Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate: 
When Theory Meets Practice

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We develop a model of selection that incorporates a key element of recent health reforms: an individual mandate. Using data from Massachusetts, we estimate the parameters of the model. In the individual market for health insurance, we find that premiums and average costs decreased significantly in response to the individual mandate. We find an annual welfare gain of 4.1 percent per person or $51.1 million annually in Massachusetts as a result of the reduction in adverse selection. We also find smaller post-reform markups. (JEL D82, G22, H75, I13)

An individual mandate that requires individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty is a centerpiece of both the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010 and the Massachusetts health reform of 2006. The individual mandate was also at the heart of the legal challenges to the ACA, and the mandate was upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in June 2012. Economic theory has long held that mandates can reduce the welfare loss from adverse selection in insurance markets (see, e.g., Akerlof 1970 and Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). On the other hand, recent empirical work on adverse selection finds relatively little welfare loss, suggesting otherwise. Reconciling these two views is of interest to economists, and it is of broader interest given the centrality of the individual mandate to both major health reforms.

The Massachusetts experience gives us a novel opportunity to examine how the mandate affected selection and welfare. We model adverse selection following the work of Einav, Finkelstein, and Cullen (2010)—henceforth, EFC. EFC stipulates that if the average cost of the insured decreases as coverage increases—in our case, from before reform to after reform—then healthier people entered the
insurance pool, and the initial market was adversely selected. We extend the framework to incorporate key features of health reform in practice—the individual mandate and insurer markups—matching the empirical context more closely and allowing us to examine the impact of the mandate on social welfare in Massachusetts.

In addition to addressing a key policy question, we contribute to the small but growing literature on the welfare cost of adverse selection in insurance markets (see Einav, Finkelstein, and Levin 2010 for a review and Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney 2012; Einav, Finkelstein, and Schimpf 2010; and Beauchamp and Wagner 2013 for recent additions). Most papers in the literature examine selection within a set of plans offered by employers and generally find that the welfare cost of adverse selection is small in that context (e.g., EFC and Bundorf, Levin, and Mahoney 2012). However, the distinction between different employer-sponsored health insurance plans is less stark than the distinction between having health insurance and not having it at all. Accordingly, the welfare cost of adverse selection on the intensive margin between plans may differ, potentially substantially, from the welfare impact on the extensive margin. Furthermore, we focus on the individual health insurance market, the market defined to include all individuals not offered health insurance through employers. The welfare cost of adverse selection could be higher in the individual health insurance market than it is in the employer-sponsored market since employers are potential risk pooling mechanisms.

Another advantage of the Massachusetts experience as an empirical context is that even before reform, Massachusetts had regulations that limited insurers’ ability to deny coverage to individuals and to price based on observable risks. These regulations, as we discuss in further detail, could potentially exacerbate adverse selection. Although Massachusetts was only one of a handful of states to have these regulations in the past, all states now have them following the implementation of the national reform. Therefore, our findings speak to the magnitude of adverse selection on the extensive margin in the presence of insurance market regulations but in the absence of an individual mandate. Our findings are therefore germane to discussions that propose removal or weakening of the national individual mandate.

Applying the theory to the data, we estimate the slopes of the average cost and demand curves using insurer enrollment, premium, and health expenditure information from regulatory filings of insurance companies. We combine the enrollment information with coverage information from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). Both datasets distinguish between the individual and group (employer) insurance markets, allowing us to model the impact of reform on the individual market separately.

To model demand, we treat the individual penalty as an effective change in price in Massachusetts. Since the Massachusetts reform was implemented at the state level, we control for other trends in the market for health insurance using data from other states. Using a similar strategy, we also recover the change in the average and marginal per capita cost of the insured population from before to after reform. Combined with the change in coverage and the magnitude of the penalty, we can estimate the slope of the insurance demand and the cost curves; allowing us to evaluate the welfare impact of Massachusetts reform.
Our empirical estimates suggest that the Massachusetts individual market was adversely selected prior to health reform.\(^1\) We find that the individual mandate reduced adverse selection, increasing welfare in the individual health insurance market by 4.1 percent (about $241) per person in the individual market, which translates into a market-wide annual welfare gain of $51.1 million. We also find evidence for smaller post-reform markups in the individual market, which increased welfare by another 1 percent (about $59) per person per year and about $12.4 million per year overall. Finally, our model and empirical estimates suggest an optimal mandate of 24.9 percent of the premium or $1,462 per year, which induces universal coverage in the individual market.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the institutional background of the individual mandate. In Section II we develop a simple model of adverse selection with an individual mandate, and in Section III we describe the estimation of the model. Section IV describes the data, and Section V presents the results. Finally, we conduct a series of robustness checks in Section VI, and Section VII concludes.

I. Institutional Background on the Massachusetts Health Reform

The Massachusetts health reform, which was signed into law in April 2006, became a model for the national reform (the ACA), which was enacted four years later in March 2010. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a, b) discuss these reforms in depth. Here, we focus on the features of the Massachusetts reform and health insurance environment that are relevant to adverse selection in the individual health insurance market.

An individual mandate was the key feature of both reforms. In Massachusetts, the individual mandate requires that almost all non-poor residents either purchase a health insurance plan that meets minimum coverage criteria defined in the “Minimum Creditable Coverage” (MCC) plan or pay a penalty. Specifically, nonexempt individuals that do not have proof of sufficient health insurance coverage when they file their income taxes are charged an income- and age-dependent penalty of up to 50 percent of the lowest-priced plan available in the Massachusetts health insurance exchange market. Table 1 summarizes the respective penalties for the year 2012.\(^2\) Individuals that earn less than 150 percent of the federal poverty line (FPL) are exempt from the penalty. The reform makes this population eligible for Medicaid or full premium discounts.\(^3\)

The mandate is particularly important for individuals and families who do not have access to employer-sponsored health insurance and must purchase health insurance through the individual market instead. These people face higher annual premiums than those with employer-sponsored health insurance. Moreover, they are exposed

\(^1\) We also found evidence of adverse selection on our previous work (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski 2012). However, that paper focused solely on hospital cost and did not address the welfare impact of the change in selection.


\(^3\) Individuals that earn less than 100 percent of the FPL became eligible for Medicaid, and individuals that earn between 100 percent and 150 percent of the FPL became eligible for full premium discounts. Individuals can also claim exemption for religious reasons or because of different affordability criteria using the Certificate of Exemption Application, available at http://tinyurl.com/odjtxrm (accessed January 14, 2015).
to the full cost of health insurance, unlike employees, who have access to the tax advantage for employer sponsored health insurance. Figure 1 lends empirical support to this appraisal using data from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) for individuals whose family income exceeds 300 percent of the federal poverty line. In Figure 1, we compare trends in Massachusetts to trends in all other states, where we have aggregated other states using NHIS sampling weights. Across the panels, we compare insurance coverage trends for consumers who are offered health insurance through their employers (the “group market”) with trends for consumers who are not offered health insurance through their employers (the “individual market”). The vertical lines separate the pre-reform and the post-reform years. Consequently, the years 2006 and 2007 represent the reform implementation years. Comparing coverage trends in the individual market with coverage trends in the group market allows us to document two important stylized facts. First, health insurance coverage is substantially higher in the group market both in Massachusetts and nationally. Second, the impact of Massachusetts health reform on health insurance coverage for the non-poor population is much larger in the individual market than the group market. We see a large coverage increase in the Massachusetts individual market relative to the national individual market following health reform, whereas the coverage increase in the group market is much smaller. This is not particularly surprising given that insurance coverage in Massachusetts group market was already close to universal
levels prior to health reform. Therefore, we expect that the effects of selection, and consequently the welfare effects from the individual mandate, are small in the group market and focus our empirical analysis on the individual market. We provide our methodology for classifying individuals as members of the individual or group pools in Section IV. Another element of the Massachusetts health reform is the introduction of a health insurance exchange market: the Commonwealth Choice program. This exchange market aims to facilitate access to health insurance for consumers in the individual market as well as small employers (up to 50 employees). For more details see Ericson and Starc (2012) who study consumer response to the specific pricing rules employed by the Massachusetts Connector. The Connector simplifies the comparison of insurance plans across and within carriers which may encourage competition and lead to smaller differences between premiums and average costs in the post-reform years. One advantage of our theory is that it allows us to capture the welfare gains from reduced adverse selection separately from the welfare gains from smaller differences between premiums and average costs.\footnote{Smaller differences between premiums and average costs in the individual market are also consistent with many other mechanisms such as newly-imposed restrictions in the premium rating methodology. Since reform, Massachusetts has required insurance carriers to use the same premium rating methodology for small employers and individuals that purchase health insurance directly, see Gorman Actuarial et al. (2006) for details. This regulation may lower premiums in the individual market because insured employees in small businesses are younger and healthier on average. We allow for differences between premiums in average cost in practice but do not explicitly model the mechanisms for changes.} Finally we emphasize two important regulations that may have exacerbated adverse selection in the pre-reform years: community rating and guaranteed issue. Since 1996, Massachusetts has had community rating regulations in place, which restrict price differentiation across consumers within the same plan. Specifically, these regulations require health insurers in the individual market to charge the same price to individuals of the same age, see Wachenheim and Leida (2012). Across ages, premiums could only vary by up to a factor of two. This legislation benefits consumers with relatively high expected claim expenditures, who might face higher premiums than their less expensive peers otherwise. Massachusetts has also had guaranteed issue regulations since 1996, which require insurers with at least 5,000 members to guarantee that any interested beneficiary could join the insurance pool. Combining these two regulations, we expect a disproportionately high share of consumers with high claim expenditures among the enrolled consumers in the pre-reform years. The Massachusetts reform retained these regulations. The ACA also established community rating and guaranteed issue regulations nationally, in addition to the individual mandate.

II. Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate in Theory

In this section, we develop a simple model that incorporates both an individual mandate and insurer markups into the general model of adverse selection developed by EFC. This model addresses selection at the extensive margin but abstracts from intensive margin selection among differentiated plans. This modeling decision follows naturally from the policy intervention of interest, the individual mandate, which affects the demand for health insurance on the extensive margin.\footnote{We discuss these modeling decisions in further detail in the online Appendix.}
A. Demand and Cost of Insurance with an Individual Mandate

In each period $t$, consumer $i$ decides either to purchase a representative health insurance plan, $H_i = 1$, or not to purchase the plan, $H_i = 0$. We take the characteristics of the health insurance plan as given, and we assume that they do not change over time. Consumers have an underlying type, $\theta_i$, which determines their willingness to pay for insurance, $v(\theta_i)$, and the expected cost to health insurers on their behalf if they take up insurance, $c(\theta_i)$. The consumer type is potentially multidimensional and describes the individual’s health profile and risk preferences, as well as other characteristics. Consumer type is distributed according to $G_\theta$ in the population. Each consumer solves the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{H_i} \{X_i + v(\theta_i) \times H_i\} \quad s.t. \quad Y_i = X_i + P \times H_i,$$

where $Y_i$ measures income, $X_i$ is a numeraire good, and $P$ denotes an insurance premium that does not vary across individuals. The share of insured consumers at the market level, $I$, is as follows:

$$I := \int_{v(\theta) > P} dG_\theta.$$

To incorporate the impact of the individual mandate on consumer demand, we introduce a financial penalty, $\pi$, paid by consumers who do not purchase health insurance. The mandate, because it changes the cost of not having health insurance, changes the budget constraint for an individual to $Y_i = X_i + P \times H_i + \pi(1 - H_i)$; the penalty effectively lowers the price of insurance relative to the numeraire. Thus, insurance coverage at the market level with a mandate is

$$I := \int_{v(\theta) > P - \pi} dG_\theta.$$

We express the market level demand curve $P = D(I, \pi)$. It is a function of insurance coverage at the market level, $I$, and the penalty associated with the individual mandate, $\pi$ (zero in the period before the individual mandate is introduced).

In order to consider welfare, we need both willingness-to-pay—demand—as well as the cost of insuring the population. We can express the market level average cost curve as a function of market level insurance coverage by

$$AC(I) = \frac{1}{I} \int_{v(\theta) > D(I, 0)} c(\theta) \ dG_\theta.$$

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6 Lack of data on plan generosity motivates this assumption. We relax it in Section VID.
7 Here, income $Y_i$ includes tax penalty revenues that are redistributed to households as a lump sum.
This equation expresses the average costs of consumers, who purchase health insurance at annual premiums $P = D(I, 0)$. By construction, these are the $I$ consumers with the highest willingness to pay.

Analogously, the marginal cost curve is given by

$$MC(I) = E[c(\theta)|v(\theta) = D(I, 0)].$$

Figure 2 presents the market equilibrium graphically in the case of an adversely select market—a downward sloping average cost curve. Before the reform, the efficient equilibrium should occur where the marginal cost curve intersects the true demand curve for insurance. However, because of asymmetric information or regulatory restrictions on pricing, in the pre-reform period ($t = \text{pre}$), the equilibrium occurs at point A, where the true demand curve intersects the average cost curve, yielding coverage level $I^{\ast, \text{pre}}$ and premium $P^{\ast, \text{pre}}$ equal to average cost.

The individual mandate simply shifts the demand curve upward by the penalty amount, $\pi$. In the pre-reform period before the individual mandate is introduced, consumer demand is captured by the lower demand curve. After reform is implemented ($t = \text{post}$), the tax penalty increases the demand for insurance because the outside option of going without health insurance is less attractive. Therefore, consumers are willing to pay an extra amount, up to $\pi$, to avoid the tax penalty; the higher demand curve in Figure 2. The new equilibrium premium and the marginal cost are determined by the point at which the new demand curve intersects

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8 Consistent with our empirical evidence on adverse selection, discussed in Section V, we focus on the case of adverse not advantageous selection.

9 The depicted demand curves $D(I, 0)$ and $D(I, \pi)$ have the same linear functional form, which is an approximation to a more general nonlinear functional form.
the average cost curve (shown by $A'$ and $D'$ respectively). Notice from Figure 2 that the mandate does not change the ordering of the consumers’ willingness to pay for health insurance. Consequently, while the tax penalty induces a *shift* in the demand curve, it induces movement *along* the cost curves ($D$ to $D'$).

### B. Welfare Implications of the Individual Mandate

With the demand curve and the average cost curve, we can calculate the change in welfare introduced by the individual mandate. The change in welfare is given by the integral over the difference between the willingness to pay and the marginal costs for the *newly* insured consumers, as depicted by the gray area in Figure 2.\(^{10}\)

Intuitively, the welfare gain due to the individual mandate captures the extent to which the outward shift in demand induced by the penalty corrects existing adverse selection; the number of individuals who are moved into coverage whose willingness-to-pay for insurance exceeds the marginal cost of insuring them but for whom that average cost of insuring them is greater than their willingness-to-pay. We note also that an individual penalty can be large enough to induce additional consumers into the market for whom the marginal cost of insuring them is greater than their willingness-to-pay, inducing a welfare loss. We return to this issue in detail below when we derive the optimal penalty.

### C. Welfare Implications from Adverse Selection and Changes in Markups

In this section, we extend our previous pricing model and allow insurers to charge a positive markup on top of average costs. Furthermore, we allow the markup to change in response to health reform. We allow for this extension for several reasons: (i) markups are a well-documented feature of health insurance markets (see, e.g., Dafny 2010), (ii) our data allows us to estimate markups in a straightforward way because health insurance is a financial product, and (iii) we have reason to believe that health reform affected markups.

Figure 3 captures these extensions and differs from Figure 2 in three important ways. First, in equilibrium, premiums may differ from average costs, which is why we introduce separate notation for each. While point A still refers to the premium in the pre-reform equilibrium, we introduce point H to refer to average cost in the pre-reform equilibrium. The vertical difference between point A and point H captures the markup. Similarly, points $A'$ and $H'$ refer to premiums and average costs in the post-reform equilibrium. Notice that we can construct a second point on the old demand curve, point C, if we subtract the observed tax penalty from the observed post-reform premium. Therefore, the pre-reform and the post-reform equilibrium outcomes determine two points on the average cost curve and two points on the old demand curve, which allow us to estimate the slopes and the intercepts of these two curves.

Second, we allow for different markups in the pre- and the post-reform period. Specifically, the vertical difference between $A'$ and $H'$ may be smaller or larger than...\(^{10}\) We discuss this result in further detail in the online Appendix.
the vertical difference between A and H. To the extent that the introduction of health exchanges’ decreased consumer search costs, increased competition, or otherwise altered market structure such that insurers cannot maintain pre-reform markups, our model captures the change.

Third, the change in markups affects social welfare. A decrease in the markup, as shown in Figure 3, is not just a transfer from insurers to consumers. It increases social welfare in the presence of adverse selection because the size of the insured population expands.

To distinguish between the welfare effect from the removal of adverse selection and the welfare effect from an increase in competition, we add a pre-reform pricing curve in Figure 3. We simply add the pre-reform markup to the average cost curve to predict insurance coverage, premiums, and costs in the post-reform period under the pre-reform markup. Specifically, the intersection between the pre-reform pricing curve and the post-reform demand curve determines the insurance coverage under the pre-reform markup, \( I^{*, \text{markup}} \). Therefore, we attribute the welfare gain up to \( I^{*, \text{markup}} \) to the removal of adverse selection and the additional increase up to \( I^{*, \text{post}} \) to the smaller post-reform markup.

Graphically, we decompose the full welfare effect into two effects. The light gray area refers to the welfare gain from the removal of adverse selection, and the dark gray area measures the welfare gain from a decrease in the post-reform loading factor. We refer to the former effect as the net welfare effect.

Following the theoretical discussion, the full welfare effect is given by the change in consumer surplus, minus the change in insurer profits:

\[
\Delta W_{\text{full}} = \Delta CS - \Delta \text{Profits}.
\]

Using the geometry of Figure 3, we can express the full welfare change in terms of the change in coverage, premiums, and average costs between the pre-reform and
the post-reform period, the pre-reform levels of coverage, premiums, and average costs, and the tax penalty.\footnote{To see this, notice that two points on the linear demand curve identify the change in consumer surplus and that two points on the potentially nonlinear average cost curve identify the change in costs. We discuss the details of this derivation in the online Appendix. We revisit the linearity assumption for the demand curve in the online Appendix, where we provide bounds for the full welfare effect.}

\begin{equation}
\Delta W_{\text{full}} = (P^{*,\text{pre}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) \times (I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}) \\
- (AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) \times (I^{*,\text{pre}} + (I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}})) \\
+ \frac{1}{2} ((P^{*,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{*,\text{pre}}) \times (I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}).
\end{equation}

This equation shows that beyond the penalty, we need information on six empirical moments to identify the change in welfare.

Because the mechanisms for welfare improvements due to health reform differ substantially between reductions in adverse selection and changes in market competitiveness, we separate these two mechanisms in our model. Separating the two mechanisms theoretically also provides a basis for us to separate them empirically. We can express the net (of changes in competition) welfare effects as follows:

\begin{equation}
\Delta W_{\text{net}} = (P^{*,\text{pre}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) \times (I^{*,\text{mark}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}) \\
- \frac{AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}}{I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}} \times (I^{*,\text{pre}} + (I^{*,\text{mark}} - I^{*,\text{pre}})) \\
\times (I^{*,\text{mark}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}) \\
+ \frac{1}{2} \times \frac{(P^{*,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{*,\text{pre}}}{I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}} \times (I^{*,\text{mark}} - I^{*,\text{pre}})^2,
\end{equation}

where we express the post-reform coverage level under the pre-reform markup, $I^{*,\text{mark}}$, as

\begin{equation}
I^{*,\text{mark}} = I^{*,\text{pre}} + \pi \frac{(I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}})}{(AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) - ((P^{*,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{*,\text{pre}})}.
\end{equation}

Intuitively, $I^{*,\text{mark}}$ equals $I^{*,\text{post}}$ if the pre-reform markup equals the post-reform markup.\footnote{We derive equation (4) in the online Appendix.}

\textbf{D. Optimal Tax Penalty}

In addition to using the model to compute welfare impacts, we can also extend our framework to compute the optimal tax penalty. The optimal tax penalty induces the
optimal level of coverage—the level of coverage at which the pre-reform demand curve intersects the marginal cost curve. Figure 4 depicts the optimal coverage level \( I^{\ast,\text{opt}} \).

Increasing the penalty improves welfare as long as marginal enrollees have a willingness-to-pay in excess of their marginal cost of coverage. Of course, a penalty can be too big in the sense that it is welfare reducing beyond a point. Figure 4 demonstrates such a case. As depicted, post-reform insurance coverage exceeds optimal insurance coverage, leading to a welfare loss. Specifically, consumers who are located on the pre-reform demand curve between the points X and C are not willing to buy health insurance at the marginal cost of covering them. Therefore, their purchase decision decreases social welfare such that the full welfare effect of the mandate is given by the light gray area minus the dark gray area.

To calculate the optimal tax penalty, first, we solve for the socially optimal coverage level, \( I^{\ast,\text{opt}} \). We can express the optimal insurance coverage as follows:

\[
I^{\ast,\text{opt}} = \max \left( 0, \min \left( 1, \frac{P^{\ast,\text{pre}} - MC^{\ast,\text{pre}}}{2(AC^{\ast,\text{post}} - AC^{\ast,\text{pre}})} \times \frac{I^{\ast,\text{post}} - I^{\ast,\text{pre}}}{(P^{\ast,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{\ast,\text{pre}}} \right) \right) 
\]

\[
= \max \left( 0, \min \left( 1, \frac{P^{\ast,\text{pre}} - AC^{\ast,\text{pre}}}{2(AC^{\ast,\text{post}} - AC^{\ast,\text{pre}})} \times \frac{I^{\ast,\text{post}} - I^{\ast,\text{pre}}}{(P^{\ast,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{\ast,\text{pre}}} \right) \right) 
\]

\[
- \frac{(AC^{\ast,\text{post}} - AC^{\ast,\text{pre}}) \times I^{\ast,\text{pre}}}{2(AC^{\ast,\text{post}} - AC^{\ast,\text{pre}})} \right) \right) \right) 
\]

Here, the minimum and the maximum operator address potential corner solutions at zero coverage and full coverage. For an interior solution, we see from the first equality that the optimal insurance coverage exceeds the pre-reform equilibrium.
coverage, whenever the pre-reform market price exceeds the costs of the marginal consumer.\footnote{We derive equation (5) in the online Appendix.}

Next, we can calculate the optimal tax penalty (conditional upon the observed post-reform markup) which shifts the equilibrium coverage to the optimal coverage level. The optimal tax penalty, $\pi^*$, equals

\begin{equation}
\pi^* = (P^{*,\text{post}} - P^{*,\text{pre}}) - (AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) + (AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) - ((P^{*,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{*,\text{pre}}) \\
+ \frac{(AC^{*,\text{post}} - AC^{*,\text{pre}}) - ((P^{*,\text{post}} - \pi) - P^{*,\text{pre}})}{(I^{*,\text{post}} - I^{*,\text{pre}})} \times (I^{*,\text{opt}} - I^{*,\text{pre}}).
\end{equation}

Intuitively, the optimal tax penalty increases proportionally as the difference between optimal coverage and pre-reform coverage increases.

### III. Empirical Model

We next develop a simple empirical model that is linked very tightly to our theoretical model. It follows directly from the graphical depiction of our model that we only need to estimate a small number of parameters to quantify the welfare effects and the optimal tax penalty. Specifically, we can fully identify our model if we combine the magnitude of the tax penalty with estimates of pre-reform levels and changes in coverage, log premiums, and log average costs. While we simply read the pre-reform levels from the data using the average realizations in the pre-reform years 2004 and 2005, we estimate changes in coverage, log premiums, and log average costs to account for national trends in health insurance coverage, premiums, and average costs. Our primary estimating equation is as follows:

\begin{equation}
Y_{st}^k = \gamma_k \times (MA \times After)_{st} + \rho_1^k \times (MA \times During)_{st} + \rho_2^k \times MA_s + \rho_3^k \times After_t + \rho_4^k \times During_t + \rho_5^k + \varepsilon_{st}^k,
\end{equation}

where $Y_{st}^k$ denotes the respective outcome measure for state $s$ in year $t$. Specifically, $k$ is either coverage, log premiums, or log average costs. MA is a dummy variable that equals one for Massachusetts. During and After are dummy variables that equal one for the reform years 2006 and 2007, and the post-reform years 2008–2010, respectively. The key parameters of interest are $\gamma_k$, which denote the reform’s impact on coverage, premiums, and average health claim expenditures.

To estimate the full change in welfare, the net change in welfare, the optimal amount of coverage, and the optimal penalty, we simply substitute the changes in coverage, log premiums, and log average health claim expenditures between the pre-reform and the post-reform period with the respective $\gamma_k$ estimate in equations (2), (3), (5), and (6). We use the average realization in the pre-reform years 2004 and 2005 as our pre-period estimates. Finally, we calibrate the level of the tax penalty, which allows us to calculate the change in welfare according to equation (2).
One empirical challenge is that premiums and claim expenditures in Massachusetts differ from the national average both in pre-reform levels and trends. While there are various potential explanations for the general differences in health care costs between states, guaranteed issue and community rating regulations are likely to explain at least a portion of these differences. Our approach allows us to control for persistent level differences between Massachusetts and the control states. However, we are concerned that our reform effect estimates may be confounded with differences in trends between Massachusetts and the control states, which are unrelated to health reform. To address this concern, we employ two approaches. First, we model the trends in premiums and claim expenditures using logarithmic specifications. Second, we apply the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003). Specifically, we construct weights for the control states such that they match Massachusetts pre-reform trends in coverage, log premiums, and log average claim expenditures as well as Massachusetts pre-reform health insurance enrollment levels. This data-driven procedure ensures that trends in the key endogenous variables are equal between Massachusetts and the control states so that we can isolate the impact of the reform.

IV. Data

One advantage of our methodology is that we are able to estimate welfare using relatively easy-to-obtain data. We require data on coverage, premiums, and cost. To support our primary analysis, we obtain data on enrollment, premiums, and cost from SNL Financial. We add coverage information from NHIS to express the enrollment information in percentages.

SNL Financial is a leading financial information firm that collects and prepares corporate, financial, market, and M&A data for a variety of different industries, including the health insurance industry. The dataset we use is based on data from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), subsequently aggregated by SNL. We are the first, to our knowledge, to employ the SNL data in economic applications, though we note that NAIC data have been used in a number of previous studies (e.g., Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Boudreaux 2013). The main advantage of the SNL data in our application is that it has been entered into matrix form, cleaned, and aggregated. Our SNL data provide information on enrollment in member-months, premiums, and claim expenditures for US health insurers at the firm-market-year-level. The SNL market definition distinguishes between the group and the non-group (individual) market within each state. While the group market data do not include self-insured plans offered by large employers, the data on the individual market should represent the universe of plans and enrollment on the individual market, which is the focus of our analysis.\textsuperscript{14}

We note that because the SNL data are at the firm-market-year level, they aggregate plans of different generosities together by firm, so we cannot directly examine changes in plan generosity. We are not aware of any data that would contain information on plan generosity for all policies sold in the individual health insurance

\textsuperscript{14} One exception are life insurers, to the extent that they also sell health insurance plans in the individual market, who do not file these reports, see Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Boudreaux (2013).
market nationally because plan generosity can vary along many dimensions. In their analysis, EFC control for plan generosity by restricting analysis to a subset of plans offered by one particular firm. This control comes at the cost of only allowing for changes in adverse selection on the intensive margin in a particular firm. In our analysis, to tackle the broad question of adverse selection on the extensive margin, we need to make a broad assumption about changes in plan generosity. On theoretical grounds, we believe that this assumption is more innocuous for studying changes in extensive margin adverse selection than it would be for studying changes in intensive margin adverse selection because the difference between any insurance and no insurance is arguably more stark than the difference between two insurance plans. On empirical grounds, we believe that changes in plan generosity have a small impact on our results based on our robustness analysis in Section VID, in which we incorporate additional data on plan generosity.

For our baseline analysis, we use data from 2004–2010, and we attempt to focus our attention on non-poor individuals, defined as those above 300 percent of the FPL. The restriction to the non-poor population in the individual market is interesting for three key reasons. First, we see the largest changes in private health insurance coverage following health reform in the Massachusetts individual market, rather than in the group market where the employer served as an effective pooling mechanism prior to reform, see Figure 1. Second, the individual market is more likely to be adversely selected than the group market prior to the reform because individual market consumers internalize the full cost of the health plan premium, while group consumers choose from a set of employer sponsored and subsidized health plans. Third, it is important to focus on the non-poor population because individuals that earn less than 300 percent of the federal poverty line gained access to highly subsidized health insurance through the Medicaid expansion or the newly introduced Commonwealth Care plans. These programs introduce price variation among consumers that is difficult to address using data at the insurer level. Furthermore, crowd-out of private coverage, as has been found in Medicaid expansions (e.g., Cutler and Gruber 1996), would bias our price elasticity estimates (and welfare estimates) downward if left unaddressed.

To restrict our analysis to non-poor individuals, we drop insurers in the Massachusetts individual market that offer Commonwealth Care health plans. The Commonwealth Care program is administered by the Connector and offers highly subsidized access to health insurance for individuals that earn up to 300 percent of the FPL. This subsidy is conceptually similar to the tax penalty as both

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15This is the case even with the advent of “bronze,” “silver,” and “gold” plans sold on exchanges under the ACA, especially since plans that do not fit these classifications can be sold outside of the exchanges and because plan networks can vary in ways that are difficult, if not impossible, to observe.

16 In theory, the Medicaid expansion can also crowd-in private coverage if the expansion targets the unhealthy population (see Clemens 2014). We think that our estimates would still be biased downward in this case because of a healthier risk pool of privately insured consumers.

17 Following state documents, we drop Boston Medical Center Health net Plan, CeltiCare Health Plan, Fallon Community Health Plan, Neighborhood Health Plan, and Network Health, see http://tinyurl.com/kg9f79q, page 7 (accessed January 14, 2015).

18 For instance, between July 2012 and June 2013 the premiums per member month range from $40 for individuals with incomes between 150 percent and 200 percent of the FPL to $182 per member month for individuals with incomes between 250 percent and 300 percent (Massachusetts Health Connector, https://www.mahealthconnector.org/, accessed February 1, 2013).
instruments lower the choice-relevant premium. However, our empirical strategy uses data aggregated at the insurer-year level. Therefore, we cannot address price variation within a plan unless we impose additional assumptions. We discuss these assumptions in Section VA, but for our baseline analysis we drop these insurers to ensure a homogeneous consumer population that does not qualify for subsidies and faces the maximum penalty, assuming that most of these individuals earn more than 300 percent of the federal poverty line, see Table 1.

We compute member-month premiums by dividing reported revenues by enrollment in member-months. Similarly, we derive member-month health claim expenditures using the reported annual expenditures. We multiply these measures by 12 to annualize the premium and the health expenditure estimates. We drop insurer-year observations with premiums or health expenditures that are smaller than $50 or larger than $20,000. In order to implement the synthetic control method, we drop states in which we do not have information on any insurer in a given sample year. We also drop states who experience a change in average claim expenditures, averaged at the state level, of more than 40 percent from one year to the other. Finally, we normalize all financial variables to 2012 dollars using the Medical Consumer Price Index.

We complement the SNL information with restricted-access NHIS data with state identifiers from years 2004–2010. We primarily use these data to translate the enrollment measures from the SNL data, which is reported in levels, into coverage percentages inside and outside of Massachusetts. We make this conversion using the representative population weights. We use the NHIS rather than the SNL to determine the percentage of individuals insured in the individual health insurance market because those data include insured as well as uninsured individuals, while the SNL data only include insured individuals. In addition to detailed data on health insurance coverage, the NHIS also collects demographic information, which allows us to distinguish between the individual and the group markets in our empirical analysis. To match the SNL sample population, we restrict the NHIS sample population to non-elderly adult family members aged 18–64 and drop families that earned less than 300 percent of the family-size adjusted federal poverty line. We also drop family members that were enrolled in a public insurance plan. We classify

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19 This reduces the number of observations by about 8 percent in the individual market. We also revise the enrollment information of one provider in New York for the year of 2008 and we drop an insurer in the state of Washington because the provided information seemed unreasonable. These adjustments do not affect our baseline estimates. However, they would add noise to our estimates in Section VIB, where we choose synthetic control states based on an indicator for guaranteed issue regulations because New York and Washington have such regulations. The online Appendix provides additional information on these observations.

20 We do this because we construct our control states based on trends in average costs. We are concerned that these substantial changes in average costs merely reflect measurement error.

21 We note here that we have explored using the Current Population Survey (CPS) for our analysis since it includes both a measure of coverage and income for individuals. Given the small sample size in Massachusetts when we restrict the sample by income and to those with individual insurance, we are concerned about the ability to measure the impact of the reform at the state level in the individual market. Consistent with this issue, in analyzing the CPS, we find implausibly small coverage level changes (near zero). Since the coverage increase is a stylized fact that has been documented in other databases, we are concerned about the CPS data quality regarding the individual market, and so we prefer the NHIS data. The issues with the CPS data underscore the value of using comprehensive administrative data from SNL.

22 The NHIS uses the poverty thresholds from the Census Bureau, which are not identical but very similar to the poverty thresholds for Medicaid and discount eligibility in Massachusetts. We keep children because we also use out-of-pocket spending information in a robustness check, which is reported at the family level.

23 These public plans include Medicare, Indian Health Service, State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), military health coverage, Medicaid and other state- or government-sponsored plans.
family members as participating in the individual market whenever no members of the family are offered health insurance through their respective employer(s).\footnote{The NHIS asks all adult family members that are present at the time of the interview whether they are offered health insurance through their workplace. For adult persons that are not present during the interview, the NHIS gathers the respective information through a present adult family member.} We aggregate these observations to the family level and consider the observation (family) to be uninsured whenever none of the remaining family members has health insurance. Finally, we compute average enrollment at the state-year-market level using representative population weights. As discussed earlier, Figure 1 presents the respective coverage trends for Massachusetts and the control states.

To compute coverage in percentages, we normalize the average observed post-reform enrollment in the SNL data for the years 2007–2010 to the average observed (state-specific) post-reform coverage in the NHIS data for the same time period.\footnote{Our approach delivers sensible coverage estimates for all states but Maine. For Maine, we conclude that coverage must have equaled 154 percent in the pre-reform period because we either overestimate the post-reform coverage in the NHIS data or because we overestimate the reduction in enrollment based on the SNL data. The measurement error biases us toward finding excessive coverage gains in Massachusetts because of health reform. To mitigate the bias, we normalize pre-reform coverage in Maine to 100 percent and simply adjust the post-reform coverage based on changes in enrollment.} Using this normalization, we calculate insurance coverage in percentages for all years using the SNL enrollment estimates. We find post-reform coverage levels in the individual market of 92 percent in Massachusetts and about 67 percent at the national level, see Figure 1. It is worth emphasizing that our sample population in Massachusetts did not achieve universal coverage in the post-reform period. Therefore, we interpret the post-reform equilibrium as an interior solution and assume that the marginal consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying health insurance. Near-universal coverage simplifies the analysis considerably relative to the case of universal coverage. In the latter case, it might be that all consumers strictly prefer health insurance, such that premiums do not necessarily reflect the willingness to pay of the marginal consumer.

V. Adverse Selection and an Individual Mandate in Practice

In this section, we discuss our empirical results. We provide graphical and regression-based results that demonstrate the impact of health reform on coverage, premiums, and average costs and quantify the key parameters for welfare analysis. The regression results, presented in Table 2, correspond to the model in equation (7) for each dependent variable of interest.

We begin by studying the impact of reform on coverage rates. Figure 5 presents coverage trends in the individual market using the SNL data, normalized by coverage rates in the NHIS as described above. The dotted blue curve and the solid black curve present coverage trends in Massachusetts and the synthetic control states, respectively.\footnote{We present and discuss the empirical weights in the synthetic control states in the online Appendix.} To emphasize the effects of health reform, we normalize 2004 coverage levels in Massachusetts and other states to zero. The vertical lines separate the pre-reform and the post-reform years. Consistent with our findings in the NHIS data alone, (Figure 1) we observe a pronounced increase in coverage in Massachusetts following health reform. At the same time, we do not observe...
increases at the national level. There is a small dip in coverage from 2010 to 2011 which we attribute to the implementation of the ACA in Massachusetts. In the interest of transparency, we present graphical results through 2011, but we focus our regression analysis on the years from 2004–2010 to avoid confounding impacts of the 2010 implementation of the ACA.

Table 2 presents the corresponding regression results in column 1, formalizing the magnitude of the impact visible in Figure 5 using our primary estimating equation (7). The only difference between Figure 5 and the regression results is that the regression results omit 2011 and group individual years into the Before, During, and After periods. We do not include any covariates in our main graphical or regression results. Following EFC, we intentionally do not include any covariates because total coverage, premiums, and costs are relevant for welfare. Because covariates such as the age and gender of enrollees are important drivers of coverage, premiums, and costs, but insurers cannot price based on them, including them as controls could obscure real impacts of the reform. It could be argued that while the characteristics of enrollees should never be included as controls, it could make sense to control for characteristics of the entire population that could enroll. We discuss robustness of the estimates with respect to the inclusion of controls for concurrent economic and demographic

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Table 2—Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>log premium</th>
<th>log claim exp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \gamma^A \times \text{after} )</td>
<td>0.265***</td>
<td>−0.233***</td>
<td>−0.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.175, 0.362]</td>
<td>[−0.286, −0.176]</td>
<td>[−0.143, −0.025]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^A \times \text{during} )</td>
<td>−0.030*</td>
<td>−0.012</td>
<td>0.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.066, 0.003]</td>
<td>[−0.063, 0.036]</td>
<td>[−0.076, 0.038]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^A \times \text{MA} )</td>
<td>0.112*</td>
<td>0.700***</td>
<td>0.761***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.010, 0.238]</td>
<td>[0.622, 0.779]</td>
<td>[0.662, 0.870]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^A \text{after} )</td>
<td>−0.044</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
<td>0.213***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.137, 0.045]</td>
<td>[0.073, 0.181]</td>
<td>[0.150, 0.268]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^A \text{during} )</td>
<td>−0.003</td>
<td>0.087***</td>
<td>0.156***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[−0.036, 0.032]</td>
<td>[0.041, 0.138]</td>
<td>[0.099, 0.212]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \rho^A \text{constant} )</td>
<td>0.591***</td>
<td>7.978***</td>
<td>7.808***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.468, 0.711]</td>
<td>[7.899, 8.057]</td>
<td>[7.699, 7.907]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform value (levels)</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>5,871.33</td>
<td>5,270.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval is displayed in brackets. Standard errors are block bootstrapped. Abadie weights depend on member month enrollment as well as changes in coverage, relative changes in average costs, and relative changes in premiums between 2004 and 2005.

*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.

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27 Among other things, the ACA includes more expansive provisions for dependent coverage than the Massachusetts reform, and those provisions went into effect in 2010. Relative to the Massachusetts reform, the ACA allows dependents up to age 26 to remain on their parents plans regardless of whether the dependents are married and regardless of whether the parental plan is self-insured. The implementation of the ACA may have prompted younger enrollees with individual insurance plans to switch to their parents’ plans self-insured employer-sponsored plans. Indeed, Akosa Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013), who study the impact of the ACA dependent coverage provisions, find an increase in parental employer-sponsored health insurance and an accompanying decline in individually-purchased individual health insurance from 2010 to 2011. Furthermore, the ACA established new high risk pools in 2010 that could have affected individual health insurance coverage. In the graphical results that we display, there does appear to be a material impact of the ACA on the individual health insurance market. However, when we replicate our analysis including 2011, the inclusion of that data point does not alter the broad conclusions that we make from our main analysis.

28 Following EFC, we intentionally do not include any covariates because total coverage, premiums, and costs are relevant for welfare. Because covariates such as the age and gender of enrollees are important drivers of coverage, premiums, and costs, but insurers cannot price based on them, including them as controls could obscure real impacts of the reform. It could be argued that while the characteristics of enrollees should never be included as controls, it could make sense to control for characteristics of the entire population that could enroll. We discuss robustness of the estimates with respect to the inclusion of controls for concurrent economic and demographic
The estimate in the first column implies that enrollment in the individual market increased by 26.5 percentage points. This is both statistically and economically significant.\(^{29}\) As shown in the bottom row of the table, pre-reform enrollment in the Massachusetts individual market equaled 70.3 percent (49,000 annual contracts) such that the estimated impact on enrollment corresponds to an increase of 18,500 annual contracts. These estimates are generally consistent with the enrollment trends reported by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy (DHCFP), supporting the validity of the SNL data for Massachusetts.\(^{30}\) Aside from the NHIS data and the DHCFP data, very few other sources allow for estimates of the change in individual health insurance market enrollment in Massachusetts, underscoring the value of our coverage estimates from SNL data combined with NHIS data.\(^{31}\)

trends in the online Appendix. We find that our results are very robust to the inclusion of these factors and suggest, if anything, that our baseline estimates understate the effects on coverage, log average costs, log premiums, and ultimately on social welfare.

\(^{29}\) We use a block bootstrap method to calculate the confidence intervals, which we discuss in the online Appendix. In the online Appendix, we also present results from an alternative parametric procedure that allows us to model contemporaneous shocks in Massachusetts, and our findings are robust to that procedure. We provide further evidence on the significance of our findings in the online Appendix, where we conduct a series of placebo studies. Following Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010), we replace Massachusetts with a set of control states as though they were treated. Our findings suggest that the experience in Massachusetts was distinctively different from those in the placebo states, which corroborates our main results.

\(^{30}\) Based on unaudited enrollment reports submitted to the DHCFP, it reports that enrollment in the individual market increased from 38,000 in June 2006, to 71,000 in March 2011, see Key Indicators: Quarterly Enrollment Update, March 2011 Edition, www.mass.gov/chia/docs/t/pubs/12/2011-june-key-indicators.pdf. There are at least two reasons for why the estimates from the DHCFP suggest a larger increase in enrollment. First, the DHCFP measures enrollment in persons whereas we measure enrollment in member months. Since we divide our observed member month estimates by 12, our results will likely understate enrollment measured in the DHCFP. Second, the DHCFP enrollment counts include insurers that offer Commonwealth Care plans, which we drop in our estimates.

\(^{31}\) The Massachusetts Health Reform Survey (MHRS) has the potential to separate individual market coverage from other coverage, but in practice, “respondents in the survey often reported being enrolled in multiple programs (e.g., Commonwealth Care and Commonwealth Choice) or having both direct purchase and public coverage. As this raises concerns about the accuracy of the reporting of coverage type for the various public programs and direct purchase, the analysis of source of coverage is limited to ESI coverage and all other types of insurance” (Long, Stockley, and Dahlen 2010, p. 7). Given the issues with the MHRS, it is not surprising that other national surveys have well-known issues in estimating the size of the individual health insurance market (see Abraham, Karaca-Mandic, and Boudreaux 2013).
Turning next to the impact on log premiums, Figure 6 shows trends in log premiums per person in the individual market, again relative to the 2004 levels. While the medical-CPI-adjusted log premiums continue to trend upward in the control states, we observe a distinct decrease in Massachusetts following the implementation of health care reform. We also notice a nominal premium decrease in Massachusetts following health reform.

Column 2 in Table 2 quantifies the reform’s effect on log premiums. Our results suggest that log premiums in Massachusetts fell by 0.233 following health care reform, relative to other states. This corresponds to a 23.3 percent decrease relative to Massachusetts’ pre-reform level of $5,870. This estimate is in the same range as that found by Graves and Gruber (2012), who use data collected by the Association for Health Insurance Plans (AHIP).

Finally, we turn to the impact of reform on log average claim expenditures. Figure 7 presents trends in log average claim expenditures in the individual market. Again, we observe a noticeable trend break in the Massachusetts individual market following health reform. Log average claims expenditures trend upward in the pre-reform and the reform implementation years, both in Massachusetts and the control states. However, in the post reform-years log average claim expenditures trend downward in Massachusetts but continue to grow for another year in the control states before they remain fairly constant in the remaining years.

32 Premiums are higher in Massachusetts than they are in other states before reform. While there are various potential explanations for the general differences in health care costs between states, guaranteed issue and community rating regulations are likely to explain the relatively larger cost differences in the individual market, at least in part. In the absence of an individual mandate, we expect that these regulations may lead to an adversely selected pool of insured individuals and the associated high premiums. Supporting this, we find that insurers located in other states that also had guaranteed issue and community rating regulation in place, henceforth “guaranteed issue states,” had higher premiums and claim expenditures than the national average. We come back to this comparison in Section VIB, where we contrast premium and health expenditure trends in Massachusetts with trends in synthetic control states chosen with weight assigned to guaranteed issue status.

33 The authors find that between 2006 and 2009, family plans and single plans decreased by 52.3 percent and 35.3 percent relative to the national trend, respectively. We consider the impact of these alternative estimates on welfare in Section VIG.
Column 3 in Table 2 quantifies the reform’s effect on log average claim expenditures, which suggests that they decreased by about 8.7 percent of the initial average claim expenditures of $5,270, because of the influx of newly insured consumers. The table also suggests a pre-reform markup, premiums minus average costs, of $600 (11 percent).

Taken together, the results from the graphical and the regression analysis across the different outcomes of interest suggest that the Massachusetts’ individual market was adversely selected prior to health reform. As coverage increased, the average expenditure level per enrollee was reduced, as were premiums. This finding is consistent with our earlier findings using data from the hospital market as well and the evidence from the literature (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski 2012; Cutler and Zeckhauser 2000; EFC).

A. Welfare Effects

We next turn to translating the results into welfare estimates. We illustrate the magnitudes of our welfare estimates in two equivalent ways. First, we plot the key equilibrium points from our theory using their empirical magnitudes from our estimates. We then show how we can compute the change in welfare analytically.

Given our estimates of the initial levels and changes in coverage, premiums, and average costs, we only require one more element to fully identify welfare effects: the empirical value of the tax penalty. Because we have estimated logarithmic specifications, we specify the empirical value of the tax penalty as a proportion of the average premium, which is consistent with the legislated description of the penalty.34 We use an annual relative tax penalty of $1,250 _______ $5,871.3 = 21.3 percent in our baseline specification, where we divide the nominal tax penalty by the pre-reform premium in Massachusetts, and consider different values in additional robustness.

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34 The tax penalty equals 50 percent of the premium of the lowest priced Commonwealth Choice plan available for adults with incomes above 300 percent of the FPL, see http://www.massresources.org/health-reform.html.
checks. According to Table 1, the average tax penalty is potentially smaller, but equation (2) shows that the overall welfare effects decrease in the calibrated tax penalty. Therefore, our baseline specification describes a conservative welfare estimate with respect to the tax penalty.

Figure 8 illustrates the empirical average cost curve, the empirical demand curve, and the associated welfare effects graphically. Our findings suggest that the individual mandate increased consumer welfare in the individual market. In fact, we find that the tax penalty could have been even larger to fully internalize the social costs of adverse selection, an observation we return to below. Following the derivation in Section IIIC, we can express the full welfare effect (the light gray and the dark gray area in Figure 8) in terms of parameters that we quantified in the difference-in-differences regression analysis. Specifically, we substitute the estimated pre-reform levels and changes in coverage, log premiums, and log average costs from Table 2 into equation (2) and find the reform’s annual effect on social welfare in Massachusetts.

\[
\Delta W_{\text{full}} = (8.678 - 8.57) \times 26.5\% \\
- (-0.087) \times (70.3\% + 26.5\%) \\
+ \frac{1}{2} (-0.233 - 0.239) \times 26.5\% = 0.051.
\]

The first term on the right-hand side addresses the observed positive pre-reform markup. The second term summarizes the role of the downward sloping average cost curve for our welfare estimates. Intuitively, the size of this effect depends on the change in log average costs and the change in coverage but also on the wedge between average and marginal costs in the pre-reform equilibrium, which is why coverage in the pre-reform equilibrium enters the formula. Finally, the third term
summarizes the role of changes in premiums for our welfare estimates.\footnote{The proportional tax penalty shifts the demand curve by $\log(1 - \pi) = \log(1 - \frac{1,250}{5,870}) = 0.239$, see the online Appendix for details.} A larger decrease in log premiums suggests that the newly insured consumers value health insurance by less.

Our model is derived from the perspective of a representative individual. To extrapolate our results to determine overall welfare gains requires us to determine the relevant population. Given the population of interest—the individual market—our estimates can be interpreted as a welfare gain relative to the pre-reform premium of approximately 5.1 percent × $5,870 = $299 per person and year. For our primary estimates, we assume that individuals above 300 percent of the FPL are similar to those receiving full subsidies (i.e., marginal costs and the willingness to pay for insurance are independent of an individual’s annual earnings). Accordingly, we extrapolate this gain to the universe of individual market participants. We revisit this assumption in the robustness section. To get a population welfare impact, we multiply the per-person estimate by a conservative market size estimate of 212,000 individuals\footnote{To quantify the size of Massachusetts’ individual market, we first aggregate the reported individual market enrollment in the SNL data across all insurers in Massachusetts at the year level. This includes consumers enrolled in Commonwealth Care plans. Second, we add the uninsured by dividing the aggregate enrollment estimate by our coverage estimate from the NHIS. Specifically, we calculate average enrollment in the years 2007–2010 and divide the number by our post-reform coverage estimate from the NHIS. Our market size estimate is smaller than the estimate reported by the DHCFP, which suggests that in 2011 about 245,000 individuals were enrolled in the individual market, see rows 2, 5, and 6 in table 2 of the quarterly enrollment update, www.mass.gov/chia/docs/id/ pubs/12/2011-june-key-indicators.pdf. As mentioned earlier, this report measures enrollment at the individual level and not at the member month level. Therefore, the reported enrollment figures overstate our enrollment measure, which is based on 12 member months.} and find a full welfare effect for the entire individual market of $63.5 million per year.

To assess the precision of our welfare estimates, we derive the distribution of the welfare effects via bootstrap. The bootstrapped confidence intervals are conditional upon the calibrated tax penalty, which we vary in the robustness section. We describe the details of the bootstrap method in the online Appendix. The first row in Table 3 displays the results for our baseline specification, which suggest that the full welfare effect is statistically significant at the 5 percent level (see column 2). We can rule out full welfare gains that are negative or greater than 9.9 percent with 95 percent confidence.

### B. Changes in the Markup versus Adverse Selection

The full welfare effect combines two effects: the welfare gain from the removal of adverse selection and the welfare gain from a smaller post-reform loading factor. A smaller post-reform markup is consistent with a more competitive market environment in the post-reform period and also with the change in the rating methodology in the individual market, which was carried out in July 2007. One advantage of our empirical method is that we can decompose the full welfare gain into a welfare gain from the removal of adverse selection and a welfare gain from a smaller post-reform markup. Furthermore, we can decompose these effects and assess welfare without modeling the mechanisms for enhanced competition directly, making our framework robust to changes in the market environment that may have affected
the conduct of competition. To separately identify the welfare impacts, we compute the welfare gains holding the pre-reform markup constant and attribute this effect to the removal of adverse selection.

Using equation (4), we conclude that health insurance coverage would have increased by 17 percentage points to $I^{*, \text{ markup}} = 87$ percent, if the pre-reform load had remained constant. Graphically, $I^{*, \text{ markup}}$ refers to the coverage share at which the post-reform demand curve intersects with the pre-reform pricing policy of the insurers. Under the pre-reform markup, premiums, and average costs would have decreased by only 5.4 percent. Based on equation (3), we find that the welfare gains due to the removal of adverse selection, represented by the light gray area, equal 4.1 percent per individual and year, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent

Table 3—Welfare Effects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tax penalty</th>
<th>Percent tax penalty</th>
<th>Full welfare effect</th>
<th>Net welfare effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline: 1,250</td>
<td>21.3 percent</td>
<td>0.051**</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450</td>
<td>7.7 percent</td>
<td>0.072**</td>
<td>0.03***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>550</td>
<td>9.4 percent</td>
<td>0.07**</td>
<td>0.033***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>650</td>
<td>11.1 percent</td>
<td>0.067**</td>
<td>0.036***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750</td>
<td>12.8 percent</td>
<td>0.064**</td>
<td>0.038***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>14.5 percent</td>
<td>0.062**</td>
<td>0.039***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>950</td>
<td>16.2 percent</td>
<td>0.059**</td>
<td>0.04***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>17.9 percent</td>
<td>0.056**</td>
<td>0.041***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,150</td>
<td>19.6 percent</td>
<td>0.054**</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>23.0 percent</td>
<td>0.048*</td>
<td>0.041**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,450</td>
<td>24.7 percent</td>
<td>0.045*</td>
<td>0.042**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,550</td>
<td>26.4 percent</td>
<td>0.042*</td>
<td>0.039**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>28.1 percent</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.038**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>29.8 percent</td>
<td>0.036</td>
<td>0.037**</td>
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<td>1,850</td>
<td>31.5 percent</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.035**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,950</td>
<td>33.2 percent</td>
<td>0.029</td>
<td>0.033*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>34.9 percent</td>
<td>0.026</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GI: 1,250</td>
<td>21.3 percent</td>
<td>0.056*</td>
<td>0.044***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
level, see column 3 in the first row of Table 3.\footnote{We can reject a negative net welfare effect with 98.8\text{\%} confidence.} From Table 2, the average premium in the population pre-reform was $5,870 per year. Therefore, the welfare gain from the reduction in adverse selection is about 4.1\text{\%} $\times$ $5,870 = $241 per person and year. As expected, this gain in the individual health insurance market is larger than the welfare loss from adverse selection that EFC find in their empirical context of the employer sponsored health insurance market of 2.3\text{\%} of the maximum money at stake (which is roughly equivalent to our measure of total cost). The welfare gain also exceeds the welfare effects in Einav, Finkelstein, and Schrimpf (2010), which suggest that adverse selection in the UK annuity market reduces welfare by about 2\text{\%} of annuitized wealth. Combined with the market size estimate, the net welfare effect for the entire individual market equals $51.1$ million per year. This welfare gain seems substantial even relative to the approximately $800 million of outlays from the federal government to finance Massachusetts health reform, see McDonough et al. (2006).

The transition to a more competitive market and the change in the premium rating methodology, on the other hand, decreased annual premiums by another 17.9\text{\%} and the associated welfare gain equals 1\text{\%} ($58.7) per person and $12.4 million for the entire market. While both effects enhanced welfare, these estimates suggest that 80\text{\%} of the total welfare gains came from reductions in adverse selection.\footnote{We also consider the reverse welfare breakdown, by considering the change in the markup first. In this calculation, we find a smaller net welfare effect of 2.8\text{\%} ($164) per person and a welfare gain from lower markups of 2.3\text{\%} ($135) per person.}

C. Optimal Tax Penalty

Our final application of our methodology is to compute the optimal individual mandate penalty based on our empirical estimates for demand and cost curves. While theoretically straightforward, to do so we must lean heavily on our assumption of linearity in demand and cost curves. Because estimation of an optimal penalty requires out of sample prediction over coverage ranges, we do not observe in the data that this assumption may not hold and, therefore, the precise magnitude of these estimates should be viewed with caution. Nevertheless, Figure 8 demonstrates that a larger shift would have increased welfare even further. Specifically, our empirical results suggest that the social optimum occurs at universal coverage levels, as even the consumers with the lowest willingness would purchase health insurance if it were offered at their marginal costs. We can use our model to compute the smallest tax penalty that implies universal insurance coverage.\footnote{In order to quantify the socially optimal penalty, we assume that the post-reform markup remains unchanged if we vary the magnitude of the tax penalty.}

In practice, the tax penalty must be sufficiently large such that the consumer with the lowest willingness-to-pay is willing to purchase health insurance if it is offered at average costs of all consumers, plus the post-reform markup that insurers charge on top of the realized average costs. Using equation (6),\footnote{In general, the formula builds on the linearity assumption in the marginal cost curve. However, our findings indicate that universal coverage is optimal. Therefore, we can calculate the optimal penalty using our demand estimates.} we conclude that the
minimal tax penalty that implements universal coverage levels equals 24.9 percent ($1,461). While this optimal penalty exceeds the actual penalty in Massachusetts, it does resemble the proposed penalty for national reform, which can equal the maximum of $2,085 and 2.5 percent of household income.

VI. Robustness

In this section, we first conduct a sensitivity analysis of our welfare estimates with respect to the tax penalty. Next, we contrast the trends in Massachusetts’ individual market with other states that also had guaranteed issue regulations as well as community rating laws in place. We continue with a more careful analysis of the community rating regulations in Massachusetts and investigate whether they affect our empirical estimates. Next, we test whether there have been meaningful changes in the generosity of the offered health insurance plans. We then revisit the welfare gains for the entire individual market using reported average costs of all insurers in Massachusetts’ individual market. Finally, we compare our regression results to other findings in the literature and investigate the implications for social welfare.

A. The Role of the Penalty

Because we have calibrated the penalty, we assess the robustness of our welfare results to alternative penalty amounts. Equation (2) shows that as the penalty decreases, there is a linear increase in the change in welfare. Since our baseline penalty constitutes an upper bound for the actual tax penalty, see Table 1, our baseline estimate provides a conservative estimate for the full welfare effect. For instance, the full welfare effect increases by 0.3 percent per person if the underlying changes in coverage stem from a $100 smaller tax penalty. Graphically, a smaller tax penalty shifts point C in the direction of point A′, see Figure 8. The effect of the tax penalty on the welfare estimate is linear because the width of the shaded polygon, \( I^{\ast, \text{post}} - I^{\ast, \text{pre}} \), remains unchanged. However, if the perceived tax penalty is higher than the actual tax penalty, as argued by Ericson and Kessler (2013), then our full welfare estimate may overstate the actual effect. Therefore, we conduct robustness checks with smaller and larger tax penalties. Column 3 of Table 3 summarizes the respective full welfare estimates for different calibrated tax penalties. The estimates are generally similar to our baseline estimate of 5.1 percent but differ somewhat if we consider substantial deviations from the calibrated tax penalty. The estimates vary from 2.9 percent at a penalty of 33.2 percent to 7.2 percent at a penalty of 7.7 percent.

The effect of the tax penalty on the net welfare effect is ambiguous. While a smaller tax penalty still implies a more elastic market demand function, a smaller tax penalty also implies a smaller post-reform coverage level in the absence of changes in insurer markups. Column 3 of Table 3 summarizes the welfare effects

\[ 41 \text{ Notice that the formula suggests an optimal penalty of 0.286. However, the underlying proportional tax penalty equals only } 1 - \exp(-0.286) = 0.249, \text{ see the online Appendix for details.} \]

\[ 42 \text{ This robustness exercise also addresses differences between the actual tax penalty and the perceived tax penalty, see e.g., Ericson and Kessler (2013) who investigate counterfactual demand responses to the mandate had it been articulated as a tax on the uninsured.} \]
associated with the removal of adverse selection for different tax penalties. These welfare effects are hump-shaped and peak at a penalty of about 20 percent. While the net welfare effects vary with the underlying penalty, we think that the relevant support for the underlying penalty lies between 16.2 percent and 21.3 percent given our restrictive sample selection. Therefore, the net welfare effect ranges between 4 percent and 4.1 percent per individual and year. Here, the calibration of the penalty seems to have a very small impact on our estimated net welfare effects. Finally, Table 3 indicates that the net welfare effect exceeds the full welfare effects for tax penalties of more than 29.8 percent. This is because consumers are less price elastic if higher tax penalties lead to the same coverage gains. Graphically, this is captured by a steeper demand curve that intersects with the marginal cost curve at a point to the left of the post-reform coverage level. Therefore, a further reduction in markups leads to a partial welfare loss: coverage increases to inefficiently high levels.

Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that individuals are responding to the statutory value of the penalty. This ignores the potential for non-pecuniary perceptions about the penalty to impact choices. For example, some consumers may see a government mandate as an affront that has a cost of compliance. Conversely, some individuals may see the penalty as their duty as a citizen. When reform was first passed in Massachusetts there was also a substantial advertising initiative that included cross-marketing with the Red Sox that may have also influenced perceptions about the need to comply. One can interpret the robustness of our results to differences in the optimal tax penalty as robustness to non-pecuniary factors that change behavior as though the penalty were larger or smaller.

B. Comparison to States with Community Rating and Guaranteed Issue Regulations

Our main empirical specification compares trends in the Massachusetts individual market to trends in the individual market of other states. If pre-reform regulations led to different trends in the individual market across states, then we might better control for trends by comparing Massachusetts to other states with similar pre-reform regulations. Only five states—Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Vermont, and Washington—had comparable guaranteed issue regulations combined with community rating laws in place. If these states experience common time trends that differ from those observed in other US states, then our baseline point estimates confound the effects of health reform with general time trends that are unrelated to health reform.

To test for differences in time trends between states with guaranteed issue and community rating regulations and other states, we add an indicator variable that takes the value of one for guaranteed issue/community rating states to the set of matching variables in the synthetic control method. The regression results are

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43 Kentucky and New Hampshire enacted similar regulations in 1994 but repealed the laws in 2000 and 2002 respectively, see Wachenheim and Leida (2012). New Jersey passed similar regulations in 1992 as well but we dropped the state from this small control group since it passed a legislation in 2008, which aimed at coverage expansion. Among other aspects, this legislation mandated coverage for children and expanded coverage for low-income parents. Furthermore, the law included several reforms to the small group and in the individual market, see Wachenheim and Leida (2012). Therefore, it remains unclear whether New Jersey constitutes a control state or a treatment state in our empirical framework.
presented in Table 4. The findings are very similar to the baseline results, see Table 2, but slightly larger in magnitude. While larger coverage gains and higher average cost savings indicate larger welfare gains, larger decreases in premiums suggest the opposite.

Following the outlined steps in Section V, we revisit the welfare effects using the parameter estimates from the first row in Table 4. The results in the last row of Table 3 suggest a larger full welfare effect of 5.6 percent, which combines a net effect of 4.4 percent and a welfare gain from a smaller post-reform loading factor of 1.2 percent. The revised welfare effects exceed our baseline results by about 20 percent, but they are still within the 95 percent confidence interval on our main estimate.

C. Community Rating

Our baseline model assumes perfect community rating such that premiums may not vary in observable consumer characteristics. In reality, premiums may vary across ages but only up to a factor of two. While this regulation is not as stringent as our baseline assumption, the community rating regulation is still binding as expected health expenditures vary considerably across ages. To quantify age-related differences in health expenditures, we use data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). We use data from 2004–2010 from all states and sum expenditures on emergency room visits, inpatient and outpatient stays, prescription drugs, and other expenditures at the individual-year level. We use the Medical Consumer

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Table 4—Difference-in-Differences Regression Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Coverage</th>
<th>log premium</th>
<th>log claim exp</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma^k MA \times after$</td>
<td>$0.305^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.266^{***}$</td>
<td>$-0.099^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[0.205, 0.402]$</td>
<td>$[-0.319, -0.213]$</td>
<td>$[-0.157, -0.033]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^k MA \times during$</td>
<td>$-0.012$</td>
<td>$-0.028$</td>
<td>$-0.051$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.048, 0.022]$</td>
<td>$[-0.082, 0.028]$</td>
<td>$[-0.110, 0.012]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^k MA$</td>
<td>$0.154^{**}$</td>
<td>$0.559^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.609^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[0.018, 0.301]$</td>
<td>$[0.497, 0.626]$</td>
<td>$[0.539, 0.682]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^k after$</td>
<td>$-0.084^*$</td>
<td>$0.161^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.225^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.182, 0.015]$</td>
<td>$[0.109, 0.214]$</td>
<td>$[0.160, 0.282]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^k during$</td>
<td>$-0.021$</td>
<td>$0.103^{***}$</td>
<td>$0.188^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[-0.055, 0.015]$</td>
<td>$[0.049, 0.158]$</td>
<td>$[0.127, 0.247]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho^k constant$</td>
<td>$0.549^{***}$</td>
<td>$8.119^{***}$</td>
<td>$7.960^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$[0.405, 0.682]$</td>
<td>$[8.051, 8.179]$</td>
<td>$[7.885, 8.030]$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-reform value (levels)</td>
<td>$0.703$</td>
<td>$5,871.33$</td>
<td>$5,270.64$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The bootstrapped 95 percent confidence interval is displayed in brackets. Standard errors are block bootstrapped. Abadie weights depend on member month enrollment, changes in coverage, relative changes in average costs, and relative changes in premiums between 2004 and 2005, as well as whether the state has guaranteed issue and community rating regulations in place.

***Significant at the 1 percent level.

**Significant at the 5 percent level.

*Significant at the 10 percent level.

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44 We also report the relevant trend graphs in the online Appendix.
Price Index to normalize the average health expenditures to 2012 prices. Finally, we estimate conditional means for the non-elderly adult population aged 18–65 using a standard nonparametric kernel estimator and find that health expenditures vary by up to a factor of six across ages.

Even though the community rating regulations appear to be binding, insurers may still, at least to some extent, price discriminate against older (more expensive) consumers. This may affect our demand estimates if the average age of the newly insured differs from the average age of the previously insured. For instance, if the newly insured are younger on average, then we overstate the change in the premiums by imposing perfect community rating. Consequently, we would conclude that the demand for health insurance is too inelastic and our welfare estimates would be too conservative. The opposite holds, if the newly insured are older on average.

To test for changes in the age composition in the pool of insured consumers, we revisit changes in the age distribution reported by the DHCFP, see Table 5. The estimates suggest that the average age of insured consumers in Massachusetts’ individual market increased by 0.4 years between 2005 and 2009. Our cost estimates would imply that the average age of the insured consumers decreased over the reform period. However, the increase may reflect a reform-unrelated demographic time trend, which is consistent with even larger increases in average age in the other market segments. Unlike our main estimates, these results do not control for national trends because they are based only on Massachusetts data. Nevertheless, we continue our analysis assuming that the increase in age was reform-related, which provides a conservative lower bound for our welfare estimates with respect to the role of community rating.

Next, we estimate the effect of age on average health expenditures in a simple linear regression model using the MEPS data. We find that a one year increase in age increases total health expenditures by $92.5. Assuming that insurers could perfectly price discriminate based on age, we conclude that premiums vary on average by up to $92.5 \times (\text{Actuarial Value}) \times (1 + \text{Markup})$ per year of age. To be conservative, we assume that the actuarial value equals 100 percent and use the larger pre-reform markup of 11.4 percent. Hence, we conclude that the average annual premium may have increased by only $41 (0.7 percent) because of the increase in average age of 0.4 years. This effect is negligible compared to our estimated change in the effective premium of $-23.3 \text{ percent} - 21.3 \text{ percent} = -44.6 \text{ percent}$. Therefore, we conclude that our welfare estimates are robust with respect to deviations from our perfect community rating assumption.

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**Table 5—Average Age in Massachusetts by Market Segment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individual</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Small group</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-size group</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large group</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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D. Change in the Generosity of Plan Design

Our baseline specification abstracts from potential changes in the generosity of health insurance plans. Therefore, our estimates overstate the role of adverse selection if consumers in the Massachusetts individual market purchase relatively less generous health insurance plans following health care reform. To quantify potential changes in plan generosity, we analyze insurer characteristics in the SNL data and information on plan characteristics from the literature.

We begin our discussion with an analysis of the SNL data. The data are aggregated at the insurer-year level, which implies that we can only address differences in plan generosity between insurance carriers. Since the SNL data do not provide explicit information on plan characteristics, we use the insurer name as a proxy for the generosity of the representative (most popular) insurance plan. Specifically, we assume that insurers that carry the word “HMO” in their name offer insurance plans that are on average less generous. Based on this assumption, we calculate the share of insured consumers that are enrolled in HMO plans at the state-year level. In Massachusetts, we find that HMO enrollment trends upward over time, but we do not find a noticeable change in enrollment between 2007 and 2008.46 On the other hand, we observe a trend break and a level shift in average costs between 2007 and 2008, see Figure 7. Therefore, we do not think that changes in HMO enrollment can explain the changes in Massachusetts average cost trend. To investigate the role of HMO enrollment for our baseline results in further detail, we reestimate our empirical specification, see equation (7), controlling for the share of insured consumers that purchase insurance plans from HMO-type insurers at the state-year level. The findings suggest that, holding plan generosity constant, premiums and average costs decrease by 26.4 percent and 7.1 percent respectively. These estimates are similar to our baseline findings and suggest slightly smaller welfare effects. However, based on the standard errors of our baseline estimates, we conclude that the differences in the point estimates are not statistically significant.

Second, we revisit evidence from the literature on changes in plan generosity. The DHCFP computes the actuarial value of the most popular plan of each carrier in Massachusetts individual market for 2007 and 2008, based on a proprietary pricing model, and reports the actuarial value and other characteristics for the least generous plan, the median plan, and the most generous plan, see Table 6.47 The results suggest that the entire distribution shifted between 2007 and 2008 toward slightly more generous insurance plans. On the other hand, the DHCFP also finds that consumer cost sharing increased as a percentage of total expenditures in the individual market from 11.1 percent in 2007 to 12.7 percent in 2008. As argued earlier, this can be interpreted as evidence for adverse selection because the newly insured healthy individuals contribute relatively more to their total expenditures in benefit plans with high deductibles. But even if we interpret the increase in

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46 In Massachusetts, we find one HMO insurer. This insurer does not report enrollment in 2004, even though other sources suggest that enrollment for this insurer was similar in 2004 and 2005. Therefore, we assume that HMO enrollment in 2004 equals the observed enrollment in 2005. Otherwise, enrollment would increase from 0 percent to 59 percent in 2005.

47 Unfortunately, we could not find these statistics for earlier years. We also note here that while these results reflect the population weights within each carrier, they do not reflect the enrollment-weighted generosity.
consumer cost sharing as evidence for a decrease in plan generosity, despite the evidence on an increase in the actuarial value, then the increase can only account for a small fraction of our baseline welfare estimates. Specifically, we conclude that $161 (35 percent) of the measured decrease in average costs can be explained by a decrease in plan generosity.48

We also note that an important change in plan generosity was the potential for younger enrollees who qualified for YAP plans. Based on the evidence from the SNL data and the literature, we conclude that changes in the plan generosity can at most explain a small fraction of our baseline welfare estimates. In fact, the evidence suggests that our welfare estimates are conservative with respect to potential changes in plan generosity.

### E. Changes in Care Delivery Due to Reform

The Massachusetts reform, while primarily focused on insurance, may have impacted care delivery through general equilibrium effects on prices or access to care. Kolstad and Kowalski (2012a) discuss the impact of the Massachusetts reform on delivery in detail. While they find an impact on access, notably use of the emergency room as a point of entry into the health care system, they do not find a change in total hospital cost growth in Massachusetts relative to other states before versus after the reform. These findings, both with and without controls for patient illness severity, are not consistent with substantial increases in prices or quantity, holding

48 Total expenditures per person combine the average costs paid by the insurer, AC, and the consumer’s contribution C. Since consumer cost sharing in 2008 equaled 12.7 percent, we know that

\[
0.127 = \frac{C^{*, \text{post}}}{AC^{*, \text{post}} + C^{*, \text{post}}}.
\]

We know that \(AC^{*, \text{post}} = 4,650\). Therefore, we can solve for \(C^{*, \text{post}}\), which equals $677. Now we can calculate the post-reform consumer contribution that maintains the pre-reform expenditure share of 11.1 percent. We conclude that the post-reform cost-sharing ratio equals the pre-reform cost-sharing ratio if the post-reform consumer and insurer expenditures equal $591 and $4,735 respectively. Hence, our baseline results overestimate the reform’s effect on average costs by about $4,811 − $4,650 = $161. Average costs decreased by 8.7 percent ($458). Hence, about $161 \$/458 = 35 percent of the cost decrease can be attributed to a decrease in plan generosity.

### Table 6—Plan Generosity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2007</th>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>Median</td>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>Minimum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actuarial value</td>
<td>0.578</td>
<td>0.694</td>
<td>0.726</td>
<td>0.635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coinsurance</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP office visit</td>
<td>$35</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC office visit</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$25</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpatient copay</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatient surgery copay</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
<td>$250</td>
<td>Deductible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency room copay</td>
<td>$200</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$75</td>
<td>$200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pharmacy deductible</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>$250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail generic</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$10</td>
<td>$20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail preferred</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$50</td>
<td>$30</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail non-preferred</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>$100</td>
<td>$60</td>
<td>$75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

illness severity fixed. Since hospital cost is the primary driver of total claims, this evidence suggests our findings do not result from changes in prices for care.

Furthermore, if expanding insurance to near-universal levels results in increases in prices charged by health care providers in Massachusetts (relative to other states) our findings would be biased down. That is, claims cost would be rising due to price increases. Therefore, our finding that the average cost of the insured declined is a lower bound.

One other potentially important issue is access to physician services. If the Massachusetts reform did increase demand, but capacity constraints on supply meant that the newly insured could not access a provider, then we would see lower cost among the newly insured as a result. While the potential for such constraints has been much discussed in the popular press, the empirical evidence does not suggest major impacts of reform. In 2005, the average wait time for an internal medicine appointment in Massachusetts was 47 days. In 2008, 2009, and 2010 the average wait was 50, 44, and 53 days respectively. While these are average measures, we do not see a sharp change between pre- and post-reform in Massachusetts. Similar trends hold for specialties as well. Taken together, the evidence suggests that general equilibrium shifts in health care delivery are unlikely to explain our results. Nevertheless, given the aggregate data on wait times, we are unable to rule out potential impacts of access on cost.

F. Welfare Gains for the Entire Individual Market

In Section V, we multiplied the per person welfare gains in our sample population by the size of the individual market to predict the welfare gains for the entire individual market. This approach is valid if marginal costs and the slope of the demand curve do not differ across income groups. While we cannot recover the demand curve for the entire market from aggregate data, we revisit variation in costs using data on all insurers in the Massachusetts individual market, including those that offer Commonwealth Care plans. We reestimate the coverage and the average cost difference-in-differences specifications using the entire Massachusetts individual market. Finally, we combine these findings with the demand estimates from Section V to compute the welfare effects in this population.

Using the post-reform coverage normalization discussed earlier, we find that the reform increased coverage by 69 percentage points in the full sample. This effect combines the coverage gains in our baseline sample with coverage gains in Commonwealth Care plans. The results from the average cost specification suggest that pre-reform log average costs equal 8.57 per insured person and that the reform decreased average costs by $-0.21$. Consistent with the larger enrollment gains, the effect on average costs exceeds our baseline results as well. To compare the magnitude of changes in

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49 See the 2013 report on patient access to care by the Massachusetts Medical Society, http://www.massmed.org/patientaccess/#.UxU4nflfU8g.

50 This is because consumers face different income-dependent premiums because of the variation in penalties and subsidies, see the discussion in Section IV.
average costs across samples, we calculate the average costs of the newly insured.\footnote{For the full sample we solve for the average costs of newly insured \( x \) as follows:} We find that the average costs of the newly insured equal 8.29 in the full sample and 8.25 in our baseline sample. This suggests that the newly insured individuals in our non-poor baseline population have better health profiles than the new enrollees in the Commonwealth Care plans, who earn less than 300 percent of the FPL.

Using the new average cost estimates, we can now revisit the full and the net welfare effects per person. We update the average costs in the post-reform period using a weighted average of the average costs of the previously insured and the newly insured, where the weights reflect the coverage trends in our baseline analysis. Specifically, we find that the log average costs in the post-reform period for the entire market equal 8.49 in the absence of subsidies and variation in the tax penalty.\footnote{We have} As mentioned earlier, we assume that the slope of the demand curve does not vary across income groups. Therefore, coverage would have increased by only 26.5 percent in the entire sample, had everybody been exposed to the same tax penalty of 21.3 percent and had there been no subsidies for individuals earning less than 300 percent of the FPL. Using the new average cost estimates, we find that the full and the net welfare effects per person equal 0.04 ($235) and 0.034 ($200), respectively. Both effects fall short of our baseline estimates by about 20 percent, but they are still within the 95 percent confidence intervals on our baseline estimates, and they are statistically different from zero at the 1 percent level. Multiplied by the predicted market size of 212,000 individuals, we conclude that the full welfare gains for the entire individual market equal $50 million. The net welfare gains attributed to the removal of adverse selection equal $42.4 million.

\textbf{G. Robustness of Welfare Effects to Estimates from Other Studies}

To assess the sensitivity of our welfare estimates with respect to our sample population, we revisit the welfare results using premium and cost estimates from other sources in the literature. We begin by considering estimates for premium changes from Graves and Gruber (2012). The authors use data from the Association for Health Insurance Plans and find that after health reform, premiums in Massachusetts decreased relative to other states by 35 percent and 52 percent for single plans and family plans, respectively. The average number of members per insurance contract in Massachusetts’ individual market decreased from 1.6 in 2005 to 1.4 in 2008.\footnote{See DHCFP data Appendix, p. 140.} This suggests that the reform induced a disproportionately large share of singles to purchase health insurance plans in the individual market. Therefore, we use the premium estimates for single plans in our first robustness check. Since Graves and Gruber (2012) do not provide information on changes in average costs, we continue with our cost estimates from the SNL data. Based on the premium results, we expect

\[
\frac{0.23 \times 8.57 + 0.69 \times x}{0.23 + 0.69} = 8.57 - 0.21. 
\]

Similarly, we solve for the average costs of newly insured in our baseline sample.
that the authors would find a larger decrease in average costs, relative to our findings, had they explored changes in average costs as well. Therefore, we interpret the revised welfare estimates as a potentially conservative benchmark. Using the new estimate on changes in premiums, we find a full welfare gain of 3.5 percent and a net welfare gain of 3 percent, see the second row of Table 7. These estimates fall short of our baseline results by 31 percent and 27 percent, which is roughly proportional to the underlying change in the slope of the demand curve.54

Next, we reconsider our welfare estimate using the demand elasticity estimates from Ericson and Starc (2012). The authors use data from the Massachusetts Connector on unsubsidized health insurance purchases in the individual market. Their price elasticities reflect the demand behavior at the intensive margin since the authors do not observe individuals that decide to remain uninsured. In comparison to our demand estimates, we expect that the authors find relatively high price elasticities because plan characteristics vary less at the intensive margin (compared to the extensive margin) and because the connector provides an Internet platform that allows consumers to compare premiums among plans. We multiply the reported age group specific semi-price elasticities by representative population weights in the individual market reported by the DHCFP and find an average semi-price elasticity of \(-2.25\) percent per $100 increase in premiums.55 We reconsider our welfare estimates in two different specifications. In the first specification, we hold on to our coverage estimates and adjust the effect on log premiums such that changes in coverage and log premiums are consistent with the semi-price elasticity from Ericson and Starc (2012). If we extrapolate the large empirical price elasticities from the intensive margin to the less elastic extensive margin, then we conclude that the observed change in coverage could have been induced by a much smaller nominal decrease in premiums of only 4.5 percent. By contrast, our own estimates indicate a nominal decrease in premiums of 23.3 percent, see Table 2.56 The relatively large demand elasticity implies a higher willingness to pay among the marginal consumers, which is why we find larger full and net welfare effects of 7.5 percent and 8.8 percent.

\[\frac{-0.35 - 0.24}{0.265} = -2.23, \text{ which exceeds our baseline slope by 25 percent.}\]

\[\frac{-0.233 - 0.24}{0.265} = -1.78. \text{ The new results suggest a slope of } -2.23.\]

\[\frac{26.5\%}{70.3\%} \times \frac{1}{2.25} \times 100 = $1,673 \text{ (28.5 percent)}.\]

Combining the observed changes in coverage with the semi-price elasticity from Ericson and Starc (2012) suggests that, effectively, premiums should have decreased by $1,673 (28.5 percent). The effective change in premiums combines a nominal decrease and the effect of the tax penalty. Since the adjusted tax penalty effectively decreased premiums by 24 percent, we adjust our baseline parameter estimate displayed in Table 2 from \(-23.3\%\) to \(-28.5\% - (-24\%) = -4.5\%\).

### Table 7—Welfare Gains Using Demand Estimates from the Literature

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full welfare effect</th>
<th>Net welfare effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline estimates</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graves and Gruber (2012)</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ericson and Starc (2012): premiums</td>
<td>0.075</td>
<td>0.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ericson and Starc (2012): coverage</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski (2012)</td>
<td>0.125</td>
<td>0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
respectively. In the second specification, we retain our baseline premium estimates and adjust our coverage estimates. We conclude that the effective premium decrease of 23.3 percent + 24 percent = 47.3 percent should have resulted in a coverage gain of 50 percent, which implies universal coverage in the post-reform period. The respective welfare gains are displayed in the fourth row of Table 7 and suggest a full and a net welfare gain of 5.9 percent and 5.1 percent respectively.

Finally, we revisit our welfare analysis based on the cost estimates from our earlier work (Hackmann, Kolstad, and Kowalski 2012), where we compare changes in hospital costs following Massachusetts health reform across counties that exhibited different coverage changes. All Massachusetts counties reached near-universal health insurance level after reform. Therefore, we see the largest coverage gains in those counties that had the lowest pre-reform coverage levels. Using hospital claims data from Massachusetts, we find that the slope of the average hospital cost curve equals −$2,250. The slope estimate suggests that a coverage increase of 26.5 percentage points reduces the average hospital related costs of the insured population by 0.265 × $2,250 = $596. To extrapolate the slope estimate to our sample population we have to make two adjustments. First, we divide the slope estimate by the share of hospital expenditures of total insured health expenditures assuming that the magnitude of adverse selection is similar between hospital related and non-hospital related health care costs. In 2007, hospital expenditures accounted for about 50 percent of total insured health expenditures. Second, we multiply the slope estimate by the actuarial value of the representative insurance plan in Massachusetts’ individual market. We use the actuarial value of the median plan in the year 2008, see Table 6. Combining these adjustments, we conclude that average insurer costs decrease by $596 × 0.5 × 0.726 = $865 = 16.4 percent in response to a coverage increase of 26.5 percentage points. This slope estimate exceeds our baseline estimate by 7.7 percentage points. We combine the revised cost estimate with the demand estimates from the SNL data and find larger full and net welfare effects of 12.5 percent and 10 percent respectively.

Overall, we conclude that our welfare estimates are in the center of welfare predictions that could have been made based on different premium and cost data sources.

VII. Conclusion

One important theoretical rationale for an individual mandate is that it can mitigate the welfare loss from adverse selection by requiring both the healthy and the sick to purchase coverage. On the other hand, recent empirical work on adverse selection finds relatively little welfare loss, suggesting otherwise. Reconciling these two views is of interest to economists, and it is of broader interest given the centrality of the individual mandate to both major health reforms.

57 The net welfare gain exceeds the full welfare gain because the post-reform markup exceeds the pre-reform markup. To calculate the net welfare gain, we calculate the post-reform coverage level at which the pre-reform markup equals the post-reform markup. In this case, we find a coverage level that exceeds 100 percent. Therefore, we choose $I^s_{\text{markup}} = 100\%$.

58 See http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7692_02.pdf, exhibit 2. We defined hospital care, physician/clinical services, and prescription drugs to be the insured health spending categories. If we add the second category to overall hospital services, then up to 84 percent of health care spending occurs in the hospital.
To do so requires (i) a model of adverse selection that incorporates an individual mandate explicitly and is empirically tractable and (ii) a setting to estimate adverse selection at the extensive margin between insurance and uninsurance. The Massachusetts health reform of 2006 gives us a novel opportunity to do just that: examine the impact of a mandate on adverse selection among the entire insured population in a policy very similar to the ACA.

We begin by extending existing theory to express the welfare impact of a mandate in terms of a small number of moments in commonly available data. We demonstrate that the change in welfare between pre- and post-reform can be computed based on changes in coverage, premiums, average costs (paid claims), and the size of the mandate penalty. Because we have independent measures of premiums and costs, and because changes in markups are an interesting potential outcome of health reform, we also incorporate markups into our welfare analysis, allowing us to distinguish changes in competition from changes in adverse selection. This approach makes the welfare effects of reform theoretically clear, and it also allows us to estimate the impact of reform from available data with a minimum of assumptions. We do so using the Massachusetts reform and data on coverage, premiums, and insurer costs from the SNL financial database and the NHIS. Each of these datasets delineates the individual and group markets, allowing us to focus our analysis on the market where we expect reform to have the largest impact (and adverse selection to be most egregious in the absence of reform): the individual market.

We find that the individual market for health insurance was adversely selected prior to reform. The introduction of reform increased coverage by 26.5 additional percentage points. The growth in coverage was associated with a reduction in the average cost of the insured by 8.7 percent. Translating our difference-in-difference estimates into welfare estimates suggests that the representative Massachusetts resident in the individual market was 5.1 percent better off due to reform. Scaling this estimate by the relevant population in the state suggests a substantial aggregate welfare gain of $63.5 million per year statewide. Welfare increased by 4.1 percent due to reductions in adverse selection alone.

Finally, we are able to compute the optimal individual mandate penalty; the penalty that induces the level of coverage that would occur without information asymmetries. Given the estimated demand in Massachusetts, the optimum occurs at universal coverage. The statutory penalty $1,250 (21.3 percent of the pre-reform premium) would, therefore, have to be increased to the estimated optimum of 24.9 percent to enhance welfare. While the estimated optimal penalty is higher than the penalty in Massachusetts it is relatively close to the penalty selected under national reform.

Our estimates require a number of assumptions and we rely on data with clear limitations. Nevertheless, our findings are robust to a variety of tests. Our methodology is tied very closely to the institutional features of Massachusetts health reform. We also expect that future work can build on our methodology to model and estimate the impact of the ACA as it is implemented nationwide.
REFERENCES


