Discussion of:

Investor Tastes, Corporate Behavior and Stock Returns: An Analysis of Corporate Social Responsibility

by Hwang, Titman and Wang

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Authors' Main Take-Aways

- Stocks that experience an increase in SRI ownership (SRIO) tend to increase CSR
- 2. Increased SRI holdings are associated with negative excess stock returns
 - Consistent with the hypothesis that an anticipated increase in CSR harms shareholders
- 3. Hedge fund holdings tend to be associated with lower CSR growth even when they are classified as SRI

Empirical Innovation: Focus on Investor

Two types of institutional investors: II and SRI

- NSRI: maximize financial performance.
- SRI: max financial performance & adhere to social responsibility
- When <u>NSRI accumulates shares</u> in a particular stock, market will react favorably (if at all) because market infers cash flow news is positive
- When <u>SRI accumulates shares</u>, the market considers whether the SRI is rebalancing shares because of expected future change in KLD
 - If negative stock reaction, "must be" negative value information about future KLD
 - If positive stock reaction: unclear if KLD is changing with positive effect or if CF news is emerging with positive effect

Panel B: DGTW adjusted returns

	$\Delta SRIO_NONHF_q$	$\Delta NSRIO_NONHF_q$
1(Low)	1.318	0.880
2	0.687	0.537
3	0.487	0.496
4	0.360	0.154
5	0.487	-0.048
6	0.258	0.225
7	-0.363	-0.086
8	-0.166	-0.055
9	-0.326	0.018
10 (High)	-0.509	0.090
TT' 1 T	-1.826***	-0.790
High-Low	(-3.87)	(-0.95)
Diff in Diff	-1.036* (-1.90)	

MAIN RESULT

I really appreciate this pattern

I have concerns with / comments on:

- measurement of SRIO
- HF analysis
- mechanism
- the take aways / restructure

Comment 1: Suggested re-structuring

Returns

- Increased holdings by SRI-investors are associated with negative excess stock returns
- Robust to alternative definitions of SRI investors (Comment 2 suggestions)

Mechanism

 Then evidence on mechanism: Current negative returns reflect an anticipated increase in CSR which harms shareholders (comment 4)

(I would order the paper this way, starting with the diff-and-diff table 6.)

But, can you show this?

Comment 2: Measurement of SRIO

Definition SRI:

- For each institutional investor, take portfolio-weighted average of (KLD mean (KLD, size decile)):
- Above-median investors are SRIs (seems too large).
- SRIO = sum of ownership % for all investors deemed SRIs

<u>Concern</u>: KLD scores are correlated with other firm attributes (labor, environmental) that systematically sort by micro-industry, by region, by exposure to government contracting, etc.

Any change in \triangle SRIO exposure to a firm could be due to:

- 1) Firm capitalization growth into a new size decile (growth in P/E, M&A, issuances)
- 2) Investors adjusting portfolio with market... what if SRI are more like indexers? (or vice versa). ΔSRIO may reflect market updating of a sector or of a sector exposed to policy, etc?

<u>Fixes</u>: Issues are not easily handled by industry-year f.e. <u>Strategy level-benchmarking</u> is better, but still concerning. <u>Factor benchmarking</u>? (Sharpe, 1992, Gerakos, Linnainmaa, Morse (2016)

Comment 2: Alternative measures of SRI

You are not going to be perfect on the prior slide. Thus, you need to swamp the reader in other, also non-perfect definitions of an SRI

Alternative SRI definitions

- UNPRI checkboxes
- Historical SRI investors
- Investors investing in other social asset classes (impact investing)
- Just looking at foundations and development organizations

Note: Foundations and development organizations are those that Barber, Morse, and Yasuda (2016) found to have positive utility (willing to forgo return)

Comment 3: No HF split

- The HF split is a bit of a distraction from your main finding.
- I'm not going to go into details here, but you just do not have the data to say anything with confidence, especially the mechanism and the results are not internally consistent.
- e.g. 1: Your tertile analysis with 126 SRI_HF.
 - Persistence is 0.77 thus most do not even change from being KLD = 0. (median is 0)

ım of investors	Numa with shanges
in or mivestors	Num with changes
42	0
42	5
42	6
126	
	42 42 42

[•] e.g. 2: Your monthly return estimation result is not consistent with the story you are pitching about hedge funds.

Comment 4: Mechanism Regress $\Delta KLD_{t to t+1}$ on institutional ownership types and controls

	(1)
$IO_{q,t}$	-0.5097***
	(-10.70)
$SRIO_{q,t}$	0.7120***
	(8.52)
$Yret_t$	0.0228**
	(2.34)
ROA	0.2124***
	(4.81)
Logasset	0.1782***
	(22.80)
KLD_t	- 0.1426***
	(-23.09)
Intercept	- 0.7286***
	(-16.72)
Year-Industry Dummies	Yes
Observations	20,806
R-squared	0.151
10 Squared	0.151

- Dependent variable ΔKLD has a mean of 0.083
 - Most observations are zero
- SRIO and IO are very <u>collinear</u>

Magnitudes:

- 1 standard deviation change in SRIO => 0.111 larger KLD
- But by adding up, a 1 sd larger SRIO means decrease in IO
 - Thus, overall effect is 0.19 larger KLD
 - 200% increase over 0.08

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Furthermore, I am not sure we should learn something here

Problem 1: Isn't the prediction about ΔSRIO not SRIO?

Problem 2: ΔKLD is not the best variable: Very little action

KLD Strength Scores	No. of Indicators	Min	Median	Max
Community Issues	8	0	0	5
Corporate Governance				
Issues	8	0	0	3
Diversity Issues	9	0	0	7
Employee Relations Issues	13	0	0	9
Environment Issues	17	0	0	5
Human Rights Issues	4	0	0	2
Product Issues	12	0	0	3
All Strength Issues	71	0	1	22

Comment 4: Mechanism: Solution (?)

So far, all I have done is to say that I am skeptical about your mechanism results The paper absolutely needs to show this channel.

Ideas:

- 1. Alternative measures of CSR used in the now vast literature
- 2. Perhaps use consequences to "bad CSR" board changes, manager turnover, negative press
- 3. Or, maybe think in a 2SLS system where you predict returns that were related to Δ SRIO and then use this predicted return to forecast Δ KLD
 - Need exogeneity condition (example in Dyck, Manuel, Morse, Pomorski 2017)
- 4. Or, at a minimum, do a discrete choice model (improve power)

Conclusion

Need to keep the agenda simple based on your idea about change in holdings

- Restructure. Lead with your best results (portfolio diff-in-diff) and then convince the readers of robustness and of the mechanism
 - I'm still not convinced on what might be driving the result, but I am intrigued
- Under this clean structure, evidence would be compelling for more research to understand more details about heterogeneity of investor utility functions