Motivating Innovation
Summary
Question. How should incentives be structured when the principal needs the agent to innovate, rather than simply to work hard?
Approach. Theory: a principal–agent model in which the agent chooses between exploiting a known approach and exploring an untested one whose payoff is learned over time.
Finding. The optimal scheme exhibits substantial tolerance, or even reward, for early failure and reward for long-term success. Commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security and timely feedback on performance are essential ingredients. In managerial compensation, the scheme can be implemented with stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes and managerial entrenchment.
Why it matters. Standard pay-for-performance is designed to elicit effort. Applied to innovation it punishes the early failures that exploration requires, so contracts that motivate innovation must be built differently.
Abstract
Motivating innovation is an important concern in many incentive problems. For example, shareholders of large corporations often need to motivate managers to pursue more innovative business strategies. This paper shows that the optimal incentive scheme that motivates innovation exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for early failure and reward for long-term success. Moreover, commitment to a long-term compensation plan, job security, and timely feedback on performance are also essential ingredients to motivate innovation. In the context of managerial compensation, the optimal incentive scheme that motivates innovation can be implemented via a combination of stock options with long vesting periods, option repricing, golden parachutes, and managerial entrenchment.
How to cite
Manso, Gustavo (2011). Motivating Innovation. Journal of Finance 66, 1823–1860.
@article{manso2011motivating,
author = {Manso, Gustavo},
title = {Motivating Innovation},
journal = {Journal of Finance},
volume = {66},
number = {5},
pages = {1823–1860},
year = {2011},
doi = {10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01688.x}
}