

How Americans Think About Trade: Reconciling Conflicts Among Money, Power, and Principles

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Trade has again emerged as a controversial issue in America, yet we know little about the ideas that guide American thinking on these questions. By combining traditional survey methods with experimental manipulation of problem content, this study explores the ideational landscape among elite Americans and pays particular attention to how elite Americans combine their ideas about commerce with their ideas about national security and social justice. We find that most American leaders think like intuitive neoclassical economists and that only a minority think along intuitive neorealist or Rawlsian lines. Among the mass public, in contrast, a majority make judgments like intuitive neorealists and intuitive Rawlsians. Although elite respondents see international institutions as promising vehicles in principle, in practice they favor exploiting America's advantage in bilateral bargaining power over granting authority to the World Trade Organization. The distribution of these ideas in America is not arrayed neatly along traditional ideological divisions. To understand the ideational landscape, it is necessary to identify how distinctive mental models—mercantilist, neorealist, egalitarian, and neoclassical economic—sensitize or desensitize people to particular aspects of geopolitical problems, an approach we call cognitive interactionism.

Ideas shape foreign policy. This notion has been at the center of traditional theories of foreign policy where concepts like value dispositions, motivations, and perceptions have figured prominently (Jervis, 1976; Cottam, 1977; Vertzberger, 1990; Herrmann and Fischerkeller, 1995). It also has more recently become an explanatory theme in international political economy (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993). For instance, when explaining the design and operation of a trading system, Robert Keohane (1984) gives substantial weight to the ideas advanced by the system's hegemon. Robert Gilpin, who in general explains the openness of trade regimes by referring to structural factors, nevertheless also devotes substantial attention to competing liberal and nationalist ideologies of political economy. In fact, Gilpin concludes that the "tension between these two fundamentally different ways of ordering human relationships has profoundly shaped the course of modern history and constitutes the crucial problem in the study of political economy" (Gilpin, 1987:10).

Given the interest in ideas and especially the ideas guiding potential hegemons, it is surprising how few studies focus on the ideas that Americans bring to questions of international political economy in general and trade issues in particular. More than thirty-five years ago Raymond Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and

Lewis Anthony Dexter (1963) conducted national surveys of the general public and business community and found that ideas favoring free trade were taking hold but that more protectionist notions were still strong among the general public. Subsequent studies of public opinion have consistently recorded mass and elite attitudes about trade but have not addressed how these attitudes are related to broader belief systems (Rielly, 1991:26–30, 1995:28–32, 1999:18–22; Kull, 2000). During the Cold War attitudes about trade did not associate closely with the broad fault lines in elite opinion that characterized the ideational landscape pertaining to foreign policy. For instance, attitudes about trade did not associate strongly with fundamental attitudinal dimensions like militant and cooperative internationalism (Wittkopf, 1990:90–91, 104–105; Holsti, 1996:108–110).

As we enter the twenty-first century, there are several reasons to reexamine the ideas that guide American trade policy. First, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, trade policy has become a prominent issue in political campaigns. Politicians have not been able, and many are not even inclined, to insulate themselves from populist anxieties. Ross Perot's protectionist metaphor—"the giant sucking sound of American jobs going south"—is only the most obvious example. Second, trade policy has resurfaced as a sharply contested issue in Congress as it had been earlier in the century (Nivola, 1997). In turn, Congress has weakened some of the institutional practices that enshrined free-trade ideas, leading some observers to worry that Washington's ability to sustain free-trade practices may be in jeopardy (Destler, 1995). Finally, international institutions that promote trade, like the World Trade Organization (WTO), have become the target of public protest. These protests have revealed that debates about trade produce diverse political coalitions that cut across partisan lines and are not well understood in traditional ideological terms. Some Republicans align with some Democrats to argue in favor of global economic engagement, while other Republicans and Democrats find themselves aligned with each other complaining about the costs of globalization in terms of the environment, labor standards, and democracy.

To study ideas about trade we employ a three-step strategy. First, we identify several possible mental models that might capture the way Americans think about trade policy. These alternative mental models might be thought of as schemata that play the role of intuitive heuristics guiding decision-making. The potential mindsets we search for begin with the neoclassical liberal economic standard and include, in addition, both a model that gives priority to ideas about national security and is consistent with mercantilist beliefs and a model that integrates into the trade policy calculation consideration of normative beliefs about distributive justice. We also introduce a model that features international institutions as coordinating bodies that facilitate market operation but compete with the national prerogatives central to a mercantilist mindset.

The second step of our strategy is to report the results of a survey of 514 American leaders drawn from a list compiled by Ole Holsti and James Rosenau (1984, 1993) of leaders in government, business, the military, and other professional realms.¹ Interviews began with questions designed to assess beliefs in classic liberal economics and free markets as opposed to beliefs in state-managed economies and mercantilism. We also asked questions to identify other dispositions often hypothesized to be relevant in foreign policy decision-making, includ-

¹ A random sample of 1,502 names was drawn from the larger list of 4,000 names. From this sample an activated pool of 1,097 cases was created. Letters were sent to these potential interviewees outlining the details of the survey, encouraging their participation, and informing them that they would be contacted shortly. Phone numbers were drawn from the sampling pool of 1,097 names and interviews conducted between June and September 1997. The survey had an overall response rate of 59.4%. When potential respondents were reached in person (i.e., not a spouse or secretary), the response rate was higher—74.1%. An interview on average lasted 30 minutes.

ing: (1) liberalism–conservatism, (2) attitudes toward internationalism and isolationism, and (3) preferences for cooperative and accommodative as opposed to assertive and militant policies. Following these questions assessing dispositions, we asked a series of questions connected to four experiments that we embedded in the survey.

The third step in our strategy is to report on the experiments we designed to reveal how Americans resolve potential conflicts between the wealth-maximizing objectives of neoclassical economic approaches and other goals such as national security and distributive justice. Our first two experiments assess the degree to which Americans are more aptly characterized as intuitive neorealists than intuitive economists and to what degree their preference for relative over absolute gains increases in response to the geopolitical cues that neorealists have claimed are critical in this regard. Our third experiment explores how normative ideas about distributive justice interact with or even overwhelm economic reasoning. In particular, we examine the degree to which support for trade depends on whether the benefits of trade are seen as flowing mostly to the rich or mostly to the poor, a theme that has become central in protests against the World Trade Organization and corporations involved in trade.

To examine how concerns about both national security and distributive justice affect the domestic political environment in which elite Americans must operate, we also ran these three experiments in a survey of the general public.²

In the survey of elite Americans, we ran a fourth experiment that explored perceptions of the WTO. Here the question is the openness of Americans to ceding national sovereignty to transnational institutions that enforce rules and adjudicate disputes in the impartial efficiency-promoting manner that liberal institutionalists deem essential for trade to flourish. The alternative is that Americans combine ideas about international trade with intuitive-realist assumptions about environmental anarchy and discount the role the WTO plays, preferring self-help strategies that take advantage of superior U.S. bargaining power in bilateral relationships. When we conducted the surveys, the WTO had not received much public attention, and we felt the general public would not be familiar with it. Consequently, we did not run this experiment in the mass survey.

In the next section we discuss the theoretical questions we explore and identify the items we used to assess mental models and value orientations. Our focus is on how the elite Americans combine ideas about economics with ideas about politics, looking at mass opinion only as a domestic consideration potentially constraining elite choice. In “Four Experiments” we present the design of each experiment and the basic results. The following section concentrates on the dif-

² This survey was conducted between April and June 1996. It consisted of a representative mass sample of 1,511 English-speaking U.S. adults living in private households. Households were selected for inclusion using a random-digit dialing procedure whereby random numbers were paired with known telephone area codes and prefixes. As a result, both listed and unlisted telephone numbers were included in the sampling frame. Within selected households, the adult resident with the most recent birthday was chosen to participate. The survey had an overall response rate of 56%. The demographics of our mass sample are roughly similar to U.S. census demographics. Compared to our elite sample, the mass sample was less educated, less wealthy, and younger. 93.5% of the elite sample have college degrees, 78% have master’s degrees, 45.8% have Ph.D.s or professional degrees. In the mass sample, 31.3% graduated from college and only 11.9% did graduate work. 82.7% in the elite had income in excess of \$50,000, 54% more than \$100,000, and 31.8% more than \$150,000 per year. Among the mass, 37.2% earned more than \$50,000 and only 9.9% earned more than \$90,000 per year. The average age in the mass sample was 45 and in the elite sample 60 years.

	<i>Gender</i>		<i>Race</i>			<i>Age</i>				<i>Education</i>			
	<i>M</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>White</i>	<i>Black</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>18–29</i>	<i>30–44</i>	<i>45–59</i>	<i>60+</i>	<i>NotHS</i>	<i>HSGrd</i>	<i>Coll.</i>	<i>CollGrd</i>
U.S. Census	52	48	75.2	11.1	13.7	22.0	32.7	22.9	22.4	19.1	34.4	24.4	22.2
Our Sample	52	48	75.8	7.7	16.5	17.2	35.4	25.9	21.4	9.4	29.5	29.7	31.3

ferences among Americans examining broad differences between elites and the general public, and, in more detail, how different types of elite Americans think about trade in different types of geopolitical circumstances. Our final section provides an overview of the ideational landscape we have explored in the United States and teases out the theoretical and political implications of the study.

Studying How Americans Think About Trade: Theory and Method

One traditional way of measuring dispositional beliefs is to compose questions that are context-neutral and to probe beliefs that are independent of any specific situation. We also start with dispositions, but following this we put ideas into context and ask how Americans combine ideas about trade with more general ideas about world politics. To identify circumstances in which economic and political ideas are likely to be combined in important ways, we rely on several prominent theoretical perspectives on international relations.

Dispositions as a Place to Start

At a basic level, it is useful to differentiate between two ideal-type orientations toward trade. The first, which we designate as the intuitive economist, assumes that free trade in the global market is the surest path to prosperity. It is consistent with neoclassical economic theory and the view that prosperity is best achieved when individual actors pursue absolute gains by exploiting patterns of comparative advantage and responding rapidly to market signals and price mechanisms (Gilpin, 1987:27–28). Constraints on trade—regulatory policies, tariffs, and the like—may be grudgingly accepted when a persuasive case for externalities can be made, but are generally viewed with deep suspicion (Lindblom, 1977). The second ideal type, which we designate as mercantilist, places priority on insulating the national market from international competitors via various forms of protectionism. It is consistent with theories that emphasize the pivotal role of the state in managing the acquisition of national power through the promotion of industries seen as strategic and the mobilization and employment of labor (Gilpin, 1987:31–34).

There are no standard instruments for measuring preferences for these ideal-type orientations. Previous studies have used questions about tariffs and the protection of jobs (Sampson and Smith, 1957; Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, 1963; Wittkopf, 1990; Rielly, 1991, 1995). Marketing studies have concentrated on economic nationalism, including preferences for products made in the United States (Bilkey and Nes, 1982; Hooley, Shipley, and Krieger, 1988; Baughn and Yaprak, 1993, 1996; Sharma, Shimp, and Shin, 1995). In our survey of leaders we replicated questions drawn from several of these previous studies (see Table 1).

We also asked a question designed to tap perceived self-interest in open trade. It read, “If other countries are allowed to sell their goods in the U.S. without restrictions, do you think your family’s well-being will be affected positively, be affected negatively, or not be affected?” We included this question because several theories of foreign policy conceive of the political process as comprising coalitions the members of which are defined largely by their economic interests. Our sample is too small to include sufficient variation and representation across economic sectors, firms, or regions. To compensate for this limitation, we asked participants directly about their perceived self-interest. The correlation between this question and the other questions measuring general trade dispositions was sufficient—by standard scale construction criteria—to justify including it in our measure of trade disposition. All of the questions we used in this regard are presented in Table 1. A confirmatory factor analysis, with RMSEA < .10, indicates the items are indeed tapping a single underlying latent factor.

TABLE 1. Questions Composing the Dispositional Trade Orientation Scale with Distribution of Responses¹

	<i>Str Agr</i>	<i>Agr</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Disagr</i>	<i>Str Disagr</i>	<i>N^a</i>
Questions asked to create the Trade Disposition Scale:						
1. "One good way to promote prosperity for Americans is to remove all trade barriers between countries."	6.9%	39.9%	20.2%	27.9%	5.1%	509
2. "We should do more to limit immigration in order to give U.S. workers more jobs."	4.7	17.5	16.9	52.3	8.6	509
3. "Curbs should be put on all imports."	.4	3.0	5.7	58.7	32.2	506
4. "Americans should always buy American-made products instead of imports."	2.1	8.2	8.4	60.2	21.1	513
	<i>Positively</i>		<i>Negatively</i>		<i>Not Affected</i>	<i>N</i>
5. "If other countries are allowed to sell their goods in the U.S. without restrictions, do you think your family's well-being will be affected."	32.4%		19.0%		48.6%	494

^aKey: Str Agr (Strongly Agree), Agr (Agree), Neutral (Feel Neutral), Disagr (Disagree), Str Disagr (Strongly Disagree).
¹Cronback Alpha for scale = .65. Confirmatory factor analysis (RMSEA < .10) indicated that the items tapped a single underlying latent factor despite the low Alpha.

To start the investigation of how ideas regarding trade are combined with political ideas, we replicated measures of three political beliefs: (1) the scope of world activities seen as relevant to the United States by observers, running from internationalists to isolationists (Wittkopf, 1990:7–9); (2) beliefs about the methods that America should use in foreign policy, running from militant and assertive strategies to more accommodative and cooperative ones (Wittkopf, 1990:23–25; Holsti, 1996:49–50, 110–111); and (3) domestic ideological beliefs, running from liberal to conservative (in the late-twentieth-century sense of those terms). Because the labels for these dispositions can mean different things to different people, we measured beliefs with a series of questions and constructed reliable and unidimensional scales for each.³

³ The distribution of responses on three of our four scales (free-trader–mercantilist, internationalist–isolationist, and assertive–cooperative) closely resembles a normal curve. The ideology scale was distributed bimodally, and more participants classified themselves as either conservative or liberal than as moderate.

We measured *Liberalism–Conservatism* with two questions: (1) "Generally speaking, would you consider yourself to be a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't you thought much about this?" (2) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an independent or what?" Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the items tap a single underlying latent factor (RMSEA < .10).

We measured *Internationalism–Isolationism* with five questions: (1) "America needs to cooperate more with the United Nations in settling international disputes." (2) "It is essential for the United States to work with other nations to solve problems, such as overpopulation, hunger, and pollution." (3) "The U.S. needs to play an active role in solving conflicts around the world." (4) "The U.S. government should just try to take care of the well-being of Americans and not get involved with other nations." (5) "The U.S. should provide less economic aid to other countries." Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the items tap a single underlying latent factor (RMSEA < .10).

We measured *Militant Assertiveness–Accommodative Cooperativeness* with six questions: (1) "Generally, the more influence America has on other nations, the better off they are." (2) "The best way to ensure world peace is through American military strength." (3) "The use of military force only makes problems worse." (4) "Rather than simply reacting to our enemies, it's better for us to strike first." (5) "Despite all the talk about a new world order, military strength and the will to use it is still the best measure of a country's greatness." (6) "The United States could learn a lot by following the example of other countries." Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that the items tap a single underlying latent factor (RMSEA < .10).

We found statistically significant associations between more specific dispositions toward trade and broader foreign policy orientations (although the associations were less than overwhelming, never explaining more than 7% of the variance). Mercantilists were generally more assertive and more isolationist.⁴ This makes sense given the recurring theme of nationalism in all three beliefs. It also is not surprising that free-traders tend to be cooperative internationalists given how closely ideas about global interdependence and gain through cooperation are connected to trade. We did not find a significant association between liberal and conservative identities and general trade dispositions. This runs counter to the notion that domestic ideology guides thinking about foreign policy (Russett and Hanson, 1975; Holsti, 1996:131–156; Murray, 1996), but it is consistent with the complex coalitions in Congress that form around trade questions and criss-cross traditional party and ideological lines.

The shifting composition of political coalitions highlight some of the limitations inherent in studying ideas about trade from a dispositional perspective alone. For instance, the dispositions are treated as inclinations that do not vary across situations, even though we know coalitions on these political questions are quite fluid. Also, there is no focus on the process by which economic and political ideas are integrated. The implicit assumption is that someone who believes in free trade also believes in cooperative internationalism and that someone guided by mercantilism is a militant internationalist. But what if someone believes in free trade and also worries intensely about national security? How does one resolve the tension between different ideas, and under what conditions will political priorities take precedence over economic rationales and vice versa? Do some conditions lead even free-traders to favor protectionist policies? Moreover, do specific situational factors incline all American leaders to give priority to political ideas, or do certain factors move some Americans in these directions but not others? These questions about process, integration, and interaction in specific situations seem closer to the key questions raised in political economy. These are the questions we designed our experiments to address.

How Might Political and Economic Ideas Combine? Existing Theories

Rather than concentrating on different dispositions, several prominent theories of international relations concentrate on the effect of environmental factors. Neorealists, for instance, argue that whatever dispositions may guide governments, security is a pervasive concern that directs attention to potential external threats. Given the inevitable uncertainty about the future intentions of other states, neorealists assume governments recognize that today's ally could be tomorrow's adversary and attend carefully to relative power, behaving as defensive positionalists (Waltz, 1979:102–128). This neorealist expectation, as expressed by Joseph Grieco, is that "a state will decline to join, will leave, or will sharply limit its commitment to a cooperative arrangement if it believes that gaps in gains will substantially favor partners" (Grieco, 1990:44). The relative-gain mentality of national security will thus edge out the absolute-gain mentality of the market.

In addition, some neorealists expect this preference for relative gains to be especially pronounced when governments deal with states that fit decision-makers' "enemy images" (Snidal, 1991a). Ally images, by contrast, are thought to work against the perception that today's partner might be a serious threat tomorrow and thus promote the pursuit of absolute gains (Powell, 1991; Snidal, 1991b; Matthews, 1996). Great asymmetries in existing power and wealth work in a related way, especially if today's partner is so much weaker or so much stronger that any gains from a contemporary trading relationship could not alter the relative balance (Grieco, 1990:46).

⁴ For assertive, $r = -.11$, $p < .02$. For isolationist, $r = .24$, $p < .001$.

Neorealists are not the only theorists who expect ideas about political circumstances to interfere with—indeed trump—economic reasoning. Constructivists expect norms and ideas about what is just and morally obligatory to compete sometimes with strictly material economic considerations (Klotz, 1995; Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). The key questions become when and under what circumstances do normative ideas prevail or combine with economic rationales in systematic ways? Obviously, not all norms are interesting in this regard; some are complementary or even integral to rational economic reasoning; for instance, the fulfillment of contracts. Some norms, however, do not so easily fit with free-market economic reasoning. Robert Gilpin (1987:63), for instance, has argued that norms associated with the defense of the welfare state have been major motives behind mercantilism.

One influential theory of distributive justice, which relates to conceptions of the welfare state, is that developed by John Rawls. In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls advances the “difference principle” that directs decision-makers: to arrange “social and economic inequalities . . . so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls, 1971:83; see also 100–108). In this theory, the single-minded neoclassical-economic pursuit of absolute gains must be qualified by ideas about how the gains should be distributed between the rich and poor. We can imagine Rawlsian principles being applied in an ethnocentric way, giving preference only to the poor in one homeland or in a cosmopolitan way favoring the poor across the global market.

Beyond ideas about national security and social justice, ideas about international institutions also may play a prominent role in shaping American thinking about trade. The question here is not whether ideas about institutions take precedence over economic reasoning. Institutions are essential in the functioning of modern markets. Institutions can promote market efficiency by providing information, regularizing procedures, enforcing contracts, adjudicating disputes, and reducing uncertainty. They can also help states to overcome security dilemmas by producing confidence that norms will be respected.

However, for institutions like the World Trade Organization to have these beneficent effects, they must have some authority to rein in sovereign governments that violate rules of international commerce. The key policy question becomes the nature of the WTO’s authority vis-à-vis state sovereignty, and, in particular, how disputes between national court systems and the WTO should be resolved. Liberal institutionalists might hope that Americans would combine their ideas about international institutions and market operations in ways that overcome nationalist and mercantilist inclinations (Keohane, 1989; Keohane and Martin, 1995). Neorealists, by contrast, might combine ideas about trade with conceptions of an anarchic system of self-interested states in which neither the WTO nor other institutions make much difference and in which self-help strategies depending on advantages in national capabilities, not international institutions, make the most sense (Mearsheimer, 1994/1995). In the first case, Americans would defer to the WTO; in the second they would take advantage of the United States’ superior power position and act more unilaterally.

Four Experiments

To explore how Americans combine ideas about economics and politics, we embedded three experiments in our surveys of the mass public and the elite.⁵

⁵ The instrument began with a series of items measuring dispositions and then included 13 experiments on a variety of foreign policy topics. It closed with a series of social and demographic questions. We randomized the order in which the experimental questions were asked.

The first two experiments manipulate situational features that neorealists contend are prominent in geostrategic thinking. These experiments do not test neorealism, rather they reveal whether Americans think as intuitive neorealists or as intuitive economists and under what conditions they lean in one or the other direction.

The third experiment investigates the role of normative ideas. It examines the possibility that Americans think as if they were intuitive Rawlsians, granting substantial weight in trade policy decisions to the distribution of gain between the rich and poor.

We also embedded a fourth experiment in our elite survey. It was designed to examine whether American leaders combine ideas about international institutions with ideas about how institutions promote market efficiency, thus supporting the authority of the WTO, or whether Americans combine ideas about international institutions with ideas about environmental anarchy and the appropriateness of self-help strategies.

The Security Experiments

(A) *Design and theory:* The first, or relative-gains, experiment invoked a trade partner in the abstract. This allowed experimental manipulation of the features that are attributed to that partner—such as whether it was an adversary or ally, and whether it was weak or strong. The second experiment introduced actual country names: England, India, and Japan. This gave us the advantage of making the context more directly relevant to policy but cost a degree of control over the specific geopolitical features that respondents might spontaneously attribute to these trade partners.

The relative-gains experiment created a hypothetical trading relationship between the United States and another, unspecified country and then manipulated three aspects of the trading relationship to which intuitive neorealists should be responsive: (1) the distribution of gains; (2) the ease with which the trade partner might become an ally or enemy; and (3) the relative wealth of the trade partner. Using a factorial design, we produced twelve variants of the hypothetical trade relationship. Every version began by asking the participant to imagine that “the United States does a lot of business with a country that [is a proven ally] of the United States.” In half the cases the phrase “is a proven ally” was replaced by the phrase “could easily become an enemy.” The scenario then continued, “This country is ‘wealthy, with an advanced economy’ or [for half of the sample] ‘poor, with a backward economy.’” The scenario concluded by saying, “From this trade, the United States makes ten billion dollars a year and the other country makes ten billion dollars,” or “From this trade the United States makes ten billion dollars a year and the other country makes one billion, only one-tenth of what the U.S. makes,” or “From this trade the United States makes only one billion dollars a year and the other country makes ten billion dollars.” All participants were randomly assigned to one of the resulting twelve versions of the scenario. After hearing the scenario, all were asked: “Do you think it is in America’s interest to restrict trade with this country?” and “Do you feel very strongly about this, or not very strongly?”⁶

Because participants were randomly assigned to the experimental conditions, preexisting ideological and dispositional variation should be relatively evenly distributed across all conditions. As a result, we can attribute significant differences in average responses between conditions to the independent variables

⁶ By combining responses to these two questions, we constructed a 5-point scale that arrayed answers from “very strongly restrict trade” to “very strongly do not restrict trade,” with those in the middle having been undecided or indifferent to the first question of restricting or not restricting trade.

manipulated in the hypothetical scenario; that is, to the factors intuitive neorealists should weigh heavily and intuitive economists should weigh lightly.

To explore further how security concerns interact with neoclassical economic ideas, our second experiment concentrated on real countries that historically had been allies or enemies of the United States and zeroed in on the importance Americans attached to conformity with free-market practices. We did this with a 3×3 factorial design that manipulated whether the trade partner was England, India, or Japan and whether it was moving toward greater compliance with free-market practices or imposing new political obstacles to trade. The scenario began, "Now, let's talk about one of our important trading partners, [Japan] or [England] or [India]." It then continued, "For a long time it's been hard to sell U.S. goods there [because of regulations, but they have recently dropped some of these restrictions] or [because of regulations, and they have just added more] or [because they have equally good products made elsewhere that they like better]. Each participant was randomly assigned to one version of the story. All participants, after hearing the basic scenario, were asked, "Should we make it harder for them to sell goods here or leave things the way they are?" If a respondent said we should make it harder, then we followed up with the question, "How much harder—somewhat difficult, extremely difficult, or impossible?"

In this experiment, intuitive neorealists should allow the identity of the trade partner to affect their choice about trade policy whereas intuitive economists should pay greater attention to trends in compliance with free-trade practices. We know from marketing studies that the origin of products affects both their popularity and their price and that Americans are particularly sensitive to products from Japan (Bilkey and Nes, 1982; Hooley, Shipley, and Krieger, 1988; Baughn and Yaprak, 1993). There are at least four reasons Americans might discriminate against Japan:

1. They believe Japan was once a powerful enemy and could become one again and thus allow the intuitive-neorealist mindset to structure their thinking. This should be evident in discrimination against Japan that disappears in relations with England and India.
2. They may feel threatened by Japan's distinctive culture, ideas that are again compatible with intuitive neorealism or Samuel Huntington's (1996) clash of civilizations argument which we see as consistent with neorealism, albeit with larger unit actors and the auxiliary assumption that cultural and racial differences contribute to distrust. If this is the case, we should see discrimination against India as well as Japan.
3. They may see Japanese firms as competitors to U.S. firms. In this case, Americans may fear that Japanese economic success threatens jobs in the United States. India's inexpensive labor could also be seen as a threat to U.S. jobs. If U.S. discrimination against Japan derives from a concern about jobs, then we ought to see some evidence of similar concern vis-à-vis India.
4. Americans might believe that Japan does not abide by free-trade practices, and thus they discriminate against Tokyo on grounds quite compatible with an intuitive-economist mindset (with an auxiliary assumption that tit-for-tat promotes trade liberalization). We examine this possibility by explicitly manipulating the "true reasons" for the trade imbalance presented to respondents—consumer preferences versus government regulation. Intuitive economists should respect as a legitimate reason for not buying U.S. goods the principle of consumer sovereignty and the availability of goods that people like better. Intuitive economists should not retaliate by imposing restrictive policies when U.S. goods fail to sell for this reason.

(B) *Results:* Table 2 presents the results of the security experiments, arrayed in several ways. It presents the percentage of elites who decide to restrict trade or stick with open-market practices when we manipulated the situational factors to which intuitive neorealists should be sensitive. Table 2 also presents two measures of the statistical significance of the difference in policy choices. We provide both chi-square (for frequency data) and an analysis of variance, ANOVA (for continuous rating scales) in this regard for each situational factor. The results suggest that many elite Americans do pay attention to relative gains and to whether a trade partner is an ally or enemy. When the trade partner is Japan there also is a significant increase in decisions to restrict trade. Although we find significant evidence that some elite Americans make choices as if they were intuitive neorealists, the majority do not. Even in our strongest manipulations of neorealist factors, a clear majority of elites choose open trade policies.

When the gains from trade are equal, the vast majority (82.4%) of our elite American participants saw no reason to restrict trade (see Table 2, row 1a). When the distribution of gains favors the trade partner, however, support for free trade drops significantly (almost 14 percentage points). This does not appear to be related simply to norms about fairness. When trade favors the United States, the vast majority (81%) favor free trade.⁷ There is a clear neorealist effect, but it is important to point out that even in the condition of a ten-to-one relative loss, more than two-thirds of elite Americans still pursue absolute gains and choose free trade.

A similar pattern is evident when the trade partner could easily become an enemy. In that case, opposition to restricting trade drops by nearly 15 percentage points but remains high at 70.8 percent (see Table 2, row 1b1). There also was a significant interaction between the distribution of gains and whether the partner was an enemy or ally—in a direction consistent with defensive positionalism. When gains were distributed equally or in the United States' favor, Americans were more likely to favor restrictive trade policy with a potential adversary than with a proven ally.⁸ When the distribution of gains favored the trade partner, Americans were as likely to favor restricting trade with a proven ally as they were with a potential enemy.⁹

American leaders were substantially more likely to favor restrictions against Japan than against either England or India (see Table 2, row 1b2). Around 80 percent of our participants opposed restricting trade with England or India, while only 57.6 percent felt this way toward Japan. There was little difference in the way either England or India was treated, suggesting that neither racial differences nor perceived variations in the competitive threat posed by inexpensive labor led to the sort of discrimination that was targeted at Japan. These results are consistent with John Rielly's (1999:20) finding that U.S. elite perceptions of Japan as an economic threat have decreased across the 1990s from 63 percent in 1990 to only 14 percent in 1998. Just the same, of all our manipulations, identifying Japan as the trade partner evoked the greatest support for restricting trade, exceeding 40 percent of the elite when averaged across the various conditions. We cannot decisively prove that these attitudes toward Japan derive from the relative ease with which elite Americans can imagine Japan as a future potential geostrategic enemy, but it strikes us as a plausible explanation.

In an extreme case of neorealist thinking, we could imagine Americans restricting trade with Japan while Japan was reducing regulations and not restricting

⁷ There is no statistical difference in the opposition to restricting trade when the gains are equal or favor the United States ten-to-one, $F(1,338) = .06$, $p = .81$.

⁸ When gains were equal, $F(1,178) = 15.56$, $p < .001$. When gains favored the United States, $F(1,154) = 3.10$, $p = .08$.

⁹ $F(1,153) = 2.06$, $p = .15$.

TABLE 2. Impact of Situational Factors on Elite Trade Policy Choices in Four Experiments

	<i>Percent of Subjects Responding (n)</i>			<i>Pearson Chi-Square</i>	<i>ANOVA</i>
	<i>Do Not Restrict</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Restrict</i>		
1. Security Experiments					
a. Relative distribution of gains					
Equal gains	82.4% (150)	6.0% (11)	11.5% (21)	$\chi^2 = 17.37, p < .005$	F(2,485) = 7.64, p < .001
Relative gain for U.S.	81.0% (128)	9.5% (15)	9.5% (15)		
Relative loss for U.S.	68.8% (108)	7.0% (11)	24.4% (38)		
b. Perceptions of trade partner					
1. Ally					
Enemy	85.0% (204)	6.3% (15)	8.8% (21)	$\chi^2 = 15.85, p < .001$	F(1,487) = 15.87, p < .001
Enemy	70.8% (182)	8.6% (22)	20.6% (53)		
2. Japan					
England	57.6% (99)		42.4% (73)	$\chi^2 = 30.63, p < .001$	F(2,481) = 16.93, p = .001
India	79.6% (129)		20.4% (33)		
India	82.1% (128)		17.9% (28)		
c. Status of trade partner					
Wealthy					
Poor	77.1% (195)	7.5% (19)	15.4% (39)	$\chi^2 = .12, p = .941$	F(1,487) = .003, p = .956
Poor	78.3% (191)	7.4% (18)	14.3% (35)		
d. Compliance with free-trade practices					
Regulations dropped	88.6% (147)		11.4% (19)	$\chi^2 = 84.53, p < .001$	F(2,481) = 38.08, p < .001
Regulations added	47.0% (78)		53.0% (88)		
Prefer other goods	82.9% (131)		17.1% (27)		
2. Distributive Justice Experiment					
a. Distribution of gains					
Wealthy in both					
Poor in U.S., wealthy in other	77.8% (98)	7.9% (10)	14.3% (18)	$\chi^2 = 25.04, p < .001$	F(2,492) = 10.10, p < .001
Poor in other, wealthy in U.S.	80.8% (101)	2.4% (3)	16.8% (21)		
Poor in both	90.8% (119)	1.5% (2)	7.6% (10)		
Poor in both	93.3% (111)	4.2% (5)	2.5% (3)		
b. Poverty in trade partner					
Worse than in U.S.					
About the same	86.4% (140)	4.3% (7)	9.3% (15)	$\chi^2 = 5.19, p = .268$	F(2,492) = 0.43, p = .654
Less severe than in U.S.	86.7% (156)	1.7% (3)	11.7% (21)		
Less severe than in U.S.	83.6% (133)	6.3% (10)	10.1% (16)		
3. Institutions Experiment (WTO)					
a. Framing of issue					
No frame					
Law frame	<i>Country to Country</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>WTO</i>	$\chi^2 = .71, p = .950$	F(2,495) = 0.084, p = .920
Power frame	66.1% (117)	4.5% (8)	29.4% (52)		
Power frame	65.1% (108)	3.6% (6)	31.3% (52)		
Power frame	66.5% (103)	5.2% (8)	28.4% (44)		

trade with England even though England was adding new regulations making it still harder for the United States to sell goods there. This was not the case, however, in our experiment. There was no significant interaction between the identity of the trade partner and our manipulation of compliance with free-market principles. This suggests that support for restricting trade with Japan could derive from perceptions that Japan does not abide by free-trade practices and is not simply a product of neorealist security concerns. When we manipulated noncompliance with free-trade practices directly, by telling our participants that a country had increased its regulations, more than half of our respondents restricted trade (see Table 2, row 1d). When countries were reducing regulations and abiding by open-market practices, in contrast, 89 percent opposed restricting trade, while 83 percent also respected the principle of consumer sovereignty if trade partners preferred other goods.

In our elite sample, the overall support for free trade is high enough that even as political considerations impinge, majority support for open trade remains. This is not true among the general public. Table 3 presents the results of the security experiments in our mass sample. Among the mass public, the support for free trade is less to start with and the effect of neorealist concerns is greater. When relative gains were distributed in favor of the United States only 64 percent of the mass public supported open trade, in contrast to 82.4 percent of the elite (see Table 3, row 1a). When the relative gains favored the trade partner, this support dropped by 26 points (compared to the 14-point decline among the elite), resulting in only 38 percent supporting free trade. The majority favored restrictions. Perceptions of the trade partner as an enemy also had effects consistent with the proposition that thinking among the general public is intuitively neorealist (Table 3, row 1b1). The status of the trade partner as wealthy and strong, which did not affect elite thinking, did affect mass thinking to some extent in the direction expected if people were intuitive neorealists (Table 3, row 1c).

Japan received tougher treatment from the mass sample than from the elite sample. Again, the evident discrimination can be explained both by possible security concerns and by possible perceptions that Japan does not abide by free-trade practices. More than 60 percent of the mass sample favor restricting trade with Japan, while a clear majority favor not restricting trade in the cases of England and India (Table 3, row 1b2). At the same time, more than two-thirds of the general public favor restricting trade when a state adds regulations while nearly this same percentage opposes restrictions when a state complies with free-market principles by either dropping regulations or exercising consumer sovereignty (Table 3, row 1d).

A larger percentage of the general public than of the elite think about trade as if they were intuitive neorealists. Fewer of them, compared to the elite, favor open trade in any case, although a clear majority does favor free trade when political considerations do not impinge. And more of them are sensitive to the factors neorealists say should affect policy calculations. Because the starting level of support for free trade among the mass public is around 60 percent, instead of the 80 percent among the elite, when people combine political concerns about national security with their thinking about trade policy, the majority in favor of free trade disappears. A clear majority in favor of trade restrictions does not always emerge, but the swing in this direction among the general public is potentially decisive politically.

The Distributive Justice Experiment

(A) *Design and theory for the Rawlsian experiment:* In the Rawlsian experiment we did not vary the relative distribution of gains between the United States and the

TABLE 3. Impact of Situational Factors on Mass Trade Policy Choices in Three Experiments

	<i>Percent of Subjects Responding (n)</i>			<i>Pearson Chi-Square</i>	<i>ANOVA</i>
	<i>Do Not Restrict</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Restrict</i>		
1. Security Experiments					
a. Relative distribution of gains					
Equal gains	64.0% (311)	10.1% (49)	25.9% (126)	$\chi^2 = 93.87, p < .001$	F(2,1482) = 60.04, p < .001
Relative gain for U.S.	61.2% (303)	10.5% (52)	28.3% (140)		
Relative loss for U.S.	38.0% (194)	10.8% (55)	51.3% (262)		
b. Perceptions of trade partner					
1. Ally					
Ally	61.7% (446)	8.9% (64)	29.5% (213)	$\chi^2 = 32.08, p < .001$	F(1,1482) = 43.64, p < .001
Enemy	47.1% (362)	12.0% (92)	41.0% (315)		
2. Japan					
England	38.4% (186)		61.6% (298)	$\chi^2 = 56.15, p < .001$	F(1,1409) = 31.01, p < .001
India	60.3% (295)		39.7% (194)		
c. Status of trade partner					
Wealthy	50.3% (365)	10.6% (77)	39.0% (283)	$\chi^2 = 9.12, p < .01$	F(1,1482) = 8.33, p < .001
Poor	57.8% (443)	10.3% (79)	31.9% (245)		
d. Compliance with free-trade practices					
Regulations dropped	62.2% (280)		37.8% (170)	$\chi^2 = 105.02, p < .001$	F(2,1409) = 54.80, p < .001
Regulations added	32.5% (148)		67.5% (308)		
Prefer other goods	60.9% (312)		39.1% (200)		
2. Norms Experiments					
a. Distribution of gains					
Wealthy in both	46.5% (181)	7.7% (30)	45.8% (178)	$\chi^2 = 106.66, p < .001$	F(2,1487) = 43.35, p < .001
Poor in U.S., wealthy in other	47.1% (185)	9.2% (36)	43.8% (172)		
Poor in other, wealthy in U.S.	65.4% (223)	10.0% (34)	24.6% (84)		
Poor in both	74.8% (279)	7.8% (29)	17.4% (65)		
b. Poverty in trade partner					
Worse than in U.S.	54.2% (260)	10.2% (49)	35.6% (171)	$\chi^2 = 5.16, p = .272$	F(2,1487) = 0.88, p = .414
About the same	60.2% (311)	8.1% (42)	31.7% (164)		
Less severe than in U.S.	59.5% (297)	7.6% (38)	32.9% (164)		

trade partner. Rather, we varied who inside the United States, the wealthy or the poor, and who inside the other country, the wealthy or the poor, benefited. Thus, the scenario described the benefits of a trading relationship as flowing to the rich in the United States and to the poor in the trade partner, to the rich in both countries, to the poor in the United States and to the rich in the trade partner, or to the poor in both countries.¹⁰ Our intent was to gauge to what degree Americans favored the poor and, insofar as they did, whether they did so only for Americans or for the poor elsewhere as well. The experiment took the form of a 3×4 factorial design. The manipulated variables were: (1) the relative well-being of the potential trade partner—trade partners could be poorer than the U.S., equally well off as the U.S., or richer than the U.S.—and (2) the distribution of the gains from trade. After hearing about the trade relationship, we asked all subjects: “Do you think it is in America’s interest to restrict trade with this country?” Subjects could answer yes or no, and we followed up with a question that probed how strongly they felt about this, thus arraying responses across a 5-point scale ranging from “very strongly yes” to “very strongly no.”

If people are intuitive economists, those who learn that the United States does a lot of business with a country and that there are absolute gains from trade have good reason to support (and no reason to oppose) the trading relationship. If Americans are intuitive Rawlsians, however, they may object to the trade even if it is producing overall national gains and benefiting groups in both countries. Intuitive Rawlsians ought to favor trade arrangements only if the poor benefit and they should oppose trade that disproportionately benefits the wealthy. If nationalist conceptions of fraternity apply, then this pattern may have an ethnocentric bent: Americans should favor trade that helps the poor in the U.S. and be indifferent to the status of the beneficiaries in the other country.

(B) Results of the Rawlsian experiment: We find that Rawlsian considerations do significantly affect the choices of some elite Americans. When trade is seen as benefiting the poor, nearly everyone (93.3%) opposes trade restrictions. This support for free trade is up nearly 16 points compared to when the wealthy benefit. Even then, however, more than 75 percent of our elite participants support open trade and fewer than 15 percent take a Rawlsian position and favor restricting trade (see Table 2, row 2a). The pattern among the mass public is somewhat different. Nearly 46 percent favor restricting trade when the benefits go to the rich, and fewer than half support open trade in this situation. When the benefits of trade go to the poor, in contrast, nearly 75 percent of the general public support open trade—a swing of nearly 30 percentage points (see Table 3, row 2a). Perhaps not surprisingly, a larger percentage of the general public appear to be intuitive Rawlsians than the percentage of elite who evidence this intuitive logic.

Neither the elite nor the mass appeared to be particularly ethnocentric in applying their Rawlsian attitudes. They did not show a preference for trade that benefited poor Americans while contributing to the rich elsewhere. To the contrary, they demonstrated some preference for trade that benefited the poor elsewhere. In the elite sample, support for open trade increased by 10 percent-

¹⁰One version of the scenario read: “Imagine now that the United States does a lot of business with another country where poverty is [far worse than in the U.S.]. In the U.S. the benefits from this trade [go largely to the wealthy. In the other country the benefits from this trade also go to the wealthy].” In another version, the poverty in the other country could be either [about the same as in the U.S.] or [far less severe than in U.S.]. These other versions also included three possible distributions of gains: (1) “In the U.S. the benefits from this trade help the poor at least as much as the wealthy. In the other country the benefits from this trade also help the poor.” (2) “In the U.S. the benefits of this trade go largely to the wealthy. In the other country the benefits from this trade help the poor.” and (3) “In the U.S. the benefits from this trade help the poor at least as much as the wealthy. In the other country the benefits from this trade go to the wealthy.”

age points as trade benefited the poor abroad and the wealthy at home compared to when it benefited the poor at home and the wealthy abroad (see Table 2, row 2a).¹¹ In the mass sample support went up more than 18 points (Table 3, row 2a).¹²

The overall level of poverty in the trade partner did not matter to most Americans, elite and mass alike (see Tables 2 and 3, row 2b). They were as ready to trade with a country in which poverty was far less severe than in the United States as they were to trade with a country in which poverty was far worse than in the United States. Evidently they did not extend Rawlsian norms to relations among national actors as collective units, but to the extent they applied these norms related to distributive justice they did so at a lower level of aggregation in which the relevant units were wealthy people and poor people. If the notion of fraternity lies behind this, as Rawls suggests, it appears to apply to a transnational community that cuts across state boundaries.

The Institutions Experiment

(A) *Design and theory*: There is substantial support for free trade among the American elite, but neorealist and normative concerns can erode the consensus. This is especially true when leaders need to take account of the mass public's perspective. Liberal institutionalists argue that the establishment of international institutions is one way to overcome, or at least manage, some of the obstacles to cooperation inherent in interstate relations. Institutions, for instance, can provide information, verification, and enforcement going some distance toward minimizing the effects of security dilemmas. This, of course, typically requires that the institution can assure its members that even a powerful state cannot violate agreed-upon norms and act unilaterally to help itself to whatever it can take.

To explore in a preliminary way how American leaders think about international institutions in the realm of interstate trade, we concentrated on the World Trade Organization. In particular, we examined whether our participants thought the United States should abide by the rulings of the WTO or give precedence to U.S. sovereignty by using the superior bargaining position of the United States in bilateral talks. We did this by setting up hypothetical conflicts between the rulings of a WTO panel and the rulings of the U.S. courts and asking our participants how the United States should deal with the conflict.

Early in the survey we asked participants whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements: (1) "Free trade among nations requires international organizations that enforce agreements and adjudicate disputes." (2) "The laws of the United States should take precedence over the rulings of the World Trade Organization." We assumed if participants were thinking as intuitive neoinstitutionalists, then they should agree with the first statement and disagree with the second. Seventy-nine percent of the elite agreed with the first statement and 48.6 percent disagreed with the second. Responses consistent with an intuitive-neorealist ideal type were fewer, with 13.3 percent disagreeing with the first statement and 31.3 percent agreeing with the second. Answers to the two questions were inversely related, as we expected.¹³ We also designed an experiment to see if these generally professed beliefs held up when people were confronted by counterarguments of the sort likely to be deployed in actual political controversies.¹⁴

¹¹ $F(1,254) = 4.87, p < .03$.

¹² $F(1,732) = 33.56, p < .001$.

¹³ $r = -.32, p < .001$.

¹⁴ The idea of using survey experiments to mimic the dynamics of political debate has been advanced elsewhere (see Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, and Tetlock, 1996).

The World Trade Organization experiment explored how malleable elite attitudes were when faced with a choice that put the norms of the WTO in competition with opportunities for aggressively advancing American interests in country-to-country talks. To do this, we asked all of our respondents the same question, “Imagine that the U.S. is locked in a serious trade dispute with another country. How do you think the U.S. should resolve this dispute? Should we engage in bilateral country-to-country negotiations or abide by the ruling of a neutral panel empowered by the World Trade Organization?” We followed up with the question “How strongly do you feel about this?” allowing us to create a 5-point scale from “very strongly” for the World Trade Organization to “very strongly” for country-to-country negotiations.

Before posing this question, we framed the issue in one of three ways. The first frame was designed to encourage neoliberal-institutionalist thinking; “Just as it would be impossible to have orderly commerce in the United States without contract law and courts, many people think it would be impossible to have orderly commerce among nations without a world court that has the power to override national law.” Immediately after this preamble, we asked one-third of the elite the WTO versus country-to-country question. The second frame stimulated self-help economic thinking: “It is well known that the United States is the world’s greatest economic power. Many people think that other countries need to trade with us more than we need to trade with them and that we should take advantage of this by negotiating the most favorable terms.” Immediately after this preamble, a second third of the sample heard the WTO versus country-to-country question. The last third of the sample received no preamble framing the issue.

If neoliberal-institutionalist and neorealist beliefs are not strongly held, then framing the question should have a large effect. The legalistic frame should sway elites to choose the WTO option and the market-power frame should lead more elites toward the country-to-country choice.

(B) Results: Neither frame had a large mean effect on policy preferences (see Table 2, row 3a). Elite opinion on the basic question was roughly the same across framing manipulations. Interestingly, we found that 65.8 percent of all respondents said that the U.S. should engage in country-to-country negotiations, with 44.7 percent saying they felt strongly about it. This distribution is consistent with ideal-type neorealist thinking, of course, and runs counter to the professed commitment to neoinstitutionalist ideas tapped by our two more abstract items mentioned above. Particularly striking is the more than 65 percent of elite Americans who favored the neorealist country-to-country choice even after hearing the international-law frame. To be sure, we did find a significant association between responses to the direct items and choices in the WTO experiment, but a gap remains in this case between professed attitudes and revealed preferences.¹⁵

The results of the four experiments suggest that most elite Americans think as though they were intuitive economists and not intuitive neorealists, although when it comes to the role of the WTO their confidence in the institution is not high. At the same time, however, the geopolitical factors that intuitive neorealists stress also play a role. These findings, of course, summarize trends across all Americans. They do not tell us whether certain types of Americans are more likely to think as intuitive neorealists or intuitive Rawlsians. They also do not tell us how Americans combine ideas about specific geopolitical and normative challenges with their broader ideological dispositions. We turn to these questions next.

¹⁵ $r = -.25$, $p < .001$ between choice in Norms and Framing experiment and answer to question regarding free trade requiring International Organizations; $r = .32$, $p < .001$ between choice in Norms and Framing experiment and response to laws of United States versus WTO rulings question.

The Distribution of Ideas Across Americans: Who Shares Which Ideas?

The Ambiguous Role of Ideological Fault Lines

The most obvious difference our experiments reveal is that between elite Americans and the general public. Our results, like those of previous studies (Bauer, Pool, and Dexter, 1963; Wittkopf, 1990:159; Rielly, 1991:26, 1995:29, 1999:20), suggest the general public is less supportive of free trade than is the elite. The general public appears also to be more sensitive to political considerations of both the neorealist and Rawlsian variety. These political considerations swayed mass opinion sufficiently to turn majorities in favor of free trade into majorities that felt the other way. Steven Kull's (2000:5–22) recent study of American attitudes about globalization also finds that the general public favors free trade in principle but believes that trade benefits the rich more than the poor and that the government ought to protect American jobs. Many possible factors might explain these differences between elite and mass opinion. For example, elites are better educated, likely to be more familiar with the economic logic behind free trade, and wealthier, thus better insulated from the most frightening insecurities—like loss of employment—potentially generated by global commerce. Although these differences between elite Americans and the general public have important implications regarding the functioning of a representative democracy, we focus here primarily on differences within the elite. In particular, we try to make cognitive sense of the diverse coalitions that form among elites when trade is discussed.

It might seem reasonable to expect that the different ways in which Americans combine geopolitical and normative ideas about international trade policy would reflect broad ideological beliefs known to define key fault lines in the domestic political landscape. For example, egalitarian liberals, who have a definite set of ideas about the role of government in redistribution of wealth at home, should be more sensitive than pro-market conservatives to Rawlsian concerns in trade policy. Likewise, we might expect Americans who support a militant foreign policy to be more inclined toward neorealist choices in trade than Americans who start from an accommodative disposition. Internationalists and isolationists might also differ with regard to how they combine neorealist concerns about national security and trade issues, with internationalists more sensitive to the types of foreign partners America gets involved with and isolationists more uniformly opposed to foreign trade interdependencies.

Although it seems reasonable to expect elite Americans to combine their dispositional ideas with their more specific ideas about trade, national security, and norms, the evidence that they do so is less than overwhelming. As reported earlier (“Dispositions as a Place to Start”) the relationship between a respondent's position on our free-trade versus mercantilism scale and his or her ideas about internationalism-isolationism and assertiveness-cooperativeness is significant but not strong. The relationship between a person's liberal and conservative ideology and his or her position on the trade scale is not even significant. Moreover, the relationship between ideational dispositions and the choice people made, without taking into account the differential effects of the experimentally manipulated situational factors, was weak. For instance, across the security and distributive justice experiments there is only one significant relationship out of the nine possible between dispositions (other than the trade disposition) and trade policy choices (isolationists were more likely to restrict trade with Japan than were internationalists). (See Table 4.)

The inconsistent direct relationship between ideational dispositions and trade policy can lead to the conclusion that Americans have no coherent ideas about trade, at least none that can be picked up in a survey. We believe that this

TABLE 4. Impact of Ideological Dispositions on Trade Policy Choices in Four Experiments

	<i>Percent of Subjects Responding (n)</i>				<i>ANOVA</i>
	<i>Do Not Restrict</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>Restrict</i>	<i>Pearson Chi-Square</i>	
1. Relative Gains Experiment					
a. Ideological scale					
Liberal	75.5% (120)	8.2% (13)	16.4% (26)	$\chi^2 = 10.60, p < .05$	F(4,466) = 1.35, p = .867
Moderate	74.2% (115)	11.0% (17)	14.8% (23)		
Conservative	82.8% (130)	1.9% (3)	15.3% (24)		
b. Internationalism/Isolationism scale					
Internationalist	79.0% (128)	6.8% (11)	14.2% (23)	$\chi^2 = .56, p = .968$	F(4,491) = 0.45, p = .770
Moderate	75.9% (126)	8.4% (14)	15.7% (26)		
Isolationist	78.0% (131)	7.1% (12)	14.9% (25)		
c. Militant assertiveness					
Militarist	74.1% (117)	5.1% (8)	20.9% (33)	$\chi^2 = 8.16, p = .086$	F(4,476) = 2.28, p = .060
Moderate	80.0% (128)	6.9% (11)	13.1% (21)		
Pacifist	79.8% (130)	9.2% (15)	11.0% (18)		
d. Trade scale					
Free-Trader	88.3% (144)	4.3% (7)	7.4% (12)	$\chi^2 = 31.64, p < .001$	F(4,489) = 15.03, p < .001
Moderate	81.9% (131)	5.6% (9)	12.5% (20)		
Protectionist	63.7% (109)	11.7% (10)	24.6% (42)		
2. Japan Bashing Experiment					
a. Ideological scale					
Liberal	74.4% (116)		25.6% (40)	$\chi^2 = 3.60, p = .165$	F(4,461) = .096, p = .430
Moderate	67.9% (106)		32.1% (50)		
Conservative	77.3% (119)		22.7% (35)		
b. Internationalism/Isolationism scale					
Internationalist	78.9% (127)		21.1% (34)	$\chi^2 = 4.80, p = .091$	F(4,484) = 2.61, p = .035
Moderate	69.1% (114)		30.9% (51)		
Isolationist	69.9% (114)		30.1% (49)		
c. Militant assertiveness					
Militarist	70.8% (109)		29.2% (45)	$\chi^2 = 2.81, p = .246$	F(4,470) = 1.33, p = .258
Moderate	69.3% (113)		30.7% (50)		
Pacifist	77.2% (122)		22.8% (36)		

d. Trade scale					
Free-Trader	81.6% (133)		18.4% (30)	$\chi^2 = 15.35, p < .001$	F(4,83) = 3.99, p = .003
Moderate	73.9% (116)		26.1% (41)		
Protectionist	62.5% (105)		37.5% (63)		
3. Rawlsian Experiment					
a. Ideological scale					
Liberal	80.4% (127)	6.3% (10)	13.3% (21)	$\chi^2 = 8.43, p = .077$	F(2,471) = 3.94, p = 3.94
Moderate	85.1% (137)	5.0% (8)	9.9% (16)		
Conservative	91.0% (141)	1.3% (2)	7.7% (12)		
b. Internationalism/Isolationism scale					
Internationalist	86.6% (142)	4.9% (8)	8.5% (14)	$\chi^2 = 2.60, p = .627$	F(4,495) = 1.04, p = .384
Moderate	84.7% (144)	4.7% (8)	10.6% (18)		
Isolationist	85.5% (142)	2.4% (4)	12.0% (20)		
c. Militant assertiveness					
Militarist	85.5% (136)	1.9% (3)	12.6% (20)	$\chi^2 = 4.49, p = .344$	F(4,479) = 1.22, p = .300
Moderate	87.3% (145)	4.2% (7)	8.4% (14)		
Pacifist	84.9% (135)	5.7% (9)	9.4% (15)		
d. Trade scale					
Free-Trader	93.9% (154)	1.8% (3)	4.3% (7)	$\chi^2 = 33.04, p < .001$	F(4,492) = 19.76, p < .001
Moderate	90.6% (144)	2.5% (4)	6.9% (11)		
Protectionist	73.6% (128)	7.5% (13)	19.0% (33)		
4. Institutions Experiment (WTO)					
a. Ideological scale		<i>Country to Country</i>	<i>Neutral</i>	<i>WTO</i>	
Liberal		55.6% (89)	5.0% (8)	39.4% (63)	$\chi^2 = 26.23, p < .001$
Moderate		62.0% (98)	3.2% (5)	34.8% (55)	
Conservative		80.5% (124)	4.5% (7)	14.9% (23)	
b. Internationalism/Isolationism scale					
Internationalist		51.2% (83)	4.9% (8)	43.8% (71)	$\chi^2 = 27.96, p < .001$
Moderate		67.6% (115)	4.7% (8)	27.6% (47)	
Isolationist		78.2% (129)	3.6% (6)	18.2% (30)	
c. Militant assertiveness					
Militarist		79.9% (127)	3.1% (5)	17.0% (27)	$\chi^2 = 22.71, p < .001$
Moderate		63.8% (104)	4.3% (7)	31.9% (52)	
Pacifist		55.3% (88)	4.4% (7)	40.3% (64)	
d. Trade scale					
Free-Trader		58.1% (93)	5.0% (8)	36.9% (59)	$\chi^2 = 15.14, p < .005$
Moderate		62.5% (100)	6.3% (10)	31.3% (50)	
Protectionist		76.6% (134)	2.3% (4)	21.1% (37)	

conclusion would be premature if not mistaken. It is important to note that our measure of free-trade versus mercantilist disposition was significantly related to choices in expected directions in every experiment. Free-traders, operating as if they were intuitive economists, opposed restricting trade more than mercantilists in both security experiments, and in the Rawlsian experiment they were more likely to abide by the ruling of the WTO and forego a self-help strategy in the institution experiment. Also our manipulation of geostrategic and normative features of the situation had consistently significant effects, suggesting that some participants attached meaning to these cues and behaved as if they were intuitive neorealists and intuitive Rawlsians. Given the randomization of (1) question order, (2) presentation of information within questions, and (3) assignment of subjects to conditions, it is improbable that these consistent effects could have been produced by the survey interview context alone.

Interactive Effects of Dispositional Mindsets and Geopolitical Context

The weak relationship between ideational dispositions and trade policy choice might result not because people lack coherent ideas but rather because different types of people combine their ideas about trade and their ideas about the specific situation and the geopolitical and normative implications differently. There are at least three useful ways to distinguish how people combine dispositional mindsets with geopolitical contexts. The first is an additive model (reflected in main effects of linear regression) in which everyone reacts to the geopolitical or normative information in the same way. The second is an ordinal model in which there are nonlinear effects such that certain types of people are much more responsive to certain manipulations of context than are other groups. Everyone, however, responds in roughly the same direction, if not to the same degree. The third model is a disordinal interaction, in which one ideological faction responds positively and another responds negatively to the same cue manipulation. Additive effects are a sign of a relatively unified polity, ordinal interactions are signs of fissure, and disordinal interactions indicate potential for dramatic polarization.

In our security experiments liberal-conservative ideological dispositions were mostly irrelevant. There were significant ordinal interactions between the other dispositions and the experimentally manipulated geopolitical factors, however. Mercantilist elites, for instance, behaved more like neorealists in both experiments. In contrast to free-traders, mercantilists were significantly more sensitive to the distribution of gains and to the identity of the trade partner.¹⁶ For instance, among free-traders 5 percent favored restricting trade when relative gains were equal. This rose only 7 points to 12 percent when the U.S. received only one-tenth of what the trade partner did. In contrast, among mercantilists relative gains made a large difference. When gains were distributed equally only 16 percent of the mercantilists favored restricting trade. When relative gains favored the trade partner 45 percent of the mercantilists favored restricting trade—a shift of 29 percent. Likewise, in the Japan experiment, it made little difference to free-traders if the partner was England, India, or Japan. Support for restricting trade with any of these countries never reached 20 percent, and the difference in support across the countries varied by less than 4 percent. Mercantilists, on the other hand, were far more sensitive when Japan was the trade partner.¹⁷ While fewer than 16 percent favored restricting trade with India, more than 63 percent favored restricting trade with Japan—a 47 percent difference.

¹⁶ For mercantilists $F(2,165) = 20.26$, $p < .001$ versus for free-traders $F(2,160) = .72$, $p = .49$.

¹⁷ $F(2,167) = 9.51$, $p < .001$ for Japan versus $F(2,159) = 5.66$, $p < .005$ for England and $F(2,153) = .46$, $p = .63$ for India.

In our second security experiment elites who were more assertive and militant were also more sensitive to the identity of the trade partner than were elites who were disposed toward cooperative accommodation.¹⁸ A similar pattern holds for isolationists compared to internationalists. In both cases assertive and isolationist elites behaved more like intuitive neorealists. The difference in how they treat Japan, compared to England or India, is much greater than the difference in how cooperative-accommodative types and internationalists treat Japan compared to England and India. For instance, 54 percent of the militant assertive elites favor restricting trade with Japan, while only 18 percent of them favor restricting trade with England, a difference of 36 percent. In contrast, among cooperative accommodationists 28.8 percent favor restricting trade with Japan and 25.9 percent favor restricting trade with England, a difference of only 3 percent.

Interactions between dispositions and situational factors were evident in the Rawlsian experiment as well. The most important interaction was between ideological disposition and who benefits from trade.¹⁹ Liberals acted like intuitive Rawlsians, favoring restrictions when the benefits of trade go to the wealthy and favoring free trade when the benefits go largely to the poor.²⁰ Conservatives, by contrast, behaved more like intuitive economists. They paid less attention to the market-irrelevant information regarding which subgroup in society benefits from the trade.²¹ For example, when the benefits of trade went to the poor in both countries, 97.5 percent of liberals favored free trade. When the benefits went to the wealthy in both countries, support for free trade among liberals dropped by 30 points to 67.5 percent. Among conservatives, by contrast, 94 percent favored free trade when the benefits went to the poor in both countries, and this level of support dropped only 6 points to 88 percent when the benefits of trade went to the rich in both countries. For a graphic display of the interaction see Figure 1. Our results are consistent with the previous findings of Murray (1996) and McClosky and Zaller (1984:191–194) who also find that liberals support aid to the poor at home and abroad.

In the WTO experiment there was a significant disordinal interaction between the framing of the issue and internationalist–isolationist dispositions.²² When the issue was not framed, internationalists and isolationists differed to some extent but not dramatically.²³ Thirty-four percent of internationalists chose the WTO option, while 23 percent of the isolationists made this choice. However, when the frame highlighted Washington's opportunity to exploit its superior bargaining power in the global market, the difference between internationalists and isolationists doubled from a gap of 11 percentage points to a gap of 22.5 percentage points. Just over 41 percent of the internationalists made the WTO choice. When the frame highlighted the central role that law and courts play in commerce, the gap between internationalists and isolationists grew even larger to 45 percentage points, with 58 percent of the internationalists choosing the WTO option, and only 13 percent of the isolationists making this choice.²⁴ For a graphic display of the interaction see Figure 2.

Framing the issues—in the manner that typically occurs in political debates—did have an effect on attitudes. But it did not promote agreement. If anything, it polarized elites. It appears that elite Americans are divided over the role of

¹⁸ For militant $F(2,151) = 12.72$, $p < .001$ versus for accommodative $F(2,155) = 1.61$, $p = .20$.

¹⁹ $F(4,455) = 2.36$, $p < .06$.

²⁰ $F(2,155) = 11.712$, $p < .001$.

²¹ $F(2,152) = .28$, $p = .75$.

²² $F(4,488) = 2.47$, $p < .05$.

²³ $F(2,173) = 2.12$, $p = .12$.

²⁴ $F(2,163) = 16.72$, $p < .001$.




FIG. 1. Willingness to Restrict Trade by Ideology and Who Benefits from Trade

international institutions in commerce, with some evidently committed to the Darwinian precept of self-help and others to legal regulation.

Although more than two-thirds of our sample gave answers consistent with neoliberal-institutionalist perspectives when asked context-free general questions, roughly two-thirds made the neorealist choice in the more contextually rich experimental context—a form of principle–policy slippage (cf. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). The difference in attitude does not appear to reflect weakly held beliefs easily swayed by our framing exercise. Rather, elites with different initial mindsets reacted differently to the same information about the context. The majority acted as intuitive neorealists, and American elites with conservative and assertive dispositions showed this inclination more clearly. It is important to note, however, that roughly a third of the elite sample held firm to their neoliberal institutionalist principles in their choices.

Conclusions

The growing globalization of commerce, the increasingly acrimonious debates over trade policy in congressional and presidential politics, and the public debate over the international institutions designed to facilitate trade draw attention to the question of how Americans think about trade policy. The role the United States plays in promoting free trade can be shaped by the preexisting mindsets that elite Americans bring to policy questions, as well as by how they combine economic and political considerations. Although the important role that ideal-type free-trader and mercantilist mindsets may play has been recognized in theory, there are few studies that identify empirically how closely these ideal-type mindsets reflect thinking in America or if political and economic considerations are combined in ways they suggest. Our purpose was to conduct an empirical study that would address these issues. We close with four main points and their




FIG. 2. Willingness to Use the WTO by Internationalist Disposition and Realist or Institutional Frame

implications. The first point relates to the methods we used and the importance of our survey and experimental findings. The final three points refer to substantive conclusions about the ideational landscape in the United States, highlighting the ideas that affect trade decisions, how they interact with other political dispositions, and the distribution of these ideas in the elite and the mass public.

(1) Although experimental economics has had a large impact on the understanding of how and why people make economic decisions (Kagel and Roth, 1995), the experimental method has not been widely applied in studies of international political economy. Partly, this may reflect a view that the advantages of rigor are outweighed by the costs in terms of external validity. The subjects available to participate in laboratory experiments are often seen as quite different from the broader population of economic decision-makers.

We have aimed to take advantage of the rigor experimental design allows, while still satisfying concerns about external validity by embedding experiments in national surveys (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Sniderman, Fletcher, Russell, and Tetlock, 1996). Many of our participants are not key governmental decision-makers, but collectively they represent the pool from which prevailing leaders are drawn. Moreover, many of them are key economic decision-makers and to the degree that firms and households in the United States trade with firms and households elsewhere, as distinct from governments trading with governments, they have great leverage over U.S. trade.

The experimental method has limitations, perhaps the most obvious of which is the comparability of decisions taken in a telephone interview context to decisions taken in the real world. Skeptics who feel that we have slighted the power of economic variables can argue that people will respond differently when real, not hypothetical, money is at stake. But there is the compelling counterargu-

ment that when real norms have been activated (people are actually being tortured and murdered) and real national security issues have been invoked (a nuclear-armed power is threatening American allies), these considerations may also weigh more heavily in people's deliberations. The effects we find as a result of the relatively weak manipulations we make in our experiments are likely to be "lower-bound" estimates. In real cases in which the stakes are more compelling and the media coverage vivid, the effects are likely to be much stronger. We see no good reason, however, to believe that our scenarios gave an unfair edge to neoclassical-economic, neorealist, or Rawlsian ideas.

It is worth commenting more generally on the significance of the methodology deployed in this study as well as in a preceding study by Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser (1999) which focused on conditions under which Americans support the use of force abroad. Whether the analytical spotlight is on geoeconomics or geopolitics, embedding experiments in surveys allows us to isolate the locus of causality much more precisely than do correlational approaches that have traditionally dominated public opinion research (cf. Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991). Experimental manipulations of question content and random assignment of respondents to experimental conditions make it possible to gauge precisely the impact of particular ideas on particular ideological factions within the citizenry. Here we see one of those rare instances in social science where a technical advance in the mechanics of data collection makes it possible to address a host of substantive questions that were previously beyond our reach. Among other things, computer-assisted telephone interviewing permits assessing the joint impact of respondent predispositions and properties of the political context that respondents are being asked to judge. Mapping out systematically the direction and magnitude of the impact of particular ideas on particular subgroups provides us not only with a cross-sectional snapshot of the state of public opinion at a given moment but also a better appreciation of how future events and arguments might either tear existing coalitions asunder or catalyze the formation of new coalitions.

(2) We created a scale to display basic attitudes about trade running from belief in free trade to belief in mercantilism. Elite American attitudes were distributed across the entire range of the scale, but most participants leaned in the direction of free trade. We found that this measure of disposition toward trade related to policy choices in every one of our experiments and appeared to tap an important difference among leaders. The experiments we embedded in the survey created geopolitical and normative contexts in which considerations besides those connected to strictly material economic matters were in play. We used these experimental manipulations to explore how Americans deal with what Gilpin called the fundamental tension between economic and political reasoning. In this regard, we found that political factors like the distribution of relative gains and the potential threat the trade partner is seen to represent affect trade policy choices for many American leaders just as if they were intuitive neorealists. However, most of our participants, always more than two-thirds, acted as if they were intuitive economists and chose to pursue absolute gains in an open market. Only a few leaders acted as if they were intuitive Rawlsians, allowing ideas about distributive justice to guide their choices.

Most of our participants in principle supported international institutions and appeared to believe that they could play a critically important role in facilitating cooperation. In practice, however, a majority of the participants did not favor relying on World Trade Organization rulings but rather preferred to rely on U.S. bilateral bargaining power. We cannot explain from our current data why our participants made these different choices. There may be slippage between rhetorical support for international governance and revealed preference in this

regard. U.S. leaders may also see serious problems with the WTO's decision-making practices, such as a lack of openness and accountability, that they believe need to be remedied before the United States relies on it. Steven Kull (2000:14) finds that among the mass public, the WTO is seen as making decisions for the benefit of big business rather than for society as a whole. Determining what elites think about the WTO and other international institutions in practice and why they favor or oppose their prevalence vis-à-vis national courts is a subject that should be explored in the future.

Our purpose has been to identify the mindsets that affect trade policy and to examine in some detail how economic and political considerations are combined. We have not attempted to explain why elite Americans have these ideas or why they combine them in neoclassical-economist, neorealist, Rawlsian, or liberal-institutionalist patterns. Given the substantial difference between our elite and mass samples, the roles education, income, profession, and sector of employment play are certainly candidate explanatory factors in this regard. In addition, we found that perceived self-interest was associated with other basic attitudes about free trade and should no doubt be examined in greater detail as well.

(3) In one sense, our project could be understood as documenting the circumstances under which Americans grant priority to politics over economics and vice versa. In a more subtle sense, however, we were documenting not the simple trumping of one set of considerations by another, but rather the distinctive and integratively complex ways in which definable ideological subgroups resolve tensions between economic and political (strategic and normative) considerations. We found, as did Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), that ideas about trade were coupled—albeit somewhat loosely—with other ideas about foreign policy such as whether America should adopt an internationalist or an isolationist stance. However, these associations between traditional dispositional fault lines and trade policy are not terribly impressive. Their weakness might lead to a judgment that trade policy choices rest almost entirely on idiosyncratic factors and parochial self-interest. We believe this conclusion is premature, and it is in this regard that the significant interactions we find between dispositions and features of the political situation are most important.

Our results indicate that some types of elite Americans are much more sensitive to neorealist concerns than others. In situations where these concerns become salient, systematic differences emerge that are not as clear in other circumstances. For instance, militant-assertive Americans are much more like intuitive neorealists and differentiate between Japan and England as trade partners much more than do cooperative-accommodative Americans. Likewise, liberals compared to conservatives are far more sensitive to how the gains of trade are distributed between rich and poor people, favoring trade that benefits the poor. These interactions suggest that rather than describing the ideational landscape relevant to trade policy in terms of fault lines separating types of people, we ought to identify types of people in certain types of situations. Also, rather than conceiving of certain situations, such as those postulated by neorealists, as uniformly undermining the pursuit of absolute gains, we ought to conceive of these situational factors as affecting some types of leaders and as having much less effect on others.

One of the more systematic effects we found was between basic trade dispositions and the factors associated with intuitive-neorealist thinking. Mercantilists were consistently more neorealist. Free-traders, on the other hand, were not inclined to divert from open-market practices even if the trade partner was gaining relatively and could be a future adversary. This could reflect simply a die-hard commitment to free trade, but may also reflect a different conception of influence and the pursuit of security in a globalized world. It is possible that

free-traders believe the best way to undermine regimes that pose a future national security threat is to engage them economically. If this is so, then strategic debate over how to deal with adversaries might be profitably explored along a trade disposition dimension.

Reliance on economic engagement will draw attention to the international institutions that manage trade. On this score, we find that elite Americans are deeply divided over how much authority to transfer to the WTO. Attitudes were not easily moved by even fairly heavy handed framing manipulations of the virtues of international institutions or national self-help strategies. In this case, types of people were not simply more sensitive to the same information. They were moved in opposite directions. Such a disordinal interaction polarizes opinion and reveals an especially important fault line. The disagreement appeared to be less over institutions per se and more over the relative legitimacy, and perhaps efficacy, of national versus international authority. On this matter, internationalists were far more ready than isolationists to extend to the WTO a logic that connects institutions to the promotion of free markets and to grant the WTO authority over national courts on these matters.

(4) Although the ideational landscape comprises several types of political actors who act differently in specified types of situations, this does not mean that all mindsets are equally powerful or likely to shape governmental policy. The distribution of influence in the United States is a topic far too complex to address adequately here. In this study, we explain how certain types of people combine economic and political considerations when they think about trade policy. We do not describe which types of elites with which mindsets have the most influence in government, nor do we predict who will be in power in the future.

Of course, there are checks and balances in the U.S. political system, and it is unlikely that any leadership could ignore entirely the viewpoint and ideas of other constituencies. Free-traders may dominate among the elite, but intuitive neorealists clearly represent an important minority. And they are an elite minority that can potentially mobilize a majority among the general public. Although the reservoir of support for free trade is fairly deep among elite Americans, it is shallow among the mass public. Also, as John Rielly (1999:20) found, elite support for free trade declined in the late 1990s and the gap between the elite and public on this score has narrowed. If elements of the elite appeal to the public in terms of national security and helping the poor, these elites can tap into widespread intuitive-neorealist and Rawlsian thinking within the general public. Appeals that emphasize the distribution of relative gains and the potential future threat the trade partner represents are likely to sway many people's thinking within the general public. So are appeals that criticize free trade for benefiting the rich more than the poor.

Elites from both the Republican and Democratic parties may use neorealist and Rawlsian appeals when seeking mass support. Attitudes toward trade are not consistently connected to a traditional liberal-conservative ideological cleavage. It is not clear from the evidence we have how much electoral support a politician could attract by playing neorealist and Rawlsian cards on trade issues. We have not examined how important trade is to people compared to other issues and factors affecting their voting decisions. We can, however, comment on the potential effect such appeals can have on the domestic climate surrounding trade policy debates. They can mobilize a majority against free-trade practices. Whether this majority becomes an effective political force is, of course, a more complicated question. It partly depends on the institutional structure that insulates governmental policy from public opinion.

Our study has generated new data and provides an example of how political psychology might be applied in the realm of international political economy. Our findings shed light on how Americans reconcile conflicts among money, power, and principle but surely do not provide definitive answers. This is an important topic that has not received the theoretical or empirical attention it deserves. Our intent has been to open a new line of research in this vein and to encourage further investigation, not to settle these matters once and for all. In an era of globalization, international trade is likely to be more abundant and more politicized. Understanding how Americans think about these issues will be necessary in analyzing the United States' foreign policy as well as its domestic politics.

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