Horizontal Mergers, Market Structure, and Burdens of Proof

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ABSTRACT

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision in *Philadelphia National Bank*, antitrust challengers have mounted *prima facie* cases against horizontal mergers that rested on the level and increase in market concentration caused by the merger, with proponents of the merger then permitted to rebut by providing evidence that the merger will not have the feared anticompetitive effects. Although the way that concentration is measured and the triggering levels have changed over the last half century, the basic approach has remained intact. This longstanding *structural presumption*, which is well supported by economic theory and evidence, has been critical to effective merger enforcement. We suggest some ways to strengthen it further.

One critical assumption in this burden shifting framework is that the goal of merger policy is to protect consumers against high prices or reduced output, product variety, product quality, or innovation (“consumer welfare”). If the goal is something else, such as deterring industrial concentration to control corporate political power, or protecting small firms from larger competitors, then the structural presumption must be viewed differently. The bulk of this essay examines and defends the role of structural presumptions in the present legal world where protection of consumer welfare is the point of merger enforcement. We also briefly consider a legislative proposal that could be seen as departing from this norm, offering some guidance concerning how this proposal could be improved so as to strengthen merger enforcement, in part by making it easier for the government to establish its prima facie case.

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Introduction

Since the Supreme Court’s landmark merger decision in *Philadelphia National Bank*,¹ challengers have mounted prima facie cases against horizontal mergers that rested on the level and increase in market concentration caused by the merger. The merging parties can then rebut this *structural presumption* by showing that the market shares do not accurately predict competitive effects. Most generally, they do this by showing that the proposed market is poorly

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defined or that market shares exaggerate the merger’s anticompetitive potential, that entry into
the market will discipline any price increase, or that the merger produces offsetting efficiencies
sufficient to keep prices at premerger levels or otherwise offset the anticompetitive effects.

The Philadelphia National Bank burden-shifting approach has been critical for effective
horizontal merger enforcement by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.
While the technical analysis of markets or the size of the relevant numbers has shifted somewhat
over time, the basic structural presumption, burden-shifting framework remains alive and well.
We strongly support the application of the structural presumption in merger cases and suggest
below how to broaden the set of situations in which the presumption operates.

One critical assumption in this burden shifting framework, as it has developed over the past 50
years, is that the goal of merger policy is to protect consumers against high prices or reduced
output, product variety, product quality, or innovation (“consumer welfare”). If the goal is
something else, such as deterring industrial concentration to control corporate political power, or
protecting small firms from larger competitors, then the structural presumption must be viewed
differently or may not apply at all. The bulk of this essay examines the role of structural
presumptions in the present legal world where protection of consumer welfare is the point of
merger enforcement. We also briefly consider a legislative proposal that could be seen as
departing from this norm.

Our approach is highly pragmatic: given that horizontal merger enforcement is typically a
predictive exercise, which is conducted after mergers are proposed but before they are
consummated, what facts can the government realistically establish in court? We argue that
considerable uncertainty is the norm, as to both the likely competitive effects of the merger and
the specific manner in which those effects will manifest themselves in the market. We thus
embrace the structural presumption for very practical reasons, notwithstanding difficulties
associated with defining the relevant market, as well as certain valid criticisms that have been
made regarding market definition. Ultimately, we argue that market shares are often highly
informative, despite the fact that one can only measure market shares after defining the relevant
market, which can be messy. Plus, importantly, the structural presumption is rebuttable.

Our response to those who criticize the structural presumption because of its reliance on market
definition is three-fold. First, we suggest that the courts, whenever practical, assess whether the
market shares that underlie the government’s structural presumption are sensitive to the precise
boundaries of the relevant market. If not, then many of the criticisms based on market definition
melt away and the structural presumption deserves greater weight. If so, then the court should
ask which set of market shares more accurately reflects the likely competitive effects of the
proposed merger for the overlap products. Direct evidence of the likely competitive effects, such
as the extent of direct competition between the merging parties, will be important for this
purpose. However, the fact that the market shares vary with the boundaries of the market does
not make those shares uninformative or require the abandonment of market definition altogether.

Second, the government is entitled to the structural presumption if the merger causes the
requisite increase in concentration in any properly defined relevant market. Even if the defense
can identify an alternative relevant market (be it broader or narrower) in which the level or
increase in concentration is insufficient to trigger the structural presumption, that showing does
not negate or rebut the presumption. This observation is especially important because the accepted method of defining relevant markets in horizontal merger cases, namely the hypothetical monopoly test (“HMT”) generally leads to relatively narrow markets.² Any candidate market for which the court concludes that a perfectly functioning cartel would lead to a significant price increase qualifies as a relevant market, using the HMT. The objection that the merger leads to only a modest increase in concentration in some broader market is not responsive, so long as the market identified by the challenger satisfies the HMT.

Third, we argue that in some cases the government should be able to prevail without invoking the structural presumption, at least not in the way it is commonly stated, based on a more direct showing of the likely competitive effects of the proposed merger. As a result, market definition need not be a gating factor for the government, and the court’s decision need not rest on market definition, especially in cases where it is unclear which relevant market would be most informative regarding the merger’s likely competitive effects. Allowing this route for the government would harmonize horizontal merger law with other areas of antitrust law, where the courts have shown an increasing willingness to look at direct evidence of the likely effect of challenged conduct, relying less on indirect evidence based on a firm’s market share.³ We also consider briefly whether the now existing statutory language permits an approach that avoids market definition altogether.⁴

Developing these ideas further, we discuss how the courts should evaluate evidence of market structure alongside with more direct evidence of likely competitive effects. In cases where the government alleges unilateral effects, alternative metrics such as diversion ratios or upward pricing pressure can complement and supplement the more traditional measures of market shares and HHIs without necessarily displacing them.⁵ In cases where the government alleges coordinated effects, the role of market definition and concentration measures such as the HHI is much more fundamental.

Two important economic ideas underlie the structural presumption. The first idea is that the loss of a significant competitor in a concentrated market is likely to lead to the creation of enhancement of market power. The second idea is that entry barriers in concentrated markets often are significant. Both of these economic ideas have been challenged over the past half-century, most notably by the Chicago School. We argue that both of these fundamental economic ideas remain valid as bases for the burden-shifting approach associated with the structural presumption. In our view, both ideas find strong support in how companies themselves formulate and execute competitive strategy, and indeed in how they evaluate proposed mergers and selected merger partners. In contrast, the Chicago School view that small

² See, for example, Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss, ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb. 2008).

³ E.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (permitting market power to be inferred from a large exclusion payment)

⁴ See discussion infra, text at notes __.

⁵ The HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is a widely used index of market concentration, measured as the sum of the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. On the use of diversion ratios and upward pricing pressure in merger analysis based on unilateral effects, see Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: from Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49 (2010).
firms are just as effective competitors as large firms, or that entry will typically and promptly occur in response to prices modestly above competitive levels, finds much less empirical support. Importantly, if those conditions do apply in particular markets, the structural presumption can be rebutted with industry-specific evidence.

**The Economic Case for the Structural Presumptions**

Building on the work of Joe S. Bain during the 1950s and 1960s, industrial organization economists devoted considerable attention to the empirical relationship between various measures of market structure and market performance. Schmalensee (1989) reviews the resulting large literature of inter-industry studies. The central finding of this literature was that more concentrated industries tended to perform poorly in serving consumers, as they displayed higher prices, higher price/cost margins, and higher profits than less concentrated industries.

These research results greatly influenced antitrust thinking during the 1960s. For example, Derek Bok, in his important 1960 paper on mergers, wrote: “Lawyers have also learned that, within a market, changes in the number and relative size of firms are among the most important determinants of competition and monopoly.” The Supreme Court, in *Philadelphia National Bank*, stated: “That ‘competition is likely to be greatest when there are many sellers, none of which has any significant market share,’ is common ground among most economists, and was undoubtedly a premise of congressional reasoning about the antimerger statute.”

The *Brown Shoe* case in 1962, the *Von’s Grocery* case in 1966, and the 1968 Merger Guidelines, can now be seen as the high-water marks relating to merger enforcement based on measures of market concentration. In *Brown Shoe*, the Supreme Court, relying heavily on its view that Congress intended to halt consolidation in its incipiency, stated: “If a merger achieving 5% control were now approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts by Brown’s competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid would then be furthered and it would be difficult to dissolve the combinations previously approved.” In *Von’s Grocery*, the Court enjoined a merger between two firms with a combined share of 7.5% in the market for retail groceries in the Los Angeles area. Noting these shares and the many acquisitions that had taken place in that market, the Court stated: “These facts alone are enough

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6 See especially JOE. S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION (1956). Prior to Bain’s work, most empirical research in industrial organization involved case studies of specific industries.


8 Derek Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 238.


to cause us to conclude contrary to the District Court that the Von’s-Shopping Bag merger did violate §7.”

Reflecting these decisions by the Court, the 1968 Merger Guidelines placed great emphasis on the overall “market structure” as the “focus” of the Department’s query. Those Guidelines identified two overall market concentration levels, and merging firm market shares, that would “ordinarily” trigger a challenge. In “highly concentrated” markets, those with a four-firm concentration ratio exceeding 75%, the Department would challenge a merger if each firm had a premerger market share exceeding 4%. For a firm with a share of 10%, the Government would challenge the acquisition of a firm with a share of at least 2%. In less concentrated markets, the Department would challenge a merger if each firm had a premerger market share exceeding 5%; if the acquiring firm’s share was 10%, the Government would challenge the acquisition of a firm with a share of at least 4%. Further, the 1968 Merger Guidelines followed Brown Shoe in applying harsher scrutiny if the market had exhibited a “trend” toward increased concentration.

In 1982, the Merger Guidelines were updated to apply a dramatically less strict structural presumption than found in the 1968 Merger Guidelines. They considered markets unconcentrated if the HHI is below 1000, moderately concentrated in the HHI is between 1000 and 1800, and highly concentrated if the HHI is above 1800. They stated that the government was likely to challenge mergers that raise the HHI by at least 100 points and lead to a post-merger HHI of more than 1800.” The 10% plus 4% merger that would have triggered a challenge under the 1968 Merger Guidelines would cause the HHI to rise by only 80 points, and thus would not create a presumption under the 1968 Merger Guidelines, regardless of the shares of the other firms. The set of mergers that trigger the structural presumption was reduced further to reflect actual Agency practice when the Horizontal Merger Guidelines were updated most recently in 2010. They define markets to be highly concentrated if the HHI is greater than 2500, and then apply the following structural presumption: “Mergers resulting in highly concentrated markets that involve an increase in the HHI of more than 200 points will be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.” For example, in a market with five 20% firms, a merger between two of those firms would raise the HHI from 2000 to 2800, triggering the presumption. However, in a market with four 20% firms and two 10% firms, a merger between a 20% firm and


13 Ibid. §5.


a 10% firm would not trigger the presumption: the HHI would increase from 1800 to 2200, so the post-merger market would only be moderately concentrated. Following the Guidelines, such a merger would “warrant scrutiny” but would not be presumed to be likely to enhance market power.\textsuperscript{17}

This weakening of the structural presumption over time in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines properly reflects advances in economic learning during the intervening 50 years. As Steven Salop puts it: “This evolution to a weaker presumption based on market shares and concentration is consistent with and was likely caused by the parallel evolution of economic analysis.”\textsuperscript{18} In particular, serious issues were raised regarding the quality of the data and the econometric methods used by the inter-industry studies that had shown a relationship between concentration and profits. Schmalensee summarizes: “The relation, if any, between seller concentration and profitability is weak statistically, and the estimated concentration effect is usually small. The estimated relation is unstable over time and space and vanishes in many multivariate studies.”\textsuperscript{19} However, important findings relating market structure to performance remain valid. In particular, the empirical evidence does show a positive relationship between seller concentration and prices or price/cost margins. On this point, Schmalensee reports: “In cross-section comparisons involving markets in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related to the level of price.”\textsuperscript{20} Such intra-industry comparisons are especially relevant for merger control policy, and indeed are often used in merger analysis.\textsuperscript{21} Michael Salinger reached the same conclusion as Schmalensee in his own review of the evidence on the relationship between market concentration and price/cost margins, stating: “The inappropriate inferences used to justify an active antitrust policy have given way to equally incorrect inferences that have been used to justify a relaxed merger policy.”\textsuperscript{22}

Economic thinking also has greatly evolved over the past 50 years as regards the interpretation of the empirical evidence relating market concentration to various measures of market performance. Two key ideas stand out.

First, since at least the 1970s, antitrust economists have recognized that, in markets where there are substantial economies of scale, the process of competition often leads quite naturally to high levels of concentration. In such markets, the most efficient firms typically incur large fixed costs, including R&D costs. In the long run, these firms will only make the necessary investments if they anticipate that future price/cost margins will be sufficiently large to allow them to earn an acceptable risk-adjusted rate of return on those investments. So, observing high levels of concentration and high price/cost margins does not, in and of itself, indicate any failure

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\begin{enumerate}
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\item\textsuperscript{17} Id. at 19.
\item\textsuperscript{18} Steven Salop, \textit{The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach}, 80 \textit{ANTITRUST L. J.} 269, 276 (2015).
\item\textsuperscript{19} Schmalensee, \textit{Inter-Industry Studies}, supra note __, Stylized Fact 4.5, p. 976.
\item\textsuperscript{20} Id., Stylized Fact 5.1, p. 988.
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of the competitive process. Indeed, such a pattern is to be expected in industries where the firms regularly make large R&D investments or incur other large fixed costs.

Second, quite apart from economies of scale, the process of competition can and often does cause a few firms to have large market shares if they are simply more efficient than their rivals.\(^\text{23}\) So, observing a few firms growing, and even driving smaller or less efficient firms out of business, also does not, in and of itself, indicate any failure of the competitive process.

For both of these reasons, which are very important in today’s economy, high levels of concentration and high price/cost margins can result quite naturally from the process of competition playing out in ways that benefit consumers.

This critical observation has very important policy implications. Efforts to proactively deconcentrate industries can easily be counterproductive – by disrupting economic efficiency and harming consumers – if they force the breakup of the most successful and efficient firms, if they prevent firms from achieving the available economies of scale, or if they discourage firms from competing and growing for fear that they will later be broken up. These dangers were quite relevant back in the 1960s, when proposals were floated to actively deconcentrate American industry. Most noticeable was the 1968 “Neal Report,” which proposed passage of a “Concentrated Industries Act.”\(^\text{24}\) This Act would have directed the Attorney General “to affirmatively search out all ‘oligopoly industries’ in the United States … and bring legal proceedings against all ‘oligopoly firms’ with the aim of reducing the share of each oligopoly firm to no more than 12%.”\(^\text{25}\)

More generally, modern industrial organization economics strongly supports the view that antitrust policy must always be careful not to discourage firms, even large firms, from competing on the merits to attract more customers and thus grow. This idea is captured well by what has become the mantra of modern antitrust policy: “the goal of antitrust is to protect competition, not competitors.” The United States has not only led the way in recognizing this important principle; we have spent decades exporting this core principle to competition authorities around the world.

What does all this mean for merger enforcement in the United States?

First and foremost, economic theory and a wide range of economic evidence support the conclusion that horizontal mergers that significantly increase market concentration are likely to lessen competition and harm consumers. We have in mind here not only the intra-industry studies on market concentration and price/cost margins noted above, but also various merger retrospectives, decades of experience with merger enforcement at the DOJ and the FTC and in the courts, evidence regarding how business executives evaluate competition and make strategic

\(^{23}\) One of the robust empirical findings in empirical industrial organization is that competing firms differ greatly in their efficiency. See, for example, Nicholas Bloom and John Van Reenen, Why Do Management Practices Differ Across Firms and Countries, 24 J ECON. PERSP. 203 (2010) and the references therein.

\(^{24}\)“Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy,” July 1968. Phil Neal was the Chairman of the Task Force.

decisions, and other evidence such as how reducing trade barriers and thus allowing foreign rivals to compete in a domestic market leads to lower prices.  

Second, the modern view that the competitive process often leads to highly concentrated markets makes it all the more important not to let the victors emerging from that process to join forces by merging. If two firms are efficient because they have achieved a large scale of operations, or because they have learned how to run their operations efficiently, consumers benefit greatly when they compete vigorously against each other. So, logically, the empirical regularities cited above – that large firms are often the most efficient and that the efficiency achieved at the leading firms is difficult for other firms to imitate or for new entrants to achieve – very much warn against allowing two incumbents with large market shares, the best simple indicator of success, to merge. Growth by smaller firms, and entry, cannot in general be relied upon to replace the competition lost through such a merger. This conclusion applies not only to price competition but also to other forms of competition that may be more important in the long run, namely competition to develop and introduce new and improved products and services. Indeed, one of the most important roles for merger enforcement is to prevent established incumbents from acquiring mavericks, disruptive entrants, or other firms that threaten their position. For that reason, it is important to be forward-looking when estimating the markets shares of such firms.

Those who call for weakening or abandoning the structural presumption are effectively arguing that recent market success is not a good predictor of future market success. But this is just not what the evidence shows. In the presence of economies of scale, which are likely to be present in a concentrated market, a small incumbent firm (or an entrant) is unlikely to be as effective a competitor as the larger firm that is being acquired. If firms differ greatly in their efficiencies, and if it is hard for the less efficient firms to imitate their more efficient rivals, as is common, we will see a strong correlation between efficiency and market share. Again, if a firm with a large market share is acquired, it is unlikely that smaller, less efficient firms (or entrants) will be able to replace the lost competition in a timely manner. Likewise, if the merging firms own valuable specific assets that are difficult to replicate, such as brand names or established relationships with customers, entry is unlikely to protect consumers from the loss of competition resulting from the merger.

In short, the structural presumption fits well not only with the economic evidence but also with business reality: as a general rule, firms with large market shares are more effective competitors than firms with small market shares, and when two of them merge, it takes time for the competition lost due to the merger to be effectively replaced by smaller firms or by entrants.  


27 While in theory sufficient merger-specific synergies could make up for the loss of competition resulting from the merger, so consumers gain rather than lose from the merger, we are aware of no economic evidence indicating that such efficiencies are common. Certainly there is no such evidence sufficient to undermine the structural presumption as a general matter. In any event, the structural presumption is rebuttable, and one means by which the
Structure and Presumptions in the Case Law and Guidelines

The decision most identified with merger laws driven by structural presumptions is Philadelphia Bank, where the Supreme Court appeared to make market structure almost decisive.28 The Court observed that private business needed to be able to engage in planning, requiring that merger rules be predictable. As a result, the courts should “simplify the test of illegality” in the “interest of sound and practical judicial administration.”29 With that, the Court held that a merger producing a firm that controls an “undue percentage share” of the market and that “results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market” is “inherently likely to lessen competition substantially.” As a result, it must be enjoined, at least “in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.…”

The Court then found such “undue” concentration based on the merging firms’ premerger market shares of 17 and 13 percent and a four-firm concentration ratio of around 70 percent.30 These numbers exceeded the standards for illegality in merger cases of that era,31 although in many cases they would not necessarily generate a challenge today. Beyond condemning the merger in this case, the Supreme Court did not specify the size of an “undue” percentage or the amount of a “significant” increase, and said nothing about overall market concentration levels. The last observation is perplexing because it suggests that Court was apparently not worried about overall market concentration as such, but mainly about the relative size of the merging partners. The court also made clear that the market share-based conclusion was presumptive. It applied only “in the absence of evidence” suggesting showing that the merger would not have the feared anticompetitive effects. The decision did not decide how burdens of proof should be assigned.

The Supreme Court’s first major qualifier of Philadelphia Bank came in 1974 in its General Dynamics decision.32 In brushing aside the government’s challenge, the Supreme Court concluded that the government’s reliance on the merging firms’ historical market shares in the production and sale of coal in certain geographic areas exaggerated the merger’s anticompetitive effects. The district court had found the alleged market to be too narrowly defined, given that

merging parties might be able to rebut the presumption is through an efficiencies defense. While the Supreme Court has never recognized such a defense, lower courts have been open to evidence about efficiencies. See 4A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, Ch. 9E (4th ed. 2016) (analyzing cases).


29 Id. at 362-363.

30 The four-firm concentration ratio, or CR4, consists of the sum of the market shares of the market’s four largest firms. The 1968 Merger Guidelines employed the CR4, but the index was replaced in the 1982/1984 Merger Guidelines by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which is measured by the squares of the market shares of all firms in the market. Steven Salop estimates that the merger between PNB and Girard would have increased the HHI from 1459 to 2037 in the market for loans, and from 1442 to 2059 in the market for deposits. Salop, op. cit., Table 1.


coal was steadily losing market share to oil and natural gas. Further, the companies’ depleted reserves strongly suggested that historical market shares would not be a reliable predictor of future competitive presence. The Supreme Court affirmed, focusing largely on the second ground.\textsuperscript{34}

The Supreme Court’s \textit{General Dynamics} analysis was not an attack on the structural presumption as such. It is better read as a caution about how market shares should be measured and understood to determine whether the structural presumption applies.\textsuperscript{35} The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in \textit{Baker Hughes} over-read \textit{General Dynamics} on this point. However, the \textit{Baker Hughes} decision also emphasized the esoteric nature of the market in that case, the U.S. market for hardrock hydraulic underground drilling rigs, which were characterized by a very small number of transactions and, as a result, wide annual variations in market share data based on sales.\textsuperscript{36} While a low number of annual sales can make market share data noisy, which suggests measuring market shares over a longer period of time, we do not see why it reduces the danger of collusion. One might as well conclude to the contrary.\textsuperscript{37} A low number of large sales for which suppliers bid could just as easily have served to make collusion more rather than less likely. The \textit{Baker Hughes} opinion also produced a startling conclusion about the burden-shifting framework – namely, that “imposing a heavy burden of production” on defendants’ rebuttal to structural evidence would be “anomalous where, as here, it is easy to establish a prima facie case.”\textsuperscript{38} The court appeared to be saying that where high market shares make the government’s prima facie structural case strong, and thus easy to make,\textsuperscript{39} some sense of justice requires that the defendant’s case be correspondingly easy to make as well. This would make little sense to us. At that point the court launched an attack at the “role of statistics” in §7 actions, referring expressly to the HHI.\textsuperscript{40}

Notwithstanding \textit{Baker Hughes} analytic shortcomings, the decision has attained considerable importance in merger litigation, most of which takes place in Washington, D.C., giving rise to what is commonly called the “\textit{Baker Hughes} presumption.” As formulated in the D.C. Circuit’s \textit{Heinz} decision:

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First the government must show that the merger would produce a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and [would] result [ ] in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market. Such a showing establishes a presumption that the merger will substantially lessen competition. To rebut the
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\textsuperscript{33} 341 F.Supp. 534, 538-540 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
\textsuperscript{34} \textit{General Dynamics}, 415 U.S. at 501-502.
\textsuperscript{35} See Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶962a (4th ed. 2015).
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.}, 908 F.2d 981 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
\textsuperscript{38} \textit{Baker Hughes}, 908 F.2d at 992.
\textsuperscript{39} See Id. at 983 & n. 3. The pre-merger markets shares were 41% and 17.5%, and in one year the two firms enjoyed a combined share of 76%.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 992.
presumption, the defendants must produce evidence that show[s] that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the [merger’s] probable effects on competition in the relevant market. If the defendant successfully rebuts the presumption [of illegality], the burden of producing additional evidence of anticompetitive effect shifts to the government, and merges with the ultimate burden of persuasion, which remains with the government at all times.  

In fact, the widely followed Heinz’ statement of the burden shifting framework is not very different from what the Supreme Court stated in Philadelphia Bank. There the Court wrote:

we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that mark is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.

Beginning with the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, some version of the burden-shifting framework has also been included in Agency enforcement policy. The 1992 Guidelines make market share thresholds presumptive, together with languages indicating that the “presumption may be overcome by a showing that factors set forth [elsewhere in the Guidelines] make it unlikely that the merger will create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise, in light of market concentration and market shares.” Those Guidelines also state, however, that they do not “attempt to assign the burden of proof” or of coming forward with the evidence on any particular issues. The 2010 Guidelines actually come the closest to stating the presumption as it was originally articulated in Philadelphia Bank:

The Agencies give weight to the merging parties’ market shares in a relevant market, the level of concentration, and the change in concentration caused by the merger…. Mergers that cause a significant increase in concentration and result in highly concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market power, but this presumption can be rebutted by persuasive evidence showing that the merger is unlikely to enhance market power.


43 Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. at 364.

44 Department of Justice and FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines §1.51(c) (Issued 1992, revised 1997), available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-0.

45 Id. at §0.1.

The Presumption in Unilateral Effects Cases

The *Philadelphia National Bank* presumption based on structural evidence plus opportunity to rebut remains alive and well in horizontal merger analysis. The basic contours of the presumption have also been adapted to unilateral effects analysis, where the primary inquiry is not based on overall market concentration, but rather on the relative degree of substitution between the merging firms’ output and the predicted impact of the merger on the post-merger firm’s prices.\(^47\) Unilateral effects were first introduced in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 1992. They now constitute the government’s primary theory of harm in most horizontal merger investigations.

The extent to which the structural presumption operates in unilateral effects cases invites an additional concern: to what extent can a “structural” presumption be said to apply when a particular type of merger analysis does not require a market definition at all? Economic analysis of unilateral effects can proceed without defining a relevant market, although there is some question about whether such analysis is permitted by the statute. The language of §7 requires those challenging a merger to identify some “line of commerce” and “section of the country” in which the anticompetitive effects of a merger will be felt. In *Brown Shoe* the Supreme Court intuited that the term “line of commerce” referred to a relevant product market, and the term “section of the country” referred to a relevant geographic market.\(^48\)

The legislative history of §7 is not entirely clear on the issue, but more likely than not the two phrases were never intended to have that precise a meaning. The phrase “line of commerce” was in widespread use by both business persons and courts to describe a particular “line” that a seller might sell, often including non-substitutable goods.\(^49\) The phrase “section of the country” was very likely intended to be jurisdictional – that is, to insure that the statute reached only anticompetitive effects felt within the United States.\(^50\) By 1950, when the amendments to §7 were drafted, courts had already begun to use the term “relevant market,”\(^51\) and if that is what Congress meant they very likely would have used it. The effect of this reading is not particularly important in a traditional concentration-increasing merger where the threat is of collusion or collusion-like behavior. For example, use of the HHI also requires that a relevant market be identified before concentration can be assessed. The requirement can become an unnecessary and counterproductive encumbrance, however, in unilateral effects cases, which examine


51 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 508 (1948) (disagreeing with government on selection of relevant market); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (using the term “market”)...
diversion of sales as between specific pairs of firms. In unilateral effects cases involving differentiated products, drawing an artificial boundary between products that are close enough substitutes to be “in the market” and those that are not, is simply not a part of the economic analysis of likely competitive effects.\footnote{Various methods are available to evaluate competitive effects, including looking at diversion ratios, calculating upward pricing pressure, and performing merger simulation, but none of these rely on market definition.} Put differently, in most cases, unilateral effects can be estimated without the need to define a relevant antitrust market, and the legal requirement that it be done can only get in the way. This is the consensus view among antitrust economists.

In any event, \textit{Brown Shoe} not only equated the two statutory phrases with relevant markets, it also stated that

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Congress neither adopted nor rejected specifically any particular tests for measuring the relevant markets, either as defined in terms of product or in terms of geographic locus of competition, within which the anti-competitive effects of a merger were to be judged.\footnote{Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320-321.}
\end{quote}

A completely acceptable reading of this language is that any grouping of sales identified as experiencing a non-cost-justified price increase can be considered a “relevant market” for the purpose of merger analysis. Happily, from the perspective of economists, this approach lines up very well with relevant markets defined using the Hypothetical Monopolist Test: if the merged firm would find it profitable to significantly raise price unilaterally after the merger, then the HMT as applied to the merging firms products will be satisfied.\footnote{The converse is not true, since the HMT takes as given the prices of all products outside the candidate market and assumes no entry into the relevant market, which makes it more likely that the price increase in question will be profit-maximizing for the merged firm.} It does not matter if conventional market definition criteria (\textit{Brown Shoe} criteria) would also have identified a broader grouping of products as a relevant market. Thus, for example, if a merger of firms A and B with harmful unilateral effects would lead to a significant price increase, then post-merger the products sold by firm AB becomes the grouping of products over which the effects of that merger are to be judged. It does not matter that firms A and B may also sell in a larger product market that also includes products sold by other firms.\footnote{See the discussion above about the HMT and our point that a merger violates Section 7 if it is likely to harm competition in any relevant market.} \textit{Brown Shoe} rather awkwardly gave some credence to this approach by acknowledging that even when a market is defined, relevant “submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes.”\footnote{Id. at 325.}

The term “submarket” has been widely criticized as permitting narrow markets to be defined that are in fact not relevant groupings for determining a firm’s ability to increase price. But the point here is that under unilateral effects analysis the term is being applied to a grouping of sales over which the post-merger firm \textit{does} have the power to increase price. Indeed, that is how most courts interpret the term today: a relevant submarket, just like a relevant market, is a grouping of sales capable of profitably sustaining a non-cost-justified price increase.\footnote{See 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW \S522 (4th ed. 2015).} We suggest that courts either drop the awkward and unnecessary “submarket” label, since “submarkets” are
themselves relevant markets, or simplify matters by explicitly stating that a merger harming competition in a “submarket” is illegal.

**Market Structure, Competition, and Consumer Welfare**

Section 7 of the Clayton Act was originally passed in 1914, and has been subject to only one major amendment of its substance, which was the Celler-Kefauver act of 1950. Most of the dramatic changes in merger policy that came soon after resulted more from the legislative history of that provision rather than from changes in the statute’s text. The text itself merely expanded §7 to cover vertical as well as horizontal mergers, and also to reach asset acquisitions as well as stock acquisitions.

In the subsequent economic and enforcement literature, market structure has never been a free-standing target of merger policy. Rather, market structure has been a way of getting at merger law’s more fundamental concerns, which are higher prices or reduced output or other consumer harms that result from less competitive market structures. Joe S. Bain, the principal architect of the so-called “Structure-Conduct-Performance” (S-C-P) paradigm was clear about this already in the 1950s, as were his followers.

Supreme Court merger policy has been less consistent, particularly in the 1960s. For example, although the Brown Shoe merger decision, which in 1962 was the first to interpret the 1950 amendments, emphasized the evils of high concentration, it actually condemned the merger based on district court fact findings that the post-merger firm would be in a position to undersell its rivals – offering either lower priced shoes or shoes of higher quality for the same price. That is, the perceived evil of high concentration in that case was scale or scope economies that served to give a large firm a competitive advantage over its rivals. As then antitrust professor Derek Bok lamented, that concern was actually quite consistent with the legislative history.


59 Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226 (1960).

60 E.g., JOE BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 408-410 (1959) (relationship between market structure and efficiency), 411-415 (relationship of market structure to price-cost margins, concluding that “high seller concentration tends to be connected with substantially higher rates of excess profit…”)


62 United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp. 721, 738 (E.D. Mo. 1959), aff’d, 370 U.S. 294 (1962) (condemning merger because it gave the post-merger firm decisive advantages, resulting in “lower prices or in higher quality for the same price”; as a result, “the independent retailer can no longer compete .. ..”).

63 Most particularly, economies of distribution, resulting in condemnation of the vertical aspect of the merger from Brown’s production facilities to Kinney’s retail stores).

64 Bok, Section 7, supra note __.
Except for that interlude, however,\textsuperscript{65} the Justice Department and later the FTC have generally agreed that the concern of merger policy is high prices and other consumers harms, and that measuring concentration is a mechanism for assessing the risk of such harms.\textsuperscript{66} Even the 1968 Merger Guidelines recognized this, concluding that “a concentrated market structure, where a few firms account for a large share of the sales, tends to discourage vigorous price competition by the firms in the market and to encourage other kinds of conduct, such as use of inefficient methods of production or excessive promotional expenditures, of an economically undesirable nature.”\textsuperscript{67} The 1982 Merger Guidelines were quite explicit about the purpose behind the Department’s merger enforcement: “The unifying theme of the Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create or enhance ‘market power’ or to facilitate its exercise.”\textsuperscript{68} The fundamental concern with high prices and consumer harms rather than concentration as such is particularly clear when we consider unilateral effects tests under the more recent Guidelines, including those issued in 2010. Under unilateral effects analysis, market concentration and even market definition itself are at most secondary concerns. Rather, one seeks to measure anticipated price effects more directly.\textsuperscript{69}

One reason for the disconnect between current policy and the \textit{Brown Shoe} concerns with the price-reducing potential of larger firms is the language of §7 itself. It speaks of mergers that may “lessen competition” without defining what competition means. Does “less competition” refer to lower output and higher price-cost margins, or rather to a market structure with fewer firms? If the former, then a merger creating a larger, more efficient firm that charges lower prices is welcome. If the latter, such a merger is unwelcome, especially if that firm will drive smaller, less-efficient firms out of business. Both of these are more-or-less consistent with the lay understanding of “competition.” Applying a consumer welfare standard favors the former.

\textbf{Current Legislative Efforts to Strengthen Merger Enforcement}

We believe that merger enforcement can be significantly strengthened through a combination of suitable enforcement actions taken by the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, and State Attorneys General, if the courts embrace the overall framework that the Supreme Court established in \textit{Philadelphia National Bank}, updated to reflect the experience gained from merger enforcement and advances in industrial organization economics since that decision.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Brown Shoe} and other big 1960s era merger cases were brought by either the Antitrust Division or the FTC, not by private plaintiffs.

\textsuperscript{66} Prior to 1950 the Agency concerns were much more with high concentration as such. See, e.g., FTC, Report on the Merger Movement: A Summary Report (1948) (high concentration); Temporary National Econ. Comm. (TNEC), Final Report and Recommendations, S. Doc. No. 35 (1941) (observing trends toward greater concentration and recommending correctives).

\textsuperscript{67} 1968 Merger Guidelines, \textit{supra} note __, §2.

\textsuperscript{68} 1982 Merger Guidelines, \textit{supra}, note __, p.2.

\textsuperscript{69} Overall, the 2010 Guidelines, § 2.2.1. describe the relevant evidence as speaking to whether “the merging parties intend to raise prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product quality or variety, withdraw products or delay their introduction, or curtail research and development efforts after the merger, or explicit or implicit evidence that the ability to engage in such conduct motivated the merger….”
Legislative changes could, of course, go further and operate far more rapidly than can government enforcement actions and the resulting development of the case law. But legislative changes can also create new problems and have unintended effects, so caution is needed.

In September, 2017, Senator Amy Klobuchar of Minnesota, the ranking Democrat on the Senate judiciary antitrust subcommittee along with several Democrat co-sponsors, introduced the “Consolidation Prevention and Competition Promotion Act of 2017.” This bill is designed to make merger enforcement more aggressive. The bill is unlikely to pass in the current Republican-controlled Congress, but together with the antitrust plank in the Democrat party platform attending the 2016 election it reflects concerns that merger enforcement has not been aggressive enough in recent years. The bill also has contains elements that appear to reflect a preference for market deconcentration for its own sake, without regard to impact on consumers. That idea has previously appeared in the political debate over the goals of antitrust.

First, the bill would substitute the word “substantially” lessen competition with the word “materially,” which the bill states to mean “more than a de minimis amount.” We welcome this change, which clearly intends to strengthen the government’s hand in court, although we are uncertain just how it will actually affect litigated merger cases.

Second, the bill would substitute the phrase “monopoly or a monopsony” for the term “monopoly.” We are unclear why the drafters included this language, since Section 7 currently reaches mergers among buyers, as recognized by both the case law and the 2010 Merger Guidelines. But the language may help clarify and emphasize for the courts that harm to suppliers, such as farmers or workers, that results from a merger between their customers or employers, can violate Section 7.

In general, a merger that harms counterparties to the merging firms by restricting the competitive choices available to them can violate Section 7. In the “normal” case where two competing sellers are merging, the potentially harmed counterparties are their customers. The canonical harm comes in the form of higher prices charged by the merging firms, which restricts demand. These customers may themselves be businesses, or they may be final consumers. When two competing sellers merge, antitrust attorneys and economists usually refer to the impact on “consumers,” but it is more accurate to refer to the impact on “customers.” An important question in any such merger is whether the merging firms are two of only a few suppliers to which certain customers can turn. When two competing buyers are merging, the economic analysis is formally equivalent, but a different set of labels applies. The potentially harmed

70 See https://www.democrats.org/party-platform.
74 When the direct customers of the merging parties are harmed, it may be presumed that some harm will flow downstream to final consumers as well, as the higher prices are passed through to some degree.
counterparties are the suppliers to the merging parties. Now the canonical harm comes in the form of lower prices paid by the merging firms for the input in question, which restricts supply.\footnote{In the case of “classic monopsony,” the sole buyer reduces the quantity purchased and this drives down the equilibrium price. This situation applies when a single buyer purchases from many suppliers of a homogeneous good who are price-takers. In the more common situation in which the inputs are differentiated, or in which the buyer negotiates with its suppliers, the mechanism is different, and the lower price will tend over time to reduce the quantity, quality, or variety of the products supplied, as suppliers make various investment decisions.} An important question in any such merger is whether the merging firms are two of only a few customers to which certain suppliers can sell. One reason there are relatively few buy-side merger challenges is that it is relatively rare for the merging firms to be two of only a few customers to which their suppliers can turn.

Third, under this bill, in a case brought by the DOJ, the FTC, or a State attorney general (but not private plaintiffs), a merger would be illegal if it “would lead to a significant increase in market concentration,” in any domestic market, “unless the acquiring and acquired person establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the effect of the acquisition will not be to tend to materially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly or a monopsony.” This part of the bill appears to codify the Philadelphia National Bank structural presumption found in the case law, but it does not specify the level or increase in concentration required for the presumption to apply.

Fourth, the bill would permit one of the federal enforcement agencies or a state attorney general (but not private plaintiffs) to challenge a merger where, as a consequence, the acquiring firm’s interest in the acquired firm exceeds an adjusted value of $5 billion; or one of the merging firms has assets, net annual sales, or market capitalization exceeding $100 billion; or if as a result of the acquisition the acquiring firm would hold an aggregate of voting securities and assets of the acquired firm exceeding $5 billion.\footnote{The $100 billion and $5 billion limits would automatically be adjusted annually based on the growth of the U.S. gross national product.} If one of these absolute value thresholds is exceeded, then the merger is presumptively unlawful and the burden shifts to the proponent of the merger to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the merger will not have the stated anticompetitive result. This provision does not require that the merging firms be competitors or potential competitors, or even in a supplier/customer relationship, provided the size thresholds are met. A merger between firms that do not compete does not increase market concentration.

We are concerned that this part of the bill is not well tailored to address competition concerns. If this provision is motivated by a concern about market concentration and market power, and the obstacles that the government faces when challenging mergers in court, then we would like to see this provision revised to target horizontal mergers. For example, the bill could provide that the government can establish a presumption that the merger violates Section 7 if the government can show that the merger would lead to a significant increase in concentration in any domestic market, so long as the alleged market is plausible. That would significantly reduce the burden on the government to define the relevant market in order to establish its prima facie case. Or the bill could specify that in order for the merging parties to rebut the government’s presumption based on ease of entry, they must establish by clear and convincing evidence that entry will be timely, likely and sufficient to deter or counteract the feared anticompetitive effects.
However, we recognize that this provision may well not primarily be motivated by concerns about market power. Section 2 of the bill, “Findings and Purposes,” states that Congress finds that “undue market concentration also contributes to the consolidation of political power, undermining the health of democracy in the United States.” If the concern animating this provision is the political power of large firms, we would strongly prefer that this critical problem facing our democracy be addressed separately, e.g., through campaign finance reform, greater transparency, tougher ethics rules, or other legislation that addresses the problem more explicitly and more directly. Mixing up those concerns with competition concerns would, in our view, be counterproductive for solving both types of problems.

Lastly, the bill also contains a provision requiring ongoing post-acquisition reporting for transactions resolved through a consent decree with the DOJ or the FTC. We strongly support this provision. The bill also would establish an ‘Office of the Competition Advocate’ within the FTC. The Competition Advocate’s principal duty would be to listen to various interest groups and prepare reports about areas meriting antitrust investigation. We very much support these activities, along with the Data Center called for within that Office. While the FTC already publishes numerous reports relating to general policy questions of this nature, the Office of Competition Advocate will have subpoena authority to collect the information it needs, even if no litigation is in prospect. This provision, if enacted, would fulfill a critical need by greatly improving the FTC’s ability to perform merger retrospectives.

Conclusion

Merger analysis is almost always a predictive exercise involving considerable uncertainty. As a result, burdens of proof matter a great deal. The structural presumption – that a merger is anticompetitive if it leads to a significant increase in market concentration – has therefore proven essential to effective merger enforcement. In our view, this presumption is strongly supported by economic theory and evidence, and by the experience gained in merger enforcement over the past 50 years. Furthermore, the existing case law, going back to the Supreme Court’s landmark 1963 decision in *Philadelphia National Bank*, gives room for the DOJ, the FTC, State Attorneys General, and the lower courts to apply the presumption more broadly, and to make the presumption more difficult to rebut. In other words, while the structural presumption is by no means the only way for the government to successfully challenge a horizontal merger, it can be used more aggressively within current law.

Looking more broadly, merger policy is one area where the courts have done a fairly good job of tracking prevailing economic thinking. This has been facilitated by the relatively general language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. For example, both the rise and subsequent decline of structuralism in merger enforcement were accomplished without significant reliance on statutory amendment. Section 7 also has proven quite able to accommodate “unilateral effects” theories. And the courts have moved from a regime in which efficiencies were either irrelevant or mergers were actually condemned because they produced efficiencies (the “efficiencies offense”) to one that contemplates an efficiency “defense.” The courts both recognized and then later pulled back on various theories of potential competition. In short, the current language of the provision has proven to be remarkably flexible. Given that the concerns of merger policy are fundamentally

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77 See Hovinkamp, Opening of American Law, supra note __, Ch. 11.
economic, this is a good thing. By contrast, legislation, particularly if it is overly specific, could freeze into place new, rigid rules or goals that do not truly promote and protect competition, at least until Congress chooses to act again.