Benjamin E. Hermalin
Thomas and Alison Schneider Distinguished Professor of Finance
and Professor, Department of Economics
Updated November 5, 2012
Short Bio • Contact Information • Publications • Teaching Notes
Working Papers and Teaching Notes
In reverse chronological order.
At the Helm, Kirk or Spock? Why Even Wholly Rational Actors May Favor and Respond to Charismatic Leaders
When a leader makes a purely emotional appeal, rational followers realize she is hiding bad news. Despite such pessimism and even though not directly influenced by emotional appeals, rational followers' efforts are nonetheless greater when an emotional appeal is made by a more rather than less charismatic leader. Further, they tend to prefer more charismatic leaders. Although organizations can do better with more charismatic leaders, charisma is a two-edged sword: more charismatic leaders will tend to substitute charm for real action, to the organization's detriment. This helps explain the literature's "mixed report card" on charisma.
Open PDF of paper
Response to Tyler Cowen's comments
Understanding Firm Value and Corporate Governance
An impressive volume of careful empirical studies finds evidence that the strength of firms' corporate governance tends to be positively correlated with their financial performance; that is, firms that score higher on some measure of governance tend to outperform those which score worse. These findings are a puzzle insofar as we expect those who decide how a firm is organized, including its corporate governance, to do so in a manner that maximizes firm value subject to the relevant constraints. If the governance we observe is constrained optimal, then why, in equilibrium, should any correlation---positive or negative---exist between it and firm performance? This paper offers an answer. In doing so, the paper also makes predictions about the correlation between firm size and strength of governance, provides new explanations for the correlation between firm size and executive compensation, and provides insights into why empirical estimates of managerial incentives are often deemed too low.
Open PDF of paper
Mathematica programs: Simulation in text
; Simulation in appendix
Network Interconnection with Two-Sided User Benefits
with Michael L. Katz, July 2001
Previous work on network interconnection has tended to overlook that both the sender and receiver of an electronic message take actions, bear costs,and derive benefits from the message exchange. In a simple model with two-sided benefits and fixed network architectures, we find that the socially optimal interconnection charge is independent of the direction of the message and is used to induce optimal end-user prices for sending and receiving messages that account for demand conditions. These optimal retail prices depend solely on the sum of the marginal costs of exchanging a message across the two networks, not the specific marginal costs of the individual networks. Optimal interconnection pricing with endogenous network investment is also explored.
Open PDF of paper
- "Hidden-Information Agency" (An introduction to mechanism design written with Bernard Caillaud.)
- "Hidden Action and Incentives" (An introduction to agency written with Bernard Caillaud.)
- "Lecture Notes for Economics" (Notes on pricing, mechanism design, and
agency at the Ph.D. level.) Revised 1/9/09
- "Second-degree Price Discrimination with a Continuum of Types"