Game Theory
An Introduction
Published by Princeton University Press, this comprehensive textbook introduces readers
to the principal ideas and applications of
game theory, in a style that combines rigor with accessibility. Steven Tadelis begins with
a concise description of rational decision making, and goes on to discuss strategic and
extensive form games with complete information, Bayesian games, and extensive form games
with imperfect information. He covers a host of topics, including multistage and repeated
games, bargaining theory, auctions, rent-seeking games, mechanism design, signaling games,
reputation building, and information transmission games. Unlike other books on game theory,
this one begins with the idea of rationality and explores its implications for multiperson
decision problems through concepts like dominated strategies and rationalizability. Only
then does it present the subject of Nash equilibrium and its derivatives.
The textbook is aimed at advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate
students. Throughout, concepts and methods are explained using real-world examples backed
by precise analytic material. The book features many important applications to economics
and political science, as well as numerous exercises that focus on how to formalize
informal situations and then analyze them.
Introduces the core ideas and applications of game theory
Covers static and dynamic games, with complete and incomplete information
Features a variety of examples, applications, and exercises
Topics include repeated games, bargaining, auctions, signaling, reputation, and information transmission
Ideal for advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students
Complete solutions available to teachers and selected solutions available to students
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