

**THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
ENVIRONMENTALISM:
THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF GREEN POLITICS AND
POLICIES**

**David Vogel
Haas School of Business
University of California at Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720-1900
E-mail: vogel@haas.berkeley.edu**

September 2001

(This paper has not been published nor is it under review by any journal)

Introduction

This article speculates on the influence of religion on national patterns of environmental politics and policies. It develops a framework for classifying national differences in environmental policies and policies among rich countries and then explores the role of culture in general and religion in particular in helping to illuminate these differences. It suggests that there is, in Weber's words, an "elective affinity" between Protestantism and a contemporary mode of green politics and policies. The national cultures of countries classified as "dark green" are more likely to have been influenced by Protestantism, while the national cultures of "light green" countries have been primarily shaped by other religious traditions.

Shades of Green

The most important determinant of a nation's environmental politics and policies is its wealth. Relatively rich countries place a higher priority on environmental protection than do relatively poor countries and, as nations become richer, they tend to devote more resources to protecting public health and safeguarding environmental quality.¹

Accordingly, the environmental politics and policies of the world's twenty-four high-income countries – defined as countries with a per capita income of at least \$11,000 in 1995 – have much in common. In each of them, environmental policy has changed substantially over the last three decades. Since the early 1970s each has devoted considerable resources to protecting and improving the environment and on many dimensions their environmental quality has substantially improved.² Moreover, these policies have received a high degree of public support. For example, according to a 1992 survey, the proportion of citizens in each of the (then) twelve EC member

states who regarded “protecting the environment and fighting pollution” as “an immediate and urgent problem” ranged from 97% in Greece to 70% in Ireland.³

However, there are also substantial differences in environmental politics and policies among rich countries. They vary on five dimensions: the extent and stability of citizen engagement in “green” civic and political activities, the relative political salience of environmental issues over time, their willingness to adopt innovative regulatory policies and programs, their emphasis on protecting nature for its own sake, and their degree of concern with environmental issues outside their borders. The national pattern of these differences yields two distinct national modes of environmental politics and policies, one labeled “light green” and the other ‘dark green.’⁴

1. Citizen Activity. Nations vary in the extent and influence of citizen efforts to safeguard or improve environmental quality. In some countries, political or civic environmental organizations tend to be large, well-organized and relatively influential while in other nations, environmental organizations are less-well organized, have relatively few members and enjoy relatively little political influence at the national level. Put differently, the extent and depth of citizen interest in either private or public efforts to protect environmental quality exhibits considerable cross-national variation.

2. Salience. Over the last three decades, environmental concerns have at some point occupied a central place on the political agenda of virtually all high income nations. Likewise, all have experienced periods in which environmental concerns became less politically salient, frequently as a response to a slowdown in economic growth. Where they differ is in the extent and magnitude of these variations. In some high-income countries, environmental issues have occupied a relatively important

place on the political agenda over a relatively long time period, while in others public interest in environmental issues has been more episodic, increasing in response to the emergence of particular problems but then subsequently diminishing. To use Anthony Downs' phrase, in some countries the "issue attention cycle" of public support for environment protection has been considerably more apparent than in others.⁵

3. Regulatory Innovation and Leadership. While over time environmental regulations, rules and standards in high-income countries have tended to converge, at any given point in time some nations have stricter standards or more extensive or innovative regulations than do others. These nations tend to be regulatory leaders and innovators. By contrast, other high-income nations tended to be regulatory laggards or followers. They are reactive rather than proactive, rarely adopting environmental standards or policies which have not already been adopted by other high-income countries. In short, some rich countries tend to "import" environmental regulations, while others are more likely to be "exporters" of new policy approaches.

4. The Extent and Focus of Nature Protection. While all high income nations engage in some efforts to protect nature, both the extent and scope of these efforts as well as the rationale for them differ. In some nations, nature protection has been accorded a relatively high priority compared to the protection of public health, while in others the environmental agenda tends to be dominated by the latter concern. Even among those nations which have devoted efforts to protect nature, their rationale varies: in some countries such efforts have an important economic component, such as promoting tourism, while in others there is more public support for protecting nature for its own sake.

To draw on the language of environmental ethics, in some countries environmental policies toward nature protection are more likely to be informed by a biocentric or ecocentric ethic rather than strictly a homocentric or anthropocentric one.⁶ Such countries are more likely to enact regulations that protect the environment, or more specifically nature, for its own sake rather than because of the benefits such protection accords humans. In other nations, such non-instrumental claims have less appeal to citizens or policy-makers.

One important dimension of nature protection is animal protection, a component of environmental regulation which exhibits substantially more cross-national variation than does health and safety regulations.⁷ Some countries have made relatively extensive efforts to protect endangered species, imposed restrictions or bans on hunting, and/or restricted the mistreatment of wild or domestic animals. By contrast, in other high-income countries the concept of animal rights and animal protection has been less politically salient.

5. Geographic Scope. High-income nations also vary considerably in the geographic scope of their efforts to safeguard or improve environmental quality. While all high-income countries have undertaken considerable efforts to protect or improve the quality of the environment within their geopolitical borders for some this has been the extent of their concern. Indeed in some countries, environmental politics primarily revolves around local issues, with most citizens being relatively indifferent to environmental issues that do not directly affect their community or region. The NIMBY (not in my back yard) syndrome, represents a localized expression of this phenomena. Such countries are likely to support international or regional

environmental initiatives only to the extent that they are necessary to protect or improve their domestic environment or as a response to international pressure.

By contrast, in other high-income countries environmental politics and policies have a relatively salient regional and/or global orientation. Both public officials and citizens are concerned with environmental practices in other countries as well as in protecting the global commons. In other words, they tend to define the agenda of environmental protection in relatively cosmopolitan terms. Such countries are more likely to employ economic and political pressure to influence the environmental practices of their trading partners, most notably in the areas of wildlife and nature protection. They are also likely to play a leadership role in pressuring for the adoption of regional and international environmental agreements and treaties.

In sum, in dark green countries, environmental politics and policies are more likely to express an environmental ethic – one which encompasses but goes beyond domestic health, safety and amenity concerns. By contrast, in light green countries, environmental politics and policies tend to be more instrumental; they are more likely to represent responses to clearly defined threats to domestic public health. Accordingly, survey data which report the degree of public support for environmental protection – as measured for example by “willingness to pay higher taxes to prevent environmental pollution” or expression of “strong approval of the ecology movement,” are not necessarily an appropriate measure of a nation’s shade of green.⁸ For these survey responses tell us nothing about the reasons for or focus of public support for environmental protection. A nation is not necessarily dark green if its citizens favor policies to ameliorate environmental problems which adversely affect their daily lives, such as urban air pollution, inadequate sewerage treatment or the lack of open spaces.

Nor is it necessarily dark green if its citizens are interested in protecting nature primarily in order to attract tourists. Indeed, such concerns and interests are by no means confined to affluent countries.

A defining characteristic of dark green countries is precisely that their citizenry's relatively high level of public concern about environment issues is not a response to the environmental problems that affect their daily lives. In dark green countries, citizens tend to define their interest in environmental policies and practices more broadly: they are more likely to support efforts to protect nature for its own sake and about to seek to improve environmental conditions outside their nation's borders. Because the potential agenda of environmental issues is so large, environmental problems are never "solved": as soon as one problem appears to be ameliorated, another problem that appears equally if not more urgent quickly emerges to take its place. Thus in dark green countries, citizens are more likely to regard the environment as being in a state of crisis.

By contrast, in light green countries the environmental agenda is more limited and narrowly focused. Thus to the extent that particular domestic health and safety problems do get ameliorated, public concern about the environment diminishes. Hence public interest in environmental issues tends to be episodic rather than sustained and the salience of environmental issues varies considerably over time.

Classifying National Patterns of Environmentalism

There are twenty-eight high income countries (including Taiwan). Four are excluded from this analysis: Singapore and Hong Kong because they are city-states, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates because their physical environment is so

distinctive. This leaves twenty-four countries (including Taiwan), which we have classified as follows:

Shades of Green

<i>Dark Green</i>	<i>Light Green</i>
Australia	Belgium
Austria	France
Canada	Greece
Denmark	Ireland
Finland	Israel
Germany	Italy
Netherlands	Japan
New Zealand	Korea
Norway	Portugal
Sweden	Spain
Switzerland	Taiwan
United Kingdom	
United States	

Since a detailed discussion of environmental politics and policies in each of these countries is beyond the scope of this article, the following discussion is intended to be illustrative rather than definitive.

One way of clearly illustrating the contrast between dark and light green environmental politics and policies is to compare the United States and Japan. Both countries have devoted considerable resources to improving environmental quality since 1970 and their domestic environment is much cleaner as a result. But in Japan the scope of public concern and thus the agenda of environmental policy has been defined relatively narrowly. It has almost exclusively emphasized pollution reduction to enhance the health of Japanese citizens. In the urban areas, this was primarily air pollution, while in some rural areas it focused on water pollution. Japanese citizens

became environmental activists during the late 1960s and early 1970s because they saw themselves as “victims” whose health was endangered rather than because they were interested in protecting the environment for its own sake. Thus “the Japanese public . . . never adopted environmentalism very seriously.”⁹ As a result, once the threats to public health posed by Japan’s severe pollution problems diminished, so did environmental activism and the political salience of environmental issues.

By contrast, the United States has had a relatively high level of environmental activism, with numerous relatively well-organized environmental pressure groups at both the local and national levels, for nearly three decades. The extent of public support for environmental protection has not diminished even as the quality of America’s environment has improved.¹⁰ While a significant number of American environmental groups have focused on nature protection and conservation, Japanese nature conservation groups have had relatively small memberships. Not surprisingly, while Japan’s success in improving air quality has been comparable to that of the United States, Japan’s achievements in domestic nature conservation pale alongside those of the United States.

There is considerable public discussion and debate in the United States about the impact of domestic patterns of consumption on the global environment. In contrast, the Japanese public has been relatively indifferent to the numerous ways in which Japan has contributed to environmental problems outside its borders, most notably through its destruction of rainforests. “Japan has been the world’s largest tropical timber importer since the 1960s.”¹¹ As Business Week notes: “At home, Japan has cleaned up its environment. But abroad, the Japanese continue to earn international ire. Its companies have failed to curb industrial pollution overseas. And

Japan continues to support environmentally destructive aid projects.”¹² Japanese fishing practices constitute a major threat to the marine ecosystem and it continues to import large number of products made from endangered species, most notably hawksbill turtles and Himalayan deer. In addition, “Japan is the biggest final consumer of ivory.”¹³ This stands in marked contrast to the United States, which has prohibited imports of endangered species, and imposed trade embargoes on countries whose nature conservation practices fall below American standards.¹⁴ Indeed, no other country has made such extensive use of trade policy to pressure its trading partners to adopt stricter regulatory standards.¹⁵

The United States has played a leadership role in pressuring for the adoption of global environmental treaties – the treaty on greenhouse emissions being a recent and notable exception. Indeed, virtually every major international environmental agreement was initiated by the United States. By contrast, Japan has signed such treaties primarily in response to foreign pressures. Significantly, according to a 1992 survey of attitudes toward the environment, while Japanese citizens are slightly more concerned about environmental problems in their community than their counterparts in West Germany, the United States and Great Britain, they are notably less concerned about global environmental problems.¹⁶ Indeed, Japan has no international environmental movement: virtually all environmental activism has been and remains local in focus.

Because the European Union has been extensively involved in making environmental policy over a relatively long period of time, EU environmental politics provide a useful and relatively clear-cut measure of relative shades of green. Within the fifteen member EU, six Member States have been noticeably “greener” than the

rest, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, Austria and Finland. They have been environmental “leaders,” consistently enacting regulatory standards stricter and more ambitious than those of the other Member States.¹⁷ Thus Denmark enacted the EU’s first returnable bottle bill as well as a tax on carbon dioxide, Germany’s recycling requirements for paper, plastic and glass are the most extensive in the world, the Netherlands has Europe’s strictest air pollution control standards and Sweden has established unusually strict controls on pesticide use as well as extensive animal protection regulations. While from the late 1970s through the mid 1990s, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands were “generally regarded as the most environmentally minded member states,” the domestic environmental standards of Sweden, Finland and Austria who entered the Union in 1995, “are at a level comparable or even higher than those of the former ‘green troika.’”¹⁸ All six countries have relatively large and influential environmental organizations and/or Green parties.

Equally important, each of these countries has played an important role in attempting to strengthen environmental standards outside its borders. This is true not only within the EU, where they have been in the forefront of pressuring for adoption of stricter EU environmental standards in areas such as packaging requirements, automotive emissions and waste water treatment, but at the global level as well. For example, both the Netherlands and Austria have sought to restrict imports of hardwoods to protect tropical forests, while Germany and the Netherlands have led the push for a treaty on global climate change as well as playing a leadership role, along with Denmark, in seeking stricter EU regulations on carbon dioxide emissions. At first glance, the inclusion of Great Britain as a “darker green” country appears puzzling as Britain long held a reputation as the “dirty man” of Europe. This was

however primarily due to British opposition to regional efforts to control acid rain and to enact stricter automobile emission standards during the 1970s and 1980s. In those instances, the British position primarily reflected both the weakness of its economy and the impact of international standards on the competitive position of domestic producers. In fact, Britain has long had one of the world's most extensive network of both national and grass-roots environmental organizations and there are few countries in which animal protection and nature conservation have been more politically salient.¹⁹ Britain currently has 3,000 animal rights groups, more than any other country.

Within the EU Britain has taken the lead on such matters as environmentally sensitive farming, integrated pollution control and eco-audits. It has also led the EU's efforts to ban the importation of animals from countries which permit the use of leg-traps and, responding to domestic political pressures it has supported, along with Austria, Sweden and Denmark, EU regulations to protect the welfare of animals in transit.²⁰ Compared to France, Britain has had a much more active environmental movement, has placed a much greater priority on nature protection, especially animal protection, and its citizen groups have been have more concerned about environmental practices outside its borders.

The other seven Member States of the EU (Luxembourg is excluded from this survey) fall into the light green camp. Spain, Portugal, Greece, Italy and Ireland have relatively weak environmental movements and a relatively low level of public interest in environmental issues. Environmental issues have periodically become salient in France and Belgium, but these nations have been unable to sustain a significant level of public concern or citizen engagement. Compared to Germany, whose Green Party

has received substantial electoral support in a number of Lander and often at the Federal level for two decades, until recently the Belgium and French Greens enjoyed limited electoral success. Equally importantly, none of the EU's light green Member States have attempted to strengthen regulatory standards outside their borders, either within Europe or internationally.

The patterns of environmental politics and policies in Canada, Switzerland Australia and New Zealand more closely resemble those of the United States and northern Europe.²¹ Environmental politics and policies in Israel are similar in a number of respects to those of the EU's southern Member States: the level of public concern and the political salience of environmental issues has been intermittent rather than sustained, and regulatory standards generally lag behind those of both the EU and the United States.²²

One indication of a nation's shade of green is its policy toward nuclear power. A number of developed countries have made investments in nuclear power. However, in dark green Sweden, Germany, the United States, Great Britain, and Austria, the development of nuclear power has encountered widespread political opposition, resulting in a halting of new construction and in some cases a phasing out of existing facilities. By contrast, light green Japan, France and Belgium continue to rely on nuclear power for a major share of their energy requirements. It is worth noting that these policy differences cannot be explained by differences in natural resources as neither Sweden nor Austria possess significant fossil fuels.

According to a comparative study of the signing of twenty-three environmental treaties, only eight countries had signed as many as twenty treaties, namely the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany and

Switzerland. All are classified as dark green. By contrast, among rich countries, only five had signed fewer than fifteen treaties, namely light green Ireland, Japan, South Korea, Portugal and Israel.²³ (Taiwan is of course excluded from this analysis).

A prominent American politician, Albert Gore, wrote a book entitled Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit which argued that the world faced an environmental crisis of historic proportions and called for a new sensibility which would reconnect people to the physical world.²⁴ Regardless of its author's inability to implement any of its policy recommendations after he became vice-president, what is significant is that a prominent politician would actually write such a book. In which other countries could one imagine a major political leader writing a popular book expressing deeply felt views on environmental policy? One can much more readily imagine a political leader in dark green Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, or the United Kingdom choosing to publicly identify with the values of environmentalism, than in light green Belgium, France, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain or Taiwan.

Explaining National Shades of Green

Why do high income countries exhibit different modes of environmental politics or policies? One possible explanation is their relative affluence. In fact, there is a relationship between per capita income and patterns of environmental politics and policies: dark green countries are, on average richer than light green ones. In 1995, the former had an average per capita GNP of 20.7; the latter, 16.6. But there are important exceptions to this pattern. Japan has the second highest per capita income, yet it is light green. France is considerably richer than Great Britain, yet the former is a lighter

shade of green than the latter. Likewise, Belgium is richer than the Netherlands, yet the latter is dark green while the former is light green. Germany and France have a roughly comparable per capita GNP, but the former is dark green while the latter is light green.

Dark green countries are not only, on average, richer than the light green ones, but they also have been richer, longer. Virtually all dark green countries were relatively rich, highly industrial nations around the turn of the century while the light green countries contain a disproportionate number of late developers including Greece, Israel, Korea, Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Taiwan. Or, to employ Wallerstein's formulation, countries located at the core of the world capitalist system are more likely to be dark green than those located in its semi-periphery.²⁵ Yet once again, there are important exceptions: both light green France and Japan were important industrial powers at the turn of the century, while dark green Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland industrialized relatively late.

Moreover, if a nation's shade of green were primarily a function of its wealth, then France, Japan, Israel, and Italy should have become dark green over time as each of them is now much richer than it was in 1970. But in fact, their mode of environmentalism has remained relatively stable. Compared to dark green nations, their level of citizen concern about environmental issues remains modest, environmental issues have continued to occupy a relatively marginal place on their political agenda, their environmental policies have not become more innovative, nature protection has not become a more important priority and they have not sought to address environmental problems outside their borders. Within the EU, the pattern of national support and opposition to new Community environmental initiatives has been

remarkably stable for twenty-five years notwithstanding substantial economic growth in a number of Member States.

Thus the contrast between environmental politics and policies in Germany and France over the last three decades, remains striking, though both have experienced relatively rapid growth rates in the post-war period. Germany has the oldest and most politically successful Green Party, while France's has only recently begun to receive significant electoral support. In Germany, citizen participation in environmental organizations is much more extensive than in France. Over the last three decades environmental issues in general and conservation issues in particular have been much more salient in Germany: there is no French counterpart to the intensity of the German concern with the condition of the "black forests." A number of stricter environmental regulations were first introduced in Germany – and then "exported" to France via the EC/EU; there are no examples of the obverse. Within the EC/EU, Germany has frequently pressured for stricter standards, while France has rarely if ever done so. The same pattern holds true at the international level.

It certainly is true that recently, France has emerged as one of the leading sources of opposition within the EU to the introduction of genetically modified seeds and crops. But in marked contrast to Britain and Germany, opposition to GMOs in France has been primarily informed by the concerns of consumers about food safety and quality. By contrast in Germany and Britain, the environmental dimensions of GMOs have dominated public opposition.

To what extent are differences in shades of green related to differences in environmental quality? Highly industrialized densely populated countries do confront especially serious environmental problems: they must enact very extensive and strict

environmental regulations in order to protect the health of their citizenry from industrial activity which is likely to be located close to population centers and they must impose extremely comprehensive land-use and nature protection policies to preserve open spaces or undeveloped areas. Accordingly, it is precisely such countries that one might expect to fall into the dark green category. In other words, their citizens might care more about environmental issues because they confront more serious or pervasive environmental problems. And they might care more about nature because it is relatively scarce.

This does appear to explain the dark green pattern of environmental politics and policies of the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria and Germany – all highly industrialized and densely populated countries which have faced significant environmental problems; their population densities are 238.4, 412.5, 120.7, 95.8, and 228.1 respectively.²⁶ Alternatively, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece might be light green because they industrialized relatively recently and thus confront fewer environmental problems. But Japan, Israel, Belgium, Italy, Greece, Taiwan, and Korea are also relatively densely populated and confront extremely serious environmental problems. Yet the latter's pattern of environmental policies and politics place them in the light green camp. Moreover, Sweden, Norway, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have relatively pristine environments, yet they fall into the dark green category. To re-emphasize the point made in the first section of this article, a nation's mode of environmentalism is *not* significantly related to the magnitude of its domestic environmental problems.

A third possible explanation for national modes of environmentalism has to do with political institutions and civic cultures. Dark green countries tend to have more

stable political institutions and more democratic civic cultures than do light green ones. While the dark green countries include all the world's oldest and most stable democracies, more than half of the light green countries, namely Greece, Japan, Korea, Portugal, Spain and Taiwan, only became democratic in the post-war period, while Italy was non-democratic for nearly two decades during this century. However two dark green countries have not been stable democracies throughout the 20th century, namely Germany and Italy.

Moreover while dark green countries tend to have more democratic civic cultures, a number of light green countries, including Italy, France and Israel, have had strong and militant trade union movements and most light green countries have periodically experienced high levels of civic engagement in recent decades. But this civic engagement has rarely focused on environmental issues. In addition, while the strong civic cultures of dark green countries might help account for the extent of public participation in environmental organizations, they cannot account for another defining feature of dark green politics, namely the degree of citizen interest in nature protection and international environmental issues.

A nation's relative wealth, the length of time it has been industrialized/rich and its political institutions and civic culture clearly influence its shade of green. But neither taken alone or together do they sufficiently explain it. There is however one factor that accounts for virtually all cross-national differences in environmental politics and policies. Dark green countries are more likely to have significant numbers of Protestants. The remainder of this article explores the role of a nation's religious heritage in shaping its contemporary mode of environmentalism.

A Cultural Explanation

The claim that contemporary environmental politics and policies have an important cultural dimension is closely associated with the work of Aaron Wildavsky and Mary Douglas.²⁷ Their understanding of the cultural roots of darker green politics – which they label radical egalitarianism – is similar in a number of respects to the one presented here. Both they and this author agree that that one cannot understand dark green politics by focusing on the environment per se: much of public support for environmentalism is linked to values and preferences which have little or nothing to do with the actual physical scope or magnitude of environmental problems. Rather environmental preferences are socially, or culturally constructed. “The sudden appearance of intense public concern about the environment can never be explained by evidence of harm . . . Between private, subjective perception and public, physical science there lies culture, a middle area of shared beliefs and values.”²⁸ Or as Wildavsky and his collaborators have argued, the key to understanding politics is to explain “where preferences come from. This is the great unanswered question in the social sciences.”²⁹

One way to demonstrate the usefulness of a cultural analysis to explain national variations in shades of green is to compare modes of environmental politics and policies in countries with similar political cultures or traditions.³⁰ The patterns of environmental politics and policies among the fourteen European high-income countries generally conform to a rough North - South division: the countries in northern Europe are generally dark green while those in southern Europe are light green. More specifically, the four Scandinavian nations exhibit a similar mode of environmentalism, as do the four Latin ones, namely Portugal, Spain, France and Italy. Likewise both France and Belgium, and Germany and Austria have similar political

cultures, while the Netherlands exhibits a number of cultural similarities to the four Scandinavian nations.

This classificatory approach can be extended beyond continental Europe. Great Britain, as well as the countries settled by large numbers of British emigrants, namely the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, all fall into the dark green camp. Likewise, the six high-income Mediterranean countries, namely the four Latin nations plus Greece and Israel, exhibit the same light green mode of environmental politics and policies, suggesting the possibility of a distinctively Mediterranean environmental ethic. A similar conclusion about cultural affinities emerges from the pattern of environmental policies and politics in the three high-income Asian countries, namely Japan, Taiwan and Korea.

The usefulness of these classifications certainly suggests that a nation's pattern of environmental politics and policies is related to characteristics of its political culture: nations with similar political cultures generally have the same mode of environmental politics and policies. Such a classificatory schema, however has one major drawback: it is not parsimonious.

Environmentalism and Religion

However, there is however one cultural variable which is remarkably consistent with the variations in shades of green in twenty-two of the world's high income countries, namely religion. As noted above, there is a striking correlation between Protestantism and dark green environmentalism. With the exception of Austria, nations which fall into the darker green camp have national cultures which were strongly influenced by Protestantism, while nations whose environmental politics and policies are light green do not. Most of the latter are Roman Catholic, three have

Confucian heritages, one is Greek Orthodox, and the other is predominately Jewish. This suggests that the geographic/cultural division between dark green, Protestant northern Europe and light green, Catholic southern Europe may have a global dimension, with the non-European English-speaking Protestant countries falling into the former camp and non-Protestant Greece, Israel and the high-income Asian countries falling into the latter.

While only one country, namely Korea, classified as light green contains any significant number of Protestants, a number of the countries classified as dark green do have sizeable Catholic populations. Nearly half of Canadians are Roman Catholic while of those Germans who list a religious affiliation, 38% list Protestant while 34% list Roman Catholic. (Moreover, prior to unification, the majority of West Germans were Catholic.) The Netherlands contains a roughly equal number of Catholics and Protestants, while the United States contains a significant number of non-Protestants. Nonetheless, Inglehart, on the basis of his World Values Survey classifies Germany, Canada and Netherlands as historically Protestant countries.³¹ While both Netherlands and Germany now have as many practicing Catholics as Protestants as a consequence of different birth rates and different rates of religious attrition, “both . . . manifest typically Protestant values. Moreover, the Catholics and Protestants *within* these countries do not show markedly different values systems.” (italics in original).³² The claim for the Protestant character of the United States has been made by numerous scholars.³³

The case of Canada is more difficult since it is a culturally divided society. But national policy clearly has been dominated by the 40% of the population of British origin; it therefore makes sense to classify Canada as a predominately Protestant

society. Switzerland is another religiously divided society: 46% of its population is Roman Catholic while 40% is Protestant. Because Switzerland is both highly decentralized and fragmented, it does not have a predominant religion. However Switzerland has certainly been strongly influenced by Protestantism.

It is important to note that this analysis uses religion to illuminate differences *among societies, not* within them. Thus within culturally Protestant but religiously pluralist societies, it is *not* the case that Protestants are “greener” than Roman Catholics or Jews. For the purpose of this analysis *all* Americans are Protestants regardless of what particular religion they do or do not practice, just as are all Germans regardless of whether they live in a predominately Catholic or Protestant Lander. Intra-national religious differences may or may not be important in understanding domestic environmental politics or policies but their significance lies outside the scope of this analysis.

Worster writes in connection with the United States: “Protestantism, like any religion, lays its hold on people’s imagination in diverse, contradictory ways and that hold can be tenacious long after the explicit theology or doctrine has gone dead. Surely it cannot be surprising that in a culture deeply rooted in Protestantism, we should find ourselves speaking its language, expressing its temperament, even when we thought we were free of all that.”³⁴ Worster’s analysis also applies to other countries. The claim that religion has had an enduring impact on contemporary political values is also made by Inglehart and Carballo, who note that even though church attendance has dramatically declined in most high-income countries (the United States is a notable exception), “The societies that are historically Catholic still show very distinct values from those that are historically Protestant – even among

segments of the population who have no contact with the church today. These values persist as part of the cultural heritage of given nations . . . ”³⁵

Protestantism and Environmentalism

Weber begins the first chapter of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism with the observation that, “the business leaders and owners of capital . . . are overwhelmingly Protestant.”³⁶ This article makes a similar observation, though since its focus is on differences among nations rather than within them, its unit of comparison is the religion which has had the most enduring influence on a nation’s culture. Weber was interested in the significance of the fact that capitalists in the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were disproportionately Protestant. This article seeks to explore the significance of the fact that, in the latter third of the 20th century, the countries characterized by dark green environmental politics and policies have national cultures which have been significantly influenced by Protestantism.

Weber sought to understand how a major revolution in values occurred in a number of regions of Europe in the sixteenth century. In brief, how did the acquisition of wealth and the pursuit of material possessions become transformed from a vice into a virtue? A change in values, though certainly less sweeping than that described by Weber, has also occurred in many wealthy countries in recent decades. Drawing on surveys since the 1970s, Inglehart concludes that there has been a broad cultural shift from material to postmaterial values in a number of high income countries and that this shift is associated with increased public support for environmental protection. He writes: “A growing body of evidence indicates that what people want out of life is changing . . . people’s basic values and goals are gradually shifting from giving top

priority to economic growth and consumption, to placing increasing emphasis on the quality of life.”³⁷

According to Inglehart, “the rise of postmaterial values helps account for the spectacular rise in the salience of environmental issues which has taken place during the past two decades.”³⁸ His data suggests that within advanced industrial societies, support for postmaterial values is strongly related to support for environmental protection.”³⁹ There is in fact considerable overlap between those societies which contain relatively large numbers of postmaterialists and those which are dark green: Finland, the Netherlands, Canada, Sweden, West Germany and the United States all rank relatively high on Inglehart’s postmaterialism index. By contrast, Inglehart finds relatively little shift toward postmaterialist values in Japan, Italy, Spain and, Korea.⁴⁰

Wildavsky and Douglas similarly note that “a cultural change . . . has taken place in our own generation . . . In the amazingly short space of fifteen to twenty years, confidence about the physical world has turned into doubt . . . Once the source of safety, science and technology has become the source of risk.”⁴¹ And like Weber, Wildavsky and Douglas want to understand among which individuals a major value inversion has occurred: Wildavsky and Douglas inquire why some Americans became hostile toward science and technology in the 1970s while Weber seeks to explain why some 16th century European Christians began to view the accumulation of wealth as a sign of God’s blessing. Wildavsky and Douglas’ explanation rests on the correlation between strong environmental beliefs and egalitarian values in the late 20th century; while Weber’s relies on a considerable overlap between capitalists and Protestants in the centuries following the Reformation.

However, the role played by religion in these two cultural shifts differs significantly. According to Weber, the individuals who first exemplified the spirit of capitalism – for whom the disciplined accumulation of wealth represented not a distraction from their religious obligations but a way to express them – held deep religious convictions. The same is not true of contemporary environmentalists. For example, in the United States environmental activists are less attracted to Judeo-Christian religions or to organized religion in general than the American public as a whole.⁴²

There have been a number of attempts to ground contemporary environmental ethics in western religions, motivated in part by an effort to respond to a widely cited article blaming the Judeo-Christian tradition for the world's ecological problems.⁴³ Thus there is a literature on the Jewish roots of environmentalism,⁴⁴ the Christian basis for environmentalism,⁴⁵ as well as at least one study of Protestant theology and environmentalism.⁴⁶ But whatever the theological soundness of these analyses, there is little political significance to the connections they draw between various religious beliefs or doctrines and contemporary environmentalism. Explicitly religious beliefs have *not* made an important contribution to the growth of contemporary public concern about the environment. In fact, survey data reveals a negative relationship between evangelical or fundamentalist Protestantism and concern about the environment in the United States. American "Judeo-Christians are generally more committed to the mastery-over nature orientation than non-Judeo-Christians."⁴⁷ According to another study, "the empirical basis for any claim that religious people are disproportionately active in the ecological movement in Western Europe is extremely flimsy."⁴⁸ Likewise within Israel, a modern industrial democracy which contains a

large number of highly religious individuals, religious Jews have been less interested in environmental issues than secular ones.⁴⁹

Accordingly, contemporary dark green environmentalism should be understood, in part, as secularized version of Protestantism. Without necessarily making or acknowledging any explicit connection to religious beliefs or practices, it draws on the rhetoric and imagery of Protestantism. In some respects, it is analogous to the secularization of the Protestant Ethic that Weber found in the writings of Benjamin Franklin.⁵⁰ Although Franklin was a “colorless deist”,⁵¹ his widely circulated and highly influential writings express the spirit of capitalism, in Weber’s words, “in almost classical purity.”⁵² And elsewhere Weber acknowledges that “the people filled with the spirit of capitalism today tend to be indifferent, if not hostile, to the Church” – which is also true of most environmentalists.⁵³

The Protestant Roots of Dark Green Environmentalism

How might Protestantism have facilitated dark green environmentalism?

To begin with, there is an actual historical link between the dissident tradition of northern European Protestantism and environmentalism in at least one Protestant country. In an essay entitled “John Muir and the Fruits of American Environmentalism,” Donald Worster writes that “Protestantism has in fact provided an important spawning ground for environmental reform movements.”⁵⁴ A number of prominent American environmentalists including John Wesley Powell, who helped form the federal conservation bureaucracy, Stephen Mather who became the first director of the National Park Service, Justice William Douglas and, most importantly John Muir, one of the founders of American environmentalism, all grew up in

religious Protestant families. (Mather was, in fact, a direct descendent of the prominent Puritan preacher Cotton Mather).

Worster argues that Muir's views toward nature were strongly influenced by his religious upbringing – his father was an itinerant preacher – and notes that while he claimed to have rebelled against his family background, he, in effect, became a kind of “frontier evangelist” himself, substituting the worship of nature for that of God.⁵⁵

Muir often referred to primitive forests as “temples” and to the sound made by trees as “psalm singing.” He argued that the wilderness should be preserved because it represented the “terrestrial manifestation of God” or “a window opening into heaven.”⁵⁶ Thus while American Protestants are not now any “greener” than are Catholics or Jews, historically individuals with Protestant backgrounds did play a critical role in shaping America's mode of environmentalism. “The moral urgency that animates the (American) environmental movement is . . . a direct legacy of Calvinism . . . the activist wing of environmentalism traces its roots through the Puritans.”⁵⁷

There are also a number of suggestive affinities between Protestantism and aspects of a dark green environmental ethic. First, both dark green environmentalism and Protestantism can be said to share a relatively pessimistic view of the world, one in which man is wicked and has committed multiple sins. For Protestants, the sins are against God, for environmentalists they are against nature. For the former, the “wages” of this sin are eternal damnation; for the latter it is the impending destruction of the eco-sphere. Both share an essentially apocalyptic vision. Thus if we continue in our present behaviors and values we are doomed. It is only by radically changing our ways – which include both our behaviors and our values – that we can possibly be “saved.”

The notion of Calvin and other Protestant reformers that we live in a depraved world filled with sinners bent on their own destruction is echoed in much contemporary “dark green” environmental rhetoric.

A second linkage lies in the notion of ascetic discipline. There is within Protestantism, a religion which emerged as a reaction to the sensuous gratification-seeking behavior of the Medieval Church, a deep suspicion of self-indulgence and excessive consumption and a strong bias in favor of self-discipline. This sensibility proved conducive to capitalist accumulation, but it can equally be made to serve an environmental ethic. It finds one contemporary expression in recycling – an essentially ascetic activity which requires continual vigilance and considerable self-discipline. For many citizens recycling represents a quasi-religious ritual, one which expresses one’s virtue and “comforts the soul.”⁵⁸ Franklin’s well-known homily, “a penny saved is a penny earned,” can readily be updated as “a piece of paper saved, a tree earned.” “Waste not, want not,” becomes “reduce, reuse, recycle.” In her analysis of the roots of environmentalism in the United States, Germany and Great Britain, Anna Bramwell observes that, “the claim that preserving finite resources is a moral duty, the ecologists’ attack on laying up earthy riches, may indeed be a residue of the Puritan ethics that once dominated much of this heartland. And whatever the degree of internationalization of environmental issues, it is these countries that have been foremost in seeing problems, proposing solutions, reaching accords . . .”⁵⁹

Third, Protestantism is a morally rigorous religion, one which places a high value on consistency: thus if something is morally wrong, one should not do it. Its pervasive sense of moralism links it to dark green environmentalism, which also approaches both politics and personal behavior from a moralistic perspective – one in

which all behaviors and beliefs have moral implications. Modern dark green environmental rhetoric is filled with moral judgments; hence the passion and sense of urgency which is more likely to characterize environmental discourse in dark green countries. By contrast, in non-Protestant cultures citizens talk about the environment less, and in less moralistic terms.

This in turn is closely related to a fourth commonality of Protestantism and dark green environmentalism, namely the notion of individual moral responsibility. For both Protestantism and dark green environmentalism, the ordinary person bears some responsibility for the fate of the world. The Protestant concept of stewardship finds its contemporary expression in an environmental politics which makes each person responsible for both nature and fate of the earth. Hence the relatively high salience of environmental issues in dark green countries and the high level of public interest in both nature protection and the global dimensions of environmental protection.

Fifth, on some dimensions Protestantism is a relatively egalitarian religion, one based on the relationship between God and each individual. This theological egalitarianism in part explains the strong historical links between Protestantism and democracy.⁶⁰ But the core democratic concept of the rights of man can be readily expanded to encompass the concept of the rights of nature: if people are equal in God's eyes, then so possibly are natural objects such as whales, tigers, trees and rivers. The notion that nature – physical objects as well as animals – has rights is by no means a universal one; it is most influential in Protestant, dark green countries. Moreover, an egalitarian ideology which includes nature as well as people provides a linkage between Protestantism and the Cultural Theory of Douglas and Wildavsky.

Finally, Protestantism, precisely because it tends to be relatively devoid of rituals and symbols, may be especially conducive to the notion that nature can, or should have spiritual significance. Thus Gore's Earth in the Balance speaks of a "spiritual crisis." The notion that nature can be a source of spiritual rebirth that, in the words of Jonathan Edwards, "God's excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love . . . appear in everything, in the sun, moon, and stars; in the clouds and blue sky; in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water, and all nature,"⁶¹ informs Protestant theology as much as darker green environmentalism. According to Perry Miller, the Puritans were "obsessed" with "the theology of nature," regarding the plants and animals of the natural world as "ministers and apostles of God, the vehicles and the way by which we are carried to God."⁶² More generally, it is Protestantism which gave the Christian religion a strong material component, giving empirical reality a kind of theological status which it lacked in Catholicism. Compared to both Catholicism and Judaism, Protestantism is relatively devoid of rituals or physical objects which have religious meaning: nature helps fill this void.

While some of these elements can also be found in both Catholicism and Judaism, it is noteworthy that three historically Protestant countries, namely the United States, Germany and England, share a strong cultural tradition of viewing "nature" as a source of spiritual value as well as a counterpart to the ills of industrial capitalism.⁶³ This tradition long predates the environmental upsurge of the 1970s. In the United States it was expressed in Transcendentalism, a philosophy which regarded nature as the best link between God and humanity. As Emerson observed: "In the wilderness, I find something more dear and connate than in the streets or villages . . . in the woods

we return to reason and faith.”⁶⁴ Thoreau’s extremely influential Walden espouses a similar viewpoint.

The idealization of nature was an important component of the English backlash against the industrial revolution, expressed first in the Romantic poets and later in the writings of John Stuart Mill and John Ruskin.⁶⁵ “By the end of the century undercurrents of romantic sentiment also ran through German society . . . a period of general cultural criticism in Germany that idealized nature.”⁶⁶ This theme was later echoed in the ideology and practices of National Socialism, suggesting the strong roots of dark green politics in German culture and society. Thus the Third Reich placed a high priority on both forest protection and animal rights: it established Europe’s first nature reserves and enacted the world’s first anti-vivisection law.⁶⁷ The Nazi’s also banned fox hunting on horseback. Significantly, active and effective nature conservation and bird protection movements existed in all three countries by the early 20th century, though not in southern Europe.⁶⁸ According to Mark Stoll, “It was in Protestant-dominated countries – England, Germany, the United States, - that . . . an ardent love of nature flourished . . . alongside the rising factory system. . . . Germans invented the science of ecology in 1866. . . . Britain’s first extended humanitarian ideals to the natural world with the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. And Americans gave the world its first national parks and its most vigorous environmental movement.”⁶⁹

The influence of this Romantic tradition may help account for the contemporary presence of dark green environmentalism in each of these countries. As James McClintock writes, “Ecology encourages a biocentric perspective that emphasizes kinship, even equality, between humans and other forms of life. Its

compatibility with a Romantic outlook is striking.”⁷⁰ Thus the idealization of the wilderness in the United States, the countryside in Great Britain and the forests in Germany.⁷¹ By contrast, the 19th century critique of modernity in the light green countries of France, Italy and Japan emphasized the virtues of rural life rather than nature.

There is of course a rich irony in the assertion that Protestantism has facilitated a dark green mode of environmentalism. The Protestant ethic has been associated with the subjugation of nature. By contrast, Asian religions, in particular Shintoism, Buddhism and Hinduism, have frequently been associated with the idea that people are not separate from or superior to nature. They claim that all forms of life – natural as well as human – are or should be revered equally. Yet people in rich countries whose heritage includes the former ethic have proven considerably “greener” than those whose cultures have been shaped by the latter. One possible explanation may be the emphasis in Protestantism on the very concept of mastery: if one believes that control or mastery of the world is possible, one can just as readily choose to save or restore nature as dominate or exploit it. In any event, it is people who are ultimately responsible for what happens to nature. As Giddens notes: “Mastery of nature . . . can quite often mean caring for nature as much as treating it in a purely instrumental or indifferent fashion.”⁷²

By contrast, eastern religious traditions, for all the high value they appear to place on nature, may promote too high a degree of passivity to lead to effective environmental activism and regulatory controls. After all, if you are part of nature, why make any special effort to preserve it? The plausibility of this explanation is suggested by the disproportionate role of Protestant Europe in the scientific revolution

of the 17th century. While scientific knowledge can and was used to control nature, more recently the scientific discipline of ecology has also provided the scientific basis for protecting it. In this sense, the “Protestant Ethic” appears to have proven far more resilient and influential, as well as flexible, than one suspects Weber or Calvin ever imagined.

Conclusion

The case for a casual linkage between Protestantism and dark green environmentalism is strongest in the United States, where one can trace actual historical links between individuals with Protestant backgrounds and the development of American environmentalism. In the cases of the United States, England and Germany, 19th century romanticism provides an historical link between Protestantism and contemporary dark green environmentalism. In other rich countries, the connection may be through post-materialism, which is more prevalent in historically Protestant countries and of which dark green environmentalism may be regarded as one expression. In other countries, the influence of Protestantism may be through capitalism itself: the world’s wealthiest and oldest industrial countries – and thus the nations with the strongest bourgeois cultures – are disproportionately Protestant.

There is no reason to assume that the connection between Protestantism and dark green environmentalism is equally strong in all Protestant/dark green countries or that it operates through identical mechanisms. The same is true of the role of religion in shaping environmental politics and policies in light green countries: it may be more important in some countries than in others. In the one country which is an exception to the strong relationship between Protestantism and dark green environmentalism, namely Austria, religion is clearly less important than culture: Austria may be dark

green as a function of its Germanic heritage. In this context, it is worth noting that two-thirds of the population of dark green Switzerland – a pluralist nation in which Catholics slightly outnumber Protestants – are Germans.

Correlation is not of course causality and the claim that a nation's religion has shaped its pattern of environmentalism must remain speculative. Nevertheless, contemporary environmentalism does appear to have an important cultural dimension and understanding the religious roots of a nation's culture can contribute to our understanding as to how its citizens and policy-makers have responded to the contemporary emergence of environmentalism.

-
- ¹ According to Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger, “Economic Growth and the Environment,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* May 1995, p. 353, 369, national environmental quality begins to steadily improve once per capita income exceeds \$8,000.
- ² For an overview, see *Environmental Performance in OECD Countries*, Paris: OECD, 1996.
- ³ Robert Worster, “Public and Elite Attitudes To Environmental Issues,” *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, Vol.5 no. 4, p. 330, Robert Rohrschneider, “Citizens’ Attitudes Toward Environmental Issues,” *Comparative Political Studies*, October, 1998, pp. 347 – 367 and Russell Dalton *The Green Rainbow*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994, chapter three.
- ⁴ These labels are inspired by but do not correspond to the distinction made by green political theorists between environmentalism and ecology or between shallow and deep ecology. Neither light or dark green environmental politics nor the policies that flow from them constitute a radical challenge to industrial capitalism or the logic of industrial growth. Rather both should be understood as variations of relatively mainstream environmental politics, though environmental activists in “dark green” countries are more likely to articulate a more critical mode of environmental discourse than those in “light green” ones. See Anthony Giddens, *Beyond Left and Right: The Future of Radical Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994. Chapter 8 for a discussion of green ideology. See also *The Politics of Nature: Explorations in Green Political Theory* Andrew Dobson and Paul Lucardie, eds. London: Routledge,

-
- 1993 and *The Economy of the Earth* Mark Sagoff, New York; Cambridge University Press. And Andrew Dobson, *Green Political Thought* London: Urwin Hyman, 1990.
- 5 Anthony Downes, “The Issue Attention Cycle and the Political Economy of Improving Our Environment,” in The Political Economy of Environmental Control Joe Bain and Warren Ilchman, eds. Berkeley: Institute of Business and Economic Research, 1992.
- 6 The distinction between anthropocentric and bio-centric or eco-centric ethics, or between shallow and deep ecology is a staple of the writings of radical environmentalists. See for example, Deep Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the Philosophy and Practice of the New Environmentalism, George Sessions, ed. Boston: Shambhala, 1995; Arne Naess, “Identification as a Source of Deep Ecological Attitudes,” in Deep Ecology, M. Tobias, ed, 1984, and Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology, New York: Routledge, 1992.
- 7 See The Animal Rights/Environmental Ethics Debate, Eugene Hargrove, ed. Albany: State University Press of New York, 1992.
- 8 These phrases are from Ronald Inglehart, “Public Support for Environmental Protection: Objective Problems and Subjective Values in 43 Societies,” P.S. March 1995, p. 59, 61.
- 9 Jeffrey Broadbent, Environmental Politics in Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 288.
- 10 See, Everett Carll Ladd and Karyln Bowman, *Attitudes Toward the Environment: Twenty-Five Years After Earth Day* Washington DC: AEI Press, 1995.
- 11 Peter Dauvergne, Shadows in the Forest: Japan and the Politics of Timber in Southeast Asia, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997, p. 2.

-
- 12 “Charging Japan With Crimes Against the Earth,” Business Week October 9, 1989.
- 13 “The World’s Eco-Outlaw,’ Newsweek.
- 14 See David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental Regulation in a Global Economy, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995, chapter 4.
- 15 See *ibid*, especially chapters 4 and 6.
- 16 Broadbent, Environmental Politics, p. 289.
- 17 For differences in environmental politics and policies among the EU’s Member States, see for example Duncan Liefferink and Michael Skou Anderson, “Strategies of the ‘green’ member states in EU environmental policy-making,” Journal of European Public Policy Vol. 5, no. 2, 1998, pp. 254-270, and Alberta Sbragia, “Environmental Policy: The ‘Push-Pull’ of Policy-Making,” in Policy-Making in the European Union Helen and William Wallace, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 236 – 255.
- 18 Liefferink and Anderson, *op cit*, 354-5.
- 19 For a discussion of the former, see David Vogel, National Styles of Regulation Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- 20 Albert Weale, “Environmental rules and rule-making in the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy 1996.
- 21 For Australia, see Elim Papadakis, Politics and the Environment: The Australian Experience St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, 1993, Australian Environmental Policy edited by KJ Walker, Kensington, New South Wales University Press, 1992 and Drew Hutton and Libby Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. For an overview of Israel, see David

Vogel, "Israeli Environmental Policy in Comparative Perspective," Israel Affairs Winter 1998, pp. 245-263.

²² See Avner De-Shalit and Moti Talias, "Green or Blue and White? Environmental Controversies in Israel," Environmental Politics, Summer, 1994, pp. 273-294.

²³ Charles Corbett and David Kirsch, "The Linkage Between ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 Standards: An International Study," Anderson School at UCLA, p. 26.

²⁴ Al Gore, Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit, New York: Penguin, 1992.

²⁵ Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System New York: Academic Press, 1974.

²⁶ The data in this paragraph is from Environmental Performance, p. 62-3.

²⁷ Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.

²⁸ Douglas and Wildavsky, p. 194.

²⁹ Quoted in Jeffrey Friedman, "Accounting for Political Preferences: Cultural Theory Vs. Cultural History," Critical Review Spring 1991, p. 326. See also Aaron Wildavsky, "Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation, American Political Science Review March, 1987, pp. 3 – 21. Whereas Wildavsky and Douglas primarily attempt to account for differences in attitudes toward technology and risk among citizens within a given country – namely the United States – the focus of this article is on differences in the pattern of environmental concerns across countries. And while Wildavsky and Douglas are primarily interested in explaining the propensity of a large category of Americans to exaggerate the risks to their health posed by industrial products and technologies, this

article's focus is both cross-national in scope and primarily interested in dimensions of environmentalism other than health and safety.

30 These classificatory patterns correspond roughly to Inglehart's. see Ronald Inglehart and Marita Carballo, "Does Latin America Exist? (And is There is Confucian Culture?): A Global Analysis of Cross-Cultural Differences," PS: Political Science, March 1997, p. 41.

31 Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997, p. 98.

32 Ibid, , p. 100.

33 See, for example, Samuel P. Huntington, American Politics and the Promise of Disharmony, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.

34 Worster, p. 200.

35 Inglehart and Carballo, p. 43.

36 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938, p. 35. Note however that this article's definition of Protestantism is broader than Weber's who was primarily interested in the role of Calvinism in facilitating the spirit of capitalism.

37 Ronald Inglehart, "Public Support for Environmental Protection" p. 61.

38 Inglehart, Modernization, p. 241.

39 Ibid, p. 242.

40 Ibid, p. 157.

41 Douglas and Wildavsky, p. 10.

-
- ⁴² Ronald Shaiko, "Religion, Politics, and Environmental Concern: A Powerful Mix of Passions," Social Science Quarterly, vol. 68, (1987), p. 250.
- ⁴³ Lynn White, Jr. "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis," Science, March 10, 1976, pp. 1203-07. For an overview of these efforts, see "Godliness and Greenness," Economist December 21, 1996, p. 108-109 and Robert Nelson, "Unoriginal Sin," Policy Review Summer, 1990, pp. 52 – 59.
- ⁴⁴ See, for example, Judaism and Ecology, Aubrey Rose, ed. London: Cassell Publishers, 1992; Eric Freudenstein, "Ecology and the Jewish Tradition," Judaism: A Quarterly Journal of Jewish Life and Thought Fall, 1970; Eilson Schwartz, "Judaism and Nature: Theological and Moral Issues to Consider While Renegotiating a Jewish Relationship to the Natural World," Judaism Fall, 1995, pp. 437- 445; Rabbi Bradley and Shavit Arison, "Each After Their Own Kind: A Jewish Celebration of Biodiversity," Tikkun Vol. 12, No. 5, pp. 43-45; David Ehrenfeld and Philip Bentley, "Judaism and the Practice of Stewardship," Judaism Vol. 34, (1985), pp. 301- 311.
- ⁴⁵ Nash, "The Greening of Religion."
- ⁴⁶ Robert Booth Fowler, The Greening of Protestant Thought, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995.
- ⁴⁷ The quotation is from Carl Hand and Kent Van Liere, "Religion, Mastery-Over-Nature, and Environmental Concern," Social Forces, December, 1984, p.555. Shaiko reports similar results. See, for example, James Guth, Lyman Kellstedt, Corwin Smidt and John Green, "Theological Perspectives and Environmentalism Among Religious Activists," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 32, no. 4 (1993), and Andrew Greeley, "Religion and Attitudes toward the Environment," Journal for the

Scientific Study of Religion Vol. 32, no. 1 (1993) pp. 19-28 and James Guth, John Green, Lyman Kellstedt and Corwin Smidt, "Faith and the Environment: Religious Beliefs and Attitudes on Environmental Policy," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 39, No. 2, May 1995, pp. 364-82.

48 Michael P.Hornsby-Smith and Michael Procter, "Catholic Identity, Religious Context and Environmental Values in Western Europe: Evidence from the European Values Surveys," Social Compass Vol. 42, no. 1, 1995, p 33.

49 See David Vogel, "Israeli Environmental Policy in Comparative Perspective".

50 For a discussion of Franklin's ideas and their enormous influence on American values, see Peter Baida, Poor Richard's Legacy, New York: William Morrow, 1990, chapter one.

51 Weber, p. 53.

52 Quoted in Baida, p. 23.

53 Weber, p. 70.

54 Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 189.

55 Ibid, p. 194.

56 Quoted in Bruce Nelson, "Bruce Babbitt, Pipeline to the Almighty," The Weekly Standard, June 24, 1996, p. 18.

57 Mark Stoll, Protestantism, Capitalism, and Nature in America Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1997 p. 49.

58 Jeff Bailey, "Curbside Recycling Comforts the Soul, But Benefits are Scant," Wall Street Journal January 19, 1995, p. 11.

-
- 59 Anna Bramwell, The Fading of the Greens, New York: Yale University Press, 1994, p. 32-33.
- 60 Alex Hadenius, Democracy and Development Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 121.
- 61 Worster, p. 199.
- 62 Quoted in Carroll, p. 18.
- 63 This is a central theme of Bramwell. See also Anna Bramwell, Ecology in the 20th Century, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989. See also Robert Rosenblum, Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition, New York: Harper and Row.
- 64 Quoted in Roderick Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind revised edition, New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 86.
- 65 See Martin Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850 - 1980 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- 66 Dalton, p. 27.
- 67 There is a fascinating literature on Nazi environmental policy and ideology. See for example, Raymond Dominick III, The Environmental Movement in Germany: Prophets and Pioneers, 1871-1971, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1972, chapter 3: The Volkisch Temptation; Bramwell, Ecology, pp 195-208; Simon Schama, Landscape and Memory, New York: Vintage Books, 1995, pp. 118-120; Robert Pois, National Socialism and the Religion of Nature, London: Croon Helm, 1986 and Luc Ferry, The New Ecological Order Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 91 – 107.
- 68 See Dalton, chapter two: “The Evolution of Environmentalism”.

69 Stoll, p.30.

70 Quoted in James Pinkerton, “Enviromanticism”, Foreign Affairs May/June 1997. p. 5.

71 See Shama, Weiner, Vogel, National Styles of Regulation.

72 Giddens, op cit, p. 209.