#### **DISCUSSION OF:**

## "Investing Outside the Box: Evidence from Alternative Vehicles in Private Capital"

by Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar, Jason Mao, Nan Zhang

**Discussion by:** 

Adair Morse University of California, Berkeley

January, 2019, AFA

## Lerner, Schoar, Mao, Zhang

<u>Motivation 1</u>: Reconciliation of:

- a) PE Puzzle that some LPs have persistent returns with
- b) Berk/Green that GPs with skill should have larger funds (decreasing returns to scale

<u>Via</u>: Pastor, Stambaugh, Taylor (also Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Morse):

• Monopsony bargaining power of large investors versus GP power via Berk/Green

<u>Motivation 2</u> (related, but not explicitly in the paper): Conflicting prior literature about whether GP-directed co-investment takes advantage of LPs

# **Prior Papers**

The authors were quick to dismiss the two prior papers on this topic:

"The only exception are studies which focus on select samples of direct investments by limited partners: Fang, Ivashina, and Lerner (2015) analyzed co-investments and solo investments using information from only seven large (and undoubtedly non-representative) limited partners, while Braun, Jenkinson, and Schemmerl (2017) looked at co-investments recorded in the CapitalIQ database, which only captures a (potentially non-random) selection of transactions."

Samples: Counts of Investments		
	Co-investment	LP Direct Investment
Fang-Ivashina-Lerner	286	104
Braun-Jenkinson-Schemmerl	1016	
Lerner-Schoar-Mao-Zhang	819	883

# **Prior Papers**

- I read these other papers. Both were serious contributions.
- Fang-Ivashina-Lerner:
  - Punchline of adverse selection.
  - Co-investment opportunities offered to LPs are lemons, taking advantage of large pools of capital needing to be put to work
- Braun-Jenkinson-Schemmerl:
  - GPs offer large deals to investor, not lemon deals.
  - Pension funds outperform in buyout market, supporting ideas of long-term relationships for big pools of capital getting preference.

## Lerner, Schoar, Mao, Zhang

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<u>Analysis focus</u>: Characterize GP-LP matches and test which features matter in returns. Conclude with how evidence supports bargaining story.

<u>Concern</u>: Lot of dimensions of plausible causal stories.

# My Suggestions

• Re-cast a bit more toward:

<u>Motivation 2</u> (reworded): Conflicting prior literature does not disentangle all the agency relationships in financial intermediation


• Set up analysis with an agenda following <u>a matrix of predictions</u> about returns and matches to test <u>different stories</u>

My opinion:

- More convincing on identification if in a matrix of competing stories,
- Does not ignore literature,
- Easier to read,
- ... compared to starting with a bargaining story in intermediation

## Matrix of stories

- Adverse selection (lemons)
- Pricing power to GP a la Berk-Green (better skill)
- Pricing power to GP correlated with portfolio company needing value-add
- Pricing power to LP via monopsony power
- Pricing power to LP via relationship favoritism
- LP expected return is declining in placement of large pool of capital (flip side of Berk Green)



<u>Graphics:</u>


Consider an GP-directed Co-Investment versus a Fund Investment


- (Ignoring Discretionary but could do same exercise)


<u>Problem in testing theories of intermediation:</u>

Confounding stories of supply side, demand side, and matching

<u>Suggestion</u>: Use Isolation of comparisons to untangle









## Fang, Ivashina, Lerner

## Main result

Co-investments underperform overall same-fund return

- Explanation: selection/lemons problem
  - GP picks which portfolio companies to offer for co-investment
- Alternative consistent explanation: Access
  - Underperformance is especially true in large portfolio companies (large funds).
  - Result could reflect scarcity in opportunity in asset class.






#### Braun, Jenkinson, Schemmerl

### Result 1

No difference in performance between portfolio companies offering co-investment and portfolio companies in same fund not offering coinvestment

Interpretation No Adverse Selection






## Braun, Jenkinson, Schemmerl

## $\underline{\text{Result } 2}$

It is the large portfolio company deals that offer coinvestment opportunities


 Interpretation: GPs limit exposure to any one portfolio company and thus use large LPs to gain access to big deals

 Alternative interpretation: Effective way for GPs to offer more supply to preferred large investors



## Matrix stories


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


### Pricing Power -1

## <u>Berk/Green Returns to Skill</u>:

- Coinvestment returns should be neutral
- But dynamics of past GP fund performance and growth in the size of total fund size + coinvestments offered should reflect decreasing returns to scale and intermediation dollar profits





## Pricing Power -2

## Value-Add Scale Effects in Intermediation:

• Coinvestment returns should be decreasing in industries, locations, stage, etc, with greater need for value-add


➤ Fund Investment

 $\rightarrow$  Co-Investment

• LPs are not offering value-add.

Portfolio Company

LP Investor




## Pricing Power – 3

## <u>Monopsony (LP power)</u>:

- Should see patterns of co-investments being concentrated in large or powerful LPs
- More direct (?): Co-investments in a fund should perform better than fund investments
  - But not once LP fixed effects included







#### Access to Placing Capital / Relationship Access

Returns of Co-investment minus Fund investment should be decreasing in LP size within same-fund investments

Returns of Co-investment minus fund investment should be increasing in relationship





Favoritism in Granting Access to Placing Capital

Returns of LP's all capital in funds with coinvestment > Returns of LP's all capital in funds without coinvestment

Portfolio Company

LP Investor

 $\bigcirc$ 

PE Fund

➤ Fund Investment

Co-Investment

# Summary

- The evidence in this paper is surely convincing on bargaining
  - But it does not rule out two or three other stories with confounding effects getting the same result
  - Perhaps the frame I've suggested will help make the truth "shine" through all the details

## <u>Really great data work and topic</u>

• We need to know these answers – so much capital and so many people's welfare is riding on intermediation