Haas School of Business
Contact Information:
Faculty Building 593
Berkeley, CA 94720-1770
phone: (01) 510-642-1502
fax: (01) 510-642-2826
Office Hours: Th 2-3pm
Publications
BOOKS
7. The Institutional Foundations of Public Policy: The Case of Argentina, with Mariano Tommasi, forthcoming, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
6. Institutions, Contracts and Regulation in Argentina, (in spanish) with Manuel Abdala, Temas, Buenos Aires, 2000.
5. Spilled Water: Institutional Commitment in the Provision of Water Services in Latin America, with W. Savedoff, Eds. Interamerican Development Bank, 1999. (translated into spanish)
4. Regulación de los Sectores de Infraestructura y Energéticos en México, (Infrastructure and Energy Regulation in Mexico) Eds. Spiller, PT and C. Sales, ITAM/Porrua Grupo Editorial, México City, Mexico, 1999.
3. The Path Towards Rational Regulation in Latin America and the Caribbean: Issues, Concepts and Experience (Directions in Development) with J. Luis Guasch, World Bank Directions in Development Series 1999.
2. Regulations, Institutions and Commitment:: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation, Ed. with Brian Levy, Cambridge University Press. 1996
1. Strategy, Structure and Antitrust in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry, with T. Muris and D. Scheffman, Quorum Books, 1993.
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ARTICLES
96. “Airline Hubs: Costs, Markups and the Implications of Customer Heterogeneity,” in D. Lee, Editor, Advances in Airline Economics, Elsevier B.V., 2006.
95. “Judicial Lobbying: The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation,” with M. Iaryczower and M. Tommasi, American Political Science Review, Vol 100, No. 1, 2006.
94. “Instability and Public Policy Making in Argentina,” Levitsky, S. and V. Murillo, eds. The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Argentine Democracy in Comparative Perspective, 2006.
93. “Institutional Changes in Emerging Markets: Implications for the Telecommunications Sector,” forthcoming in Cave, M., S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang, Eds. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Volume 2, 2006.
92. “The Institutions of Regulation,” with M. Tommasi, in C. Menard and M. Shirley, Eds. Handbook of New Institutional Economics 2005.
91. “Toward a Positive Theory of State Supreme Court Decision Making,” with R.G. Vanden Bergh, Business and Politics, Vol 5. Issue 1, 7-43, 2003.
90. “The Evolution of Advanced Large Scale Information Infrastructure in the United States,” with S.M. Greenstein and M.M. Lizardo, in , Shampine, A. Ed., Down to the Wire: Studies in the Diffusion and Regulation of Telecommunications Technology, Nova Science Publishers, 2003.
89. “Institutional Changes in Emerging Markets: Implications for the Telecommunications Sector,” forthcoming in Cave, M., S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang, Eds. Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, Volume 2, 2006.
88. “Institutional or Structural, Lessons from International Electricity Sector Reforms,” with Guy Holburn, Brousseau, E., and JM. Glachant, The Economics of Contracts, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
87. “Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint,” with M. Bergara and B. Richman, Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol XXVIII, 2003, pp: 247-280.
86. “Professional Politicians – Amateur Legislators: The Argentine Congress in the XXth Century,” with Mark Jones, Sebastian Saiegh, and Mariano Tommasi, Vol 46, No. 3, American Journal of Political Science, 2002, pp:656-669.
85. "Judicial Decision Making in Unstable Environments: Argentina 1938-1998”, with Matias Iaryczower and Mariano Tommasi," Vol 46, No. 4, American Journal of Political Sciences," 2002, pp:699-716.
84. "The Death of the Internet," Sloan Management Review, 2002.
83. “Structure, Strategy and Regulation: Telecommunications in the New Economy,” with R. deFigueiredo, , Detroit Law Review, 2001.
82. “Transaction Cost Economics: Its Influence on Organizational Theory, Strategic Management and Political Economy,” with G.R. Carroll and D.J.Teece, in Carroll, G.R. and D.J. Teece, Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford: 1999.
81. “Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol 15, No. 2, Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 1999: 349-377.
80. “An Informational Perspective on Administrative Procedures,” with Rui deFigueiredo and Santiago Urbiztondo, Vol 15, No. 1, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 1999:283-305.
79. “Towards a Property Rights Approach to Communications Spectrum”, with C. Cardilli, Vol. 16, No.1 Yale Journal of Regulation, 1999: 53-84.
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78. "Commitment and Governance in Infrastructure Sectors," with W. Savedoff, in F. Basanes, E. Uribe and R. Willig, Eds., Can Privatization Deliver? Infrastructure for Latin America, IADB, Washington DC: 1999.
77. "Competition and Direct Access in New Zealand's Electricity Market," with Mario Bergara, G. Zaccour Ed., Deregulation of Electric Utilities, Kluwer Press, 1998.
76. "The Frontier of Telecommunications Deregulation: Small Countries Leading the Pack," with Carlo Cardilli, Vol 11, No. 4, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1997: 127-138.
75. "Regulatory Agencies and the Courts," P. Newman, Ed., Palgrave Dictionary of Law & Economics, 1997.
74. "Agency Discretion and Accountability in Regulation," forthcoming, P. Newman, Ed., Palgrave Dictionary of Law & Economics, 1997.
73. " Organizing Global Seamless Networks: Contracts, Alliances and Hierarchies," with Svein Ulset, forthcoming in E. Bohlin and S.L. Levin, Eds., Telecommunications Transformation: Technology, Strategy, and Policy, IOS Press, The Netherlands., 1997.
72. “What’s in the Air: Interlicense Synergies and their Impact on FCC Broadband PCS Spectrum Auctions,” with Patrick Moreton, Vol. XKI (2) Journal of Law & Economics, 1998: 677-716.
71. "Political Institutions and Electric Utility Performance: A Cross Nation Analysis," with Mario Bergara and Witold Henisz, Vol. 40, California Management Review, 1998:18+.
70. “The Introduction of Direct Access in New Zealand’s Electricity Market,” with Mario Bergara, Vol. 6, No.2., Utility Policy, 1997: 97-106.
69. “Product Complementarities, Capabilities and Governance: A Dynamic Transaction Cost Perspective,” with B. Zelner, Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol 6, No. 3, 561-594, (1997).
68. "Regulation without Commitment: Price Regulation of UK Utilities (with special emphasis on telecommunications)," with Ingo Vogelsang, V. 153 No. 4, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 1997: 607-629.
67. “Decision Costs and the Strategic Design of Administrative Processes and Judicial Review,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol. 26, No. 2, Journal of Legal Studies, 1997: 347-370.
66. "Econometric Market Delineation," with D. Scheffman, Managerial and Decision Economics, 1996, pp. 165-178. Reprinted in Series in Managerial Economics, R. McChesney, Ed., J.M. Wiley, forthcoming.
65. “Invitations to Override: Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions,” with Emerson Tiller, Vol. 16, No.4, International Review of Law & Economics, 1996: 503-521.
64. “A Positive Political Theory of Regulatory Instruments: Contracts, Administrative Law or Regulatory Specificity?,” V. 69, N. 2, USC Law Review, 1996: 477-515.
63. “Institutions and Commitment,” Industrial and Corporate Change (1996).
62. “Folk Theorems on Transmission Open Access: Proofs and Counterexamples,” with S. Oren, P. Varaiya and F. Wu, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10:5-23,(1996).
61. “Modern Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Activity: An Empirical Investigation” with S. Greenstein, Industrial and Corporate Change (1995).
60. "Nodal Prices and Transmission Rights: A Critical Appraisal," with S. Oren, P. Varaiya and F. Wu, 8(3) The Electricity Journal, April 1995, pp:24-35.
59. “The Effect of Incentive Regulation on Local Exchange Companies’ Deployment of Digital Technology,” with S. Greenstein, and S. McMaster, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1995.
58. "How Not to Do It: Electricity Regulation in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay," with L. Viana, in E. Kahn and R. Gilbert, Eds., International Comparison of Electricity Regulations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
57. "Where is the Sin in Sincere: Sophisticated Voting in the Courts," with Matthew Spitzer, Journal of Law Economics and Organization (1995).
56. "Implementing Transmission Open Access: Comments on Transmission Pricing in Chile," IEEE Transactions, 1994.
55. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: The Case of Jamaica Telecommunications," with Cezley Sampson, in B. Levy and P. Spiller, Eds, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1993).
54. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: The Case of British Telecom," with Ingo Vogelsang, in B. Levy and P. Spiller, Eds, The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1993).
53. "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Five Country Studies of Telecommunications Regulation," with Brian Levy, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (1994). Reprinted in Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, Eds, Transaction Cost Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics.
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52. "Political Appointees vs. Career Civil Servants: A Multiple-Principals Theory of Political Institutions," with S. Urbiztondo, European Journal of Political Economy, (1994).
51. "Fares and Network 'Feed': Estimating Economies of Traffic Density in Airline Hub-and-Spoke Networks," with J. Brueckner, Journal of Law and Economics (1994).
50. "Regulatory Commitment and Utilities' Privatization: Implications for Future Comparative Research," in Banks, J. and E. Hanusheck, Eds., The Research Agenda in Political Economy, University of Rochester (1993).
49. Book review of "Telecommunications Pricing: Theory and Practice," by Mitchell, M. Bridger and Ingo Vogelsang, Journal of Economic Literature (1993).
48. "Regulations, Institutions and Commitment in Telecommunications: A Comparative Study of Five Countries," with Brian Levy, The World Bank Economic Review (1993), 215-52. Reprinted in Cook P. and C. Kirkpatrick, Eds. Privatisation in Developing Countries, forthcoming, Edward Elgar.
47. "Institutions and Regulatory Commitment in Utilities' Privatization," Industrial and Corporate Change (1993).
46. "A Positive Theory of Legislative Intent," with E. Schwartz and S. Urbiztondo, Law and Contemporary Problems (1993).
45. "Fare Determination in Airlines Hub-and-Spoke Networks," with J. Brueckner and N. Dyer, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Autumn 1992), pp. 309-333.
44. "Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor Decisions: 1949/1987," with R. Gely, Rand Journal of Economics (1992).
43. "Strategy and Transaction Costs in the Carbonated Soft Drink Industry," with T. Muris and D. Scheffman, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 83-129. Reprinted in Scott Masten, Economics of Contracts.
42. "The Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and Procedures: An Introduction," with J. Ferejohn, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), pp. 1-7.
41. "Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines," with M. Spitzer, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1992), pp. 8-46.
40. "The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan," with R. Gely, 12 International Review of Law and Economics (1992), pp. 45-67.
39. "Buyers' Strategies, Competition, and Entry Barriers," with D. Scheffman, Economic Inquiry, Vol. XXX, No. 3 (1992), pp. 418-436.
38. "Rationality, Decision Rules and Collegial Courts," International Review of Law and Economics (1992).
37. "Agency Discretion under Judicial Review," in Formal Theory of Politics II: Mathematical Modelling in Political Science, Vol. 16, No. 8/9, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, (1992), pp. 185-200.
36. "A Congressional Theory of Indian Property Rights: The Cherokee Outlet," with L. Alston, Property Rights and Indian Economics, T. Anderson (ed.), Landham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., (1991).
35. "Competition and Mergers in Network Airlines," with J. Brueckner, 9 International Journal of Industrial Organization (1991), pp. 323-42.
34. "The Timing and Sequencing of a Trade Liberalization Policy: The Case of Uruguay," with E. Favaro, Liberalizing Foreign Trade: The Experience of Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, M. Michaely (ed.), New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., (1991).
33. "Government Institutions and Regulatory Policy: A Rational Choice Analysis of Telecommunications Deregulation," forthcoming P. Quirck and R. Rich, Understanding and Improving Public Decision Making, IGPA, University of Illinois (1990).
32. "A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases," with R. Gely, 6 Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (1990), pp. 263-301. Reprinted in Oliver Williamson and Scott Masten, Transaction Cost Economics, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics (1995).
31. "Agency and the Role of Political Institutions," Information and Democratic Process, J. Ferejohn and J. Kuklinsky (eds.), University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois (1990).
30. "Politicians, Interest Groups and Regulators: A Multiple Principals Agency Theory of Regulation, (or Let Them Be Bribed)," XXXIII Journal of Law and Economics (April 1990), pp. 65-101.
29. "Competition and Entry in Small Airline Markets," with P. Reiss, XXXII Journal of Law and Economics (December 1989), pp. S179-S202.
28. "Empirical Approaches to Market Power," with D. Scheffman, XXXII Journal of Law and Economics (December 1989), pp. S3-S10.
27. "A Note on Pricing on Hub-And-Spoke Networks," 30 Economics Letters (1989), pp. 165-169.
26. "Arbitrage During the Dollar Sterling Gold Standard, 1890 1908: An Econometric Perspective," with R. Wood, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, No. 4 (August 1988), pp. 882-892.
25. "The Estimation of Transaction Costs in Arbitrage Models," with R. Wood, 39 Journal of Econometrics (1988), pp. 309-326.
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24. "Incentive Schemes with Multiple Agents and Bankruptcy Constraints," with J. Demski and D. Sappington, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 44, No. 1 (February 1988), pp. 156-167.
23. "The Political Economy of Industrial Regulations: A Survey with Implications for Regulation Studies in Developing Countries," Special Anniversary Issue, Vol. 15, No. 3, Estudios de Econom?a, Vol. XV, No. 3 (December 1988), pp. 419-470.
22. "Geographic Market Definition Under the DOJ Merger Guidelines," with D.T. Scheffman, XXX Journal of Law and Economics (April 1987), pp. 123-147.
21. "Managing Supplier Switching," with J. Demski and D. Sappington, Rand Journal of Economics (Spring 1987), pp. 77 97.
20. "International Technological Diffusion, Product Differentiation and Economies of Scale," with Colin Lawrence, Structural Change, Economic Interdependence, and World Development, J.H. Dunning and M. Usui (eds.), London: McMillan Press, (1987).
19. "Entry Barriers and Multiproduct Oligopolies: Do They Forebear or Spoil?" with M. Gelfand, 5 International Journal of Industrial Organization (1987), pp. 101-113.
18. "On the Definition of Markets: Wholesale Gasoline in the Northeastern United States," with C. Huang, Journal of Industrial Economics (December 1986), pp. 131 145.
17. "Comments," Empirical Approaches to Consumer Protection Economics, P. Ippolito and D. Scheffman (eds.), Federal Trade Commission, (1986).
16. "Treble Damages and Optimal Suing Time," Research in Law and Economics, Vol. 9 (1986), pp. 45 56.
15. "Trade Liberalization in Oligopolistic Industries: The Quota Case," with E. Buffie, 20 Journal of International Economics (1986), pp. 65 81.
14. "Futures Market Backwardation Under Risk Neutrality," with T. Bresnahan, Economic Inquiry (July 1986), pp. 429 442.
13. "Comments on Easterbrook and Snyder," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XXVIII (2), (May 1985).
12. "Tobin's q and Monopoly Power: A Capital Asset Pricing Perspective," Economics Letters, (1985), pp. 261 263.
11. "On Vertical Mergers," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Fall 1985), pp. 285 312.
10. "The Effects of Entry Regulation on Oligopolistic Interaction: The Uruguayan Banking Sector," with E. Favaro, Rand Journal of Economics (Summer 1984), pp. 244 254.
9. Book review of A Political Economy of Uruguay Since 1870, by M.H.J. Finch, Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 13, No. 3 (December 1983), pp. 399 401.
8. "Regulating by Partial Deregulation: The Case of Telecommunications," with G. Knieps, Administrative Law Review (October 1983).
7. "The Differential Effect of Airline Regulation on Individual Firms and Markets: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Law and Economics (October 1983).
6. "Assessing the Profitability Effects of Airline Deregulation," Economics Letters (November 1983).
5. "On Adjusting for Risk Changes when Assessing the Profitability Effects of Regulatory Changes," Economics Letters 10 (1983), pp. 369 374.
4. "Product Diversity, Fixed Costs and International Trade," with C. Lawrence, Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 1 (February 1983), pp. 63 83.
3. "Uncertain Availability, Spatial Location and Regulation: An Application to the Airline Industry," Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol. 3, No. 2 (June 1982), pp. 57 69 (Invited paper).
2. "Analysis of R&D Failure," with M. Teubal, Research Policy 6 (1977), pp. 254-275.
1. "Methodological Aspects of Innovation Research," with R. Rothwell, J. Towsend and M. Teubal, Omega, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1977).
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Bi-weekly Column in El Cronista Comercial
Buenos Aires Argentina (In Spanish Only)
From February 2001 until May 2003, I wrote a bi-weekly column in El Cronista Comercial, a leading financial newspaper in Argentina. My columns dealt with how I saw regulatory and institutional issues in Argentina, but I
also indulged in some commentary about global issues.
47. FLEXIBILIDAD COMO ESTRATEGIA;
FLEXIBILITY AS STRATEGY Dec 5, 2002 Las empresas con poca flexibilidad solo son factibles en entornos estables o monopolicos.
46. UN PAIS SIN PROCEDIMIENTOS;
A COUNTRY WITHOUT PROCEDURES: Nov 21, 2002 Lo que un grupo de gobernadores decide hoy, fácilmente se abandona o revierte mañana.
45. TARIFAS SOCIALES AEREAS: UNA MALA
IDEA EN UN MAL MOMENTO; SOCIAL AIR PRICES: A BAD IDEA IN A BAD MOMENT Nov 7, 2002 El efecto de la
Resolución 35 es el opuesto de lo que el Gobierno debería estar buscando.
44. ENRON, ETICA Y ELECTRICIDAD; ENRON, ETHICS AND ELECTRICITY Oct 24, 2002 La falta de ética en el comportamiento de Enron no fue la causa de la crisis energética en California
43. CON LAS TARIFAS, AL FONDO; WITH TARIFS, TO THE END Oct 10, 2002. Los precios de los servicios celulares han bajado en términos reales.
42. LA CORTE Y LA
GRAN DEPRESSION;THE COURT AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION Sep 26, 2002.htm Al fin de su
mandato, Duhalde no podrá doblegar a la Corte.
41. EL 'NEW DEAL' ARGENTINO; THE ARGENTINE "NEW DEAL" Sep 12, 2002 El período
recesivo que se vive hoy en la Argentina es muy similar a la Gran Depresión
que afectó a EE.UU. en el ?29.
40.
CAPACIDAD EXCEDENTE Y TARIFAS PUBLICAS; EXCESS CAPACITY AND PUBLIC SERVICES TARIFFS Aug 28, 2002 Los aumentos
mínimos de tarifas abren la puerta para un tarifazo futuro.
39. LA ARGENTINA ES DIFERENTE; ARGENTINA IS DIFFERENT Aug. 21, 2002 Las provincias no
han tenido miramientos en emitir semi-monedas.
38. CRECIMIENTO Y CONCEPTO PAIS;GROWTH AND COUNTRY CONCEPT Aug 1, 2002 Los países de la
región deberán lograr consenso interno si aspiran a obtener una ayuda seria.
37. MERCADOS, CREDIBILIDAD Y POLITICA;MARKETS, CREDIBILITY AND POLITICS Jul 18, 2002 Es clave romper el vínculo entre legisladores nacionales y líderes partidarios provinciales.
36. MAS COMPETENCIA EN EL ACCESO A INTERNET; MORE COMPETITION IN INTERNET ACCESS Jul 4, 2002< El modelo 0610 ha sido un mecanismo exitoso, pero fue diseñado para una época de monopolios.
35.
MANIOBRAS DEL OFICIALISMO CON LAS
EMPRESAS PRIVATIZADAS; GOVERNMENT MANEUVERS WITH THE PRIVATIZED ENTERPRISES Jun 20, 2002 Hay ya varias
empresas de servicios públicos en situación de cesación de pagos Se deben eliminar la fijación de
precios máximos, e imponer penalidades por
mala calidad.
34.
SE DEBEN ESTABLECER NUEVAS REGLAS PARA LAS FUTURAS ELECCIONES; NEW RULES FOR NEW ELLECTIONS Jun 6, 2002 El país recuperará
credibilidad cuando se rompa el control de los gobernadores sobre el
Congreso.
33. GOBERNADORES 3,
CENTRO 0; GOVERNORS 3, CENTER 0 May 2, 2002 La intransigencia de las provincias al ajuste ha creado el nefasto sistema
de incentivos existente en el país.
32.
UNA SALIDA ?DORNBUSCHIANA? PARA LA COPARTICIPACION FEDERAL;
A "DORNBUSCHEAN" SOLUTION FOR FEDERAL COPARTICIPATION
May 4, 2002 El Organismo Fiscal Federal debería gestionar un consorcio de ONG?s
internacionales.
31.
EL FMI SE EQUIVOCA SOBRE LOS BONOS; THE IMF IS WRONG
ABOUT THE BONDS April 4, 2002 El requerimiento del Fondo de rescatar los bonos provinciales, es música a
los oídos de los gobernadores.
30.
POR UNA SOLA VEZ;
JUST ONCE Mar 7, 2002 El Gobierno
le exige al sector privado más y más ajustes para mantener un Estado
obsoleto e ineficaz.
29.
FÚTBOL PARA TODOS, DERECHOS PARA NINGUNO;
SOCCER FOR ALL, RIGHTS FOR NO ONE Mar 20,
2002 El Congreso parece equiparar los partidos del Mundial y de la
Selección a un servicio público.
28.
MIRANDO HACIA ADELANTE EN LA RENEGOCIACIÓN DE CONCESIONES;
LOOKING AHEAD ON PUBLIC SERVICE CONTRACT RENEGOTIATIONS
Feb
21, 2002 En ninguna concesión los contratos requieren que se devuelva lo ganado
honestamente.
27.
ADIOS PRESIDENTE, BIENVENIDO PRIMER MINISTRO;
GOOD BYE PRESIDENT, WELCOME PRIME MINISTER Feb 8,
2002. Un sistema
parlamentario podría generar rápidos cambios sin quiebres institucionales.
26.
EL MEJOR REMEDIO PARA LA CORTE ES EVITAR LAS PRESIONES POLITICAS;
THE BEST REMEDY FOR THE COURT IS TO AVOID POLITICAL
PRESSURES Jan 24, 2002 Con tanta
rotación de la Corte no es de extrañar que la visión de la ciudadanía no sea
muy buena.
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25.
LA DEUDA, NO
ES; IT'S NOT THE DEBT Dec 13,
2001 Las propuestas tienen que ser consistentes con la capacidad de cambiar
expectativas de los acreedores.
24.
LA DESREGULACIÓN ALIVIA A LA RECESIÓN;
DEREGULATION AND RECESSION Nov 29,
2001 La desregulación en la recesión crea
nuevos negocios y libera la imaginación empresaria.
23.
HACIA UN FEDERALISMO COMPETITIVO Y COOPERATIVO; TOWARDS A
COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM Nov 15,
2001 Deben introducirse normas para que los legisladores sean electos en forma
directa.
22.
El crecimiento requiere cambios
institucionales; GROWTH REQUIRES INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES Oct 31,
2001
21.
LOS PREMIOS NOBEL Y LA REGULACIÓN PROVINCIAL; NOBEL
PRIZES AND PROVINCIAL REGULATION Oct 19, 2001 La Nación debe cambiar la forma de regular los servicios públicos y limitar
la discrecionalidad.
20.
PRIVATIZACIONES, AGUA Y SALUD; PRIVATIZATIONS, WATER AND
HEALTH Sep 19, 2001 Las privatizaciones han tenido un impacto directo en la disminución de la
mortalidad infantil.
17.
MICROSOFT Y LA BANCARROTA DEL DINERO ELECTRÓNICO;
MICROSOFT AND THE BANKRUPTCY OF ELECTRONIC MONEY Aug 30,
2001 La Internet abierta no puede desarrollar contenidos que requieran pequeños
pagos.
16.
PROBLEMAS CON EL
CORREO; PROBLEMS WITH THE POSTAL SERVICE Aug 16,
2001 Una
experiencia en la que los diseñadores de concesiones aprenderán qué no hacer.
15.
DEFICIT CERO, SALARIOS Y BUROCRACIA; ZERO DEFICIT,
SALARIES AND BUREAUCRACY Aug 3, 2001
14.
Microsoft (ganador - si y no);
MICROSOFT (WINNER - YES AND NOT); Jul 5,
2001 El fallo le permite seguir con los desarrollos integrados, pero no evitará
juicios.
13.
La inevitable quiebra de Aerolineas; THE INEVITABLE BANKRUPTCY OF AEROLINEAS Jun 21, 2001 Tras la quiebra debería
apuntarse una política de cielosabiertos.
12.
LA VENTA DE LAPA ABRE DUDAS SOB EL ALCANCE DE LAS REGULACIONES; SALE OF LAPA OPENS DOUBTS ABOUT REGULATIONS Jun 14,
2001 Entregar las rutas de Aerolíneas en un paquete limitaría la cantidad de
ofertas, creen los expertos.
11.
EL ACTIVO DE LA AÉREA, EN MANOS DEL GOBIERNO; AIRLINES
ASSET IN GOVERNMENT'S HANDS May 31, 2001 Si la empresa quiebra con semejante deuda, es poco probable que todos los
acreedores puedan cobrar.
10.
La reducción de las legislaturas
mejorara' el incentivo electoral;
SHRINKING LEGISLATURES WILL HELP ELECTORAL INCENTIVES May
10, 2001 La eliminación de los Senados provinciales
implicará menores
gastos legislativos directos y una
importante reducción de
la sobrerepresentación.
9.
CALIFORNIA ESTÁ EN BANCARROTA ENERGÉTICA;
CALIFORNIA IS IN ENERGY BANKRUPTCY Apr 12,
2001 Nefasta consecuencia de varios meses de parálisis política.
8. JUECES O BURÓCRATAS;
JUDGES OR BUREAUCRATS Apr 10,
2001 Este es
el momento para que la Corte Suprema muestre su independencia del Poder
Ejecutivo.
7.
EL SISTEMA MULTICARRIER DEBE USARSE PARA TODAS LAS LLAMADAS;
THE MULTICARRIER SYSTEM MUST BE USED FOR ALL CALLS Mar 29,
2001 Debe instrumentarse un reglamento sencillo y en consenso con los operadores,
que debe incluir penalidades para quienes no lo respeten.
6.
Si no Cambia el Regimen Electoral la
Reforma del Estado SerÁ Insipida;
WITHOUT ELECTORAL CHANGES THE REFORM OF THE STATE WILL NOT BE Mar 15, 2001 En países presidenciales, como la Argentina o EE.UU., la burocracia tiene
dos jefes, el Ejecutivo y el Parlamento. Pero en la Argentina, el Congreso
es un Parlamento amateur.
5.
LA AGENDA DE REGULACIONES QUE DEBERA ABORDAR EL NUEVO EQUIPO
ECONOMICO; THE REGULATORY AGENDA FOR THE NEW
GOVERNMENT Mar 8 2001 Con Manuel A. Abdala
4.
LA
REGULACION PROPUESTA PARA LOS CORREOS NO SIRVE PARA EL SECTOR;
THE PROPOSED REGULATION FOR POSTAL SERVICES IS NOT USEFUL
Feb
28 2001
3.
LOS PROBLEMAS DE RENEGOCIAR SIN MARCO REGULADOR; PROBLEMS
OF RENEGOTIATING WITHOUT A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK Feb 15.
2001 Inversiones y Aumentos Tarifarios: El Trade-off
Inadecuado.
2.
LA RECETA PARTE DE UN DIAGNÓSTICO EQUIVOCADO; THE RECIPE
IS PART OF A WRONG DIAGNOSTIC Jan 10, 2001 La salida
de la crisis financiera tiene que atacar la fuente del problema, y no sus
manifestaciones.
1.
TELEFONÍA MÓVIL EL MOTOR DE LA COMPETENCIA EN
TELECOMUNICACIONES; MOBILE TELEPHONY IS THE ENGINE OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPETITION
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