Pablo T. Spiller

Jeffrey A. Jacobs Distinguished Professor of Business and Technology Professor of Business and Public Policy
Curriculum Vita | Research | Publications | Consulting | Teaching | Personal | Contact



9. El Juego Político En América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las Políticas Públicas?, Eds. with Scartascini, C., E. Stein, and M. Tommasi, BID, Mayol Ediciones, Colombia. 2011.

8. Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, Eds., with Stein, E., M. Tommasi and C. Scartascini, DRCLAS, Harvard University/InterAmerican Development Bank, Washington DC, 2008.

7. The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: The Case of Argentina, with Mariano Tommasi, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

6. Institutions, Contracts and Regulation in Argentina, (in spanish) with Manuel Abdala, Temas, Buenos Aires, 2000.

5. Spilled Water: Institutional Commitment in the Provision of Water Services in Latin America, with W. Savedoff, Eds. Interamerican Development Bank, 1999. (translated into spanish).

4. Regulación de los Sectores de Infraestructura y Energéticos en México, (Infrastructure and Energy Regulation in Mexico) Eds. Spiller, PT and C. Sales, ITAM/Porrua Grupo Editorial, México City, Mexico, 1999.

3. Managing the Regulatory Process: Design, Concepts, Issues, and the Latin American and Caribbean Story, with J. Luis Guasch, World Bank Directions in Development Series 1999.

2. Regulations, Institutions and Commitment:: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, Ed. with Brian Levy, Cambridge University Press. 1996.

1. Strategy, Structure and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry, with T. Muris and D. Scheffman, Quorum Books, 1993.


108. “Basic Economic Principles of Infrastructure Liberalization: A Transaction Cost Perspective,” in International Handbook of Network Industries – The Liberalization of Infrastructure. Finger, M. and R.W. Künneke, Eds. Edward Elgar Publishing, MA, USA, 2011.

107. “Transactions Cost Regulation,” forthcoming Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.”

106. “Third-Party Opportunism and the Theory of Public Contracts: Operationalization and Applications,” forthcoming, in Brousseau, E. and J.M Glachant, Institutional Foundations of Markets, Cambridge University Press.

105. “How is it played in Latin America? Political Institutions, Negotiation Processes and Public Policy,” with Scartascini, C., E. Stein, and M. Tommasi, Chapter 1 in El Juego Político En América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las Políticas Públicas?, Eds. with Scartascini, C., E. Stein, and M. Tommasi, BID, Mayol Ediciones, Colombia. 2011. (in spanish).

104. “A country without a course.  How is public policy made in Argentina?," with M. Tommasi, Chapter 3, in El Juego Político En América Latina: ¿Cómo se deciden las Políticas Públicas?, Eds. with Scartascini, C., E. Stein, and M. Tommasi, BID, Mayol Ediciones, Colombia. 2011. (in spanish).

103. “Regulation: A Transaction Cost Perspective,” California Management Review, Vol. 52, No.2, 2010: 147-158.

102. “An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications,” in M. Ghertman and C. Menard, Eds. Deregulation or Re-regulation: institutional and other approaches, Edward Elgar Publishing. 2009.

101. "Political Institutions, Policymaking Processes, and Policy Outcomes in Argentina," with Mariano Tommasi, in Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, Eds., with Stein, E., M. Tommasi and C. Scartascini, DRCLAS, Harvard University/InterAmerican Development Bank, Washington DC, 2008.

100. “Political Institutions, Policymaking and Policy: An Introduction,” with Ernesto Stein and Mariano Tommasi, in Policymaking in Latin America: How Politics Shapes Policies, Eds., with Stein, E., M. Tommasi and C. Scartascini, DRCLAS, Harvard University/InterAmerican Development Bank, Washington DC, 2008.

99. “Buy, Lobby or Sue: Interest Groups’ Participation in Policy Making – A Selective Survey,” with Sanny Liao, Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michael Glachant, Eds. New Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press. 2008.

98. “Strategic Judicial Decision Making,” with Rafael Gely, forthcoming, Whittington, Keith E., E. Daniel Kelemen and Gregory A. Caldeira, Eds., Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics, Oxford University Press. 2008.

97. “The Organizational Implications of Creativity: The US Film Industry in Mid-XXth Century,” with Ricard Gil, 50/1 California Management Review, 2007: 243-260.

96. “Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups and the Implications of Customer Heterogeneity,” in D. Lee, Editor, Advances in Airline Economics, Elsevier B.V., 2006.

95. “Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation. Argentina 1935-1998,” with M. Iaryczower and M. Tommasi, American Political Science Review, Vol 100, No. 1, 2006.

94. “Instability and Public Policy Making in Argentina,” Levitsky, S. and V. Murillo, eds. The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Argentine Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2006.

93. “Institutional Changes in Emerging Markets: Implications for the Telecommunications Sector,” forthcoming in Cave, M., S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang, Eds. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Volume 2, 2006.

92. “The Institutions of Regulation,” with M. Tommasi, in C. Menard and M. Shirley, Eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics 2005.

91. “Toward a Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making,” with R.G. Vanden Bergh, Business and Politics, Vol 5. Issue 1, 7-43, 2003.

90. “The Evolution of Advanced Large Scale Information Infrastructure in the United States,” with S.M. Greenstein and M.M. Lizardo, in , Shampine, A. Ed., Down to the Wire: Studies in the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technology, Nova Science Publishers, 2003.

89. “Institutional Changes in Emerging Markets: Implications for the Telecommunications Sector,” forthcoming in Cave, M., S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang, Eds. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Volume 2, 2006.

88. “Institutional or Structural: Lessons from International Electricity Sector Reforms,” with Guy Holburn, Brousseau, E., and JM. Glachant, The Economics of Contracts, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

87. “Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint,” with M. Bergara and B. Richman, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol XXVIII, 2003, pp: 247-280.

86. “Amateur Legislators - Professional Politicians: The Consequences of Party-Centered Electoral Rules in a Federal System,” with Mark Jones, Sebastian Saiegh, and Mariano Tommasi, Vol 46, No. 3, American Journal of Political Science, 2002, pp:656-669.

85. "Judicial Independence in Unstable Environments, Argentina 1935-1998,” with Matias Iaryczower and Mariano Tommasi," Vol 46, No. 4, American Journal of Political Sciences," 2002, pp:699-716.

84. "The Death of the Internet," Sloan Management Review, 2002.

83. “Structure, Strategy and Regulation: Telecommunications in the New Economy,” with R. deFigueiredo, , Detroit Law Review, 2001.

82. “Transaction Cost Economics: Its Influence on Organizational Theory, Strategic Management and Political Economy,” with G.R. Carroll and D.J.Teece, in Carroll, G.R. and D.J. Teece, Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1999.

81. “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol 15, No. 2, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1999: 349-377.

80. “An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures,” with Rui deFigueiredo and Santiago Urbiztondo, Vol 15, No. 1, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 1999:283-305.

79. “Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum,” with C. Cardilli, Vol. 16, No.1 Yale Journal of Regulation, 1999: 53-84.

78. "Commitment and Governance in Infrastructure Sectors," with W. Savedoff, in F. Basanes, E. Uribe and R. Willig, Eds., Can Privatization Deliver? Infrastructure for Latin America, IADB, Washington DC: 1999.

77. "Competition and Direct Access in New Zealand's Electricity Market," with Mario Bergara, G. Zaccour Ed., Deregulation of Electric Utilities, Kluwer Press, 1998.

76. "The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation: Small Countries Leading the Pack," with Carlo Cardilli, Vol 11, No. 4, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997: 127-138.

75. "Regulatory Agencies and the Courts," P. Newman, Ed., Palgrave Dictionary of Law & Economics, 1997.

74. "Agency Discretion and Accountability in Regulation," forthcoming, P. Newman, Ed., Palgrave Dictionary of Law & Economics, 1997.

73. "Organizing Global Seamless Networks: Contracts, Alliances and Hierarchies," with Svein Ulset, forthcoming in E. Bohlin and S.L. Levin, Eds., Telecommunications Transformation: Technology, Strategy, and Policy, IOS Press, The Netherlands., 1997.

72. “What’s in the Air: Interlicense Synergies and their Impact on FCC Broadband PCS Spectrum Auctions,” with Patrick Moreton, Vol. XKI (2) Journal of Law & Economics, 1998: 677-716.

71. "Political Institutions and Electric Utility Performance: A Cross Nation Analysis," with Mario Bergara and Witold Henisz, Vol. 40, California Management Review, 1998:18+.

70. “The Introduction of Direct Access in New Zealand’s Electricity Market,” with Mario Bergara, Vol. 6, No.2., Utility Policy, 1997: 97-106.

69. “Product Complementarities, Capabilities and Governance: A Dynamic Transaction Cost Perspective,” with B. Zelner, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol 6, No. 3, 561-594, (1997).

68. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment in the UK: The Case of Telecommunications," with Ingo Vogelsang, V. 153 No. 4, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1997: 607-629.

67. “Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Processes and Judicial Review,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol. 26, No. 2, Journal of Legal Studies, 1997: 347-370.

66. "Econometric Market Delineation," with D. Scheffman, Managerial and Decision Economics, 1996, pp. 165-178. Reprinted in Series in Managerial Economics, R. McChesney, Ed., J.M. Wiley, forthcoming.

65. “Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol. 16, No.4, International Review of Law & Economics, 1996: 503-521.

64. “A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory Specificity?,” V. 69, N. 2, USC Law Review, 1996: 477-515.

63. “Institutions and Commitment,” Industrial and Corporate Change (1996).

62. “Folk Theorems on Transmission Open Access: Proofs and Counterexamples,” with S. Oren, P. Varaiya and F. Wu, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10:5-23,(1996).

61. “Modern Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Activity: An Empirical Investigation,” with S. Greenstein, Industrial and Corporate Change (1995).

60. "Nodal Prices and Transmission Rights: A Critical Appraisal," with S. Oren, P. Varaiya and F. Wu, 8(3) The Electricity Journal, April 1995, pp:24-35.

59. “The Effect of Incentive Regulation on Local Exchange Companies’ Deployment of Digital Technology,” with S. Greenstein, and S. McMaster, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995.

58. "How Not to Do It: Electricity Regulation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay," with L. Viana, in E. Kahn and R. Gilbert, Eds., International Comparison of Electricity Regulations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

57. "Where is the Sin in Sincere: Sophisticated Voting in the Courts," with Matthew Spitzer, Journal of Law Economics and Organization (1995).

56. "Implementing Transmission Open Access: Comments on Transmission Pricing in Chile," IEEE Transactions, 1994.

55. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: The Case of Jamaica Telecommunications," with Cezley Sampson, in B. Levy and P. Spiller, Eds, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1993).

54. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: The Case of British Telecom," with Ingo Vogelsang, in B. Levy and P. Spiller, Eds, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1993).

53. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies of Telecommunications Regulation," with Brian Levy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (1994). Reprinted in Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, Eds, Transaction Cost Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics.

52. "Political Appointees vs. Career Civil Servants: A Multiple-Principals Theory of Political Institutions," with S. Urbiztondo, European Journal of Political Economy, (1994).

51. "Fares and Network 'Feed': Estimating Economies of Traffic Density in Airline Hub-and-Spoke Networks," with J. Brueckner, Journal of Law and Economics (1994).

50. "Regulatory Commitment and Utilities' Privatization: Implications for Future Comparative Research," in Banks, J. and E. Hanusheck, Eds., The Research Agenda in Political Economy, University of Rochester (1993).

49. Book review of "Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice," by Mitchell, M. Bridger and Ingo Vogelsang, Journal of Economic Literature (1993).

48. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment in Telecommunications: A Comparative Study of Five Countries," with Brian Levy, The World Bank Economic Review (1993), 215-52. Reprinted in Cook P. and C. Kirkpatrick, Eds. Privatisation in Developing Countries, forthcoming, Edward Elgar.

47. "Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities' Privatization," Industrial and Corporate Change (1993).

46. "A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent," with E. Schwartz and S. Urbiztondo, Law and Contemporary Problems (1993).

45. "Fare Determination in Airlines Hub-and-Spoke Networks," with J. Brueckner and N. Dyer, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 309-333.

44. "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relations Decisions: 1949-1988," with R. Gely, Rand Journal of Economics (1992).

43. "Strategy and Transaction Costs: The Organization of Distribution in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry," with T. Muris and D. Scheffman, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 83-129. Reprinted in Scott Masten, Economics of Contracts.

42. "The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction," with J. Ferejohn, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-7.

41. "Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines," with M. Spitzer, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), pp. 8-46.

40. "The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan," with R. Gely, 12 International Review of Law and Economics (1992), pp. 45-67.

39. "Buyers' Strategies, Competition, and Entry Barriers," with D. Scheffman, Economic Inquiry, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (1992), pp. 418-436.

38. "Rationality, Decision Rules, and Collegial Courts," International Review of Law and Economics (1992).

37. "Agency Discretion under Judicial Review," in Formal Theory of Politics II: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 8/9, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, (1992), pp. 185-200.

36. "A Congressional Theory of Indian Property Rights: The Cherokee Outlet," with L. Alston, Property Rights and Indian Economics, T. Anderson (ed.), Landham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., (1991).

35. "Competition and Mergers in Network Airlines," with J. Brueckner, 9 International Journal of Industrial Organization (1991), pp. 323-42.

34. "The Timing and Sequencing of a Trade Liberalization Policy: The Case of Uruguay," with E. Favaro, Liberalizing Foreign Trade: The Experience of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, M. Michaely (ed.), New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., (1991).

33. "Government Institutions and Regulatory Policy: A Rational Choice Analysis of Telecommunications Deregulation," P. Quirck and R. Rich, Understanding and Improving Public Decision Making, IGPA, University of Illinois (1990).

32. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," with R. Gely, 6 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1990), pp. 263-301. Reprinted in Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, Transaction Cost Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics (1995).

31. "Agency and the Role of Political Institutions," Information and Democratic Process, J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinsky (eds.), University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois (1990).

30. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, (or Let Them Be Bribed)," XXXIII Journal of Law and Economics (April 1990), pp. 65-101.

29. "Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets," with P. Reiss, XXXII Journal of Law and Economics (December 1989), pp. S179-S202.

28. "Introduction: Empirical Approaches to Market Power," with D. Scheffman, XXXII Journal of Law and Economics (December 1989), pp. S3-S10.

27. "A Note on Pricing on Hub-And-Spoke Networks," 30 Economics Letters (1989), pp. 165-169.

26. "Arbitrage During the Dollar-Sterling Gold Standard, 1899-1908: An Econometric Approach," with R. Wood, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4 (August 1988), pp. 882-892.

25. "The Estimation of Transaction Costs in Arbitrage Models," with R. Wood, 39 Journal of Econometrics (1988), pp. 309-326.

24. "Incentive Schemes with Multiple Agents and Bankruptcy Constraints," with J. Demski and D. Sappington, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 156-167.

23. "The Political Economy of Industrial Regulations: A Survey with Implications for Regulation Studies in Developing Countries," Special Anniversary Issue, Vol. 15, No. 3, Estudios de Econom?a, Vol. XV, No. 3 (December 1988), pp. 419-470.

22. "Geographic Market Definition Under the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines," with D.T. Scheffman, XXX Journal of Law and Economics (April 1987), pp. 123-147.

21. "Managing Supplier Switching," with J. Demski and D. Sappington, Rand Journal of Economics (Spring 1987), pp. 77 97.

20. "International Technological Diffusion, Product Differentiation and Economies of Scale," with Colin Lawrence, Structural Change, Economic Interdependence, and World Development, J.H. Dunning and M. Usui (eds.), London: McMillan Press, (1987).

19. "Entry Barriers and Multiproduct Oligopolies: Do They Forebear or Spoil?," with M. Gelfand, 5 International Journal of Industrial Organization (1987), pp. 101-113.

18. "On the Extent of the Market: Wholesale Gasoline in the Northeastern United States," with C. Huang, Journal of Industrial Economics (December 1986), pp. 131 145.

17. "Comments," Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, P. Ippolito and D. Scheffman (eds.), Federal Trade Commission, (1986).

16. "Treble Damages and Optimal Suing Time," Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 9 (1986), pp. 45 56.

15. "Trade Liberalization in Oligopolistic Industries: The Quota Case," with E. Buffie, 20 Journal of International Economics (1986), pp. 65 81.

14. "Futures Market Backwardation Under Risk Neutrality," with T. Bresnahan, Economic Inquiry (July 1986), pp. 429 442.

13. "Comments on Easterbrook and Snyder," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVIII (2), (May 1985).

12. "Tobin's q and Monopoly Power: A Capital Asset Pricing Perspective," Economics Letters, (1985), pp. 261 263.

11. "On Vertical Mergers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1985), pp. 285 312.

10. "The Effects of Entry Regulation on Oligopolistic Interaction: The Uruguayan Banking Sector," with E. Favaro, Rand Journal of Economics (Summer 1984), pp. 244 254.

9. Book Review "A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870: M.H.J Finch," Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December 1983), pp. 399 401.

8. "Regulating by Partial Deregulation: The Case of Telecommunications," with G. Knieps, Administrative Law Review (October 1983).

7. "The Differential Impact of Airline Regulation on Individual Firms and Markets: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1983).

6. "Assessing the Profitability Effects of Airline Deregulation," Economics Letters (November 1983).

5. "On Adjusting for Risk Changes when Assessing the Profitability Effects of Regulatory Changes," Economics Letters 10 (1983), pp. 369 374.

4. "Product Diversity, Economies of Scale, and International Trade," with C. Lawrence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 1 (February 1983), pp. 63 83.

3. "Uncertain Availability, Spatial Location and Regulation: An Application to the Airline Industry," Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 57 69 (Invited paper).

2. "Analysis of R&D Failure," with M. Teubal, Research Policy 6 (1977), pp. 254-275.

1. "Methodological Aspects of Innovation Research," with R. Rothwell, J. Towsend and M. Teubal, Omega, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1977).

Bi-weekly Column in El Cronista Comercial
Buenos Aires Argentina (In Spanish Only)
From February 2001 until May 2003, I wrote a bi-weekly column in El Cronista   Comercial, a leading financial newspaper in Argentina. My columns dealt with how I saw regulatory and institutional issues in Argentina, but I also indulged in some commentary about global issues.

47. FLEXIBILIDAD COMO ESTRATEGIA; FLEXIBILITY AS STRATEGY Dec 5, 2002. Las empresas con poca flexibilidad solo son factibles en entornos estables o monopolicos.

46. UN PAIS SIN PROCEDIMIENTOS; A COUNTRY WITHOUT PROCEDURES Nov 21, 2002. Lo que un grupo de gobernadores decide hoy, fácilmente se abandona o revierte mañana.

45. TARIFAS SOCIALES AEREAS: UNA MALA IDEA EN UN MAL MOMENTO; SOCIAL AIR PRICES: A BAD IDEA IN A BAD MOMENT Nov 7, 2002. El efecto de la Resolución 35 es el opuesto de lo que el Gobierno debería estar buscando.

44. ENRON, ETICA Y ELECTRICIDAD; ENRON, ETHICS AND ELECTRICITY Oct 24, 2002. La falta de ética en el comportamiento de Enron no fue la causa de la crisis energética en California

43. CON LAS TARIFAS, AL FONDO; WITH TARIFS, TO THE END Oct 10, 2002. Los precios de los servicios celulares han bajado en términos reales.

42. LA CORTE  Y LA GRAN DEPRESSION; THE COURT AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION Sep 26, 2002. Al fin de su mandato, Duhalde no podrá doblegar a la Corte.

41. EL 'NEW DEAL' ARGENTINO; THE ARGENTINE "NEW DEAL" Sep 12, 2002. El período recesivo que se vive hoy en la Argentina es muy similar a la Gran Depresión que afectó a EE.UU. en el ?29.

40. CAPACIDAD EXCEDENTE Y TARIFAS PUBLICAS; EXCESS CAPACITY AND PUBLIC SERVICES TARIFFS Aug 28, 2002. Los aumentos mínimos de tarifas abren la puerta para un tarifazo futuro.

39. LA ARGENTINA ES DIFERENTE; ARGENTINA IS DIFFERENT Aug. 21, 2002. Las provincias no han tenido miramientos en emitir semi-monedas.

38. CRECIMIENTO Y CONCEPTO PAIS; GROWTH AND COUNTRY CONCEPT Aug 1, 2002. Los países de la región deberán lograr consenso interno si aspiran a obtener una ayuda seria.

37. MERCADOS, CREDIBILIDAD Y POLITICA; MARKETS, CREDIBILITY AND POLITICS Jul 18, 2002. Es clave romper el vínculo entre legisladores nacionales y líderes partidarios provinciales.

36. MAS COMPETENCIA EN EL ACCESO A INTERNET; MORE COMPETITION IN INTERNET ACCESS Jul 4, 2002. El modelo 0610 ha sido un mecanismo exitoso, pero fue diseñado para una época de monopolios.

35. MANIOBRAS DEL OFICIALISMO CON LAS EMPRESAS PRIVATIZADAS; GOVERNMENT MANEUVERS WITH THE PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES Jun 20, 2002. Hay ya varias empresas de servicios públicos en situación de cesación de pagos Se deben eliminar la fijación de precios máximos, e imponer penalidades por mala calidad.

34. SE DEBEN ESTABLECER NUEVAS REGLAS PARA LAS FUTURAS ELECCIONES; NEW RULES FOR NEW ELLECTIONS Jun 6, 2002. El país recuperará credibilidad cuando se rompa el control de los gobernadores sobre el Congreso.

33. GOBERNADORES 3, CENTRO 0; GOVERNORS 3, CENTER 0 May 2, 2002. La intransigencia de las provincias al ajuste ha creado el nefasto sistema de incentivos existente en el país.

32. UNA SALIDA ?DORNBUSCHIANA? PARA LA COPARTICIPACION FEDERAL; A "DORNBUSCHEAN" SOLUTION FOR FEDERAL COPARTICIPATION May 4, 2002. El Organismo Fiscal Federal debería gestionar un consorcio de ONG?s internacionales.

31. EL FMI SE EQUIVOCA SOBRE LOS BONOS; THE IMF IS WRONG ABOUT THE BONDS April 4, 2002. El requerimiento del Fondo de rescatar los bonos provinciales, es música a los oídos de los gobernadores.

30. POR UNA SOLA VEZ; JUST ONCE Mar 7, 2002. El Gobierno le exige al sector privado más y más ajustes para mantener un Estado obsoleto e ineficaz.

29. FÚTBOL PARA TODOS, DERECHOS PARA NINGUNO; SOCCER FOR ALL, RIGHTS FOR NO ONE Mar 20, 2002. El Congreso parece equiparar los partidos del Mundial y de la Selección a un servicio público.

28. MIRANDO HACIA ADELANTE EN LA RENEGOCIACIÓN DE CONCESIONES; LOOKING AHEAD ON PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS Feb 21, 2002. En ninguna concesión los contratos requieren que se devuelva lo ganado honestamente.

27. ADIOS PRESIDENTE, BIENVENIDO PRIMER MINISTRO; GOOD BYE PRESIDENT, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER Feb 8, 2002. Un sistema parlamentario podría generar rápidos cambios sin quiebres institucionales.

26. EL MEJOR REMEDIO PARA LA CORTE ES EVITAR LAS PRESIONES POLITICAS; THE BEST REMEDY FOR THE COURT IS TO AVOID POLITICAL PRESSURES Jan 24, 2002. Con tanta rotación de la Corte no es de extrañar que la visión de la ciudadanía no sea muy buena.

25. LA DEUDA, NO ES; IT'S NOT THE DEBT Dec 13, 2001. Las propuestas tienen que ser consistentes con la capacidad de cambiar expectativas de los acreedores.

24. LA DESREGULACIÓN ALIVIA A LA RECESIÓN; DEREGULATION AND RECESSION Nov 29, 2001. La desregulación en la recesión crea nuevos negocios y libera la imaginación empresaria.

23. HACIA UN FEDERALISMO COMPETITIVO Y COOPERATIVO; TOWARDS A COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM Nov 15, 2001. Deben introducirse normas para que los legisladores sean electos en forma directa.

22. El crecimiento requiere cambios institucionales; GROWTH REQUIRES INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES Oct 31, 2001.

21. LOS PREMIOS NOBEL Y LA REGULACIÓN PROVINCIAL; NOBEL PRIZES AND PROVINCIAL REGULATION Oct 19, 2001. La Nación debe cambiar la forma de regular los servicios públicos y limitar la discrecionalidad.

20. PRIVATIZACIONES, AGUA Y SALUD; PRIVATIZATIONS, WATER AND HEALTH Sep 19, 2001. Las privatizaciones han tenido un impacto directo en la disminución de la mortalidad infantil.

17. MICROSOFT Y LA BANCARROTA DEL DINERO ELECTRÓNICO; MICROSOFT AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF ELECTRONIC MONEY Aug 30, 2001. La Internet abierta no puede desarrollar contenidos que requieran pequeños pagos.

16. PROBLEMAS CON EL CORREO; PROBLEMS WITH THE POSTAL SERVICE  Aug 16, 2001. Una experiencia en la que los diseñadores de concesiones aprenderán qué no hacer.


14. Microsoft (ganador - si y no); MICROSOFT (WINNER - YES AND NO) Jul 5, 2001. El fallo le permite seguir con los desarrollos integrados, pero no evitará juicios.

13. La inevitable quiebra de Aerolineas; THE INEVITABLE BANKRUPTCY OF AEROLINEAS Jun 21, 2001. Tras la quiebra debería apuntarse una política de cielosabiertos.

12. LA VENTA DE LAPA ABRE DUDAS SOB EL ALCANCE DE LAS REGULACIONES; SALE OF LAPA OPENS DOUBTS ABOUT REGULATIONS Jun 14, 2001. Entregar las rutas de Aerolíneas en un paquete limitaría la cantidad de ofertas, creen los expertos.

11. EL ACTIVO DE LA AÉREA, EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO; AIRLINES ASSET IN GOVERNMENT'S HANDS May 31, 2001. Si la empresa quiebra con semejante deuda, es poco probable que todos los acreedores puedan cobrar.

10. La reducción de las legislaturas mejorara' el incentivo electoral; SHRINKING LEGISLATURES WILL HELP ELECTORAL INCENTIVES May 10, 2001. La eliminación de los Senados provinciales implicará menores gastos legislativos directos y una importante reducción de la sobrerepresentación.

9. CALIFORNIA ESTÁ EN BANCARROTA ENERGÉTICA; CALIFORNIA IS IN ENERGY BANKRUPTCY Apr 12, 2001. Nefasta consecuencia de varios meses de parálisis política.

8. JUECES O BURÓCRATAS; JUDGES OR BUREAUCRATS Apr 10, 2001. Este es el momento para que la Corte Suprema muestre su independencia del Poder Ejecutivo.

7. EL SISTEMA MULTICARRIER DEBE USARSE PARA TODAS LAS LLAMADAS; THE MULTICARRIER SYSTEM MUST BE USED FOR ALL CALLS Mar 29, 2001. Debe instrumentarse un reglamento sencillo y en consenso con los operadores, que debe incluir penalidades para quienes no lo respeten.

6. Si no Cambia el Regimen Electoral la Reforma del Estado SerÁ Insipida; WITHOUT ELECTORAL CHANGES THE REFORM OF THE STATE WILL NOT BE Mar 15, 2001. En países presidenciales, como la Argentina o EE.UU., la burocracia tiene dos jefes, el Ejecutivo y el Parlamento. Pero en la Argentina, el Congreso es un Parlamento amateur.




2. LA RECETA PARTE DE UN DIAGNÓSTICO EQUIVOCADO; THE RECIPE IS PART OF A WRONG DIAGNOSTIC Jan 10, 2001. La salida de la crisis financiera tiene que atacar la fuente del problema, y no sus manifestaciones.