David Levine Industrial
January 19, 2005 PHDBA
Tuesday 9:30 to 12:30 in F678 Haas.
Professer: You can reach me at my office, F671
Haas, phone 642-1697, fax 643-1420, email Levine@haas.berkeley.edu
hours: are by appointment or just drop by.
is based 30% on class participation, 10% on several class presentations, and
60% on an empirical project. Class participation is required. Most
presentations should use a one-page handout.
sets: are due Wednesdays at 3:00 p.m. I will
not grade them, but records of your turning them in will be used to decide
close grading decisions. You are encouraged to work together on the homework.
Section: Students should set up a section
meeting to go over the material.
Project: The project applies the theories and
tools of this class to a situation that interests you. You are invited to work
with a classmate. The ideal length of the project is 15 to 20 double-spaced
pages plus tables and references. Projects should include a theoretical
framework and relevant data. Everyone must hand in a tentative abstract with
the question to be addressed and with references to one or more data sources
before Spring Break. The project is due without exception on May 12. More on
the assignment is in the handout.
Mailing list: If you have not already
received email from the class email alias phdba259c-1, sign up for it by
the end of the week. To do this, visit www.haas.berkeley.edu/majordomo.
Readings and messages will be emailed
to you; you are expected to read your email several times a week.
class web page: is at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/levine/ba254c/
(I realize the class # is an anachronism.)
you: Please email me or bring to
the next class a page with your name, career background, phone number, where
you are from, and interests.
Lunch: I would be pleased to have lunch on
Thursdays after class with anyone who is free.
Each week there are assigned
(marked with an *) readings.
Others readings and questions
are unmarked. A single student will do each unstarred reading and answer each
question. That student will then present the reading and/or question to the
group. The notes How to Present in Class should help you
prepare brief presentations of each paper.
week also has homework questions. You are encouraged to work on homework
questions in groups, and it is fine to hand in collective solutions. For
collective solutions, if a question asks for two reasons for some fact, the
collective answer should typically include more than two reasons. Please email
me answers to the questions by Wednesday at 3:00 p.m.
* The Economic Nature of the Firm: A Reader,
edited by Louis Putterman and Randall S. Kroszner, Cambridge University Press,
second edition, 1996.
Ehrenberg and Robert Smith, Modern Labor
Economics, Eighth Edition, AddisionWesley. An advanced undergraduate labor
economics text such as this one provides crucial background reading. If you
have not taken a previous course in graduate or undergraduate labor economics,
I am assuming you are reading this or a similar textbook’s chapters for
Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics, Organization and Management,
Prentice Hall, 1992. This is an excellent introductory text on the economics of
list (this document).
How to Present in Class
Katz and David H. Autor, “Changes in the Wage Structure and Earnings
Inequality,” chapter 26 in vol. 3A, Handbook of Labor Economics,
Inter-Industry Wage Differences," Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Spring 1989, pp 181-194.
1. What are two characteristics of a person, an establishment, and an
occupation that predict high wages? Describe two theories (in 2 sentences per
theory) of why each characteristic is a good predictor. Provide one fact or
test that would support the importance of each theory.
2. What two (or more) of these characteristics are more important now than 25
years ago? Why do you think these factors have risen in importance?
3. What are three reasons that inequality has risen in the U.S. in the last
generation? How would you test the importance of each potential explanation?
Ehrenberg and Smith, Ch. 1 and 2. Be
sure you can do ch. 1 appendix problems 1-3 (p. 14) and ch. 2 review problems
1, 6, 9, and 10 (pp. 54-55).
all evens out in the end.”
Charles, "Equalizing Differences in Labor Markets,"
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85,
1980. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28198002%2994%3A1%3C113%3AEDITLM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T
Background: “Compensating Wage Differentials and
Labor Markets,” ch. 8 in Ehrenberg and Smith. Make sure you can do the review problems 4
and 6 (the latter answer should use the concept of adverse selection).
1. Under what assumptions would safety regulation harm those in unsafe jobs?
2. Why might we not detect compensating differences, even if they are present?
3. What is the main advantage of longitudinal
vs. cross-sectional tests of compensating differences? What, if any, are the
problems of longitudinal data?
earn what you learn”
Causality and the Returns to Education, “ handout.
Becker, Gary , Human Capital,
2nd ed., University of Chicago
Press, 1975, pp. 15-44.
Card, “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings,” chapter 30 in The
Handbook of Labor Economics, volume IIIA, 1999, pp. 1801-1859. Esp.
sections 3.3 to 3.5.
D. Angrist and Alan B. Krueger, “Instrumental Variables and the Search
for Identification: From Supply and Demand to Natural Experiments,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.
15, No. 4, Fall 2001: 69-87. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28200123%2915%3A4%3C69%3AIVATSF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
“Investments in Human Capital: Education and Training,” ch. 9 in
Ehrenberg and Smith.
* 1. In
Becker’s theory, who pays for general human capital? What are examples in
* 2. In
Becker’s theory, who pays for firm-specific general capital? What are
conditions might lead to under-investment in general human capital?
conditions might lead to under-investment in firm-specific human capital?
not how you feel it’s how you look, and you look marvelous.”
when people differ in hard-to-observe ways.
“Adverse selection,” “Signaling,” and
“Recruiting,” in Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, Economics,
Organization and Management, Prentice Hall 1992: 149-159, 339-344.
Imperfect Information Problem Set ,
Market Signaling," Quarterly Journal of Economics , August,
1973: 355-79. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197308%2987%3A3%3C355%3AJMS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
Farber and Robert Gibbons, "Learning and Wage Dynamics," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 1996, Nov, 111,
4: 1007‑1047. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199611%29111%3A4%3C1007%3ALAWD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U
get what you sweat.”
Donald, "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop,"
American Journal of Sociology, 57,
March 1952: 426-442.
Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman. (1999) “Careers in organizations:
theory and evidence,” in the Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3B,
O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds. Amsterdam : Elsevier Science. See esp.
sections 2.3 to 4.3 (pp. 2384-2420).
Hideo Owan, Barton H. Hamilton and
Jack A. Nickerson, “Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and
Participation,” with Journal of Political Economy, v111, n3,
465-497, June 2003.
Edward, and Sherwin Rosen, "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, 89, October 1981, pp. 841-864. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28198110%2989%3A5%3C841%3ARTAOLC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E
Ronald A., "The Trouble with Tournaments," Economic Inquiry, 22, 1 January, 1984: 147-149.
Edward, "Why is there Mandatory Retirement?" Journal of Political
Economy, 87, 1979, pp.
1261-1264. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-3808%28197912%2987%3A6%3C1261%3AWITMR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
Gerald, Cheats at Work, George, Allen, and Unwin, London , 1982. [Each
student takes one chapter.]
1. What are the potential beneficial effects of piece rates on incentives and
2. What are four reasons employers do not always pay piece rates?
3. What are two problems of piece rates that tournaments might solve?
4. What are two new problems tournaments create?
What are two common processes in organizations that work somewhat like
tournaments? Is there any evidence of the theoretical advantages and
disadvantages of tournaments?
Where are two settings other than piece rates where principals must set output
targets (perhaps implicitly) but agents are better informed? Do you have any
evidence (perhaps anecdotal) that agents restrict output? If so, how do agents
enforce the agreement? If not, why not?
make what you take.”
Lindbeck; Dennis J. Snower Insiders versus
Outsiders The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15,
No. 1. (Winter, 2001), pp. 165-188. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28200124%2915%3A1%3C165%3AIVO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P
Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan, “Is There Discretion in Wage Setting?
A Test Using Takeover Legislation,” RAND Journal of Economics, Autumn
1999 v30 i3 p535(2). Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0741-6261%28199923%2930%3A3%3C535%3AITDIWS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
What are three tactics that employees can individually do to increase their
bargaining power? What are two potential employer responses?
What are two tactics that a work group can do to increase their bargaining
power? What are two potential employer responses?
What are two tactics that employees can do as an occupational group in a firm
to increase their bargaining power?
What are two tactics that employees can do as a class nationally to increase
their bargaining power? What are two potential employer responses?
What are three characteristics of employee groups (workgroups, within an
employer, or within an occupation) that increases their cohesiveness? What are two potential employer responses?
What are three factors that might provide an employer the ability to pay
above-market wages? Which of these factors are persistent, and which erode over
get what they pay for.”
Katz, Larry, "Efficiency Wage Theories: A Partial Evaluation," in S.
Fischer ed., NBER Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge MA , 1986.
Levine, David I., "What Do Wages Buy?" Administrative Science
Quarterly , 38, 3,
September, 1993, pp. 462-483. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0001-8392%28199309%2938%3A3%3C462%3AWDWB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D
Harry, "Wages, Employer Costs, and Employee Performance in the Firm,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 3, February 1990, pp. 146-164. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0019-7939%28199002%2943%3A3%3C147S%3AWECAEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
1. What are three reasons that employers might not cut wages when there is a
queue of unemployed workers of observably similar skills who are willing to
work at a lower wage?
What are two pieces of evidence that these theories might hold?
What is a weakness with each form of evidence, so that employers might actually
just be paying for high skills or poor working conditions?
don’t make money when you treat people funny.”
“Labor contracts as partial gift exchange,”
George Akerlof; [in Putterman & Kroszner ]
Levine, David I., "Fairness, Markets and Ability to Pay:
Evidence from Compensation Executives," American Economic Review, 83, 5, December 1993, pp. 1241-1259.
Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28199312%2983%3A5%3C1241%3AFMAATP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8
Doeringer, Peter, and Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets: ch. 4.
and Simon Gächter. 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 14: 159-81. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28200022%2914%3A3%3C159%3AFARTEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3
1. What are two reasons most large companies administer pay with complex
structures based on job analysis and job evaluation, instead of just paying
What are three factors that influence which reference group an employee
What are two ways organizations might attempt to manipulate employees’
choice of salient reference group?
the end of this section you should be able to answer a question such as:
are three theories of why wages (Y) differ by industry (X)? How might you shed
light on the relative validity of these theories? How would your answer change
for other outcomes (Y) such as safety, promotions, or job satisfaction? How
would your answer change for other X’s such as:
characteristics such as age, education, female, black, Hispanic, southern,
rural, tenure at the company, labor market experience, tenure and
experience squared, occupation, region, marital status, test scores, and
characteristics such as establishment size, industry, %union, age, and
characteristics such as autonomy, feedback, and whether work takes place
subordinate, and boss characteristics such as dispersion of sex, race, or
age, and whether work groups are co-located or dispersed.
does your answer change when you consider the endogeneity of many of these
of the readings in this section are found in The Economic Nature of the Firm,
edited by Louis Putterman and Randall Krosner, Cambridge University Press, 2nd
Putterman, Louis and Randall Krosner, "Introduction," pages 1-34, The
Economic Nature of the Firm.
Alchian, Armen A. and Demsetz, Harold, "Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization," American Economic Review, Dec. 1972, 62:
777‑95. [inPutterman & Kroszner]
G. Rajan, Luigi Zingales, “Power in a Theory of the Firm,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
113, no. 2 (May 1998): 387-432. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28199805%29113%3A2%3C387%3APIATOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C
Albert, Exit Voice, and Loyalty, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA,
Coase, Ronald, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica, 4, 1937.
[in Putterman and Kroszner]
1. What are three reasons why firms exist?
2. What are two arguments why organizations usually reach (near to) efficiency?
3. What are two arguments why organizations often do not reach efficiency?
What are two reasons capital almost always hires labor, instead of workers
Doeringer, Peter B., and Michael Piore Internal Labor Markets and Manpower
Analysis, Heath, Lexington, MA , 1971, pp. 1-63.
Ronald Clark, The Japanese Company, 140-179.
Neumark, “Changes in Job Stability and Job Security,” ch. 1 in On
the Job: Is Long-term Employment a Thing of the Past? Sage, NY, 2000.
1. How would you know an internal labor market if you saw one?
2. What are four reasons for the presence of internal labor markets?
3. Some claim internal labor markets are declining. What evidence should we
examine to understand whether this claim is true?
Casey Ichniowski, Thomas Kochan, David I. Levine, Craig Olson, and George
Strauss, "What Works at Work: A Critical Review," Industrial
Relations, 35, 3, Summer ,
1996, pp. 299-333.
Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw, and Giovanna Prennushi, “The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on
Productivity: A Study of Steel Finishing Lines,” American
Economic Review , June 1997.
“Measuring Organizational Performance,”
* 1. What
is a good study design to determine the effects of a human resource policy on
performance? Pick a real or hypothetical sample, human resource policy,
performance measure, and method of analysis.
* 2. Why might there be bundles of human resource
policies? How would one test for their importance?
At the end
of this section you should be able to answer a question such as:
are three theories of why productivity (Y) differs by whether profitsharing is
might you shed light on the relative validity of these theories?
would your answer change for other outcomes such as stock market value, customer
satisfaction, or employment stability?
you answer change for other X’s & interactions:
characteristics: size, complexity, ownership (workers, CEO, banks),
characteristics: quality, innovation, or cost important? Theories of
resource policies: teamwork, training, pay practices, etc. Theories of
management policies: quality programs, design practices, R&D spending,
environmental characteristics: laws and regulations, labor market
and why do the endogenous management practices relate to the more exogenous
· Management and HR policies = f(market
and other environmental characteristics) ?
Coase, From “The Nature of the Firm,” [in Putterman & Kroszner
Klein, Robert Crawford, and Armen Alchian, “Vertical integration,
appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process,” Journal of Law and Economics, 21, 978:
297-326. [in Putterman & Kroszner]
Williamson, “The Governance of Contractual Relations.” [in
Putterman & Kroszner]
Teece, “Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firm,” [in
Putterman & Kroszner]
Helper and David I. Levine, "Long Term Supplier Relations and Product
Market Structure," Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 8, 3,
October, 1992, pp. 561-581. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=8756-6222%28199210%298%3A3%3C561%3ALSRAPS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G
Williamson. "The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost
Approach." American Journal of Sociology. 87(1981):548-577.
Kirk, and David J. Teece. (1982). "Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical
Integration in the Automobile Industry," Bell Journal of Economics 13: 206-213. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28198221%2913%3A1%3C206%3ASSCAVI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4
Susan, John Paul MacDuffie, and Charles Sabel. (2000). "Pragmatic
Collaborations: Advancing Knowledge While Controlling Opportunism," Industrial and Corporate Change 9(3):
* 1. What
are the main determinants of whether a company makes (vertical integration) or
* 2. What
are 3 factors that shift the relative cost of making, buying from an
arms’-length supplier, or buying from a supplier with a long-term
relationship? How does having a network of relationships with others affect
these trade-offs? What are three attributes of nations, time periods, legal
environments, or other environmental shifters that affect the trade-off among
would you test one or more theory of supplier relations?
questions for everyone: How does the rise of the Internet affect the
make-or-buy decision? How does the Internet affect the choice to have
arms’-length vs. long-term supplier relations?
Michael and Meckling, William, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics,
October, 1976, 3: 305-360. Excerpt in Putterman & Krozner .
Manne, from “Mergers and the Market for corporate control,” in
Putterman & Kroszner.
Fama, “Agency problems and the theory of the firm,” in Putterman
Paul and John Roberts, “Financial Structure, Ownership, and Corporate
Control,” ch. 15 in Economics, Organization and Management, pp.
Bertrand, Sendhil Mullainathan, “Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones
without principals are, Quarterly Journal of Economics; Cambridge ; 116,
3, Aug 2001: 901-932.
Johnson, W. Bruce; Magee, Robert P.; Nagarajan , Nandu J.;
Newman, Harry A.; Schwert, G. William. An Analysis of the Stock Price Reaction
to Sudden Executive Deaths: Implications for the Managerial Labor
Market/Comment Journal of Accounting and Economics, Apr 1985, 7(1-3):
homework, each student should each pick one incentive mechanism.
* 1. How
important is each form of oversight or incentive in the U.S. ? Conversely, to
what extent are executives free agents, able to make decisions for their own
goals or benefit?
* 2. What
are the advantages and disadvantages of each form of oversight or incentive?
* 3. What
factors shift the relative importance of fear of bankruptcy, fear of
replacement, fear of takeover, hope for high future pay, hope for high status,
social norms, and hope for appreciation of assets (as opposed to independence
and opportunism) in shaping executive behavior? How do these factors vary among
nations, time periods, legal environments, technology or product
* 4. What
possibilities do executives have to minimize the effectiveness of each form of
monitoring? How does your answer depend on the specifics of the firm or the
* 5. How
would you test one or more theory of executive pay, capital structure, and/or
and Medoff, What Do Unions Do?, Basic, 1984, chapters1 and 11.
“Unions and the Labor Market,” ch. 13 in Ehrenberg and Smith.
* Henry S.
Farber “The Analysis of Union Behavior,” Handbook of Labor
Economics Volume 2, Chapter 18.
are three factors that influence union leaders’ emphasis on wage growth
vs. employment stability or growth (that is, new organizing) vs. other goals?
How would you show the importance of one or more of these factors?
are two factors suggested by OB theories that might influence union behavior?
How would you test one of these theories?
Richard, "The Exit-Voice Tradeoff in the Labor Market: Unionism, Job
Tenure, Quits and Separations," Quarterly Journal of
Economics , June 1980: 643‑672.
Freeman, "Longitudinal Analyses of the Effects of Trade Unions" Journal
of Labor Economics, January 1984.
Kim, “ Unionization and Productivity: Micro-Econometric Evidence
,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 95, No. 4. (Dec.,
1980), pp. 613-639.
David G. Blanchflower,
Alex Bryson, “What Effect do Unions Have on Wages Now and Would 'What Do
Unions Do' Be Surprised?” NBER Working Paper 9973, 2003. http://papers.nber.org/papers/w9973.pdf
1. Why is it difficult to determine the effect of unions on wages?
2. What are three reasons unions might increase productivity?
3. What are two reasons unions might decrease productivity?
4. What are three aspects of the company, union, workforce, or organizational
environment that might lead you to expect unions to decrease vs. increase
Dickens, William T., and Jonathan Leonard, "Accounting for the Decline in
Union Membership" Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April
1985, pp. 323-334. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0019-7939%28198504%2938%3A3%3C323%3AAFTDIU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y
1. What are three hypotheses for union decline in the U.S. What evidence is
consistent with each of them?
Joseph Altonji and Rebecca Blank, “Race and Gender in the Labor
Market,” (skip 2.4, skim 3.5, skip 4.2, 5 and 6). Chapter 48 in Handbook
of Labor Economics , v. 3C, 1999.
David I. Levine, " Overt Discrimination by Multinational Firms,"
Industrial Relations, 37, 2, April 1998, pp. 121-125. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/levine/discedit2.html
Jonathan Leonard and David I. Levine, “ Diversity, Discrimination, and
Performance.” Working paper, 2002. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/levine/papers/Diversity%20and%20Performance%201-7-04.doc
Differences in Pay” Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, Journal of Economic Perspectives Vol.
14, No. 4, Fall 2000: 75-100 http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/extension/files/20010919034808-pub645.pdf
Judith K; Neumark, David; Troske, Kenneth R. “Wages, productivity, and
worker characteristics: Evidence from plant-level production functions and wage
equations,” Journal of Labor Economics , Jul 1999, 17(3): 409-446.
Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0734-306X%28199907%2917%3A3%3C409%3AWPAWCE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23
Erica, "The Structure of the Female Male Wage Differential ‑ Is it
Who You Are, What You Do, or Where You Work," Journal of Human
Resources, 1991 Summer, V. 26 N. 3:457‑472. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-166X%28199122%2926%3A3%3C457%3ATSOTFW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
Leonard and David I. Levine, “The
Effect of Diversity on Turnover: A Very Large Case Study,” working
paper, 2002. http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/levine/Papers/div52.doc
, William A., Jr., and Patrick L. Mason, “Evidence on Discrimination in
Employment,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12, 2, Spring 1998:
63-90. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199821%2912%3A2%3C63%3AEODIEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R
James, “Detecting Discrimination,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives , 12, 2, Spring 1998: 101-116. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-3309%28199821%2912%3A2%3C101%3ADD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I
this homework, each student takes one method.)
How can one detect discrimination on the job? What are good and bad features
· Wage equations;
· Field experiments with matched testers
applying for a job;
· Laboratory experiments such as simulated
hiring decisions based on resumes;
· Surveys of self-reported discriminatory
· Surveys of self-reported victimization
· Complaints to anti-discrimination enforcers
such as company equal opportunity offices, the EEOC, or the courts;
· Discriminatory want ads or other aspects
of the formal hiring process;
· Using customer buying patterns (that is,
prices or quantities) to detect customer discrimination;
· Using employee behaviors such as
quitting to detect co-worker discrimination;
· Any other method?
What are the results of each method?
What are human capital theory explanations of the racial and gender wage gaps
in the U.S. ?
Background: Ehrenberg and Smith, “Measured and
Unmeasured Sources of Earnings Differences,” pp. 379-393.
Race, and Ethnicity in the Labor Market,” ch. 12 in Ehrenberg and Smith
Shelly and Richard Startz, “Private Discrimination and Social
Intervention in Competitive Labor Markets,” American Economic Review,
73, 3, June 1993: 340-7. Stable URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198306%2973%3A3%3C340%3APDASII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6
Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the
Corporation, ch. 8.
How can one differentiate employer discrimination, mistaken stereotypes,
customer discrimination, and employee discrimination?
In theory, which of these forms of discrimination will market forces erode?
Provide two examples of market forces breaking down those forms of
might statistical discrimination persist?
What do psychology & micro-OB tell us about persistent stereotypes that
could lead to persistent discrimination? Compare and contrast stereotypes with
What do sociology & macro-OB tell us about norms concerning sex & race
roles that could lead to persistent discrimination?
Background: Ehrenberg and Smith, “Theories of
Market Discrimination,” 394-407.
Socioweb Web index
of Chicago grad students’s summaries of articles on Formal Organization
Links to Social Psychology Topics
Work and Organizational Psychology (Division 1 of the IAAP)
Resources for Economists on the Internet
Internet resources on human resource management
Guide to Labor Oriented Internet Resources (Maintained by
Academy of Management
The Dilbert Zone
page is maintained by David I. Levine. Send suggestions to firstname.lastname@example.org