compared to the literature is that it allows a natural and transparent modeling of pure selectivity skill, defined as the ability to select the better yielding assets from a class of seemingly identical assets. We use this feature to show that Jensen’s alpha may fail to identify informational advantage even though investors in our framework only have superior information about individual assets, while being symmetrically informed about the returns of the market portfolio. On the positive side, we show how our model provides a theoretical basis for some simple, intuitive approaches to performance evaluation that have proved popular with practitioners, such as the “style” alpha methodology of W. Sharpe and the usage of fund-dependent benchmarks.

Specifically, we consider a model featuring different locations, or asset classes. A fraction of investors in every location are regular investors and the complement are “swindlers.” Regular investors are endowed with common stocks that pay random location-dependent dividends at date one, while each swindler owns a “fraudulent” stock that pays nothing.
Investors obtain signals on the type of a given stock (regular or fraudulent) in every location. Important, the quality of that signal depends on both the investor’s and the firm’s locations, allowing for significant heterogeneity in information quality across investors. However, to highlight the differences with the literature, we assume that no investor possesses any superior information with respect to the realization of regular-firm dividends in a given location.

Swindlers have an unmitigated incentive to trade so as to equalize the price of their stock with the prices of other stocks in their location. A pooling equilibrium emerges with all common and fraudulent stocks in a given location trading at the same price. The failure rate $f$ of an investor’s signal to identify fraudulent stocks in a given location can be equivalently viewed as a tax rate when investing in that location: A proportion $f$ of the stocks identified by the investor’s signals as regular pay nothing. Indeed, we prove an equivalence between our model and a much simpler dual (Walrasian) economy populated only by competitive investors faced with investor- and asset-specific capital taxation. The market-clearing conditions in such a dual economy need to be carefully formulated to reflect that these taxes are redistributive rather than “iceberg” costs, since trading does not destroy resources, but only redistributes them from investors with inaccurate signals to swindlers.

Our setup does not require noise traders to avoid information revelation through prices, due to two main assumptions. First, the swindlers are not competitive — each of them is endowed with a large holding of a fraudulent firm, and takes into account the effect of her trade on its price. Second, there is no short selling in equilibrium. Therefore, a swindler can trade to push the price of her firm towards the pooling price, and the most a well-informed agent can do is withhold demand for this firm.

The investors inside the model have an incentive to bias their portfolios towards the locations where they enjoy an informational advantage, since those are the locations where they perceive lower implicit taxes. In contrast to the literature, which we summarize below, the portfolio biases towards specific locations exist independently of the particular realization.

---

2In the body of the text, we impose a shorting restriction. In the appendix we allow short selling, but allow the swindler to manipulate the earnings of her company. We show that the ability to manipulate earnings deters shorting, even when it is allowed in principle.
of the signals. Furthermore, the portfolio of any given investor is “sparse,” in the sense that it involves zero holdings in several individual assets, and may even involve zero allocations to entire asset classes, consistent with some features of real-world portfolios.³

The combination of non-revealing prices (leaving room for the better informed investors to earn superior returns) and portfolio heterogeneity makes this model a natural framework to study the validity of different performance evaluation approaches from the perspective of an uninformed econometrician. There is an established literature that has addressed this issue in noisy rational expectations models. Our framework, however, provides a novel way to capture situations where superior performance is associated purely with selectivity rather than market timing, since assets inside a location look identical to an outside econometrician, and no agent has superior information about the return distribution of the asset class itself.

We arrive at the following conclusions. Jensen’s alpha may fail to identify informational advantage: passive strategies (i.e., returns obtained by simply buying the portfolio of all firms in a location, ignoring any signals) generically may have alpha, and informed strategies may have negative alpha. We link these phenomena to the heterogeneity of informational inefficiency across markets.

We then address the question of how to appropriately perform performance evaluation in our setup. We show that the key feature of successful performance evaluation is to use a criterion that assigns zero alphas to linear combinations of passive investments in the asset classes in which the informed investor participates actively. Intuitively, this ensures that the return obtained by an informed investor could not have been replicated by a passive investor investing in the same asset classes.

This is the reason why the “style-alpha” approach, which was proposed by Sharpe (1992) and has proved very popular among practitioners, has several theoretical merits in our framework. Such an approach identifies skill with the alpha obtained from a regression of the investor’s return on the passive returns obtained in the asset classes where the investor participates actively. We show that the alpha of such a regression provides a clear mapping to the investor’s informational advantage.

³See Koijen and Yogo (2016) for empirical evidence on portfolios held by institutional investors.
We also discuss the implications of market segmentation (and, more broadly, portfolio specialization) for performance evaluation. We argue that, for portfolios invested in a limited set of asset classes, the performance evaluation criterion should only be required to assign zero alphas to passive returns in this set — rather than in all asset classes. We illustrate this point with an example of a non-exploitable arbitrage, whereby it is impossible to use one pricing kernel to price all passive strategy returns, but it is still possible to evaluate performance using investor-specific evaluation criteria.

The paper relates to various strands of the literature. The literature on noisy rational expectations models is the most popular approach to introduce informational asymmetries into finance models. This literature is too voluminous to summarize, so we provide indicative examples only. Technically, our setup borrows elements from both Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Akerlof (1970). Admati (1985) extends the noisy REE framework to a multi-asset framework. This literature typically utilizes random supply shocks (“noise”) to preclude revelation. Moreover, our tax equivalence result does not require a CARA-normal framework.

A popular application of multi-asset REE models is the explanation of portfolio biases. The issue of portfolio biases (in particular, the home bias) is especially prevalent in international finance, but the insights of this literature apply to understanding portfolio concentration and under-diversification more broadly. The common thread of that literature is that locals end up with a superior signal about the aggregate performance of the local stock market. The superior signal quality makes domestic agents face lower variance when investing in local stocks, leading to an unconditional home bias. A counterfactual implication is that conditional on a bad signal about the domestic market, locals should shun, if not outright

---

4It is known, however, that (privately known) endowment shocks can achieve a similar outcome to random supply. See, e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia (1981).
5See also Breon-Drish (2015) for an analysis of REE frameworks without normal distributions.
7This is either outright assumed, or the result of endogenous information acquisition. For instance, in Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2009) local investors only need to have an arbitrarily small initial informational advantage in their local assets to generate a home bias, since they will endogenously choose to allocate their information acquisition capacity to the local asset.
short, domestic stocks. This seems at odds with the fact that the home bias is present for any given year, any given country, and for any sample period that one may consider. In our model the portfolio bias towards asset classes where one is better informed applies independently of any specific realization of the signals. The reason is that the portfolio bias is not driven by having superior information about the aggregate dividend realization in a given location, but rather because of superior asset selection ability within the location.\(^8\) This superior selection ability acts as a redistributive tax with obvious deterrence effects on investors who are not as well informed as locals.\(^9\)

The sparsity of individual portfolios in our framework is another important qualitative difference from the REE literature, where all holdings are interior. While in principle one could obtain sparse portfolios in a conventional REE framework by introducing shorting constraints, this would jeopardize the tractability of the conventional REE framework, especially in a multi-asset framework.

The international finance literature has modeled financial frictions as actual taxes or transaction costs, and on occasion informational disadvantages as taxes in reduced form.\(^10\) Our paper provides the theoretical underpinning of doing so, and draws attention to the proper specification of market clearing conditions to ensure the correct mapping between redistributive taxes and asymmetric information frictions.

The paper also contributes to the literature that critiques CAPM alpha, estimated from the perspective of an uninformed investor, as a measure of skill — see, e.g., Admati and Ross (1985), Dybvig and Ross (1985), Grinblatt and Titman (1989), and Mayers and Rice (1979), among many. Our results in Section 3.3. differ from those in Mayers and Rice (1979) and Dybvig and Ross (1985), who introduce the notions of timing and selectivity skill and show that when agents possess “pure selectivity,” thus no “timing,” skill (as they do in our

\(^8\)Hatchondo (2008) also considers an adverse-selection set-up. An important difference to that model is that we do not rely on noise trading, assuming instead the existence of strategic “swindlers.” In addition, our model accepts closed-form solutions, and leads to a tax-equivalence result. Finally, we can obtain the no-shorting outcome endogenously, although in the main body of the paper we impose short selling restrictions directly for simplicity.

\(^9\)See also Kurlat (2013) for the role of information asymmetry as taxation in a different example. Li et al. (2012) also model fraudulent assets, but in a different context.

\(^10\)See, e.g., Okawa and van Wincoop (2012) for an illustrative example, as well as references therein.
framework), then the alpha of an informed investor’s portfolio return with respect to any reference portfolio must be non-negative. Unlike in these papers, in our setting optimal informed portfolios are not necessarily interior (due to the shorting constraint), and we show that, as a result, they may have negative alpha even when an investor possesses pure selectivity skill. More generally, the ease with which our framework accommodates portfolio constraints allows us to show that the results in Mayers and Rice (1979) and Dybvig and Ross (1985) hinge critically on the (implicitly assumed) absence of such constraints. Besides studying the alpha of an investor’s entire portfolio, we also discuss the alpha obtained by an investor in a single asset class (or, more generally, a given subset of asset classes). We are motivated by the real-world fact that portfolio choice is routinely delegated to managers with mandates to pick good assets within a narrow set of asset classes.\footnote{A voluminous literature studies how delegated portfolio choice may lead to portfolio weighting distortions. We do not attempt to summarize this literature, and simply refer to Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer (1985) for an early and important contribution.}

Sharpe (1992) proposed style analysis as a performance evaluation criterion. In some ways our paper provides an explicit micro foundation for this criterion in an equilibrium framework. We note, though, that the specific equilibrium return properties obtaining in our model are not identical to the ones assumed by the statistical model of Sharpe (1992).

We also relate to a literature that analyzes general properties of evaluation criteria and the use of stochastic discount factors for performance evaluation.\footnote{See, e.g., Chen and Knez (1996) and Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) for two indicative examples.} We differ in focus from that literature: Rather than considering any possible information structure, we make specific assumptions, which in particular allow a conceptual separation between diversifiable asset-selection risk (with agents being asymmetrically informed about it) and non-diversifiable asset-class risk (with agents being symmetrically informed about it). Our framework results in a tighter theoretical characterization of valid performance measures — indeed, in an essentially unique performance evaluation criterion. With our assumptions, an essentially sufficient condition for a valid performance evaluation criterion is to assign a zero value to any linear combination of passive strategy returns in the asset classes where the investor is actively participating.
We conclude with two caveats about our conclusions on performance evaluation. First, we abstract from timing ability, i.e., superior information about the behavior of asset classes as a whole, on which there exists an extensive literature. Instead, we concentrate on the stronger results that obtain when information pertains exclusively to the relative quality of individual securities. Second, our focus is exclusively on identifying a market participant’s stock-selection ability from the perspective of an econometrician. We therefore do not address how an individual investor would allocate her investment among various (potentially informed) managers, which is the central issue in the study of fund flows.\footnote{For a discussion of these issues, see Berk and Green (2004), Ferson and Lin (2014), and Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) among others.}

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. contains the model and the tax equivalence result. Section 3. contains the application of the model to performance evaluation, and Section 4. concludes. The proofs of propositions that are not contained in the text and numerical illustrations are provided in the appendix. An online appendix contains the analytical details of some model extensions.

2. Model

2.1. Locations, preferences, and firm and investor types

Time is discrete. In the baseline version of the model there are two dates, but we also consider a multi-period version in Section 2.7.2. and the online Appendix A. All trading takes place at time $t = 0$, while at $t = 1$ all payments are made and consumption takes place. There are $K$ different locations, and each investor is located in one of the $K$ locations. There is a continuum of investors in each location and we index a representative investor in a given location by $i$. Investors maximize expected utility of period-1 wealth, $E[U(W)]$, for some increasing and concave function $U$.

Investors’ time-zero endowments consist of shares in firms that are domiciled in their location. Investors in every location $i$ are of two types, common investors and swindlers,
while firms are of two types, regular and fraudulent. The number of shares in each firm is normalized to one, as are the measures of investors and firms at each location. Common investors in location $i$ are a fraction $\kappa \in (0, 1)$ of the population in that location. They are identically endowed with an equal-weighted portfolio of all regular firms in location $i$. All regular firms in location $i$ produce the same random output $D_i$, and pay it out as a dividend. (Adding a firm-specific, idiosyncratic risk would be simple, but would offer no additional insights). The total measure of regular firms is $\kappa$ in each location.

Swindlers are a fraction $1 - \kappa$ of the population in each location. Each swindler is endowed with the share of one fraudulent firm. Fraudulent firms produce no output or dividend ($D_i = 0$).

For every firm in every location, there is a market for shares where any investor can submit a demand. Moreover, there exists a market for a riskless bond, available in zero net supply. The interest rate is denoted by $r$.

2.2. Signals

Each investor obtains a binary signal of the type — regular or fraudulent — of every firm in every location. The precision of these signals depends on the locations of the investor and the firm.

Specifically, an investor $l$ in location $i$ obtains a signal $\iota^R_{jk} \in \{0, 1\}$ about every firm $k$ in location $j$. This signal characterizes the firm as either regular ($\iota^R_{jk} = 1$) or fraudulent ($\iota^R_{jk} = 0$). The signal is imperfect. It correctly identifies every regular firm as such. However, it fails to identify all fraudulent firms: it correctly identifies a fraudulent firm with probability $\pi_{ij}$ and misclassifies it as regular with probability $1 - \pi_{ij}$. For simplicity, all signals, i.e., across all agents and all firms in all locations, are independent conditional on the firm types. Similarly, we assume $\pi_{ii} = 1$, so that investors are fully informed about their local markets. These assumptions are inessential and can be easily relaxed.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14}If we wanted to remove the property $\pi_{ii} = 1$, we would have to also assume that different subsets of the continuum of local regular investors are endowed with different subsets of the continuum of regular firms.
All firms in location $j$ are divided into two categories: regular firms ($\kappa$) and fraudulent firms ($1 - \kappa$). A proportion $f_{ij}$ of the firms identified as regular are actually fraudulent. All firms identified as fraudulent are indeed fraudulent.

Given this setup, Bayes’ rule implies that the probability that a firm in location $j$ is fraudulent given that investor $i$’s signal identifies it as regular is given by

$$f_{ij} \equiv \frac{(1 - \pi_{ij})(1 - \kappa)}{\kappa + (1 - \pi_{ij})(1 - \kappa)}.$$  

(1)

The law of large numbers implies then that $f_{ij}$ can also be interpreted as the fraction of fraudulent firms among all firms in location $j$ identified by the signal of investor $i$ as regular.

To summarize the information structure, Figure 1 illustrates the nature of the information provided to a given agent in location $i$ about all the firms in location $j$. Figure 2 emphasizes the bilateral nature of the information structure: information quality, captured by $f_{ij}$, depends on both the firms’ and investor’s locations.

Figure 1: The figure offers a schematic representation of the information structure of the model. In location $j$, a fraction $\kappa$ of the firms are regular and the complement $1 - \kappa$ are fraudulent. A given investor in location $i$ receives signals about the type of each of these firms. A proportion $f_{ij}$ of the firms identified as regular are actually fraudulent. All firms identified as fraudulent are indeed fraudulent.
Figure 2: The figure illustrates the nature of the information network. In particular, information quality, captured by the failure rate $f_{ij}$, depends both on the firms' and investor's location. Agents in $i$ and $i'$ may have signals of different qualities about location $j$. Similarly, agents in $i$ may have signals of different qualities about locations $j$ and $j'$.

### 2.3. Budget constraints

Letting $B^{ci}$ denote the amount that a common investor in location $i$ invests in riskless bonds and $X_{jk}^{ci}$ the number of shares of firm $k$ in location $j$ that she buys, the time-one wealth of a common investor located in $i$ is given by

$$W_1^{ci} = B^{ci}(1 + r) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{1} D_{jk} X_{jk}^{ci} dk.$$  

(2)

The first term on the right-hand side of (2) is the amount that the investor receives from her bond position in period 1, while the second term captures the portfolio-weighted dividends of all the firms that the investor holds. The time-zero budget constraint of a common investor in location $i$ is given by

$$B^{ci} + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_{k \in [0,1]} P_{jk} X_{jk}^{ci} dk = \frac{1}{\kappa} \int_{k \in [0,1]} P_{i,k} \rho(i,k) dk,$$  

(3)
where \( \rho_{(i,k)} \) is an indicator function taking the value one if the firm \( k \) in location \( i \) is a regular firm and zero otherwise, and \( P_{jk} \) refers to the price of security \( k \) in location \( j \). The left-hand side of (3) corresponds to the sum of the investor’s bond and risky-security spending, while the right-hand side reflects the value of the (equal-weighted) portfolio of regular firms the investor is endowed with.

The budget constraint of a swindler owning firm \( l \) in location \( i \) is the same as (3), with two exceptions: (i) the value of the agent’s endowment is given by \( P_{il} \), and (ii) the agent may hold a non-infinitesimal fraction of the shares in his own firm, denoted by \( S_{il} \). Thus,

\[
B_{sil} + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_{0}^{1} P_{jk}X_{jk} \, dk + S_{il}P_{il} = P_{il}.
\] (4)

Finally, the time-1 wealth of a swindler is

\[
W_{1sil} \equiv B_{sil}(1 + r) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_{k \in [0,1]} D_{jk}X_{jk} \, dk.
\] (5)

### 2.4. Optimization problem

Common investors are price-takers. Taking as given a set of prices for risky assets for all firms in all locations and an interest rate, a common investor maximizes

\[
\max_{B_{ci},X_{jk}} E \left[ U(W_{1ci})|\mathcal{F}_i, P_{jk}, r \right]
\] (6)

subject to (3) and a short-selling constraint: \( X_{jk}^{ci} \geq 0 \). Here we impose the short-selling restriction exogenously, but in the appendix we consider a simple extension in which agents endogenously refrain from selling short. Specifically, we allow the swindler to manipulate earnings — in particular, to report higher earnings than actual — which exposes anyone shorting a fraudulent firm to the risk of large losses. We relegate the details to online Appendix C, and for the rest of the paper we simply exclude short sales.

The investor conditions on her own information set \( \mathcal{F}_i \) (i.e., on her signals about every security), as well as on the prices of all securities in all markets.
The problem of the swindler is similar to the one of the common investor. The difference stems from the fact that the swindler is endowed with, and therefore naturally may trade, a non-zero fraction of the shares in a particular firm, namely hers. As a consequence, the swindler’s trading impacts the price of her stock, and she takes this impact into account. Similar to a common investor, the swindler who owns firm \( l \) in location \( i \) solves

\[
\max_{B^{sil}, X^{sil}_{jk}, S^{sil}} \mathbb{E} \left[ U(W_{1}^{sil}) \mid \mathcal{F}_{it}, P_{jk}, r \right]
\]

subject to the budget constraint (4) and \( X^{sil}_{jk} \geq 0 \).

2.5. Equilibrium

An equilibrium is an interest rate \( r \) and a collection of prices \( P_{ik} \) for all risky assets, asset demands and bond holdings expressed by all investors in all locations, such that: 1) markets for all securities clear; 2) risky-asset and bond holdings, \( \{X^{ci}_{jk}, B^{ci}\} \), are optimal for regular investors in all locations given prices and the investors’ expectations; 3) bond holdings \( B^{sil} \) and asset holdings for all securities \( X^{sil}_{jk} \) and \( S^{sil} \) are optimal for swindlers given their expectations; and 4) all investors update their beliefs about the type of stock \( k \) in location \( j \) by using all available information to them — prices, interest rate, and private signals — and Bayes’ rule, whenever possible.

Our equilibrium concept contains elements of both a rational expectations equilibrium and a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. All investors make rational inferences about the type of each security based on their signals, the equilibrium prices, and the interest rate, by using Bayes’ rule and taking the optimal actions of all other investors (regular and swindlers) in all locations as given. The continuum of regular investors are price takers in all markets.

Swindlers, however, are endowed with the shares of a fraudulent company and take into account the impact of their trades on the share price. In formulating a demand for their security, swindlers have to consider how different prices might affect the perceptions of other investors about the type of their security. As is standard, Bayes’ rule disciplines investors’ beliefs only for demand realizations that are observed in equilibrium. As is usual in a Bayes-
Nash equilibrium, there is freedom in specifying how out-of-equilibrium prices affect investor posterior distributions of security types.

While agents in our model condition on the observed price, allowing them to also condition on the float (i.e., the number of shares that are traded in equilibrium) would not affect our results. As long as we maintain the assumption of anonymity in trading, a swindler can simply put all her shares up for sale and simultaneously submit a demand function to make sure the market for her company clears at the price $P_j$. Since the supply of shares for both a fraudulent and a regular firm is normalized to one, the float would be the same.

By Walras’ law, we need to normalize the price in one market. Since we abstract from consumption at time zero for parsimony, we normalize the price of the bond to be unity ($r = 0$).

### 2.6. Tax equivalence

While our economy is seemingly complex, its equilibrium outcomes coincide with those of a much simpler Walrasian economy featuring distortionary and redistributive taxes. The intuition behind this result is quite straightforward: Conditional on investing in a location, investors optimally invest equal amounts in all assets for which they have positive signals and in no others (the only exception is the swindler investing in her firm), but the signal is imperfect. The failure rate of the signal translates into a lower payoff relative to that obtained by a local, perfectly informed investor; the proportional loss can be thought of as a tax rate, which depends on both the investor and the target location of the investment. In addition, as long as prices are positive, which we will assume throughout,\textsuperscript{15} swindlers have strict incentives to invest in their own firms so as to render them indistinguishable from regular firms, by submitting elastic demands at the prevailing price of all other assets in the location. This ensures a pooling equilibrium that justifies the behavior of the other investors.

The characterization of the equilibrium is particularly simple in the case where investors have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), that is, when $U(x) = -e^{-\gamma x}$ for $\gamma > 0$. In

\textsuperscript{15}This condition is clearly weak, and satisfied automatically if dividends $D_j \geq 0$ a.s.
this case there are no wealth effects on the optimal number of risky assets, and therefore common investors and swindlers in the same location hold exactly the same number of shares of risky assets, which simplifies the statement of Theorem 1 below. Having noted that, we would also like to point out that the CARA assumption and the associated lack of wealth effects are inessential for the nature of the result. Since, for practical purposes, it is sometimes convenient to use other preferences (e.g., homothetic), we state in the appendix the straightforward generalization of Theorem 1 to any utility function $U$ (Theorem 1b). An additional implication of this extra generality is that the conclusions of Section 3.4. on the theoretical merits of style analysis hold independently of preference or distribution assumptions. Finally, while the focus of this paper is theoretical rather than quantitative, we make use of Theorem 1b to compare the quantitative results of our asymmetric-information model with CARA and CRRA preferences. These results are similar, as the numerical Example 1 in Appendix B illustrates.

**Theorem 1** Suppose that $U(x) = -e^{-\gamma x}$. There exists an equilibrium of the original economy in which the prices of all assets in each location are equal. Furthermore, the prices $P_j$ and aggregate positions $X_j^i$ taken by investors located in market $i$ when investing in market $j$, excluding swindlers’ positions in their own firms, are given as a solution to the problem

$$X^i \in \arg \max_{X \geq 0} E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} ((1 - f_{ij})D_j - P_j) X_j \right) \right]$$

$$\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{K} (1 - f_{ij}) X^i_j,$$

assuming that this solution is characterized by $P_j \geq 0$.

Equation (8) formalizes the decision problem of an investor facing taxes $f_{ij}$, as explained above. Equation (9) is the market-clearing equation for regular firms. The left-hand side, $\kappa$, equals the supply of firms: only $\kappa$ of the firms are regular. The right-hand side represents the demand for regular firms, and it depends on the tax rates: a proportion $f_{ij}$ of the demand $X^i_j$ is directed to fraudulent firms, leaving only the remainder to acquire regular firms. (We
Figure 3: This figure illustrates the portfolio choice of a common investor in location $i_0 = 20$ under three alternative correlation structures. We assume $K = 39$ locations in which a proportion $\kappa = 0.99$ of assets are regular and pay normally distributed dividends with mean 1 and standard deviation 0.25; the pairwise correlation is the same for all pairs $(j, j')$ with $j \neq j'$, and given by the parameter $\rho$. Agents have CARA utilities with parameter $\gamma = 2$. We set $\pi_{ij} = 1 - \frac{1}{2}(1 - \cos(2\pi d(i, j)))$ with $d(i, j) = \min\{|i - j|, K - |i - j|\}/K$, which yields $f_{ij}$ as a decreasing function of the circular distance $d(i, j)$ between $i$ and $j$. In the benchmark case $\rho = 0.5$, the expected excess passive return on an asset is 6.08%, and the lowest tax dissuading investor $i$ from investing in location $j$ is $f_{ij} = 0.52\%$.

Note that in a pooling equilibrium the swindler submits an elastic demand for her own firm, i.e., absorbs the residual demand for her own firm at the price $P_j$, so that the market for fraudulent firms clears by construction.)

An obvious implication of Theorem 1 is that investors have an incentive to place a larger fraction of their wealth in locations where they are faced with lower implicit taxes. Indeed, if the effective taxes are sufficiently severe compared to the diversification benefit, then the investors may choose to concentrate their portfolio in a subset of locations, placing zero weights in the others.

Figure 3 provides an illustration of the tradeoff between diversification and information-
tax avoidance. In a symmetric set-up, the higher the correlation between any two locations, the lower the threshold for $f_{ij}$ above which agent $i$ does not wish to invest in market $j$, and therefore the fewer markets the investor participates in. The precise model assumptions are listed in the caption to the figure.

There are two noteworthy differences between our model and conventional multi-asset noisy rational expectations models. First, in our model optimal portfolios always exhibit zero holdings in some individual assets, and sometimes even in entire asset classes, as Figure 3 illustrates. Second, the asset-class portfolio allocation is independent of the signal realizations. This means that signal realizations determine only the specific stocks in the asset class that are included in the investor’s portfolio, but not the portfolio weight of a location. By contrast, in a noisy REE equilibrium, investors receive signals about the dividend of the location, and therefore the portfolio weight of a given location is signal dependent. In particular, even well-informed local investors may choose to short their own location if they receive a bad signal about its dividend.

The market clearing condition (9) highlights that the implicit taxes in our setup are redistributive, rather than “iceberg costs.” Indeed, if we multiply both sides of equation (9) by $D_j$, we obtain

$$\kappa D_j = \sum_{i=1}^{K} (1 - f_{ij}) D_j X^i_j.$$ 

In words, the aggregate dividends $\kappa D_j$ in location $j$ are all paid to investors in proportion to their holdings of regular firms in this location, and no dividend gets lost.

Theorem 1 provides a micro-foundation to the common practice (especially in international economics, but also more broadly) of using taxes (or “wedges”) as a reduced-form way of modeling informational frictions, as long as these taxes are redistributive, rather than iceberg costs. Theorem 1b in the appendix shows that the equivalence between this information-asymmetry model and a simple, Walrasian economy with distortionary, redistributive taxes holds for any concave preferences and distributional assumptions on dividends.

For the purposes of the remainder of the paper, Theorem 1 makes the description of an equilibrium and its properties relatively easy, a feature that we use in Section 3.
it provides an intuitive analogy between informational disadvantages and taxes.

2.7. Further discussion of assumptions and robustness

To conclude this section, we make a few remarks on the generality of the model. In particular, after a brief discussion of the concept of “swindlers,” we concentrate on describing how the model can accommodate repeated trading and information revelation over time.

2.7.1. Swindlers

From a modeling perspective, swindlers prevent revelation through the price. Thus, while strategic and well informed, they end up playing a similar role to noise traders (or agents with random endowments) in a rational expectations equilibrium. In terms of interpretation, a literal, but somewhat narrow, real-world counterpart to the activity of swindlers inside the model would be corporate fraud. Based on SEC enforcement cases, identified (and prosecuted) cases of fraud pose a non-negligible source of losses to common shareholders, which are around 0.42% of market capitalization on an annual basis. This number is likely to substantially understate the true extent of damages suffered by common investors, since the number of frauds associated with SEC enforcement action is small compared to the substantive number of cases adjudicated by class actions, or the ones that are never identified. Thus, while outright fraud is part of the motivation for introducing swindlers,

16Using data from the latest available decennial report on fraudulent financial reporting covering the years 1998-2007, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) presents data on 347 cases of identified fraud. The most prevalent cases are Enron and Worldcom over that period, but there are several other non-trivial cases of fraud in the sample. The study reports that the average shareholder value of the identified firms is slightly larger than one billion, implying that the aggregate shareholder value of the affected firms is about 347 Billion. The vast majority of the firms either go bankrupt or get involuntarily delisted in the aftermath of fraud. The sample does not include any major recession (other than the small recession of 2001). Including data for the 2008 recession is particularly informative, since the economic weakness unveiled two further major scandals (Madoff 65 Billion and the Lehman accounting scandal, 50 Billion), bringing the market value of the capitalization affected by fraud to 462 Billion or approximately 42 Billion per year. This amounts to 42 basis points of the stock market capitalization at the beginning of the sample.

17In a Forbes Magazine article, James Kaplan, cofounder and chairman of Audit Integrity notes: “The 347 companies prosecuted in the decade through 2007 represent a small fraction of the number of financial fraud cases that occurred. Very few frauds result in SEC enforcement action; many more are adjudicated by class actions. Most are recorded only in stakeholder disappointment, large price drops, bond defaults and
in the real world several actions of insiders may not fit the strict description of fraud, yet result in losses for common investors. For this reason, we favor a broader interpretation of our swindlers as insiders who possess and act strategically on superior information.

The baseline model assumes that fraudulent firms produce zero output, but that idealization is not necessary. Making fraudulent firms valuable or risky impacts the swindlers’ incentives to retain ownership in order to pool, but a pooling equilibrium continues to exist, and an appropriate version of Theorem 1 continues to hold. (An illustration of this statement, in an even richer environment, is provided by the multi-period extension described in the next section.) A pooling result would also hold if there were multiple types of regular firms in a location, an issue that we address in online Appendix B.

2.7.2. Information revelation and repeated trade

In the baseline model, all trade takes place in period 0 and all uncertainty is resolved in period 1. The question arises whether a pooling equilibrium survives type revelation as cashflows are realized over time. Succinctly put, the answer is yes.

To address this question, in the online Appendix A we present a minimal model extension that features sequential trading with investors updating their information prior to each round of re-trade. Here we only summarize the new economic issues that arise in this extension, and refer the reader to the online appendix for the details of the setup and the precise statements of the propositions, as well as further discussion of assumptions and alternatives.

Specifically, we consider the same static model as in the paper, except that there are three periods rather than two. (The logic extends to more than three periods.) Agents trade in periods 0 and 1 and consume in periods 1 and 2. All firms in a location pay a location-specific dividend in period 1. Only regular firms pay a dividend at time 2. Importantly, some (but not all) of the fraudulent firms become publicly identified as such (“go bankrupt”) before date-1 trading commences.

This extension of the baseline model features two new elements: (a) the time-1 asset insolvency.” (Kaplan A. James, “Why Corporate Fraud is on The rise,” Forbes Magazine, June 10, 2010.)
endowments (i.e., asset ownership before trading) are different from the time-0 endowments, and (b) due to the assumption that some fraudulent firms become publicly known in the intermediate period, there is updating (but not full learning) in period 1 prior to trading.

Under appropriate parametric conditions, a shadow-tax equilibrium akin to the static one (Theorem 1) characterizes both periods of trading. The argument becomes more complex in a dynamic framework because of two issues. First, since the fraudulent firms pay a positive dividend in period 1, the swindler faces a tradeoff in period 0 between retaining a fraction of her shares and selling the other ones for a higher price, and selling all her shares at a lower (revealing) price. Second, swindlers (those whose firms do not go bankrupt in period 1) must choose to pool also in period 1, a condition that comes down to the aggregate demand for any swindler’s firm from the other agents being higher at date 1 than at date 0. That way, the swindler is a net seller of her own firm shares, in line with her incentives given that her firm is over-priced in a pooling equilibrium.

3. Informationally Inefficient Markets: Implications

In this section we exploit the equivalence formalized in Theorem 1 between informational frictions and taxes to study the ability of popular performance-evaluation approaches to appropriately identify investors with “skill,” i.e., investors who select stocks based on informative signals. Throughout we envisage an econometrician, by definition uninformed, who observes the return obtained by an investor on her portfolio and is trying to infer if that investor had valuable signals in choosing her portfolio.

The first question we address (Sections 3.1.–3.2.) is whether CAPM alphas provide an appropriate measure of an investor’s informational advantage. Specifically, in these two sections we assume that dividends are joint normal so that the CAPM would hold in the absence of informational asymmetries. We also assume that investors have CARA preferences, so that we can provide simple, closed-form solutions for equilibrium prices. Using these prices, in Sections 3.2. and 3.3. we analyze the properties of equilibrium alphas inside the model and conclude that they are problematic: investors with no skill may have positive alpha, while
investors with skill may have negative alpha. This shows that even though in our model the only skill is a stock-selection skill, the CAPM alphas do not provide an appropriate measure of this skill.

Motivated by the negative results of Sections 3.1.–3.3., Sections 3.4. and 3.5. analyze the essentially unique meaningful performance measure in our model. This performance measure, whose validity in our model is independent of return or preference specifications, is closely related to W. Sharpe’s style analysis.

### 3.1. Equilibrium prices

To ensure that the CAPM would hold in the absence of informational frictions, in Sections 3.1. and 3.2. we assume that the dividends $D_j$ are jointly normal. For simplicity we also assume that they have the same mean, which we normalize to unity. To obtain explicit expressions for equilibrium prices, we endow investors with CARA utilities, $U(W) = -e^{-\gamma W}$.

We let $\lambda_{ij} \geq 0$ denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with $X_{ij} \geq 0$, and define

$$p_{ij} \equiv 1 - f_{ij}$$

as the effective payoff to investing in assets of location $j$. Note that $p_{ij}$ is the probability that security $j$ is regular given that the signal of investor $i$ identifies it as such. Clearly, $p_{ij} \geq \kappa$, with strict inequality if the investor’s signal is valuable. Given the CARA-normal setup, the first-order condition of an investor in location $i$ faced with problem (8) is

$$\gamma \text{cov} \left( p_{ij} D_j , \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_{ik} D_k X_i^k \right) = p_{ij} - P_j + \lambda_{ij}. \quad (11)$$

Dividing this equation by $p_{ij}$ and summing over all agents $i$ yields

$$\gamma \text{cov} (D_j, \kappa D^a) = 1 - \frac{P_j}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} + \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} \lambda_{ij}, \quad (12)$$
where we introduced the notation $D^a$ for the average dividend, $D^a \equiv \frac{1}{K} \sum_{j=1}^{K} D_j$, and used the fact that (9) and exchanging the order of the summation yield

$$\sum_{i=1}^{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} p_{ik} D_k X_k^i = \sum_{k=1}^{K} D_k \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ik} X_k^i = \kappa K D^a. \quad (13)$$

These calculations lead to the following result.

**Proposition 2** The price $P_j$ is expressed as

$$P_j = \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} \right)^{-1} \times \left( 1 - \gamma \text{cov}(D_j, \kappa D^a) + \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{ij} p_{ij}^{-1} \right)$$

$$= \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij} \right) \times \left( 1 - \gamma \text{cov}(D_j, \kappa D^a) + \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \lambda_{ij} p_{ij}^{-1} \right) \times \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} \right)^{-1} \times \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij} \right). \quad (14)$$

The proposition provides a natural formula. In equation (14), the first term captures the average post-tax payoff to investors, the second the risk adjustment and the effect of the shorting constraint, while the third measures dispersion in $p_{ij}$ across agents. Equation (14) shows that two asset classes may be priced differently even when containing the same amount of aggregate risk (i.e., $\text{cov}(D_j, D^a)$ is the same for all $j$) and being held in positive amounts by all agents ($\lambda_{ij} = 0$). As long as $p_{ij} \neq p_{ij'}$ for some $i$ for two asset classes $j$ and $j'$, it is possible that $P_j \neq P_{j'}$. This observation will prove useful in the next section.

### 3.2. Alpha does not measure skill

We next obtain some implications of the model for CAPM alphas. By CAPM alphas we mean the estimates of the constant in a regression of the excess return obtained by an investment strategy on the excess return of the market portfolio. Throughout the paper, we do not concern ourselves with estimation issues. We focus exclusively on the implications of our theory for the moments of such regressions.

To start, we define $R^p_j$ as the gross return of a passive (or index) return in location $j$.  

21
This is the gross return obtained by simply buying all the firms in location \( j \). (This would be the return of an uninformed investor, who doesn’t have access to any private signals.) Given the assumptions of the model, this return is given by \( R^p_j = \frac{\kappa D_j}{P_j} \), with expectation \( \kappa \).

Similarly, define the average price \( P^\alpha \equiv \frac{1}{K} \sum_{k=1}^{K} P_k \), and the return on an index replicating the market portfolio is \( R^\alpha = \frac{\kappa P^\alpha}{P^\alpha} \). Recalling that the interest rate is normalized to zero, we define \( \alpha_j \) as the constant in the regression of the observed (passive) return of the index in location \( j \) on the market portfolio return:

\[
R^p_j - 1 = \alpha_j + \beta^p_j (R^\alpha - 1) + \varepsilon^p_j. \tag{15}
\]

We have the following result.

**Proposition 3** The passive alpha with respect to the market equals

\[
\alpha_j = \left( \beta^D_j \frac{P^\alpha}{P_j} - 1 \right) + \kappa \frac{1 - \beta^D_j}{P_j}, \tag{16}
\]

where \( \beta^D_j \) is the “cash-flow beta”

\[
\beta^D_j = \frac{\text{cov}(D_j, D^\alpha)}{\text{var}(D^\alpha)}. \tag{17}
\]

Note that in the special case in which there is no asymmetric information \( (p_{ij} = \kappa) \) and all positions are strictly positive \( (\lambda_{ij} = 0 \ \forall i,j) \) equations (14) and (16) imply the usual CAPM relation \( (\alpha_j = 0) \).\(^{18}\)

However, in the presence of informational asymmetries, \( \alpha_j \) is non-zero in general, even for passive strategies. To see this in the simplest possible case, consider a world with \( \beta^D_j = 1 \)

\(^{18}\)To see this, notice that equation (14) implies that \( P_j = \kappa - \gamma \kappa^2 \beta^D_j \sigma^2 \). Then it follows from (16) that \( \alpha = \beta^D_j \frac{\kappa - \gamma \kappa^2 \sigma^2}{P_j} - 1 + \frac{\kappa}{P_j} (1 - \beta^D_j) = \frac{\kappa - \gamma \kappa^2 \beta^D_j \sigma^2}{P_j} - 1 = 0. \)
for all $j$. Accordingly,

$$
\alpha_j = \frac{P^a}{P_j} - 1 = \frac{\frac{1}{K} \sum_{j=1}^{K} \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} \right)^{-1}}{\left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} p_{ij}^{-1} \right)^{-1}} - 1. \tag{18}
$$

The above equation implies that some asset classes may still exhibit prices that are lower (or higher) than average, despite all assets having the same exposure to aggregate risk and the same expected dividend. For instance, a lower overall quality of information in asset class $j$ (low values of $p_{ij}$ compared to other asset classes) translates into a lower-than-average price for that class; since $\alpha_j = \frac{P^a}{P_j} - 1$, even an index investment in such a class has positive alpha.

If uninformed (passive) strategies command alphas, then alphas cannot be an accurate measure of an investor’s information advantage ($p_{ij} > \kappa$), which we interpret as “skill.” Indeed, continuing with the assumption that $\beta_j^D = 1$ for all $j$, the alpha resulting from a regression of the return that an investor $i$ obtains when investing in location $j$ on the return of the market portfolio is given by

$$
\alpha_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij} P^a}{\kappa P_j} - 1. \tag{19}
$$

Hence, even an investor who has an informational advantage might exhibit a negative alpha when that informational advantage happens to be in an asset class that is comparatively more expensive than the average asset class, i.e., $P^a < P_j$.\(^{19}\)

Equations (18) and (19) imply that when $\beta_j^D = 1$ both passive and active alphas depend exclusively on $p_{ij}$ and $\kappa$ — neither on risk aversion, nor on the volatility of dividends. Equilibrium portfolio allocations and expected returns on the other hands do depend on all the parameters of the model. This property implies that the magnitude of alphas and the magnitude of portfolio biases are not linked in this model, as the numerical Example 2 in Appendix B illustrates.

\(^{19}\)From equation (19), knowledge of class-by-class alphas (or returns) is sufficient to compare the level of information about a certain class across investors. However, if the econometrician only observes the overall return of an investor (or simply uses a coarser definition of asset classes), and assuming that different investors invest in different asset classes, then the equation does not rank investors by informational advantage.
The reason why the CAPM fails to assign zero alpha even to passive strategies is qualitatively different from the arguments that have been proposed so far. Unlike elsewhere in the literature, in our setup investors don’t possess any signals on the realization of $D_j$, so they are on equal footing about predicting the return of an asset class. It is tempting to attribute the failure of the CAPM in our model to the fact that different investors hold different mean-variance efficient portfolios, so that the market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient for any investor. This fact, however, is not sufficient to render the CAPM alpha an inaccurate measure of skill: Suppose, for instance that all prices across all asset classes are equal ($P_j = P$), which would occur for instance if the informational advantages are symmetric ($p_{ij} = p$ for all $i \neq j$ and some positive $p < 1$), and all betas are unity. In that case investors still choose different mean-variance efficient portfolios, depending on their locations. Yet, equation (16) shows that alphas are zero for passive strategies, while equation (19) shows that informed investors have positive alphas.

What makes alpha a valid measure of performance in this special case? As we show in more generality in Section 3.5., the key feature of this special case is that the market portfolio is mean-variance efficient from the perspective of an uninformed investor. However, this property is special to this example. In general the market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient even from the perspective of an uninformed agent, and hence the CAPM alpha is not a valid measure of performance.

We conclude this section with a parenthetical remark on the magnitude of passive alphas implied by equations (16) and (18). Inspection of equation (18) shows that when $\beta_j^D = 1$ for all assets $j$, the alphas of passive strategies are bounded above by $\kappa^{-1} - 1$ and below by $\kappa - 1$. However, when $\beta_j^D$ varies across asset classes, then the passive strategy alphas need not obey these bounds, and the exact magnitude of the passive strategy alphas do not depend only on informational asymmetry assumptions (specifically on the assumed values of $p_{ij}$ and $\kappa$), but also on statistical assumptions about the second moment of $D$. Example 3 in Appendix B provides an illustration of this point.
3.3. Negative alpha for an investor’s optimal portfolio

In the previous section we showed how CAPM alphas can be positive for uninformed passive returns and negative for the returns obtained in a specific asset class by an investor possessing selection skill in that class.

In this section we examine the alpha of an investor’s optimally chosen portfolio, rather than her return within an individual asset class. In two important papers, Mayers and Rice (1979) and Dybvig and Ross (1985) have shown that a mean-variance efficient portfolio utilizing useful private information has a positive alpha with respect to any reference portfolio as long as the informational advantage helps the investor choose individual assets better (“selection ability”), but without allowing her to predict the return of the benchmark portfolio any better than other market participants (“no timing ability”). While in our framework investors have pure selection ability in the sense of Mayers and Rice (1979) and Dybvig and Ross (1985), their results no longer apply. Indeed, in this subsection we show that the alpha of an informed investor’s optimal portfolio may be negative, even though she possesses stock selection skill.

To better compare our results with the literature, we will not only consider alphas with respect to the market portfolio return (CAPM alphas), but we will allow for an arbitrary benchmark or reference portfolio $w_B$ of risky asset class weights.

To relate to the literature, we present a sufficient condition that allows extending the results of Mayers and Rice (1979) and Dybvig and Ross (1985) to our framework. To that end, let $R^I$ denote the gross return obtained by a (potentially informed) investor on her entire portfolio and $R^B$ the gross return on an uninformed portfolio assigning weights $w_B$ to the various asset classes. Denote by $E(\cdot)$ expectations under the econometrician’s information set and by $\sigma_X$ the standard deviation of $R^X$, $X \in \{I, B\}$, under the same information set.

**Proposition 4** Suppose that

$$\frac{|E(R^B) - 1|}{\sigma_B} < \frac{E(R^I) - 1}{\sigma_I}$$

Then the expected alpha of a regression of the excess return of the investor’s return on the excess return of the benchmark portfolio is positive.
In words, Proposition 4 states that if the absolute value of the Sharpe ratio of the benchmark portfolio is smaller than the Sharpe ratio of the investor’s optimal portfolio, then the investor’s portfolio exhibits positive alpha with respect to the benchmark return.

In Dybvig and Ross (1985) condition (20) is automatically implied by the optimality of the investor’s portfolio: A mean variance investor with the ability to short will always choose a portfolio with an absolute Sharpe ratio (weakly) larger than any given portfolio $w^B$. Indeed, both $w^B$ and $-w^B$ are feasible portfolios, even though they involve ignoring one’s private information. Hence, in a mean-variance framework, the absolute value of the Sharpe ratio of the reference portfolio cannot exceed the Sharpe ratio of her optimally chosen portfolio (by revealed preference).

However, without shorting, condition (20) may fail, and in fact even if the reference portfolio involves only positive weights: Intuitively, in order to be able to attain the absolute value of the Sharpe ratio of the reference portfolio, an investor may need to be able to invest in both $w^B$ and $-w^B$, which is not the case in our framework.

Allowing for the violation of condition (20), it is possible to produce examples where the alpha of an informed investor on her entire portfolio is negative. In Appendix B (Example 4), we provide a simple numerical example in which an informed investor has a negative alpha with respect to the market portfolio.

We note parenthetically that the failure of condition (20) is not special to the presence of shorting frictions. Any portfolio friction that could render the constrained optimal portfolio mean-variance inefficient could lead to a failure of condition (20). In Appendix D (Example 1) we illustrate this with an example featuring a borrowing constraint. We show that an informed agent may obtain a negative alpha on her (constrained optimal) portfolio even in situations where all weights of the reference portfolio, all portfolio weights of all agents, and all expected excess returns are positive.

To summarize, once we allow for portfolio constraints, the correspondence between alpha and skill — even at the level of an investor’s total portfolio return — may no longer hold. This is particularly problematic in practice, since an econometrician typically does not know
whether an investor’s observed portfolio return results from an interior or a constrained optimal portfolio, and therefore cannot control appropriately for this issue.

### 3.4. General properties of evaluation measures and style alphas

The previous section shows that the CAPM fails to assign zero alpha to passive strategies. We show here that this failure is responsible for the imperfect mapping between skill and alpha that we highlighted above. In particular, we show that assigning zero alpha to passive strategies is actually a sufficient condition for a performance measure to be valid (in the sense of correctly identifying a skilled investor). Moreover, this validity result is independent of whether the investor’s portfolio choice is interior or constrained optimal across asset classes. It is also independent of preference or return distribution assumptions, since it is based only on tax equivalence, which holds generally (Theorem 1b). As a practical illustration of the results, we show that the style alpha measure proposed by W. Sharpe is a valid performance measure. We start with a definition.

**Definition 1** Let \( g \) be a functional mapping random variables into the space of real numbers such that

1. Letting \( R_{j}^{e,p} \) denote the excess passive return in location \( j \), \( g(R_{j}^{e,p}) = 0 \).

2. \( g \) is linear, i.e., for two random variables \( X \) and \( Y \) and a scalar \( A \), \( g(X + Y) = g(X) + g(Y) \) and \( g(A X) = A g(X) \).

3. \( g(1) > 0 \).

If such a functional \( g \) exists we will refer to it as a “valid performance functional.”

The three requirements listed in Definition 1 are intuitive. We require that \( g \) assign the value zero to all passive (uninformed) excessive returns (property 1) and all portfolios thereof (property 2). The third property states that a riskless excess return should be assigned a positive value.
Assuming the existence of a valid performance functional in the sense of Definition 1, we next show that it correctly identifies an investor’s informational advantage. To see this, note that the excess return of an informed investor $i$ in our model can be written as

$$ R_{e,i} = \sum_{j=1}^{K} (q_{ij} R_j - 1) w_j^i, $$

where $q_{ij} \equiv \frac{p_{ij}}{\kappa} \geq 1$ and $w_j^i \geq 0$ is the portfolio weight of agent $i$ represented by asset class $j$. Hence,

$$ g(R_{e,i}) = g\left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} q_{ij} (R_j - 1) w_j^i + \sum_{j=1}^{K} (q_{ij} - 1) w_j^i \right) $$

$$ = 0 + g(1) \sum_{j=1}^{K} (q_{ij} - 1) w_j^i $$

$$ \geq 0. $$

We summarize the implications of the above discussion in the following proposition.

**Proposition 5** Assume that a valid performance functional $g$ exists and fix an investor $i$. Then $g(R_{e,i}) > 0$ if and only if investor $i$ has an informational advantage ($q_{ij} \equiv \frac{p_{ij}}{\kappa} > 1$) in at least one asset class, where she assigns a positive weight $w_j^i > 0$.

**Remark 1** We note that equation (21) also shows that the functional $g$ is essentially unique — any two measures $g$ and $g'$ differ at most by a multiplicative constant.

One way to construct a functional $g$ is the so-called “style” analysis, proposed by Sharpe (1992). According to this approach, the return of each manager is regressed on the passive returns of all possible asset classes. Moreover, to interpret the betas as portfolio weights, one additionally requires that the betas on the passive strategies add up to one. (In practice, they are also restricted to be positive, to satisfy the no-shorting constraints faced by mutual-fund managers.) The constant (alpha) of such a regression is interpreted as a manager’s skill.

Viewing style analysis as mapping the (excess) return of a manager to a value of alpha, it is straightforward to show that it satisfies all the aforementioned properties of the functional $g$. We record the result formally:
Proposition 6 Let \( w^i_j = \frac{p_j X^i_j}{W^j_0} \) be the portfolio weight of the investment in location \( j \) by an investor in location \( i \). Consider the style regression of the gross return obtained by such an investor on the passive returns, including the risk-free one. The constant \( \alpha^s_i \) in this regression is the portfolio-weighted informational advantage of investor \( i \) across all markets in which she invests:

\[
\alpha^s_i = \sum_{j=1}^{K} \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{\kappa} - 1 \right) w^i_j. 
\]  

(22)

An alternative way of formulating the functional \( g \) is as follows. Let \( \Sigma \) denote the covariance matrix of passive excess returns \( R_{e,p}^j \), \( E(R_{e,p}^j) \) the vector of expected excess passive returns, \( w = \Sigma^{-1} E(R_{e,p}^j) \) a mean-variance efficient portfolio from the perspective of an uninformed econometrician, and \( R^{MVE} = w^\top R_{e,p} \) the excess return of the portfolio. Then the functional \( g(R_e) \equiv E(R_e) - \text{cov}(R_e, R^{MVE}) \) satisfies all the requirements of the functional \( g \), since it is linear, satisfies \( g(1) = 1 \), and most importantly assigns the value zero to all passive excess returns. This observation formalizes the claim we made in Section 3.2.: The reason for the inadequacy of CAPM alphas is that the market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient even from the perspective of an uninformed econometrician. (See also Ferson and Siegel (2001) for the properties of unconditionally efficient portfolios for the purposes of performance evaluation.)

Our analysis in this section is related to Chen and Knez (1996), who characterize performance measures satisfying a reasonable minimal set of requirements in a general payoff-and-information environment. Our special model structure implies a tighter characterization — essentially, our performance measure is unique, assigns positive alpha to informed strategies, and it can be thought of as a style alpha.

3.5. Investor-specific performance evaluation

A key requirement for a valid functional \( g \) is that it assign zero alpha to passive strategies. An issue that we did not address in the previous section is that the requirement need only
apply with respect to the locations in which a given investor \( i \) participates. Indeed, equation (21) continues to hold even if the values \( g(R_j^{e,p}) \) are set arbitrarily whenever the investor chooses \( w_j^i = 0 \).

This observation is of practical importance because in the real world many portfolios are concentrated in only a few asset classes, and virtually all shun some asset classes. It also helps explain the widespread use of heterogeneous benchmarks. Thus, if the goal is to evaluate the stock-picking skills of an asset manager who only invests in, say, Finnish stocks, then our analysis provides a justification for regressing her return only on the Finnish stock market index rather than some global index, or a set of indices from several countries. We also note that adding more classes not only does not help, but in fact hurts by deteriorating the quality of estimation and inference with finite data.

The above discussion helps us illustrate an additional point of some theoretical interest: One can find valid, investor-specific \( g_i \) even when a functional \( g \) pricing all passive strategies does not exist. The easiest way to illustrate this point is by using a minimal example whereby an equilibrium features an unexploitable arbitrage. For instance, consider an economy in which \( (a) \) the passive portfolios in two locations (say, locations \( j \) and \( j' \)) have the same dividends from the perspective of a passive investor \((\kappa D_j = \kappa D_{j'})\) but different prices \((P_j \neq P_{j'})\);\(^{20}\) \( (b) \) investor \( j \) invests only in market \( j \), because \( \frac{p_{jj}}{P_j} > \frac{p_{jj'}}{P_{j'}} \) and similarly investor \( j' \) only invests in market \( j' \). The absence of shorting makes this arbitrage opportunity compatible with equilibrium. A global performance functional \( g \) applying simultaneously to \( R_j^{e,p} \) and \( R_{j'}^{e,p} \) does not exist, yet investor-specific performance functionals \( g_j \) and \( g_{j'} \) are easy to construct, e.g., by regressing each investor’s return on the passive returns in the asset classes in which she invests.

3.6. Summing up alphas

We now take a closer look at the cross-section of portfolio performance in our model. The starting point is the general observation that, relative to the market, the average alpha must

\(^{20}\) This could occur in equilibrium, for instance, because the investors in a third location \( j'' \) are better informed about one of these two locations, resulting in a higher price for its securities.
be zero by construction. However, in our model all the investors are assumed to have some information, which should allow them to improve on the market portfolio and consequently exhibit positive alphas.

To discuss this issue, we revisit Section 3.2. and concentrate on an economy that is symmetric with respect to the various locations. In this economy, $P_j = P = P^a$, and equation (19) gives $\alpha_{ij} = \frac{p_{ij}}{\kappa} - 1 > 0$. Since all individual alphas are positive, it would appear that the portfolio-weighted average of alphas (across investors) is strictly positive. This conclusion is not correct, though, because the analysis so far has ignored the swindlers’ investment in their own firms. Indeed, these agents invest a non-zero fraction of their portfolio in an asset costing $P > 0$ and paying back zero, i.e., offering a net return of $-100\%$.

One can see explicitly the negative return to the swindlers’ retained holdings in their own firms in the market-clearing equation from Theorem 1. Focusing on a single market, recalling that $1 - f_{ij} = p_{ij}$, and summing across investors $i$ expresses equation (9) as

$$0 = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \left( \frac{p_{ij}}{\kappa} - 1 \right) X^i_j + (-1) \times \left( 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{K} X^i_j \right).$$

(23)

The right-hand side of equation (23) contains two terms. The first term is positive and captures the intuition of aggregate positive alphas. The second term, though, is negative, because $\sum_{i=1}^{K} X^i_j < 1$: the difference $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{K} X^i_j$ represents the swindlers’ position in their own firms in location $j$, and $-1$ is the associated net return.

The alphas realized by the swindlers combine the $-100\%$ on their own firms with the positive values on the rest of their portfolios, but are negative in the aggregate. This is despite the fact that the swindlers possess superior information. Given their endowment of worthless stock, swindlers are actually better off retaining some of their shares in their effort to pool with the regular stock. The reason for their negative alpha is not suboptimal behavior, but rather the nature of their initial endowment.\footnote{This phenomenon is related to discussions in Kacperczyk et al. (2014, 2016).}
4. Conclusion

We develop a multiple-market, multiple-investor model, whereby informational asymmetries act as distortionary and redistributive capital taxes. By explicitly modeling the incentive to diversify across asset classes, and introducing strategic-trading considerations for some traders, we can dispense with noise trading, yet keep prices non-revealing. Moreover, the duality between the model and a tax economy makes the model quite tractable to analyze, without requiring CARA utilities and normal dividends.

By drawing a distinction between asset classes (sets of assets that appear identical from the perspective of an uninformed agent) and individual assets within asset classes, the model can account for portfolio biases towards specific asset classes for any realization of the signals about the quality of individual assets. Hence the model provides a simple and analytically convenient framework to model persistent portfolio biases toward a set of asset classes, under-diversification, and portfolios with non-interior (zero) holdings of individual assets.

To illustrate the analytical tractability of the model we revisit an established literature that analyzes the properties of popular performance evaluation measures. Our framework allows a particularly clean distinction between pure selection and timing abilities. Without trivializing the possible importance of timing information, we show that the specific informational assumptions we adopt provide a simple and intuitive theoretical basis for portfolio evaluation criteria such as style analysis and fund-dependent choice of benchmarks, which are widely used in practice.
References


Appendix

A  Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1. This theorem is a special case of the more general Theorem 1b, stated and proved below. In particular, equations (8) and (9) in the statement of Theorem 1 constitute a particular case of the system (A.1)–(A.4), since with CARA preferences all objectives are independent of the wealth endowment and therefore identical, and consequently so are the portfolios.

To state the result for a general utility function $U$, let $X^c_j$ be the per-capita number of shares invested by a common investor from location $i$ in assets in location $j$, and $X^s_j$ the analogous number of shares invested by a swindler in location $i$ in all firms other than his own. We let $T_i$ be the mass of shares sold by a swindler in his own firm.

Theorem 1b There exists an equilibrium of the original economy in which the prices of all assets in each location are equal. Furthermore, the prices $P_j$ and equilibrium positions solve the system

\[
X^c_i \in \arg \max_{X \geq 0} E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} ((1 - f_{ij})D_j - P_j) X_j + P_i \right) \right] \tag{A.1}
\]

\[
X^s_i \in \arg \max_{X \geq 0} E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} ((1 - f_{ij})D_j - P_j) X_j + T^i P_i \right) \right] \tag{A.2}
\]

\[
T^i = \sum_{j \neq i} \frac{f_{ji}}{1 - \kappa} (\kappa X^c_j + (1 - \kappa)X^s_j) \tag{A.3}
\]

\[
\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{K} (1 - f_{ij}) \left( \kappa X^c_j + (1 - \kappa)X^s_j \right), \tag{A.4}
\]

assuming that this solution is characterized by $P_j \geq 0$. 

36
Equation (A.1) is the obvious objective for a common investor. Equation (A.2) is the objective of a typical swindler in location \(i\). Unlike a common investor, who is endowed with wealth \(P_i\), this investor’s wealth consists of the number of shares that he trades (sells) in equilibrium, \(T^i\). This number of shares equals the number of shares bought by investors, both common ones and swindlers, in other locations who received positive signals, as captured by equation (A.3). The conditional independence of the signals allows the simplification that the demand is the same for all fraudulent firms. In this equation, the term \(\frac{f_{ji}}{1-\kappa}\) on the right-hand side represents the proportion \(f_{ji}\) of the demand from location \(j\) to location \(i\) being directed to fraudulent firms, and shared among the \(1-\kappa\) firms there. Finally, equation (A.4) is the market-clearing condition for a common firm in location \(j\).

**Proof of Theorem 1b.** We start with an equilibrium in the simplified competitive (symmetric information) tax economy, and then proceed through a couple of steps. First, we construct demand curves in the original economy, making use of the tax-economy equilibrium. Second, we check that these demand curves are optimal given the other agents’, and the markets clear.

We specify the demands of the agents using the solution \((X_{ci}^{j}, X_{sil}^{j}, P_j)\) to (A.1)–(A.4):

\[
X_{jk}^{ci} = (1 - f_{ij}) \kappa^{-1} X_{j}^{ci}_{jk} 1_{(P_{jk}=P_j)} \tag{A.5}
\]

\[
X_{jk}^{sil} = (1 - f_{ij}) \kappa^{-1} X_{j}^{sil}_{jk} 1_{(P_{jk}=P_j)} \tag{A.6}
\]

\[
S^{il} = \begin{cases} 
[0, \infty) & \text{if } P_{il} = P_i \\
0 & \text{if } P_{il} \neq P_i 
\end{cases} \tag{A.7}
\]

Recall that we are looking for a Nash equilibrium, in which all agents take the others’ actions as given. For any agent-asset pair excluding a swindler and his own firm, this means that the price is taken as a given. A swindler can impact the price of his firm by his choice of quantity, taking into account the demand curves of all the other agents.

In words, all investors buy the same number of shares in each market as in the tax economy, but they split this position (equally) only among the firms about which they receive
a good signal — note that the multiplicative factor \((1 - f_{ij}) \kappa^{-1}\) equals the reciprocal of the probability that a given signal is good — as long as the price equals the pooling equilibrium price \(P_j\). Implicitly, the agents treat any firm whose price is not \(P_j\) as a fraudulent firm, which is intuitively justified by the fact that the only possible deviation resulting in a different price is by a swindler in his own asset.\(^{22}\) The swindler submits an elastic demand at \(P_j\).

It is easy to see that, given these demand curves, markets clear. To see that \(X_{jk}^i\) is optimal, start by writing the expected utility for the agent as

\[
\begin{align*}
E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_k (D_{jk} - P_j) X_{jk}^i \, dk + P_i \right) | \iota^{il} \right] \\
= E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_k (\rho(j,k)D_{j} - P_j) X_{jk}^i \, dk + P_i \right) | \iota^{il} \right]
\end{align*}
\]  

(A.8)

and note that, by Jensen’s inequality, this utility is maximized by choosing \(X_{jk}^i\), for fixed \(j\), to be measurable with respect to \(\iota_{jk}^{il}\) — in words, the agent invests identically in all assets in market \(j\) in which she received the same signal. Furthermore, the agent will not buy any asset with low signal \((\iota_{jk}^{il} = 0)\), since it returns zero for sure but has a positive price.

Take \(k\) with \(\iota_{jk}^{il} = 1\) and let \(\hat{X}_j^i = X_{jk}^i \Pr (\iota_{jk}^{il} = 1) = X_{jk}^i \frac{\kappa}{1 - f_{ij}}\). Then both sides in equation (A.8) are also equal to

\[
E \left[ U \left( \sum_{j=1}^{K} ((1 - f_{ij})D_j - P_j) \hat{X}_j^i \right) | \iota^{il} \right],
\]  

(A.9)

which is the same as (A.1), so that \(\hat{X}_j^i = X_j^i\). It follows that the optimal position is

\[
X_{jk}^i = \Pr (\iota_{jk}^{il} = 1)^{-1} \hat{X}_{jk}^i \iota_{jk}^{il} = (1 - f_{ij}) \kappa^{-1} X_{jk}^i \iota_{jk}^{il}.
\]  

(A.10)

Equation (A.5) is immediate.

The same argument holds for the choice that a swindler makes with respect to all assets

\(^{22}\)Consequently an appropriate adaptation of the notions of sequential equilibrium or trembling-hand perfection would result in the demand curves (A.5)–(A.6).
but her own. When choosing the position in her own asset, the only consideration is the time-zero revenue \((1 - S^d)d_P\), since the asset pays zero. Given the other investors’ demands, the insider must ensure that \(P_d = P_i\). To that end she submits a demand that fails to clear the market at \(P_d \neq P_i\), and is willing to take any position at \(P_d = P_i\). 

**Proof of Proposition 3.** By the definition of \(\alpha_j\),

\[
\alpha_j = \frac{\kappa}{P_j} - 1 - \frac{\text{cov}(\frac{\kappa D_j}{P_j}, \frac{\kappa D^a}{P^a})}{(\frac{\kappa}{P_j})^2 \text{var}(D^a)} (\kappa \frac{P_j}{P^a} - 1) = \frac{\kappa}{P_j} - 1 - \beta_j^D \frac{P^a}{P_j} (\frac{\kappa}{P^a} - 1)
\]

\[
= \left( \beta_j^D \frac{P^a}{P_j} - 1 \right) + \frac{\kappa}{P_j} (1 - \beta_j^D).
\]

**Proof of Proposition 4.** Let \(R_{I,e} = R_I - 1\), \(R_{B,e} = R_B - 1\), \(\beta = \frac{\text{cov}(R_B, R_I)}{(\sigma_B)^2}\), \(\rho_{B,I} = \frac{\text{cov}(R_B, R_I)}{\sigma_B \sigma_I}\), and \(\text{sgn}(x) = 1\) for all \(x \geq 0\) and \(\text{sgn}(x) = -1\) for all \(x < 0\). Assumption (20) implies

\[
E(R_{I,e}) > \frac{\sigma_I}{\sigma_B \text{sgn} (E(R_{B,e}))} E(R_{B,e}) = \frac{\text{sgn}(E(R_{B,e}))}{\rho_{B,I}} \times \beta E(R_{B,e}).
\]

Accordingly,

\[
\alpha_{I,B} = E(R_{I,e}) - \beta E(R_{B,e})
\]

\[
> \left( \frac{\text{sgn}(E(R_{B,e}))}{\rho_{B,I}} - 1 \right) \beta E(R_{B,e})
\]

\[
= (\text{sgn}(E(R_{B,e})) - \rho_{B,I}) E(R_{B,e}) \frac{\beta}{\rho_{B,I}}. \tag{A.11}
\]

We end the proof by showing that

\[
(\text{sgn}(E(R_{B,e})) - \rho_{B,I}) E(R_{B,e}) \frac{\beta}{\rho_{B,I}} > 0. \tag{A.12}
\]

To that end, we note that \(E(R_{B,e}) - \rho_{B,I}\) has the same sign as \(E(R_{B,e})\), while \(\beta\) and \(\rho_{B,I}\)
have the same sign. This completes the proof.

**Proof of Proposition 6.** The result follows immediately from the fact that any informed excess return equals a linear combination of passive excess returns plus an additive constant, which is given by (22). Alternatively, one can also check directly that the style alpha satisfies the properties required of a performance functional $g$, with $g(1) = 1$. ■

### B Numerical Examples

**Example 1** Suppose that $K = 2$, $\kappa = 0.98$, and the information is captured by the assumption $p_{12} = p_{21} = \kappa$. We report results for two scenarios. In the first scenario, agents have CRRA preferences with risk aversion $\gamma = 2$, dividends are independent and their logarithm is normally distributed with standard deviation equal to $\sigma = 0.2$ and mean equal to $-\frac{1}{2} \sigma^2$. We apply Theorem 1b to compute equilibrium. In the second scenario, agents have CARA preferences with risk aversion $\gamma = 2$ and dividends are normal and independent with standard deviation $\sigma = 0.2$ and mean equal to 1. We apply Theorem 1 to compute the equilibrium.

Due to the symmetry of the setup, the price in both locations is the same ($P_1 = P_2 = P$) and portfolio holdings are symmetric, $X_{12} = X_{21}$. Table 1 reports the shares of the local market held by local agents $X_{11} = X_{22}$ and the equilibrium price $P$ in the two scenarios. The table also reports results for scenarios featuring one changed parameter at a time.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Portfolios (pct.)</th>
<th>Passive alphas (pct.)</th>
<th>Active alphas (pct.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma = 1$</td>
<td>$\gamma = 3$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 24 18</td>
<td>39 31 29</td>
<td>0.23 2.27 0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 58 03</td>
<td>34 40 25</td>
<td>−0.45 1.58 −0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 18 79</td>
<td>26 29 46</td>
<td>0.23 0.43 2.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: The two tables under “portfolios” provide the percentage shares of risky assets invested by agent $i$ in market $j$. Columns correspond to agents and rows to markets. Portfolios depend on whether $\gamma = 1$ or $\gamma = 3$. The column “passive alphas” provides the passive alphas obtained in the three different markets. The table “active alphas” provides the alphas obtained by (column) agent $i$ in (row) market $j$. Both passive and active alphas do not depend on $\gamma$.

The table illustrates that CRRA and CARA preferences lead to quantitatively similar outcomes. The reason for this finding is quite general: The expected consumption of the representative agent in a location is $\kappa \approx 1$, so that the two utility functions are effectively the same up to the second order. Moreover, for the parameters that we chose the normal distribution provides a good approximation to the log-normal.

Example 2 Suppose that $K = 3$, $\kappa = 0.98$, the covariance matrix of $D_{ij}$ is $0.2^2 \times I_{3 \times 3}$ (the identity matrix), and the information matrix for $p_{ij}$ is

$$p_{ij} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0.9820 & \kappa \\ 0.9820 & 1 & \kappa \\ \kappa & \kappa & 1 \end{bmatrix},$$

where the column refers to an agent and the row to a market. Using the prices given by (14), we compute the equilibrium portfolios and active and passive alphas. We record these quantities in Table 2.

Example 3 Suppose that $K = 3$, $\kappa = 0.98$, $\gamma = 4$, and the covariance and information matrices $D_{ij}$ and $p_{ij}$ are both symmetric and given by

$$\Omega = \begin{bmatrix} 0.096 & 0 & -0.036 \\ 0 & 0.06 & -0.03 \\ -0.036 & -0.03 & 0.03 \end{bmatrix}, \quad p_{ij} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0.9980 & \kappa \\ 0.9980 & 1 & \kappa \\ \kappa & \kappa & 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$
Once we solve for an equilibrium, we obtain the vector of passive strategy alphas \( \alpha_j = (2.45\%, 0.51\%, -2.64\%) \), whose smallest (largest) value is lower (higher) than \( \kappa-1 \) \((\kappa^{-1}-1)\).

**Example 4** Suppose that \( K = 3 \), \( \kappa = 0.98 \), \( \gamma = 1 \), and the covariance matrix of \( D_{ij} \) and the information matrix for \( p_{ij} \) are both symmetric and given by

\[
\Omega = \begin{bmatrix}
0.05 & 0.04 & -0.06 \\
0.04 & 0.05 & -0.06 \\
-0.06 & -0.06 & 0.09 \\
\end{bmatrix}, \quad p_{ij} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0.998 & \kappa \\
0.998 & 1 & \kappa \\
\kappa & \kappa & 1 \\
\end{bmatrix}.
\]

In equilibrium, agents 1 and 2 participate (i.e., have positive holdings) in all markets, while agent 3 holds a positive position only in market 3 and zero positions in markets 1 and 2. In this example, agent 3 has a CAPM alpha equal to \(-1.91\%\) on her (optimal) portfolio, despite utilizing superior information in market 3.
Online Appendix

A  Repeated Trade

A.1  Setup

Here we provide a dynamic extension of the model that introduces intermediate consumption and sequential trade due to information arrival. The goal of this section is illustrative, and hence we make several simplifying (but inessential) assumptions that help us save on notation and exposition.

We aim for an extension that is as close as possible to the baseline version of the model, while allowing for repeated trade. The setup is therefore the same, with the exception that there are three dates, and firm types are revealed publicly gradually. At date 0 agents are endowed with assets and can trade. At date 1 agents collect intermediate dividends, consume, and trade. At date 2 agents receive terminal dividends, which they consume. All agents maximize the same expected utility

\[-E_0 \left[ \frac{1}{\gamma_1} e^{-\gamma_1 C_1} + \frac{1}{\gamma_2} e^{-\gamma_2 C_2} \right],\]

where \(\gamma_1\) and \(\gamma_2\) capture the absolute risk aversion coefficients for intermediate and terminal consumption. (Consumption at time 1 is not important. Similarly, neither is allowing \(\gamma_1\) and \(\gamma_2\) to differ, though it is useful if one wishes to maintain the same absolute risk aversion coefficient for the value function at dates 0 and 1).

Just as in the baseline version of the model, agents obtain signals about all firms at time 0. As in the text, a positive signal identifies the fraction \(\kappa\) of regular firms correctly, but also mis-classifies an additional mass of \(\frac{f_{ij}}{1-f_{ij}} \kappa\) fraudulent firms as regular. We recall the notation \(p_{ij} = 1 - f_{ij}\).

At the interim date 1 all firms (fraudulent and regular) in location \(j\) pay the same normally distributed dividend \(D_{j,1}\) with mean 1 and variance \(\sigma_1^2\). At date 2 regular firms pay
a second dividend \( D_{j,2} \) with mean 1 and variance \( \sigma_2^2 \), which is independent of the dividend paid at date 1. By contrast, fraudulent firms pay a dividend of 0 at date 2, similar to the text. To simplify, we assume that the dividends are independent across locations.

Other than intermediate payoff, the main feature of this dynamic extension is the arrival of a public signal at the interim date 1. This signal arrives before agents engage in date-1 trade and betrays a fraction \( \delta \) of the fraudulent firms as such. Accordingly, these firms pay the dividend \( D_{j,1} \) and, since everyone understands that they will not be making further dividend payments, their price drops to zero.

Finally, we impose shorting constraints. Since all swindlers in location \( j \) experience the same demand for their shares from location \( i \), all investors in location \( i \) experience the same capital loss \( X_{j,0}^i P_{j,1} \delta f_{ij} \kappa \) upon arrival of the public signal.

Agents can trade in shares of all firms in all locations as described in the text. In addition, they can employ a storage technology that allows them to exchange one unit of consumption in period \( t \) for \( 1 + r \) units of consumption in period \( t + 1 \). The interest rate is therefore fixed at \( r \).

### A.2 Optimization problems

We conjecture in this section, and verify later in the next, the existence of a pooling equilibrium similar to the one described in the text. Specifically, all firms in location \( j \) at time \( t \) trade at the same equilibrium price \( P_{j,t} \). Swindlers in location \( j \) find it optimal to adjust their holdings of their own stock \( S_{j}^{eq} \) to ensure that the market for their stock clears at the price \( P_{j,t} \). Because prices are non-informative, investors utilize their imperfect private signals when selecting stocks in each period and only invest in the stocks that their signal identifies as regular.

Using backwards induction, the optimization problem of a regular investor is

\[
V_1(W_1^{ci}) = \max_{B_1^{ci},X_{j,1}^{ci} \geq 0,C_1^{ci}} \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_1}e^{-\gamma_1C_1^{ci}} + \frac{1}{\gamma_2}E_1e^{-\gamma_2W_2^{ci}} \right), \tag{A.1}
\]
subject to
\[ B^c_i + \sum_{j=1}^{K} P_{j,1} X^c_i + C^c_i = W^c_1 \]  
and
\[ W^c_2 = B^c_1 (1 + r) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \hat{p}_{ij,1} D_{j,2} X^c_{j,1}, \]
where
\[ \hat{p}_{ij,1} = \frac{\kappa + (1 - \delta) \frac{f_{ij}}{1 - f_{ij}} \kappa}{\kappa + \frac{f_{ij}}{1 - f_{ij}} \kappa} = 1 - \delta f_{ij}. \]

We note also that the time-1 wealth of the agent is given by
\[ W^c_1 = B^c_0 (1 + r) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} X^c_{j,0} (D_{j,1} + \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{j,1}), \]
where
\[ \hat{p}_{ij,0} = \frac{\kappa}{\kappa + (1 - \delta) \frac{f_{ij}}{1 - f_{ij}} \kappa} = \frac{1 - f_{ij}}{1 - \delta f_{ij}}. \]

The problem of the investor is essentially identical to the one in the text, except for the presence of intermediate consumption and the fact that the one-period-ahead post-tax adjustment factors from the points of view of dates 0 and 1 are given by \( \hat{p}_{ij,0} \) and \( \hat{p}_{ij,1} \) respectively. Notice that the compounded post-tax adjustment factors satisfy \( \hat{p}_{ij,0} \hat{p}_{ij,1} = 1 - f_{ij} = p_{ij} \), which is the one-period post-tax adjustment factor in the text. In that sense, this model captures a two-stage release of information.

The swindler faces an identical maximization problem at time 1, once we compute her time-1 wealth as
\[ B^s_i + W^s_i = B^s_i (1 + r) + \sum_{j=1}^{K} X^s_{j,0} (D_{j,1} + \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{j,1}) + (S^s_{i,0} - S^s_{i,1}) P_{s,1}, \]
i.e., we take into account the proceeds from the sale of additional fraudulent shares at date 1.

### A.2.1 Equilibrium at the interim date

Repeating the analysis in the text, and noting that optimal risky asset demands are the same for both swindlers and regular investors, the demand $X^i_{j,1}$ for stocks in location $j$ emanating from location $i$ obeys the first order equation:

$$
\gamma_2 \hat{p}_{ij,1} \sigma_2^2 X^i_{j,1} = \hat{p}_{ij,1} - P_{j,1} (1 + r) + \lambda_{ij,1}.
$$

(A.6)

As in the text, market clearing requires that

$$
\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \hat{p}_{ij,1} X^i_{j,1}.
$$

(A.7)

Dividing both sides of (A.6) by $\hat{p}_{ij,1}$, adding across all $i$, and using (A.7) leads to

$$
P_{j,1} (1 + r) = \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \hat{p}^{-1}_{ij,1} \right)^{-1} \times \left( 1 - \gamma_2 \sigma_2^2 \frac{\kappa}{K} + \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \hat{p}^{-1}_{ij,1} \lambda_{ij,1} \right). 
$$

(A.8)

Note that (A.8) is identical to equation (14) in the text. Since the goal of this section is illustrative, we assume further that the parameters are such that $\lambda_{ij,1} = 0$, i.e.,

$$
\min_i \hat{p}_{ij,1} - \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \hat{p}^{-1}_{ij,1} \right)^{-1} \left( 1 - \gamma_2 \sigma_2^2 \frac{\kappa}{K} \right) > 0.
$$

(A.9)

For future reference, we note that with $\lambda_{ij,1} = 0$ equations (A.6) and (A.8) imply

$$
X^i_{j,1} = \left( \hat{p}_{ij,1} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} \hat{p}^{-1}_{lj,1} \right)^{-1} \times \frac{\kappa}{\hat{p}_{ij,1}} + \frac{1 - \left( \hat{p}_{ij,1} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} \hat{p}^{-1}_{lj,1} \right)^{-1}}{\gamma_2 \hat{p}_{ij,1} \sigma_2^2}. 
$$

(A.10)

### A.2.2 Date zero prices

Solving the consumption problem associated with (A.1)–(A.3) and substituting back the optimized value for consumption and asset demands, the value function at time 1 of an
investor in location \( i \) is given by\(^{23}\)

\[
V_1 (W_1) = \varphi_i e^{-\rho W_1},
\]

where

\[
\rho \equiv \frac{\gamma_1 \gamma_2 (1 + r)}{(\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 (1 + r))},
\]

and \( \varphi_i \) is a constant that depends on the investor’s location (and hence on the quality of her information), but not on whether she is a swindler or a common investor.\(^{24}\)

The period-zero problem of a common investor is to maximize \( \mathbb{E}[V_1 (W_1)] \) subject to her budget constraint, which leads to the first order condition

\[
X_{ci} = 1 + \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{j,1} - P_{j,0} (1 + r) + \lambda_{ij,0} \rho \sigma_1^2.
\]

A difference with the baseline model is that — due to the presence of an intermediate dividend that is paid by both regular and fraudulent stocks — the swindler has an incentive to short the local regular firms in period zero in an effort to hedge out the date-1 location-specific dividend exposure that results from retaining \( S_0^{	ext{si}} \) shares in her own firm. Indeed, while the swindler’s first order condition for all locations \( i \neq j \) is identical to equation (A.13),

\(^{23}\) Because of the finite horizon of the setup, the absolute risk aversion coefficient of the value function is \( \rho \), and is not equal to either \( \gamma_1 \) or \( \gamma_2 \). This is an artefact of the finite horizon nature of the setup. (One simple way to ensure that our results do not rely on this feature is to simply set \( \gamma_1 = \gamma_2 = r \) in which case \( \rho = \gamma_2 \) and the demand functions for risky assets have the same slope across the two periods.)

\(^{24}\) Specifically,

\[
\varphi = e^{-\frac{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 (1 + r)}{\gamma_1 + \gamma_2 (1 + r)} b \left( \frac{1}{\gamma_1} + \frac{1}{\gamma_2 (1 + r)} \right)},
\]

where

\[
b = \log \left( E_1 \exp \left( -\gamma_2 \sum_{j=1}^{K} X_{j,1}^i (p_{ij,1} D_{j,2} - P_{j,1} (1 + r)) \right) \right) - \log (1 + r).
\]

Since the optimal choice of \( X_{j,1}^i \) does not depend on the investor’s wealth (due to exponential utilities), \( \varphi \) depends on the investment opportunity set, but not on the investor’s wealth. Moreover, the constant is the same for swindlers and common investors alike.
her unconstrained demand for regular firms in location \( j \) is given by
\[
X_{j,0}^{s_j} = X_{j,0}^{c_j} - S_{0}^{s_j}.
\] (A.14)

In words, the above equation says that the swindler would like to equalize her exposure to period-1 dividend risk \((X_{j,0}^{s_j} + S_{0}^{s_j})D_{j,1}\) to that of a regular investor in the same location \((X_{j,0}^{c_j}D_{j,1})\). As long as \(p_{ij} > \kappa\) for some \(i\), the quantity \(X_{j,0}^{s_j} - S_{0}^{s_j}\) would be negative in equilibrium if shorting was allowed.\(^{25}\) With constrained shorting, the swindler has a zero demand for local regular firms.\(^{26}\)

The market clearing condition for regular firms becomes
\[
\kappa = \sum_{i \neq j} X_i^{j,0} (1 - f_{ij}) + \kappa X_{j,0}^{c_j},
\] (A.15)

which we rewrite as
\[
\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} X_{j,0}^{i}
\] (A.16)

by defining \(\bar{p}_{ij,0} = p_{ij}\) if \(i \neq j\) and \(\bar{p}_{ii,0} = \kappa\).

Combining (A.13) with (A.16) gives
\[
P_{j,0} (1 + r) = 1 + P_{j,1} \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} \hat{p}_{ij,0} \right) - \frac{\kappa}{K} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} \lambda_{ij,0} + \frac{\rho \sigma_1^2}{K} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0}. \] (A.17)

Restricting attention to parameters such that
\[
P_{j,1} \left( \min_i \hat{p}_{ij,0} - \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} \hat{p}_{ij,0} \right) + \frac{\kappa}{K} \frac{\rho \sigma_1^2}{K} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} > 0, \] (A.18)

all \(\lambda_{ij,0}\) in equation (A.17) are zero. Condition (A.18) will hold for large enough \(\rho\) and \(\sigma_1\).

Equations (A.8) and (A.17) give the equilibrium prices in periods 0 and 1 respectively.

\(^{25}\)The reason is that each foreigner’s signal identifies all regular firms as such but only a fraction of the fraudulent firms. Hence the foreign demand for fraudulent stocks is smaller than the foreign demand for regular stocks, as long as some of the signals contain some useful information \((p_{ij} > \kappa)\).

\(^{26}\)We also solved a version of the model where we allow the swindler to short local regular firms, and verified that the conclusions of this section do not depend on whether the swindler can short local stocks or not.
A.3 Verification of conjectured equilibrium

We conclude by verifying that, for an appropriate subset of parameter values, the swindler has an incentive to “pool,” i.e., to set her demands $S_{sj}^0$ and $S_{sj}^1$ so that the market for her stock clears at prices $P_{j,0}$ and $P_{j,1}$ respectively.

We start by considering the incentive of a swindler whose stock is not publicly identified as fraudulent to submit an elastic demand curve at time 1. Similar to the one-period model we presented in the text, the swindler knows that her stock will pay no dividend at time 2. Hence, as long as $S_{sj}^0 - S_{sj}^1 > 0$ — i.e., as long as the swindler is a net seller of her stock in period 1 — she has an incentive to pool.

To derive conditions under which $S_{sj}^0 > S_{sj}^1$, we note that market clearing at time 0 for fraudulent firms implies that $S_{sj}^0$ is given by

$$1 - \kappa = \sum_{i \neq j}^K f_{ij}X_{j,0}^i + (1 - \kappa) S_{sj}^0.$$  (A.19)

The left-hand side of equation (A.19) represents the supply of fraudulent shares, while the right-hand side gives the sum of the external demand $\sum_{i \neq j}^K f_{ij}X_{j,0}^i$ and the demand that swindlers need to absorb, $(1 - \kappa) S_{sj}^0$. Similarly, market clearing at time 1 implies

$$(1 - \kappa) (1 - \delta) = \sum_{i \neq j}^K (1 - \hat{p}_{ij,1}) X_{j,1}^i + (1 - \kappa) (1 - \delta) S_{sj}^1.$$  (A.20)

Dividing both sides of (A.19) by $1 - \kappa$ gives

$$1 = \sum_{i \neq j}^K \frac{f_{ij}}{1 - \kappa} X_{j,0}^i + S_{sj}^0,$$  (A.21)

while dividing both sides of (A.20) by $(1 - \kappa) (1 - \delta)$ and using the definitions of $\hat{p}_{ij,1}$ and $\hat{p}_{ij,0}$ gives

$$1 = \sum_{i \neq j}^K \frac{f_{ij}}{(1 - \kappa) \hat{p}_{ij,0}} X_{j,1}^i + S_{sj}^1.$$  (A.22)

Subtracting (A.22) from (A.21) and re-arranging leads to

$$S_{sj}^0 - S_{sj}^1 = \frac{1}{(1 - \kappa)} \sum_{i = 1}^K \frac{f_{ij}}{\hat{p}_{ij,0}} (X_{j,1}^i - \hat{p}_{ij,0}X_{j,0}^i).$$  (A.23)
In turn, equations (A.13) and (A.8) imply

$$X_{ci,j,0} = \left( \hat{p}_{ij,0} - \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} \hat{p}_{ij,0} \right) \right) \frac{P_{j,1}}{\kappa \rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{K} \frac{\kappa}{\sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0}},$$

(A.24)

while equation (A.10) implies

$$X_{i,j,1} = \left( \frac{1}{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} \hat{p}_{ij,1} \right)^{-1} \times \frac{\kappa}{\hat{p}_{ij,1} K} + \frac{1 - \left( \hat{p}_{ij,1} \frac{1}{K} \sum_{l=1}^{K} \hat{p}_{ij,1} \right)^{-1}}{\gamma_2 \hat{p}_{ij,1} \sigma_2^2}.$$

(A.25)

To ensure that the swindler has an incentive to pool at date 1, we need the right hand side of (A.23) to be positive. The following result provides sufficient parameter conditions under which this is the case.

**Lemma 7** If $\delta$ sufficiently close to one and $p_{ij}$ is sufficiently close to $\kappa$ for all $i \neq j$, then $S_{s}^{s_j} > S_{1}^{s_j}$.

The lemma is based on the observation that, under symmetric information at time 1 ($\delta = 1$), foreigners demand as much of regular assets in a location as locals, but less when at an information disadvantage, thus at time 0.

**Proof of Lemma 7.** As $\delta$ approaches one we have $\lim_{\delta \to 1} \min_{i,j} \hat{p}_{ij,1} = 1$, and hence equation (A.25) implies $\lim X_{i,j,1} = \frac{\kappa}{K}$. Furthermore, $p_{ij}$ and $\hat{p}_{ij,0}$ are equal in the limit. Equation (A.24) implies

$$\lim_{p_{ij} \to \kappa \forall i \neq j, \delta \to 1} \hat{p}_{ij,0} X_{j,0}^{ci} = \kappa \left( \kappa - \left( \frac{K - 1}{K} \kappa + \frac{1}{K} \right) \right) \frac{P_{j,1}}{\rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{\kappa}{K} < \frac{\kappa}{K}.$$

Accordingly, $X_{j,1}^{i} - \hat{p}_{ij,0} X_{j,0}^{i} > 0$ in the limit, and consequently the right-hand side of (A.23) is strictly positive, proving the lemma. ■

We next turn to period 0. Using the swindler’s budget constraint, and noting that the optimal demands of risky assets for the swindler and the common investor are the same for
all locations \( j \neq i \), the period-1 wealth of the swindler is

\[
W_1^{si} = (1 - S_0^{si}) P_{i,0} (1 + r) + \sum_{j \neq i}^K X^{ci}_{j,0} (D_{j,1} + \hat{p}_{j,0} P_{j,1} - P_{j,0} (1 + r)) \\
+ S_0^{si} D_{i,1} + \left( S_0^{si} - S_1^{si} \right) P_{i,1} h_{it},
\]  

(A.26)

where \( h_{it} \) is an indicator function taking value 0 if the swindler’s stock is not publicly identified as fraudulent at time 1 (its type is still “hidden”) and 0 otherwise.

A swindler could choose to not submit an elastic demand at price \( P_j \), in which case her stock would be identified as fraudulent. In that case her stock would sell at time 0 for the price \( P_{i,0}^f \equiv P_{i,0} - \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{i,1} \). While the swindler is selling her shares for a lower price, she is no longer forced to retain a fraction of her own stock and hence absorb a disproportionate share of the risk associated with the interim period dividend. She can just behave like a regular investor with an endowment whose value is not \( P_{i,0} \) but \( P_{i,0}^f \). The wealth of a swindler who decides to not pool is therefore

\[
W_1^{si,f} = P_{i,0} (1 + r) - \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{i,1} + \sum_{j=1}^K X^{ci}_{j,0} (D_{j,1} + \hat{p}_{j,0} P_{j,1} - P_{j,0} (1 + r)).
\]  

(A.27)

Subtracting (A.26) from (A.27) gives

\[
\Delta W_1^{si} = (S_0^{si} - X_{i,0}^{ci}) (D_{i,1} - P_{i,0} (1 + r)) + \left( \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - X_{i,0}^{ci} \right) P_{i,1} + \left( S_0^{si} - S_1^{si} \right) P_{i,1} h_{it}.
\]

Lemma 8 Assume that \( \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - X_{i,0}^{ci} > 0 \). Then

\[
E \left[ e^{-\rho W_1^{si}} \right] < E \left[ e^{-\rho W_1^{si,f}} \right].
\]  

(A.28)

\footnote{If the price were lower, than the investor with the worst possible information (\( j = \arg \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} \)) about location \( i \) would strictly prefer to purchase the fraudulent stock for the price \( P_{i,0}^f \) and then invest \( \frac{\min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} P_{i,1}}{1 + r} \) in a bond, thus guaranteeing herself a return higher than what she would achieve by investing in a stock that her information identifies as regular in location \( i \).}
Proof of Lemma 8. Market clearing for regular firms at time 0 implies

\[ 1 = \sum_{i \neq j} \left( \frac{\bar{p}_{ij,0}}{\kappa} \right) X_{j,0}^{ci} + X_{i,0}^{ci} \]

and hence

\[ \lim_{\max_{i,j} \text{s.t. } i \neq j (p_{ij}) \to \kappa} X_{i,0}^{ci} = 1 - \sum_{i \neq j} X_{j,0}^{ci} \, . \]

Similarly, market clearing for fraudulent firms is

\[ 1 = \sum_{i \neq j} \left( \frac{f_{ij}}{1 - \kappa} \right) X_{j,0}^{ci} + S_{i,0}^{si} \, . \]

Taking limits,

\[ \lim_{\max_{i,j} \text{s.t. } i \neq j (p_{ij}) \to \kappa} S_{i,0}^{si} = 1 - \sum_{i \neq j} X_{j,0}^{ci} = \lim_{\max_{i,j} \text{s.t. } i \neq j (p_{ij}) \to \kappa} X_{i,0}^{ci} \, . \]

i.e.,

\[ \lim_{\max_{i,j} \text{s.t. } i \neq j (p_{ij}) \to \kappa} (S_{0}^{si} - X_{i,0}^{ci}) = 0 \]

and therefore the variances of the normal terms in \( W_{1}^{si} \) and \( W_{1}^{si,f} \) are equal in the limit, while \( E[\Delta W_{1}^{si}] > 0 \). Even in the absence of the term \((S_{0}^{si} - S_{1}^{si}) P_{i,1} h_{il}\), therefore, we would have

\[ E \left[ e^{-\rho W_{1}^{si}} \right] < E \left[ e^{-\rho W_{1}^{si,f}} \right] \, . \]

Since this term only decreases the left-hand side, the conclusion holds. ■

We note that \( \hat{p}_{ij} \geq p_{ij} \geq \kappa \), and a reasonable calibration for \( \kappa \) would be at least 0.9, possibly much closer to 1. On the other hand, \( X_{i,0}^{ci} \) would be not too far from \( \frac{1}{\kappa} \); even with
extreme home bias, this value would be expected to exceed 0.75. In the interest of making statements about exogenous parameters, we nevertheless state another lemma:

**Lemma 9** A sufficient condition for \( \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - X_{i,0}^{ci} > 0 \) is

\[
\kappa - \left( \frac{1 - \kappa}{\rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{K} \right) > 0.
\]

(A.29)

**Proof of Lemma 9.** Equation (A.8) implies \( P_{j,1} < 1 \) and hence

\[
\min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - X_{i,0}^{ci} = \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - \left( \left( \hat{p}_{ij,0} - \frac{1}{K} \sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0} \hat{p}_{ij,0} \right) \frac{P_{j,1}}{\rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{K} \frac{\kappa}{\sum_{i=1}^{K} \bar{p}_{ij,0}} \right) > \kappa - \left( \frac{1 - \kappa}{\rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{K} \right)
\]

Hence, if \( \kappa - \left( \frac{1 - \kappa}{\rho \sigma_1^2} + \frac{1}{K} \right) > 0 \), then \( \min_j \hat{p}_{ij,0} - X_{i,0}^{ci} > 0 \). ■

**A.4 Discussion**

This model extension is designed to make one point: The pooling outcome can survive in an economy in which markets are active repeatedly, and agents incur strictly positive costs from pooling, namely under-diversification. The key reason is the possibility of selling more shares at a pooling, thus inflated, price in the future.

We kept the model deliberately bare, but it is worth pointing out several elements that could be incorporated easily. One is an additional reason why swindlers may end up selling more in the future: new-share issuance. Thus, one can imagine that regular firms occasionally have new investment opportunities that they finance with new equity, and that fraudulent firms copy their issuance behavior and use the proceeds to benefit the concentrated owner (the swindler) excessively.

Another would be the explicit modeling of a longer duration between time 0, when the initial sale happens, and the date when the public signal is revealed — say, \( T - 1 \), with \( T > 2 \) this time. At times \( t = 1, 2, \) etc., the swindlers continue to experience the diversification
incentive to signal, but the prospect of further sales at $T - 1$ can suffice to induce pooling. Furthermore, such future sale possibilities may recur, especially if taking the form of new-share issuance.

**B Multiple Types of Regular Firms**

We address here the question of the type, if any, with which swindlers choose to pool when there exist different types of regular firms, trading at different prices. The main conclusion is that the swindlers may choose to pool with any type of firm, a conclusion that we illustrate in a simple multiple-type extension of the baseline model.

To keep the setup as simple as possible, we consider a symmetric two-location model. In each location $j$ there is a benchmark normally distributed dividend $D_j$ with standard deviation $\sigma_D$. For ease of exposition, we assume $D_1$ and $D_2$ to be independent, and also assume that agents have a constant absolute risk aversion equal to $\gamma$. This simple setup facilitates simple and transparent closed-form solutions.

Firms may be either regular or fraudulent. As in the main model, fraudulent firms pay a dividend of zero and are owned initially by swindlers, who trade them strategically. Regular firms come in several — for simplicity, two — types, defined by their dividend. Specifically, a firm $k$ in location $j$ may be of type $\tau = t < 1$ or of type $\tau = 1$, meaning that its dividend is $\tau D_j$. (Note that we can refer to fraudulent firms as firms of type 0.) There is a mass of $\kappa$ regular firms in each location, of which $a_t\kappa$ of type $t$ and $a_1\kappa$ of type 1, with $a_t + a_1 = 1$.

To keep the analysis close to the baseline text, we assume that locals are perfectly informed about the local firms. However, they have imperfect information about the foreign firms. Each agent receives a signal about each “foreign” firm. If the firm is of type $\tau > 0$, then the signal is $\tau$. If the firm is fraudulent, then the signal is $\tau$ with probability $b_\tau > 0$, where $\tau \in \{0, t, 1\}$. We assume that, conditional on a firm, the agents’ signals are drawn independently from the distribution described.

In equilibrium, firms of type $\tau > 0$ are traded at price $P_\tau$, while a firm of type 0 may be traded at either price. We denote the probability that a firm identified as of type $\tau$ to a
foreigner is actually of that type by \( p_r \). We also define \( \bar{\tau} = a_t t + a_1 \) to capture the economy’s loading on the dividend level \( D_t \).

We concentrate on symmetric equilibria in the sense that prices are independent of location. We distinguish several cases.

**Case 1.** \( P_t \neq P_1 \) and all fraudulent firms trade at \( P_1 \). In this case, we show that, of the local firms, local investors invest only in the ones that are truly of type 1, and shun the type-\( t \) firms. The reason is that they have superior information, so their advantage is to tell apart the firms that are pooled. Letting \( W_1 \) denote the time-1 wealth of agent 1, marginal-utility considerations for this agent give

\[
\begin{align*}
\gamma \text{cov}(D_1, W_1) &= 1 - P_1 + \lambda_{11} \quad \text{(B.1)} \\
\gamma \text{cov}(tD_1, W_1) &= t - P_t + \lambda_{1t} \quad \text{(B.2)} \\
\gamma \text{cov}(p_1D_2, W_1) &= p_1 - P_1 + \lambda_{21} \quad \text{(B.3)} \\
\gamma \text{cov}(tD_2, W_1) &= t - P_t + \lambda_{2t}, \quad \text{(B.4)}
\end{align*}
\]

where we added Lagrange \( \lambda_{11}, \lambda_{1t}, \) etc. for all the positions, of which none may be short, and the probability \( p_1 \) that a firm purchased as type 1 by a foreigner is indeed of type 1 is computed similarly to the text as

\[
p_1 = \frac{a_1 \kappa}{a_1 \kappa + b_1 (1 - \kappa)} < 1. \quad \text{(B.5)}
\]

We have the following lemma.

**Lemma 10** In any equilibrium where the swindlers pool with type-1 firms, it must be the case that

1. \( \lambda_{11} = \lambda_{21} = \lambda_{2t} = 0; \)
2. \( \lambda_{1t} > 0. \)

**Proof of Lemma 10.** Since both types of assets are held in equilibrium, at least one of \( \lambda_{11} \)
and $\lambda_{21}$ is zero, and similarly at least one of $\lambda_{1t}$ and $\lambda_{2t}$ is zero.\textsuperscript{28} In an equilibrium of the type we propose it must also be the case that $\lambda_{21} = 0$. Otherwise, there would be no trade in type-1 stocks by foreigners and hence swindlers would have no incentive to pool with type-1 stocks. (We verify later that indeed $\lambda_{21} = 0$ in our proposed equilibrium). It then follows, from equations (B.1) and (B.3), that $\text{cov}(D_2, W_1) < \text{cov}(D_1, W_1)$: the local agent is more exposed to a location’s dividend than the foreigner. Equations (B.2) and (B.4) then imply that $\lambda_{1t} > \lambda_{2t}$, thus $\lambda_{2t} = 0$ and $\lambda_{1t} > 0$. Finally, since $\lambda_{1t} > 0$, $\lambda_{11} = 0$: agent 1 must invest in some local assets, otherwise $\text{cov}(D_1, W_1) = 0$, and the foreigner would have to be holding all local assets in equilibrium. By symmetry, this would imply $\text{cov}(D_2, W_1) > 0 = \text{cov}(D_1, W_1)$, which contradicts $\text{cov}(D_2, W_1) < \text{cov}(D_1, W_1)$.  

An immediate implication of Lemma 10 is the following relation between $P_1$ and $P_t$:

$$\frac{P_t}{P_1} = \frac{t}{p_1},$$

(B.6)

which follows from combining (B.3) with (B.4) and the first statement in Lemma 10. Intuitively, in an equilibrium of the type we envisage foreigners are “marginal” in both types of stocks, and hence the ratio of dividends equals the ratio of prices.

Next we derive some explicit expressions for prices and demands $X_{i\tau}$, where $i$ refers to the agents located in $i$, $j$ refers to the destination market and $\tau$ denotes the perceived quality of the asset. We note that, by symmetry, $X_{i\tau} = X_{j\tau}$.

Using this symmetry relation, the market clearing conditions can be expressed as

$$X_{11} + p_1 X_{21} = a_1 \kappa$$

(B.7)

$$X_{2t} = a_t \kappa.$$  

(B.8)

Using the definition of wealth $W_1 = X_{11} D_1 + (p_1 X_{21} + t X_{2t}) D_2$ and combining the four equations (B.1)–(B.4) with the two market clearing conditions (B.7)–(B.8) allows us to solve

\textsuperscript{28}Note that — due to symmetry — the regular investors in both locations have symmetric multipliers. Hence if both $\lambda_{11}$ and $\lambda_{21}$ were positive, then no agent would want to hold firms of type $\tau = 1$ in either location. Similarly, at least one of $\lambda_{1t}$ and $\lambda_{2t}$ must be zero in an equilibrium, otherwise no one would express a positive demand for assets of type $t$.  

56
explicitly for the equilibrium price and the demands as

\[
P_1 = \left(\frac{1}{2} (1 + p_1^{-1})\right)^{-1} \left(1 - (a_1 + ta_t) \gamma \kappa \frac{\sigma_D^2}{2}\right)
\]

\[
= \left(\frac{1}{2} (1 + p_1^{-1})\right)^{-1} \left(1 - \bar{\tau} \gamma \kappa \frac{\sigma_D^2}{2}\right),
\]

(B.9)

while the traded quantities are given by

\[
X_{11}^1 = \frac{1 - P_1}{\gamma \sigma_D^2},
\]

(B.10)

\[
X_{21}^1 = \frac{p_1 - P_1}{\gamma p_1^2 \sigma_D^2} - \frac{ta_t \kappa}{p_1},
\]

(B.11)

\[
X_{2t}^1 = a_t \kappa.
\]

(B.12)

We note that the expression for the price is essentially identical to the one we obtained in the text, which shows that the economy with multiple types of regular firms is quite similar to the one with a single type.

To complete the equilibrium verification it remains to check that the swindler indeed has an incentive to pool with type-1 assets. An intermediate step towards verifying this is to ensure that \(X_{21}^1 > 0\) in equilibrium (if foreigners don’t purchase type-1 assets, then the swindlers would have no incentive to pool with the type 1 assets). Combining (B.11) with (B.9) leads to the condition

\[
1 - \frac{2}{1 + p_1} \left(1 - \bar{\tau} \gamma \kappa \frac{\sigma_D^2}{2}\right) > ta_t \gamma \kappa \sigma_D^2,
\]

(B.13)

or

\[
1 - p_1 < \gamma \kappa \sigma_D^2 (a_1 - p_1 ta_t),
\]

(B.14)

which is satisfied when \(\gamma \sigma_D^2\) is sufficiently large (providing motives to diversify, and hence trade for non-informational reasons) and \(ta_t\) is small (the payoff of type-\(t\) assets is not a substantial part of the economy).

Assuming parameters such that (B.14) holds, we next consider the profits that a swindler realizes from pooling with type-1 assets, as required by equilibrium — denoted by \(\Pi^*\) — relative to type-\(t\) assets, obtained if the agent deviated — denoted by \(\Pi'\).
To determine these profits, we observe that in the proposed equilibrium the total quantity of shares demanded of any fraudulent firm is \( \frac{1-p_t}{1-\kappa} X_{11}^2 \), resulting in the following proceeds

\[
\Pi^* = \frac{b_1 X_{11}^2}{a_1 \kappa + b_1 (1 - \kappa)} P_1. \tag{B.15}
\]

If the swindler deviates, then each swindler gets to sell to \( b_t \) foreigners, each of which buys \( X_{1t}^2 = a_t \kappa \) shares, or one share of every firm, since foreigners buy all firms of type \( t \). Consequently the swindler’s profit is

\[
\Pi' = b_t P_t. \tag{B.16}
\]

It is easy to see that, as long as \( X_{11}^2 > 0 \), thus as long as equation (B.14) is satisfied, then \( \Pi^* > \Pi' \) for low enough \( b_t \) and hence the swindler has no incentive to pool with type \( t \) firms. (Note that \( b_t \) does not enter (B.14).)

**Case 2.** \( P_t \neq P_1 \) and all fraudulent firms trade at \( P_t \). Here the previous analysis applies word for word, as long as types 1 and \( t \) are interchanged. In particular, the pricing equations are given by

\[
P_t = \frac{1}{2} \left( 1 + p_t^{-1} \right)^{-1} \left( 1 - \bar{\tau} \gamma \kappa t \sigma_D^2 \right), \tag{B.17}
\]

\[
P_1 = \frac{P_t}{tp_t}, \tag{B.18}
\]

with

\[
p_t = \frac{a_t \kappa}{a_1 \kappa + b_t (1 - \kappa)} < 1. \tag{B.19}
\]

**Case 3.** A slightly different type of equilibrium is one that obtains when \( a_1 \) and \( a_t \) are large enough that swindlers are tempted to deviate to an asset with no adverse selection, and therefore end up mixing. In this case, \( P_1 \neq P_t \) and there is pooling in both assets — thus foreigners continue to invest in both.
In this case, pricing depends, once again, on which asset(s) locals invest in. As in cases 1 and 2, locals may end up investing in only one asset, whose price is then given by equation (B.9) or (B.17), as the case may be. Furthermore, locals may be marginal in both assets, as well, and if so both equations hold. The one additional difference with cases 1 and 2 is that the probabilities \( p_1 \) and \( p_t \) now depend on the swindlers’ mixing choices; in particular, they are determined precisely so that the swindlers are indifferent.

To summarize, in an economy with multiple types of regular firms, swindlers may pool with either type, or indeed with both. In all cases, however, prices and trading are qualitatively the same as in the baseline economy, which features one type of regular firms. In particular, there is always some degree of pooling — swindlers have no disincentive to pool, the only question is what types they pool with — that imposes an implicit tax on foreigners in the assets concerned. Furthermore, since these assets attract investment from both locals and foreigners, the formula for the price given in the text, equation (14), holds for that asset with all Lagrange multipliers \( \lambda \) equal to zero.

### C  Dividend Manipulation and No Shorting

We sketch here a model of dividend manipulation, and in particular how the possibility of such manipulation can impose an endogenous barrier to shorting.\(^{29}\) Specifically, we assume that each swindler has the ability to borrow any amount \( L \) of her choosing at time 0, divert these funds into the firm, and report earnings equal to \( L (1 + r) = L \) in period 1. (Equivalently, we could assume that the swindler can take an action to produce earnings \( L \) by incurring a personal non-pecuniary cost of effort, which would have a value \( L \) in monetary terms.)

Here we modify the conditional independence of signals, and posit instead a joint distribution under which all the signals about some fraudulent assets are negative, but the identity of these assets is unknown to everybody. Thus, an agent with a negative signal about a firm

---

\(^{29}\)The idea that dividend manipulation can form the basis for stock price manipulation relates to Vila (1989).
cannot be sure that all the other agents don’t also have negative signals. Mathematically, for any firm \( k \) in location \( j \) and any agent \( l \) in location \( i \), the probability that all the signals obtained about the firm in all locations \( i' \) are negative conditional on the signal to agent \( l \) in location \( i \) being non-negative is strictly positive:

\[
Pr \left( \tau_{ij}^{'l'} = 0 \; \forall i', l' | \tau_{ij}^l = 0 \right) > 0.
\]

Given the possibility of dividend manipulation, equation (5), giving the swindler’s time-1 wealth, becomes

\[
W^{sil}_1 \equiv B^{sil} + \sum_{j=1}^{K} \int_{k \in [0,1]} D_{jk} X^{sil}_{jk} \, dk + L^{il} (S^{il} - 1). \quad (C.1)
\]

We note that the difference to (5) is the term \( L^{il} (S^{il} - 1) \), which is intuitive. If \( S^{il} - 1 < 0 \), i.e., if the swindler reduces her ownership of shares by being a net seller, then she has no incentive to perform earnings diversion, since she will recover only a fraction of the funds she diverted into the company. If, however, the swindler is a net buyer of her own security \( (S^{il} - 1 > 0) \), then the ability to manipulate earnings becomes infinitely valuable, since \( L^{il} \) can be chosen to be an arbitrarily large number. Intuitively, the swindler can report arbitrarily large profits at the expense of outside investors who hold negative positions (short sellers) in the fraudulent firm.

This feature discourages any other agent from shorting: with non-zero probability all other agents know that the firm is fraudulent and don’t buy any shares, so that any shorting results in \( S^{il} > 1 \).

**D Leverage constraints**

The goal of this extension is to show how a leverage constraint, which implies that an investor’s portfolio may not be mean variance efficient even with her own information set, can imply a negative CAPM alpha on the investor’s (constrained) optimal portfolio.
To fix ideas, suppose that an agent with CARA coefficient \( \gamma \) cannot issue bonds \((B \geq 0)\). Letting \( X \) denote a vector of the investor’s holding in market \( j = 1, 2, \ldots, K \), her optimization problem can be written in vector form as

\[
\min_{\mu, \lambda, \Lambda} \max_{X, B} \Pi'X'1_K + B - \frac{\gamma}{2} X'\Pi'\Omega\Pi X - \mu (X'P + B - W_0) + \lambda_B B + X'\Lambda,
\]

where \( \Pi \) is a diagonal matrix with \( j \)’th diagonal element given by \( p_{ij} \), \( 1_K \) is a column vector of ones of length \( K \), \( \Omega \) is the covariance matrix of dividends, \( P \) is a vector of prices, \( W_0 \) is the agents initial wealth, \( \lambda_B \) is the Lagrange multiplier associated with \( B \geq 0 \), \( \Lambda \) is a column vector of Lagrange multipliers associated with \( X_{ij} \geq 0 \), and \( \mu \) the Lagrange multiplier associated with the agent’s budget constraint.

The first order conditions with respect to \( X \) and \( B \) imply

\[
\frac{1}{\gamma} (\Pi_i\Omega\Pi_i)^{-1} (\Pi_i - (1 + \lambda_B) P + \Lambda) = X_i. \tag{D.1}
\]

If the Lagrange multiplier \( \lambda_B \) is positive, the agent effectively faces a modified price vector for the risky assets, and as a result a modified expected excess return vector. Accordingly, her portfolio is in general not mean-variance efficient, even utilizing her own private information.

The fact that the agent’s optimal portfolio may not be mean-variance efficient means that condition (20) does not hold in general, even if all (passive) expected excess returns are positive and the reference portfolio has positive weights, as the following example illustrates.

**Example 1** Consider an economy without borrowing constraints, so that prices are given by equation (2). Specifically we set \( K = 3 \), \( \kappa = 0.99 \), \( \gamma = 2 \), and the covariance matrix of \( D_{ij} \) and the information matrix \( p_{ij} \) as

\[
\Omega = \begin{bmatrix}
0.0656 & 0.0640 & -0.0216 \\
0.0640 & 0.0656 & -0.0216 \\
-0.0216 & -0.0216 & 0.1228
\end{bmatrix}, \quad p_{ij} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & 0.9999 & \kappa \\
0.9999 & 1 & \kappa \\
\kappa & \kappa & 1
\end{bmatrix},
\]

where row \( i \) refers to an agent and the column \( j \) to a market. In this example, the price vector is \((0.9256, 0.9256, 0.9411)\), so that all (passive) excess returns are positive. The portfolios of
all agents are strictly positive in all three markets. In particular, agents in market 3 choose risky portfolio weights (32%, 32%, 36%) in the three markets.

Now suppose that in market 3 we introduce a common investor with the same information as the other agents in market 3, but subject to the borrowing constraint $B \geq 0$. We consider the limit $W_0 \to 0$, which ensures that the borrowing constraint binds. We compute the agent’s (constrained optimal) portfolio of risky asset holdings to be (50%, 50%, 0%) and to exhibit a negative CAPM $\alpha$ of $-0.05\%$. 