The Allocation of Resources by Interest Groups: Lobbying, Litigation and Administrative Regulation

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Corrigendum

It has come to the publisher’s attention that the following figure was reproduced incorrectly in Business and Politics 4(2). Please find it in its correct format below.

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FIGURE 2. Equilibrium to the lobbying game.